High Court Patna High Court - Orders

Sandhya Kumari vs The State Of Bihar &Amp; Ors on 29 June, 2010

Patna High Court – Orders
Sandhya Kumari vs The State Of Bihar &Amp; Ors on 29 June, 2010
      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                     LPA No.1614 of 2009
SANDHYA KUMARI, W/O SHRI PRAKASH KUMAR, C/O BINAY
KUMAR, SAVITRI NIWAS, HOUSE NO. 12, IST FLOOR, KAVI
RAMAN PATH, EAST BORING ROAD, PATNA ........................
..................................................... PETITIONER / APPELLANT
                         Versus
1. THE STATE OF BIHAR, THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY, OLD
SECREARIAT, PATNA
2.   THE     PRINCIPAL      SECRETARY,       SOCIAL       WELFARE
DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, OLD SECRETARIAT,
PATNA
3. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENT,
GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR, OLD SECRETARIAT, PATNA
4. THE DIRECTOR, I.C.D.S. DIRECTORATE,           INDIRA BHAWAN,
RAM CHARITRA PATH, NEAR HARTALI CHOWK, PATNA
5. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, GAYA
6. THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE-CUM-CONDUCTING
OFFICER, GAYA
7. THE SUB DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE, SHERGHATI, GAYA
8. THE DISTRICT PROGRAMME OFFICER, GAYA-CUM-THE
PRESENTING OFFICER ..... RESPONDENTS / RESPONDENTS
                            with
                     LPA No. 1615 of 2009
1. SANDHYA KUMARI, W/O SHRI PRAKASH KUMAR, C/O BINAY
KUMAR      SAVITRI    NIWAS,      HOUSE    NO.   12,   1ST   FLOOR,
KAVIRAMAN       PATH,       EAST     BORING       ROAD,      PATNA
..................................................... PETITIONER / APPELLANT
                         Versus
1. THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY, OLD
SECRETARIAT, PATNA
2.   THE     PRINCIPAL      SECRETARY,       SOCIAL       WELFARE
DEPARTMENT, GOVT. OF BIHAR, OLD SECRETARIAT, PATNA
                   -2-




3. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, SOCIAL WELFARE DEPRTMENT,
GOVT. OF BIHAR, OLD SECRETARIAT, PATNA
4. THE DIRECTOR, I.C.D.S. DIRECTORATE, INDIRA BHAWAN,
RAM CHARITRA PATH, NEW HARTALI CHOWK, PATNA
5. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, GAYA,
6. THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE-CUM-CONDUCTING
OFFICER, GAYA
7. THE DISTRICT PROGRAMME OFFICER, GAYA-CUM-THE
PRESENTING OFFICER,
8.   THE   SUPERINTENDENT         OF    POLICE,   VIGILANCE
INVESTIGATION BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF VIGILANCE, GOVT.
OF BIHAR, PATNA
9. THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, VIGILANCE
INVESTIGATION BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF VIGILANCE, GOVT.
OF BIHAR, PATNA ................ RESPONDENTS / RESPONDENTS.
                           with
                  LPA No. 582 of 2010
1. THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY, OLD
SECRETARIAT, PATNA
2.   THE   PRINCIPAL      SECRETARY,     SOCIAL    WELFARE
DEPARTMENT, GOVT. OF BIHAR, OLD SECRETARIAT, PATNA
3. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENT,
GOVT. OF BIHAR, OLD SECRETARIAT, PATNA
4. THE DIRECTOR, I.C.D.S. DIRECTORATE, INDIRA BHAWAN,
RAM CHARITRA PATH, NEAR HARILAL CHOWK, PATNA
5. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, GAYA
6. THE ADDL. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE - CUM - CONDUCTING
OFFICER, GAYA
7. THE DISTRICT PROGRAMME OFFICER, GAYA - CUM - THE
PRESENTING OFFICER ............................... APPELLANTS
                       Versus
1. SANDHYA KUMARI, W/O SRI PRAKAS, C/O BINAY KUMAR,
SAVITRI NIWAS HOUSE NO. 12, IST FLOOR, KAVI RAMAN PATH,
EAST BORING ROAD, PATNA ......... RESPONDENT - PETITIONER
                                   -3-




              2.   THE    SUPERINTENDENT         OF    POLICE,     VIGILANCE
              INVESTIGATION BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF VIGILANCE, GOVT.
              OF BIHAR, PATNA
              3. THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, VIGILANCE
              INVESTIGATION BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF VIGILANCE, GOVT.
              OF BIHAR, PATNA ................ RESPONDENTS / RESPONDENTS.
                                 -----------

(In L.P.As. No. 1614/09 & 1615/09)
For the Appellant : Mr. Purushootam Kumar Jha and
Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Advocates.

