JUDGMENT
D.N. Chowdhury, J.
1. Both these appeals, viz., MA(F) 1/1994 and MA(F) 3/1994, were taken up together for hearing since they involve common questions. Both the appeals arise out of two different Awards passed by the learned Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, West Tripura, Agartala.
2. The appellants in MA(F) 1/1994 were the claimants in Title Suit (WC) No. 21/92, claiming compensation on the death of Dulal Goswami, the driver of Truck No. TRL-3795. Appellant No. 1 in MA(F) 1/1994 is the wife of the deceased and the other appellants are the daughter and sons, respectively of the deceased, Dulal Goswami, who met with an accident arising out of and in the course of employment at village Ghoshpukur under Phansidewa Police Station of Darjeeling District in the State of West Bengal, on December 11/12, 1990 and succumbed to the injuries sustained by him in the accident. In default of the payment of compensation due under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the claimants/appellants initially filed a petition before the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, West Bengal, Calcutta, against the opposite parties/respondents which was subsequently transferred to the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, West Tripura, Agartala. The parties appeared before the Commissioner. The owner/O.P. No. 1 admitted that the deceased was driver of the vehicle bearing Registration No. TRL-3795 which met with an accident at village Ghoshpukur under Phansidewa Police Station of Darjeeling District on the relevant date. O.P. No. 2, the Insurance Co., submitted its written objections. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Commissioner framed issues and adjudicated upon the same accordingly. The Commissioner accepted the claimants’ case that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment of deceased, Dulal Goswami. On evaluation of the facts, the learned Commissioner reached the conclusion that the deceased was aged about thirty-three years at the time of his death and held that the deceased on the date of his death, was drawing a salary of Rs. 1500 p.m. On the basis of the aforesaid conclusions, the learned Commissioner taking note of explanation II to Section 4 of the Act, 1923 for the purposes of calculation of the compensation, confined the monthly wages of the deceased to Rs. 1000 only. On that basis, the learned Commissioner decided 201.66 as the relevant factor for working out the lumpsum equivalent of the compensation amount and accordingly awarded a compensation of Rs. 80,664 being the amount which comes out after multiplication of 40% of the monthly wages by the relevant factor (i.e. 201.66). The learned Commissioner further held that since the vehicle in question was insured with the O.P/respondent No. 2 and the Insurance Policy was also subsisting, the O.P./Insurance Co. should make payment of the aforesaid amount of award to the claimants within a period of forty five days from the date of the Award together with an interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the awarded amount from the date of filing of the application till realisation of the entire amount.
3. The appellants in MA(F) 3/1994 were the claimants in Title Suit (WC) No. 22/92, being the wife and minor son and daughters of deceased Kami Debnath, driver of vehicle (truck) bearing Registration No. TRL – 3795, who also met with an accident at Village Ghoshpukur under Phansidewa Police Station of Darjeeling District on December 11/12, 1990 and died. The case was initially filed before the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, West Bengal, Calcutta on May 16, 1992, which was later on transferred to the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, West Tripura, Agartala. It was alleged that deceased Kanu Debnath, aged about thirty years, was employed as driver of truck No. TR: 3795 under the O.P. No. I/owner. He was sent on duty from Agartala to Calcutta in the said vehicle which met with an accident as mentioned above and the workman succumbed to the injuries sustained by him in the accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. A case was registered by the Phansidewa Police Station vide M/A Case No. 55/1990 dated December 12, 1990. After the accident the drivers and their assistants were not traceable, but later on, three dead bodies were recovered from near the place of occurrence and on identification of the (lead bodies, the death of the driver, Kanu Debnath, was confirmed. On recovery of the dead bodies, the Karsiang Police Station started a case bearing No. 184/90 dated December 13, 1990. The claimants/appellants claimed a sum of Rs. 3,32,768.00 as the amount of their compensation with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the aforesaid amount from the date of filing of the application. The opposite parties, owner as well as the Insurance Company, appeared and submitted written objections. The owner admitted that deceased, Kanu Debnath, was employed as driver of truck No. TRL-3795 which was insured with the O.P. No. 2 Insurance Co. The owner also admitted that the deceased died in the accident. The Insurance Co. also contested the case. The learned Commissioner, however, after assessing the evidence, accepted the case of the claimants that the accident took place in the manner alleged and the deceased Kanu Debnath died out of and in the course of his employment. On evaluation of the materials, the learned Commissioner found that the deceased was 30 years of age at the time of his death and was drawing a salary at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per month at the relevant time of his death. In terms of Section 4 of the Act, 1923, the learned Commissioner, for the purpose of calculation of compensation had (sic) limited the monthly wages of the deceased at Rs. 1000/- and chose the relevant factor as 207.98 as per the schedule IV to the Act, 1923. Accordingly the Commissioner awarded a compensation for an amount of the product of 40% of the monthly wages and the relevant factor (207.98 in the case), which comes to Rs. 83,192.00. The learned Commissioner accordingly directed the O.P. No. 2/ Insurance Co. to pay the compensation amount to the claimants within a period of forty five days from the date of the award with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the awarded amount from the date of filing of the application till realisation.
