JUDGMENT
Ahmad, J.
1. This is an application from Jail under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by one Samalia Bhuian, who has been detained in custody under detention order, no. 300 C. D. dated the 8th April, 1950 passed against him under Preventive Detention Act, 1950, From his application it appears that even previously he had filed an application, which it is said in the application, was reported to him to have been dismissed by this Court. Against that order, he has appealed before the Supreme Court of India, which is most likely still pending for disposal. The copy of the grounds of detention served on the petitioner in pursuance of Section 7 of the Act is dated the 26th April, 1950.
It discloses that the petitioner is an important member of the Communist Party of India. In the body of the grounds it is stated that in pursuance of an international plan of action, the Communist Party of India has adopted a highly secret programme of overthrowing through violence the Government of India as constituted by law. With this end in view, the organisation and the prominent functionaries of the party like Shri B. T. Ran-diva, Shri Chandra Sekhar Singh, Shri Samar Ray, Shri Prabir Mullick, Shri Chinmony Mukharji and others have been very active in putting the plan into operation. The underlying idea is to destroy the present social order
by simultaneously waging political and economic struggle so that a communist state as envisaged by the party could supplant the existing Government. On this line, it is stated, secret directions have also been issued to different communist cells, functioning in Bihar to build up illegally, as quickly as possible, large stock of fire arms and ammunition, to smuggle explosives on a large scale, especially from the industrial areas to collect iron bars and other implements for breaking jails and for capturing different service associations so that the services could be exploited at a critical moment to turn against Government and thereby to bring about a complete collapse of the administration. Kisan zamindar conflict has been intensified and efforts have been made to incite kisans to take forcible possession of zamindars’ lands even when there is no semblance of any legal right and to use violence if necessary against the zamindars and the police and magistracy in the process of enforcing law and order. Likewise on the industrial front the party has been inciting workers to obtain what the party considers to be the right of the labourers even by resorting to violence, if need be. To accentuate discontentment among the masses, efforts have been made to bring about railway strike so that the supply of food, which is already in a precarious position, may be brought to a stand-still. In fact, a number of leaflets under different headings were issued by and on behalf of the members of the party and the party itself to all sections to bring about that railway strike. Meetings were also held and secret directions on the line and policy of the party were given. Fortunately due to prompt action on the part of Government the attempt could not succeed. The party is, however, on the look out to divert its energy already mobilised in some different direction. Recently, it came to the notice of Government that violent attacks had been made on the police escorts, sometimes successfully, to rescue communists from custody and also to commit other acts of violence. Strict actions are taken against those who hesitate or are found reluctant to come in line with the policy of the party.
2. In particular against the petitioner the allegation is that he continues to be a member of the Communist Party of India and therefrom an inference is suggested to be drawn that he is still an active communist and is actively participating in the programme indicated above, otherwise, he would have been by this time chucked out from the party. This inference, it is said, finds strong corroboration from the following facts: (1) He is a close associate of Samar Ray and Prabir Mullick. (2) He is a close associate of communist Chinmoy Mukherji. Documents recovered from the person of communist Chinmoy Mukherji indicated that the party members were to raise militants and to establish links with the R. C. P. I. (3). The name of the petitioner was found mentioned in the list of militants recovered from the possession of Chinmoy Mukherji. That list indicated that a meeting of such militants was also held on 15-6-49, when the Party members were advised to advance courageously and fearlessly. (4). The Petitioner contacted Samar Ray and another underground communist of Bengal at Howrah on the night of 30-10-49 when he received instructions from
the aforesaid line. (5). The petitioner contacted absconder communist Anant Sharma on the night of 14-1-50 and received instructions to observe, ‘Black Day’ on the 26th January 1950.
3. On the basis of the facts stated in relation to the activities of the communist party, in general, and in pursuance of the evidence found of the close association of this petitioner, in particular, with the said policy and programme of the party, Government has come to the conclusion that if he is allowed to remain at large he will indulge in activities to the prejudice of public safety and the maintenance of public order and for prevention of such activities his detention was considered necessary.
4. The contention of the applicant in his petition is that the grounds are vague and as such he has been deprived of making a proper representation. Also it is contended that the grounds give no particulars or at least particulars of a kind which connect him with any specific act of violence said to have been incorporated in the international plan of action of the Communist Party with a view to overthrow through violence the Government of India as constituted by law, or even any other act which is not consistent with the fundamental rights provided in Part III of the Constitution, or is not permissible under law. In the absence of such particulars, therefore, it has been stressed that there was no ground for the detaining authority to arrive at the satisfaction to which, it is said, it did. The order, however, has not been challenged so far as it appears from his petition on the ground of mala fide. In other words it has not been contended that the grounds are so completely irrelevant as cannot satisfy any rational person about necessity for the order. What has been stressed is that the facts stated in the grounds, though there may be some rational connection between them and the order passed, are not sufficient to afford a complete chain of reasoning to arrive at the conclusion to which the detaining authority claims to have come to, nor the grounds are helpful to the detenu to know the charge framed against him.
