JUDGMENT
D.D. Sinha, J.
1. Heard Mr. Srirang Bhandarkar, learned Counsel for the Applicant and Mr. A. S. Kilor, learned Counsel for the Respondent.
2. The civil revision application is directed against the order dated 22-4-2002 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, whereby application moved by the applicant Under Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, came to be rejected.
3. learned Counsel for the applicant states that the non-applicant had filed Special Civil Suit No. 114/90 against the applicant for recovery of post and future maintenance and “Stridhan”. The claim made in the said suit was for Rs. 1,58,000/-. In that suit, non-applicant alleged that she has no independent source of income to support her livelihood and therefore, she claimed maintenance of Rs. 3,000/- per month.
4. learned Counsel for the applicant further contended that the applicant filed written statement and opposed the claim of the non-applicant for maintenance. It is contended that as the non-applicant herself had deserted the applicant, hence she had no right to claim maintenance. During the pendency of the said suit, the applicant and non-applicant decided to amicably settle the dispute and therefore, arrived at amicable settlement. The terms of the settlement were incorporated in the compromise pursis which was signed by the applicant and non-applicant and was filed on record in the said suit. The counsel for the petitioner further contended that since the issue was compromised, the trial Court on 20-7-1998 passed a compromise decree in terms of the said compromise pursis. It is contended that when the decree of compromise was passed by the trial Court, the non-applicant was only contributory lecturer, however, at the later point of time, she was made permanent lecturer in 1999 and started receiving substantial salary and therefore, she was not in need of maintenance amount. Since the non-applicant was started getting good salary, it was not necessary for the applicant to pay the maintenance amount as agreed as per the compromise decree. It is contended that on 21-10-2000 applicant filed R.M.J.C. No. 127/2000 for seeking modification of the compromise decree Under Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, as there was change in the circumstances. However, trial Court rejected the application of the applicant, hence the present revision application.
5. learned Counsel for the applicant has contended that as per Section 25 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, decree awarding maintenance can be altered subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration. It is contended that, in the instant case, at the time of passing of compromise decree, the non-applicant was in need of maintenance and therefore, the applicant agreed to pay maintenance of Rs. 1200/- per month till her death w.e.f. 1-8-1998. However, at the later point of time, there was a material change in the circumstances, such as, non-applicant became permanent lecturer and started receiving substantial salary and therefore, in view of Section 25 of the Act of 1956, the applicant was entitled to move the application for alteration of amount of maintenance. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, contended that all these aspects are ignored by the Trial Court and wrongly rejected the application of the applicant and therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. In order to substantiate the contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Madras High Court , Seshi Ammal and Anr. v. Thaiyu Ammal as well as decision of the Supreme Court , Amireddi Raka Gopala Rao and Ors. v. Amireddi Sitharamamma and Ors.
6. Mr. Kilor, learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the impugned order and has contended that the non-applicant has filed a suit for post and future maintenance as well as “Stridhan”. Issue in the said suit was amicably settled between the applicant-husband and the non-applicant-wife and the terms of compromise were incorporated in the compromise pursis which was filed in the trial Court and on the basis thereof, compromise decree was passed. It is further contended that one of the condition of settlement was that the applicant shall pay the maintenance of Rs. 1200/- per month to the non-applicant till her death. It is submitted that on the basis of terms and conditions mentioned in the pursis, the compromise decree was passed and therefore, those terms and conditions are binding on the parties to the compromise decree for ever and therefore, the application filed by the non-applicant Under Section 25 of the Act of 1956 was not maintainable. It is further contended that the compromise decree has reached finality and therefore, the trial Court is justified in rejecting the application filed by the non-applicant Under Section 25 of the Act.
7. I have given anxious thoughts to the various contentions canvassed by the respective counsel. Perused the impugned order as well as decisions cited and relied on by the counsel for the applicant.
8. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the suit filed by the non-applicant-wife for maintenance against the applicant-husband was compromised and compromise decree was passed by the trial Court on 20-7-1997. It is also not in dispute that at the time of passing of compromise decree, the non-applicant was a temporary lecturer and was receiving salary of about Rs. 3,000/-. It is also not in dispute that one of the terms and conditions of settlement mentioned in the compromise pursis was that the applicant shall pay maintenance of Rs. 1200/- to the non-applicant till her death. It is no doubt true that when the trial Court passes compromise decree in the civil suit, the terms and conditions on which the compromise decree is passed by the Court are binding on the parties to such compromise decree and in the normal circumstances such compromise decree can only be reopened, altered, modified or revoked if it is obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion etc. and not otherwise.
9. Before I consider the provisions of Section 25 of the Act, it will be proper to take into consideration Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act, which provides for relevant factors to be considered by the Court while determining the amount of maintenance required to be granted to a wife, children or aged or infirm parents under this Act. These factors are as follows :
(a) the position and status of the parties;
(b) the reasonable wants of the claimant;
(c) if the claimant is living separately, whether the claimant is justified in doing so;
(d) the value of the claimant’s property and any income derived from such property, or from the claimant’s own earnings or from any other source;
(e) the number of persons entitled to maintenance under this Act.
It is, therefore, evident that one of the consideration to be kept in mind by the Court while determining the amount of maintenance to a wife is the earning/income, if any, of the wife and whether it is sufficient or otherwise to fulfil her reasonable wants. It is, therefore, evident that after determining the amount of maintenance if the decree is passed accordingly or by agreement of the parties the amount of maintenance is fixed, however, at later point of time if there is material change in the circumstances, on the basis thereof the amount of maintenance is fixed and if such change justify the alteration of the amount of maintenance so fixed, in such situation the right is given to either of the spouse to move the Court for such alteration.
10. The provisions of Section 25 read thus
25. The amount of maintenance, whether fixed by decree of the Court or by agreement either before or after the commencement of this Act, may be altered subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration.
The plain reading of the provision makes it implicitly clear that the amount of maintenance whether fixed by a decree of the Court or by an agreement may be altered subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration.
11. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Para 9 in case of Amireddi Raka Gopala Rao and Ors. v. Amireddi Sitharamamma and Ors. reads thus :
(9) In Kameshwaramma v. Subramanyam , the plaintiff’s husband had died in the year 1916, and the plaintiff had entered into a compromise in 1924 fixing her maintenance at Rs. 240 per year and providing that the rate of maintenance shall not be increased or reduced. The question arose whether, in spite of this agreement, the plaintiff could claim increased maintenance in view of Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. It was held that, in spite of the aforesaid term of the compromise, she was entitled to claim increased maintenance Under Section 25. This conclusion follows from the plain words of Section 25 under which the amount of maintenance, whether fixed by decree or agreement either before or after the commencement of the Act, may be altered subsequently. The decision was, therefore, plainly right. No doubt, there are broad observations in that case to the effect that the right of maintenance is a recurring right and the liability to maintenance after the Act came into force is imposed by Section 22, and there is no reason to exclude widows of persons who died before the Act from the operation of Section 22. Those observations were not necessary for the purpose of that case, because the widow in that case was clearly entitled to maintenance from the estate of her deceased husband dying in 1916 under the Hindu Law, as it stood then, independently of Sections 21 and 22 of the Act, and in spite of the compromise fixing the maintenance before the commencement of the Act, the widow could in view of Section 25 claim alteration of the amount of maintenance. The decision cannot be regarded as an authority for the proposition that Sections 21 and 22 of the Act affect rights already vested before the commencement of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the claim of the respondent to maintenance for their lives is not affected by the Act.
12. The abovereferred observations of the Apex Court in no uncertain terms convey that the amount of maintenance though fixed by the agreement between the parties can be altered subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alterations and therefore, the application filed by the applicant Under Section 25 of the Act of 1956, is maintainable. The findings recorded by the Trial Court in the impugned order in view of provisions of Section 25 of the Act of 1956, are clearly misconceived, devoid of substance and cannot be sustained in law.
13. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 22-4-2002 is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the trial Court for reconsideration of the application of the applicant Under Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, on its own merit and as per procedure prescribed Under Section 25 of the Act and decide the same after taking into consideration the contingency stipulated in Section 25 of the Act of 1956. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No order as to cost.