JUDGMENT
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.
1. Jodduguru Reddyari Rami Reddy (detenu) was ordered to be detained by the order of the Collector and District Magistrate, Anantapur, in C.C. (C1) 108/97 dated : 16-1-1997 passed under section 3(1) and (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short Act 1 of 1986). The said detenu was arrested on 17-1-1997 and lodged in District Jail, Secunderabad. The order of detention is attacked by the Petitioner on the ground that the instances given in the grounds of detention relate to law-and-order and not to public order.
2. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contends that both the grounds mentioned in support of the order of detention are matters of law-and-order and not that of public order and, therefore, the order of detention has to be quashed.
3. Ms. Vijayalaxmi, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the learned Additional Advocate General vehemently contends that attack on the rival group would disturb the peace of the whole locality and, therefore, it would be a case of affecting the public order.
4. Before we examine the validity of the contention raised by the learned counsel it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of Act 1 of 1986. Section 3(1) under which the order is purported to have been passed reads as follows :
“The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any boot-legger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.”
5. A plain reading of the provision extracted above shows that if the detaining authority is satisfied with reference to any boot-legger, dacoit, drug offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land grabber that it is necessary to detain any one of the said category of persons to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, he may make an order directing that such person be detained. The expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the public order’ is defined under section 2(a) of Act 1 of 1986, which reads as follows :
“……….. acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” means when a boot-legger, a dacoit, a drug-offender, a goonda, an immoral traffic offender or a land-grabber is engaged or is making preparations or engaging, in any of his activities as such, which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order.
Explanation :- For the purpose of this clause public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia, if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this clause directly, or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health.”
6. The definition read with the explanation makes it clear that if any of the activities of a boot-legger, a dacoit, a drug-offender, a goonda, an immoral traffic offender or a land grabber, in which he is engaged or is making preparation to engage, is directly or indirectly causing or is calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health, then he is said to be acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. There is a well defined distinction between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’.
7. In Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, the Supreme Court pointed out the distinction between the ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’. Para 13 of the judgment which deals with this aspect reads as follows :
“The true distinction between the areas of “public order” and “law and order” lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is a fine one but this does not mean that there can he no overlapping acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”
The aforesaid passage is quoted and followed in Gulab Mehra v. State of U.P., .
8. In a recent Judgment in Mutakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M. M. Mehta, referring to the provisions of Section 3(1) of Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, which is analogous to the provisions of Act 1 of 1986, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed :
“A distinction had to be drawn between law and order and maintenance of public order because most often the two expressions are confused and detention orders are passed by the authorities concerned in respect of the activities of person which exclusively fall within the domain of law and order and which have nothing to do with the maintenance of public order.”
Speaking for the Court, Faizan Uddin, J., pointed out as follows :
“………….. in order to bring the activities of a person within the expression of “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” the fall out and the extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him or to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a large section of society. It is the degree of disturbance and its impact upon the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality which determies whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts only to a breach of “law and order” or it amounts to “public order”. If the activity falls within the category of disturbance of “public order” then it becomes essential to treat such a criminal and deal with him differently than an ordinary criminal under the law as his activities would fall beyond the frontiers of law and order, disturbing the even tempo of life of the community of the specified locality.”
9. From the above discussion it follows that to bring the activities of a person who is sought to be detained under Act 1 of 1986, the detaining authority has to he satisfied that the extent and reach of the alleged activities are such that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him and to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a large section of society, his detention is necessary. The impact of these activities upon the even tempo of life of the society will determine whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts only to the breach of “law and order” or it amounts to disturbance of “public order”.
10. Keeping the above principle in mind, if we examine the grounds in this case, we find it difficult to hold that they fall within the realm of the public order. The grounds are as follows :
“1. On 20-11-1995 you along with 6 others joined together at Peddayekkalur village at about 5.00 a.m. formed into an unlawful assembly with the common object of assaulting your rival group armed with sticks, iron pipes, spears, axes, battle axes and country made bombs and attacked your rivals and attempted to murder them and caused injuries and damages. The case is registered as Cr. No. 37/95 under Sections 147, 148, 324, 326, 307, 427 r/w 149, I.P.C., Sections 3 and 5 of E.S. Act. You were arrested on 7-12-1995 and sent for remand and were released on bail on 7-3-1996 in Cr.M.P. No. 192/96, dt. 7-3-1996, case is under investigation.
2. On 13-4-1996 you along with 13 others joined together at Pedda Yekkalur village at about 6.00 a.m. formed into an unlawful assembly with the common object of assaulting your rival group armed with sticks, sickles and country made bombs and attacked K. Krishna Reddy s/o Mallireddy and others and attempted to murder them and caused injuries. The case is registered as Cr. No. 16/96 under sections 147, 148, 324, 307, r/w 149, I.P.C., Sections 3 and 5 of E.S. Act. You were arrested and sent for remand on 7-5-1996 and released on bail in Cr.M.P. No. 607/96 dt. 20-6-1996. Case is under investigation. A rowdy sheet No. 301 is against you in Muchukota P.S.”
11. A perusal of these grounds leaves no doubt in our minds that the activities mentioned are the matters which can be dealt with under ordinary criminal law and that they do not fall within the category of disturbances of public order.
12. Before parting with this case we would like to observe that in various cases which have come up before us, we have noticed that the order of detention contained grounds which are irrelevant or do not constitute a ground to bring the detenu within the definition of goonda under which he is sought to the brought or that the distinction, between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is not maintained. In our view it would serve the cause of public if the detaining authorities are given proper training on various aspects of preventive detention laws so that the liberty of citizens is not invaded on the grounds which are not justified under the respective Preventive Detention Acts and in appropriate cases where persons have to be dealt with under the Act, are not released due to inappropriate or defective drafting or addition of irrelevant ground in the grounds of detention.
13. For the above reasons we are unable to sustain the impugned order of detention No. C1/108/97 dated : 16-1-1997 passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, Anantapur. The impugned order is accordingly quashed. The respondents are directed to release the detenu in the above case forthwith, if he is not required to be detained in any other case.
14. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.
Petition allowed.