4. In both the appeals, though the appellants raised numerous contentions for enhancement of the amount of the compensation, but mainly focused their argument on payment of the compensation calculated by taking 50% of the monthly wages of the deceased and multiplying the same by the relevant factor. According to Mr. S. Talapatra, the learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeals, in view of the amendments introduced by Act 30 of 1995, instead of 40% of the monthly wages of the deceased worker, the appellants are entitled to a higher percentage of the monthly wages of the deceased while calculating the amount compensation as per the law. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 is a welfare legislation enacted to provide to certain classes of workers/workmen compensation for injuries sustained or death out of and in the course of employment. The amendment was made taking into account the rise in the price index. According to Mr. Talapatra, such statutes are to be construed liberally.
5. Both the appellants in the appeals were represented through their counsel. The main contentions of the appellants were seriously contested by Mr. S.M. Ali, the learned counsel for the respondents. Mr. Ali, the learned counsel submitted that the amendment is to be given effect to prospectively. The learned counsel further submitted that since the accident took place prior to the amendment and even the awards were also passed prior to the amendment. That the adjudication of the claims took place prior to the amendment and the present appeals were also filed before the enactment of the amendment Act 30 of 1995, by which the amendments were introduced. Mr. Ali, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that as per the accepted norms of interpretation, the provisions of the amended clause cannot be given effect to retrospectively now at this stage when the Commissioner has recorded his findings on all those issues and, therefore, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
6. Before entering into the merits of the case and the respective submissions of the parties, it will be appropriate to look to the provisions of the Statute, both prior to the amendment and after the amendment. The relevant provisions of the old Act and the amended Act are given below:-
Prior to amendment, Section 4(1)(a) of the Act, 1923 reads as follows:-
“4. Amount of Compensation – (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely
(a) Where death result from the injury
an amount equal to forty per cent of the monthly wages of the deceased workman multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of twenty thousand rupees whichever is more;”
After the amendment of the Act, in Section 4 of the Principal Act, in Sub-section (1),-
(i) in Clause (a), for the words ‘forty per cent’ and ‘twenty thousand rupees’, the words ‘fifty per cent’ and ‘fifty thousand rupees’ shall respectively be substituted;”
From the above amendment, it, thus, transpires that in place of 40% the Legislature enhanced the amount to 50% by amended provision. The only question that comes into consideration in this appeal is as to whether the benefit of the amended legislation, which came into force after filing of the appeal, will apply in the present case.
7. The employer’s liability for compensation is already in the Statute Book which enjoins upon the employer to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the Act, 1923 when personal injury is caused to workmen by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The amount of compensation payable is determined in terms of Section 4 of the Act. The legislature by introducing the amendments vide Act 30 of 1995, substituted the word “fifty per cent” in place of the words “forty per cent” in Clause (a) to Section 4(1) of the Act and thereby altered the measure of determining the amount of compensation. The amended provisions of Section 4 of the Act, 1923 (as amended by Act 30 of 1995), did not bring in any new scheme or mechanism; it only brought a revision in the amount of compensation taking note of the economic scenario. It is not a new benefit.