For the Respondents: Mr. Siddhartha Prasad, AC to AAG-9,
Mr. Bijay Kumar Pandey,AC to GP-18.

(In L.P.A. No. 582/2010)
For the Appellants: Mr. Bijay Kumar Pandey,
AC to G.P.-18.

For the Respondents: Mr. Purushootam Kumar Jha and
Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Advocates.

———–

5. 29.06.2010. These three appeals, preferred under Clause

10 of the Letters Patent arise from the common judgment

and order dated 12.11.2009 passed by the learned single

Judge in CWJC Nos. 14323/2009 and 14407/2009.

2. L.P.A. Nos. 1614/09 & 1615/09 have been

preferred by the writ petitioner in so far as the learned

single judge has refused to quash the disciplinary

proceeding initiated against her and has refused to quash

the order of suspension made against her.

3. L.P.A. No. 582/2010 has been preferred by the

State in so far as the State is directed to pay subsistence
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allowance to the writ petitioner for the entire period she

has been placed under suspension irrespective of the fact

that she has not remained present at the Headquarters

and that she has not marked her attendance in the

attendance register.

4. By order dated 13.01.2009 the writ petitioner,

a Child Development Project Officer, has been placed

under suspension. During the period of suspension, her

Headquarters is kept at Patna. A disciplinary proceeding

has been initiated against the writ petitioner for the

alleged acts of commission and omission amounting to

misconduct. It is alleged that she made selection of

Anganbari Sevikas in contravention of the Departmental

Guidelines No. 2783 dated 03.10.2006. Pending the

disciplinary proceeding the writ petitioner did not remain

present at the Headquarters nor did she mark her

attendance. The writ petitioner was, therefore, not paid

the subsistence allowance otherwise payable to her.

5. Feeling aggrieved she filed the above CWJC

No. 14407 of 2009 and prayed, inter alia, that the order

of suspension and the charge sheet dated 13.01.2009
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issued against her be quashed. She alleged malafide

against some top ranking politicians and the Members of

the Special Committee of the Bihar Vidhan Sabha. She

also filed the above CWJC No. 14323 of 2009

challenging the supplementary memorandum of charge

dated 05.02.2009.

6. The writ petitions were contested by the State

Government. According to the State Government, unless

the writ petitioner reported at the Headquarters and

marked her attendance, she would not be entitled to

subsistence allowance.

7. The learned single Judge was pleased to allow

the writ petition partially. The learned single judge was

pleased to rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the matter of Anwarun Nisa Khatoon

v. State of Bihar & Ors. [(2002) 6 SCC 703] to hold

that “there is no requirement for a suspended

employee to mark attendance before his subsistence

allowance could be paid. A suspended employee is

entitled to be paid his subsistence allowance as the

master servant relationship subsists.”
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8. Following the judgment, the learned single

Judge was pleased to direct the State Government to pay

to the writ petitioner the arrears of subsistence allowance

with interest @ 5%. The learned single Judge was further

pleased to direct the State Government to hold enquiry,

fix administrative responsibility for non-fulfillment of

statutory obligations and recover the amount of interest

from the person concerned including issue of initiation of

departmental proceedings against him. The learned

single Judge, however, refused to quash the disciplinary

proceeding or the order of suspension made against the

writ petitioner.

9. Feeling aggrieved the writ petitioner has

preferred the above L.P.A. Nos. 1614/2009 and

1615/2009 and the State Government has preferred

L.P.A. No. 582/2010.

10. Mr. Purushottam Kumar Jha, learned Advocate

has appeared for the writ petitioner. He has assailed the

judgment of the learned single Judge in so far as the

learned single Judge has refused to quash the disciplinary

proceeding or to revoke the order of suspension. Mr. Jha
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has taken us through the record. He has strenuously

urged that the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated

against the writ petitioner on account of interference by

some political person. The initiation of disciplinary

proceeding is actuated by mala fide. He has also

submitted that the initiation of the disciplinary

proceeding is uncalled for. The charges levelled against

the writ petitioner are false and baseless. None of the

selections alleged to have been made by the writ

petitioner was, in fact, made by her. The proceeding

requires to be quashed and set aside. He has submitted

that no Gazetted Officer of the State has ever marked

his/her attendance in the attendance register nor the writ

petitioner, who is the Child Development Project

Officer, is required to sign her attendance.