5. The question is whether the grounds are such as would assist the detenu to know exactly what he has been charged with and to make a proper representation to which he is entitled both under the Act and under the Constitution. If they are not, there is violence of fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions, which will make the order a void order. What is a ground contemplated under the Act to be given to a detenu for the purpose of his representation has been explained in the case of ‘STATE OF BOMBAY v. ATMA RAM SHRIDHAR’, 1951 S C R 167 by Kania, C. J., in the following words :
"By their very nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete detailed recital of all the facts. The conclusions drawn from the available facts will show in which of the three categpries of prejudicial, acts the suspected activity of the particular person is considered to fall. These conclusions are the 'grounds' and they must be supplied....................Ordinarily 'the grounds" in the sense of conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenu is suspected of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him. Of course if the detenu is told about the details of facts besides the grounds he will certainly be in a better position to deal with the same. It is significant that the clause does not say that the 'ground' as well as details of facts on which they are based must be furnished." What the vagueness of a ground was also discussed in that case. It was observed : "The contention that the grounds are vague requires some clarification. What is meant by vague? Vague can be considered, as the antonym of 'definite'. If the ground which is supplied is incapable of being understood or defined with sufficient certainty it can be called vague. It is not possible to state affirmatively more on the question of what is vague. It must vary according to the circumstances of each case."
In the present case though it was desirable that better and further particulars should have been given in order that it may have been more definite and intelligible to the detenu, it cannot, how,ever be said that the grounds supplied to the detenu, in this case, as they are, are however, so vague as not to convey any idea as to the charge framed against him. The activities of a party, in general, which has not been declared illegal may not by itself be a ground for holding that any particular member is identified with any particular programme of that party. The activities of the party only afford a background for an intelligent appreciation and weighing of the acts attributed to the particular member. In the light of this background, many of the acts of the particular member, which (are ?) innocent and legal on the face of it, may be found to have a different implication behind them. Therefore, the ground that a particular act on the face of it is legal or innocent by itself is not sufficient to exonerate the individual for the purpose of preventive detention. His activities have to be weighed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances wherein he has voluntarily placed himself. The responsibility is his for placing himself in those surroundings, and he does it not without risks of being even sometimes truly misunderstood. The remedy of having been so misunderstood is in the right of explaining his acts in his representation and not a plea in court for setting aside the order. In the present case, the grounds supplied do afford sufficient facts to disclose the charge framed against the detenu. Therefore, the allegation that the ground is vague is not sustainable.
6. The next question for consideration is that before the Government can pass an order of preventive detention under the Act it must be satisfied with respect to the individual person that his activities are directed against one or other of the objects mentioned in the Act and that the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to prevent him from acting in such a manner. Kania, C. J. dealing with this point in the case referred to above observed :
“There can be no satisfaction if there are no grounds for the same. There may be a divergence of opinion as to whether certain grounds are sufficient to bring about the satisfaction required by the section. One
person may think one way, another the other way. If therefore, the grounds on which it is stated that the Central Government or the State Government was satisfied are such as a rational human being can consider connected in some manner with the object which were to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fide cannot be challenged in a court. Whether in a particular case the grounds are sufficient or not, according to the opinion of any person or body other than the Central Government or the State Government, is ruled out by the wording of the section. It is not for the court to sit in the place of the Central Government or the State Government and try to determine if it would have come to the same conclusion as the Central or the State Government. As has been generally observed, this is a matter, for the subjective decision of the Government and that cannot be substituted by an objective test in a court of law. Such detention orders are passed on information and materials which may not be strictly admissible as evidence under the Evidence Act in a court, but which the law taking into consideration, the needs and exigencies of administration, has allowed to be considered sufficient for the subjective decision of the Government.”
Further on this very point he observed :
“Although the ground may be good there may be a certain indefiniteness in its statement. Proceeding on the footing that there is some connection, i.e., the ground by itself is not so convincingly irrelevant and incapable of bringing about satisfaction in any rational person the question whether such ground can give rise to the satisfaction required for making the order is outside the scope of the inquiry of the Court.”
In the present case, as already stated by me, there is no contention that there is no rational connection between the ground given and the order passed. All that is said is that they are not sufficient. This question, according to the authority referred to above, is not open to the Court to go into. Therefore, this ground also fails.
7. In the result, therefore, the application is dismissed.
Shearer, J.
8. I agree.