8. A Statute is not called a retrospective Statute merely “because a part of the requisite for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing” [CRAZES ON STATUTE LAW, 7th Edn. page 387]. According to the learned author, one is to “look at the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law, and what it was the legislature contemplated”. The word “retrospective” itself is somewhat ambiguous. A Statute is not retrospective merely because it affects the existing rights. Statutes are classified not by mere reference to their scope and manner of the enactment, but also by reference to the features and contends of the Statute. The Statutes are clarified as penal or remedial, enabling or restraining, mandatory or directory, declaratory or enacting Statutes. A declaratory Statute either resolves the doubts on a particular point or re-state the law on a particular subject. It is the enacting Statute which effects a change in law. Punishments for offences are provided in a penal Statute, whereas a remedial Statute provides for reliefs to persons. The purpose of remedial Statute is to “supply defects and abridge superfluities” (Ref. hALSBURvs LAWS OF ENGLAND 4th edn. para 807, Note 2).
9. Under the general rules of interpretation, Statutes are to be construed as prospective. In the case of remedial or procedural law which do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy vested or contractual rights, but is confined to remedies or modes of procedure, are held to operate retrospectively. “A remedial Statute is to be construed to effect the purpose for which it was enacted, and, if the reason of the Statute extends to past transactions as well as to those in the future, it will be so applied, although it does not, in terms, so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty.” (Ref. CIS. Vol. 82, 416). Similarly, amendments which are purely remedial operate retroactively and those which merely cause changes in the adjective or procedural law apply to all cases pending and subsequent to their enactment, whether the cause accrued prior or subsequent to the time the change became effective, unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation, or accrued causes of action. (Ref. CJS, Vol. 82, 432).
10. The Legislature by amending Section 4 of the Principal Act, 1923 did not change the colour and content of the Act and the liability of the employer for paying compensation. The Legislature did not bring any distinction between the accidents those which took place prior to the amendment (Act 30 of 1995) and those which took place after the amendments. The amending provisions do not suggest any limitation. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 is a welfare legislation which requires to be given a broad and liberal interpretation. The Statute deals with compensation for accident arising out of and in the course of employment to a certain class of workmen. It is a Legislation dealing with Human Rights of the workmen. In construing such a legislation, the artifice of mechanical interpretation is to be banished and the Court in interpreting such Statutes, is to concern itself with the essence and measures of the legislation, the nature and complexion of the Statute as well as the backdrop and framework of the law.
11. Mr. S.M. AH, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2, is no doubt right in his submission that the accident took place prior to the amendments and even the Awards were made by the Court prior to the amended Act came into force. But though the Awards were passed on August 25 & 28, 1993, respectively, the Awards did not attain finality. On the date of amendment of the Act, the appeals were pending before (he Court. An appeal is the continuance and extension of the original case/petition. Therefore, there cannot be any impediment in giving effect to the amended provisions of the law in this case.
12. It is further seen that the learned Commissioner gave a definite finding that the income of the deceased was Rs. 1500 per month at the time of death. In view of Explanation-II to Section 4 of the Act, 1923, as existed at the relevant time, for the purpose of computation of the monthly wages, it was limited to Rs. 1000 (Rupees one thousand) only. Provisions of Explanation II to Section 4 of the Act, 1923 was amended by the Amending Act of 1995 and it now reads as follows:
“Explanation II – Where the monthly wages of a workman exceeds two thousand rupees, his monthly wages for the purpose of Clause (a) and Clause (b) shall be deemed to be two thousand rupees only.”
As the wages of the deceased workman was Rs. 1500 (Rupees fifteen hundred) per month, he will now be- entitled to 50% of said Rs. 1500.
13. For the foregoing reasons, we modify the awards as follows:
In the Award dated August 25, 1993 [TS-(WC) 21,92], the claimants Sandhya Goswami and others, shall be entitled to a compensation of (50% of monthly wages) x 201.66 (the relevant factor) which comes to Rs. 750×201.66= Rs. 1,51,245 (Rupees one lakh fifty-one thousand two hundred forty five) only, instead of Rs. 80,664.
Likewise, in the Award dated August 27, 1993 (TS(WC) 22/92) claimants Dipali Debnath and others, shall be entitled to a compensation of (50% of the monthly wages) x 207.98 (the relevant factor) which comes to Rs. 750×207.98= Rs. 1,55,985 (Rupees one lakh fifty five thousand nine hundred eighty-five) only, instead of Rs. 83,192.
All other directions/terms given in the above two Awards shall remain the same.
14. Ordered accordingly. The appeals are accordingly allowed to the extent indicated. The respondents shall deposit the balance of the amounts within a period of two months. No order as to costs.