JUDGMENT
Anand Prasad Sinha, J.
1. This application is directed against the order dated 4.3.1982 passed by Shri Chandranand Jha, Executive Magistrate, Dinapur, in a proceeding under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) by which the petitioners have been asked to execute Bond for Rs. 5000/- each with two sureties of the like amount each for a period of one year for maintaining peace.
2. It appears that at the instance of the opposite party No. 2, the proceeding had been initiated on 11.2.1981 and consequent to the notice the petitioners had appeared on 25.2.1981 and had filed their show cause.
3. Thereafter the case was adjourned to several dates and on 2.4.1981 the parties were directed to produce witnesses and the case was adjourned to 9.4.1981. On 9.4.1981 simply a list of witnesses had been filed and again the case was adjourned to 16.4.1981.
4. Thereafter, the case was adjourned again to several dates both on account of the party and also as the Presiding Officer was not available and he was busy otherwise. The next important relevant date will be 7.1.1982. The learned Magistrate on that date had simply mentioned that the proceeding is being extended for six months.
5. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted, that, as a matter of fact, the entire proceeding, after the expiry of six months with effect from 25.2.1981, i.e. on completion of the proceeding on 24.8.1981, was not in accordance with law as provided under Section 116(6) of the Code, which runs as follows:
The inquiry under this section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, and if such inquiry is not so completed the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs:
Provided that where any person has been kept in detention pending such inquiry, the proceeding against that person, unless terminated earlier, shall stand terminated on the expiry of a period of six months of such detention.
6. Therefore, if at all there was any necessity of extending the period of proceeding beyond the period of six months and it was necessary to do the same as provided under Section 116(6) of the Code, the proceeding ought to have been extended on or before the expiry of six months i.e. 24.8.1981 in this case. The mandate of law is so mandatory that the extension of the life of the proceeding is not dependant upon the condition that only when any application is filed by any party, the life will be extended, but in absence of any extension of the period in accordance with law, the proceeding will come to an end automatically.
7. In such a situation, in the facts of the case in hand, I am afraid, the proceeding was not in accordance with law and there could not be any valid and legal order under Section 117 of the Code.
8. The another important fact is that for extension of the period, special reasons have to be recorded in writing by the learned Magistrate. In the instant case, as stated above, even on 7.1.1982, much after the expiry of six months, the proceeding has been extended without giving any special reasons.
9. The special reasons, as contemplated under Section 116(6) of the Code is something distinguishable from the normal or usual reasons which generally exist in such proceeding. The normal or usual reasons may be negligence of the parties in bringing the witnesses and also failure on the part of the learned Magistrate to take up the case promptly on the date fixed on the plea that the learned Magistrate bad been either on leave or deputed to do other works.
10. In my opinion, this cannot be said to be special reasons for extension of the period. Special reason can be equated with something extra ordinary circumstance, quite distinguishable from the fact that there has been non-cooperation by the parties or there has been lack of promptness on the part of the learned Magistrate in disposal of the case.
11. To illustrate, if a proceeding is withheld on account of some stay order passed by the appellate courts or in spite of best efforts, some of the member of the parties could not be apprehended and if on that account the proceeding could not be finished within a period of six months and if thereafter the proceeding is extended by giving reasons, it will be termed as special reason for the extension of the period of the proceeding.
12. However, it is never the spirit of the law that a proceeding can be extended beyond the period of six months several times, which may be termed unreasonable in look, on the facts and circumstances existing in the case, and that does not appear to be permissible in law because it will amount to circumventing the dominant provision laid down under Section 118 of the Code that a proceeding under Section 137 of the Code shall be completed within k period of six months. In other words, the occasion of special reason for extension should come rarely and purely on special occasions.
13. In the instant case, from the order sheet it will appear that absolutely there was no occasion for any special reason to extend the period at all and the proceeding has been conducted in a most leisurely manner, without any efforts of disposing of the proceeding within a period of six months and that being so, there was completely lack of the condition for lawful extension of the proceeding.
14. Under the circumstances, the entire proceeding including the impugned order vitiates and they are accordingly quashed. The application is thus allowed.