ORDER
Jyoti Balasundaram, Vice President
1. Classification of goods described by the importers (the appellants herein) as “used hydraulic truck mounted mobile cranes” is the issue for determination in this appeal – whether under Customs Tariff Heading 8705.10 as held by the authorities below or 8426.19 as claimed by the importers.
2. We have heard both sides.
3. It is the case of the department that the goods imported are nothing but special purpose motor vehicles falling for classification under Customs Tariff Heading 87.05. The authorities below have relied upon HSN Notes to Heading 87.05 which inter alia covers “Crane lorries, not for the transport of goods, consisting of a motor vehicle chassis on which a cab and rotating crane are permanently mounted.” It is the contention of the appellants who are represented by their counsel, that the goods are self-propelled machines in which propelling and control elements of a complete motor vehicle chassis are located in the cab of the working machine mounted on a wheeled or automobile chassis and, therefore, excluded from the coverage of Chapter 87 as seen from the HSN Explanatory Notes, and falling for classification under Chapter Heading 84.26 which includes “Self-propelled machine in which one or more of the propelling or control elements of a complete automobile chassis are located in the cab of a lifting or handling machine (generally a crane) mounted on a wheeled chassis whether or not the whole can be driven on road under its own power.” They rely upon the decision of the Tribunal in Aban loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd. v. CC, Chennai 2000 (124) ELT 746, in which mobile cranes mounted on automobile chassis have been held to fall for classification under CTH 8426.12 and not under 87.05. We find that the Commissioner (Appeals) has distinguished this decision on the ground that the Tribunal in the case of Jesia Mistry Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. CC, Mumbai has distinguished the Aban Loyd decision cited supra, and the Commissioner (Appeals) has also listed out the distinguishing features between the goods imported by Aban lloyd and those imported by the appellants herein. We note that in the Aban Lloyd’s case, the Tribunal held that the correct classification of mobile crane mounted on automobile chassis was under CTH 8426.12 and in the case of Jesia Mistry, classification of truck mounted crane was held to be under CTH 8426.41. In other words, in the case of Jesia Mistry which is the later decision, the Tribunal only distinguished the earlier order on the ground that the subheading of Chapter Heading 84.26 adopted therein was not acceptable and classified the goods under a different sub-heading of the same Chapter Heading 84.26. In the later case, it is not the decision of the Tribunal that the goods would not fall under Chapter Heading 84.26 and the Tribunal did not have any occasion to go into the question of whether the goods would fall for classification under CTH 87.05. However, since the appellants admit that the technical literature produced before the Tribunal and relied upon it to inter alia establish that the power for extending and controlling the straddles is derived from the vehicle and that the rest of the lifting is powered and controlled independent of the chassis which were two of the features noted by the bench in the case of Aban Lloyd, was not before the Commissioner (Appeals), the interest of justice requires that the entire material now sought to be relied upon by the appellants is considered by the adjudicating authority to arrive at a decision on the correct classification. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the adjudicating authority to pass fresh orders on merits in accordance with law, after extending a reasonable opportunity to the appellants of being heard in their defence and producing the technical literature which is produced before the bench. Since the matter has been pending for a long time, it is expected that fresh orders be passed pursuant to our direction, as far as possible, within a period of three months from the date of reciept of this order.
4. The appeal is thus allowed by way of remand.