11. L.P.A. No. 582 of 2010 has been preferred

belatedly by the State in so far as the learned single

Judge has directed the State Government to pay

subsistence allowance to the writ petitioner for the entire

period of her suspension from service.

12. Interlocutory Application No. 2915/2010
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under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by

the State for condonation of 41 days’ delay occurred in

preferring L.P.A. No. 582/2010. For the reasons

mentioned in the Application, the delay in preferring the

Appeal by the State is condoned. I.A. No. 2915/2010

stands allowed.

13. Mr. P.K. Shahi, learned Advocate General

has appeared for the State. He has relied upon proviso

(iii) to sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Bihar Government

Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2005.

He has submitted that the said proviso specifically

provides “that the government servant shall be

entitled to receive subsistence allowance only for such

period when he is actually present at the

Headquarters during the suspension period. He is

required to mark his attendance in the attendance

register meant for such government servant.” In the

submission of Mr. Shahi, on the face of the statutory rule

of 2005, the above referred judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has no applicability.

14. We agree with Mr. Shahi. The Hon’ble
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Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the Rules of

2005. In view of the prevalent rules to the contrary,

earlier judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has no

applicability.

15. It is not in dispute that neither the writ

petitioner remained present at the Headquarters during

the period of suspension nor did she mark her

attendance. We are of the opinion that in view of the

specific statutory rule that governs the conditions of

service of the delinquent employee, the writ petitioner

was duty bound to remain present at the Headquarters

and to mark her attendance in the attendance register.

Indisputably, the writ petitioner did not remain present at

the Headquarters, nor did she mark her attendance. The

above proviso to Rule 10(1) of the Rules of 2005 is clear

and unambiguous. It does enjoin the delinquent servant

placed under suspension to remain present at the

Headquarters and to mark the attendance. It is a pre-

requisite to claim subsistence allowance during the

period of suspension. In our opinion, the State

Government was justified in refusing to pay subsistence

– 10 –

allowance to the writ petitioner. The learned single Judge

has erred in overlooking the aforesaid statutory provision

and in following the earlier decision of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court. The order of the learned single Judge in

so far as the State is directed to pay subsistence

allowance to the writ petitioner irrespective of her

absence from the Headquarters requires to be set aside.

16. As to the disciplinary proceeding, we are of

the opinion that it is too early to stall the disciplinary

proceeding or to set aside the charges levelled against the

writ petitioner. It may be noted that though the writ

petitioner has alleged mala fide against certain persons in

the State Government, such persons have not been

impleaded as party respondents. In absence of the

parties against whom the malafides are alleged, the

allegations of mala fide cannot be entertained. The

disciplinary proceeding must proceed further to its

logical end. It is clarified that in the event the writ

petitioner is found guilty and is visited with some

punishment, she may challenge the order of punishment

and will be at liberty to raise all available grounds

– 11 –

including the ground of mala fides.

17. The order of the learned single Judge refusing

to quash the disciplinary proceeding is confirmed.

18. In so far as the order of suspension is

concerned, we are of the opinion that the allegations

made against the writ petitioner are not such which

warrant continuance of the order of suspension. The

allegation is that the writ petitioner made selection of

Anganbari Sevikas contrary to the relevant guidelines.

The selection of Anganbari Sevika is not a matter of

recurrence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that

continued suspension of the writ petitioner pending the

disciplinary proceeding is not required.

19. For the reasons aforesaid, we partially allow

L.P.A. No. 1614 of 2009. The order of suspension dated

13.01.2009 is revoked. The writ petitioner will be

reinstated in service within three weeks from today.

L.P.A. No. 1615/2009 is dismissed.

20. The impugned order dated 12.11.2009 of the

learned single Judge in so far as the State Government

has been directed to pay subsistence allowance to the

– 12 –

writ petitioner for the period she did not remain present

at the Headquarters and she did not mark her attendance

is quashed and set aside. The writ petitioner will not be

entitled to subsistence allowance for the period during

which she did not remain present at the Headquarters or

she did not mark her attendance. Accordingly, L.P.A.

No. 582/2010 is allowed.

21. It is clarified that this order shall not preclude

the writ petitioner from challenging the order of

punishment or from claiming the salary for the period of

suspension at the end of the disciplinary proceeding.

22. The Interlocutory Applications filed by the

appellant are accordingly disposed of.

( R.M. Doshit, CJ )

( Shiva Kirti Singh, J )
Dilip