JUDGMENT
D.K. Jain, J.
1. Land measuring 1 bigha 2 biswas comprised in Khasra Nos. 367 and 369 in village Mehrauli, New Delhi, is the subject-matter of the present writ petition.
2. The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, Land and Building Department, issued notification dated 1.5.2003 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) expressing its intention to acquire 3 bighas 6 biswas of the land in Khasra Nos. 366, 367 and 369, village Mehrauli, New Delhi, which includes the aforesaid land as well. By means of this notification objections to the proposed acquisition were invited. It appears that no objections were filed by any person. Thereafter declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 23.7.2003 to the effect that Lt. Governor was satisfied that the land is required to be taken by the Government at public expense for the public purpose, namely, “for C.R.P.F. Camp under Planned Development of Delhi” and thus, the said land was acquired for this purpose. Present writ petition has been filed challenging the aforesaid acquisition.
3. As per the averments made in the writ petition, subject land was sold by the Government in public auction sometime in the year 1962 when one Sardar Sarbinder Singh purchased it in the said auction. Sale certificate was issued in his favor on 17.10.1962 followed by corrigendum dated 16.2.1972 and mutation was sanctioned in his name in the revenue records by the revenue authorities on 18.3.1988. However, as this land was illegally occupied by the CRPF, Sardar Sarbinder Singh issued legal notice dated 19.7.1988 to Lt. Governor, Land & Building Department, DDA and Commandant, CRPF. Significantly in this notice it was stated that the land was occupied in the year 1980 illegally and in authorised by and the addressees were called upon to acquire the said land within the statutory period. However, the respondents did not pay any heed to this notice. On 12.10.1990 the petitioner purchased this land from Sardar Sarbinder Singh by registered sale deed. When the land in question was not vacated, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 84 of the Delhi Land Retorms Act on 23.2.1988 in the Court of SDO/ Revenue Assistant, Mehrauli. There is vast area of land, contiguous to this land in question, which is in occupation of CRPF and which was acquired earlier and placed at the disposal of CRPF. It appears that while taking possession of the said land CRPF occupied the land in question also under the impression that this land was also part of the land possession of which was handed over to CRPF earlier. It was in these circumstances, the Court of Revenue Assistant in the aforesaid proceedings ordered demarcation and in the demarcation it was found that the land in question belonged to the petitioner and not the CRPF. This resulted in passing order dated 22.10.1988 by the Revenue Assistant to the effect that CRPF was illegally occupying the land. Appeal filed by CRPF was dismissed. Further appeal filed by the CRPF in the Court of Financial Commissioner was also dismissed on 23.11.2001, the CRPF filed Writ Petition No. 2692/2002 against the decision of the Financial Commissioner which is pending in this Court.
4. While the aforesaid proceedings are pending, the impugned notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act have been issued for acquiring this land.
5. Mr. L.R. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised two-fold arguments. Firstly, it was contended that Section 4 notification stipulates that land is required for a public purpose, namely, “for C.R.P.F. Camp under Planned Development of Delhi”, According to him, as per the Master Plan, user of the land is stated to be agricultural and, therefore, it could not be used for CRPF Camp. His second submission was that the notifications are acts of mala fide and colourable exercise of power as after losing the Court case up to thestage of Financial Commissioner and when the writ petition filed by the CRPF was pending, present acquisition proceedings are initiated.
6. We are unable to gree with the learned Counsel. As per petitioner’s own showing, the land is in possession of CRPF since 1980. The CRPF was under the impression that its possession over the land is bona fide as it was part of the land earlier handed over to the CRPF. Thus, it cannot be denied that admittedly the CRPF has been using this land since 1980. It is only when in the proceedings before the Revenue Courts, it was realised that the land in question belongs to the petitioner and not the CRPF, proceedings for acquisition of this land were initiated. In order to satisfy ourselves about this position, we summoned the records. Mr. Poddar has produced the original record pertaining to the acquisition of this land. On perusal of the record it is clear that according to CRPF land is required by it and after it was realised that land in question belongs to the petitioner it made request for acquisition of this land through DDA. DDA also examined the proposal and on being satisfied, sent the proposal to the Competent Authority. Competent Authority, namely, the Lt. Governor after examining the proposal approved the same. Therefore, in this conspectus, it cannot be said that it is a colourable exercise of power by the Government. On the contrary, the very fact that land is in possession of CRPF for the last more than 20 years and is being used by it would be an indicator that the CRPF required this land for its use. It cannot be said that use is not for public purpose. After this realisation dawned on the respondents that the occupation of this land is not legal as it belongs to the petitioner, steps have been taken for acquisition of the land for the CRPF. As already noted above, even when the petitioner’s predecessor was claiming that land belongs to him his request to the respondents was to acquire the land by resorting to the procedure contained in the Act. It is only because of the dispute as to whether the land belonged to the CRPF or the petitioner that requisite steps for acquisition were not taken earlier.
7. Moreover, it is the petitioner, who in fact is the gainer in the process as he would now be entitled to the compensation at the rates prevailing as on the date of notification. One can usefully refer to the judgment in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, BTDA, Bagalkot v. Mohd. Hanif Sahib Bawa Sahib, , where in similar circumstances acquisition was held to be valid. The relevant paras 13 and 14 of the said judgment read as under:
“13. After due deliberations on the contentions raised by the Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that on the given facts and circumstances of the present case the appreciation of 10% per annum given for the subsequent year is neither excessive nor unreasonable so as to call for our interference. Counsel for the parties did not dispute that after the submersion of the old township are of Bagalkot in. water, a new township was being built up. For this a lot of development activities are taking place. This is evident from the fact that a number of acquisitions have been made for the development of the new township of Bagalkot. In this order, reference has been made to the earlier acquisition of 1979. In Civil Appeal Nos. 1552-54 of 2000 as well, acquisition of the land was made for formation of a link road to the new town. We agree with the Counsel for the appellant that the Reference Court wrongly valued the land at Rs. 6.85 per sq. ft. for the year 1985 taking the base price of the land at Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. for the year 1979 on an appreciation of 10% per annum for every subsequent year. The appreciation of value of land at 10% on the basic price of Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. would increase the value of the land @ 0.30 paise per year, 0.30 paise multiplied by 7 would come to Rs. 2.10 paise. If the appreciation in value of the land for the next seven years is taken at Rs. 2.10 paise and added to the base value of Rs. 3/- the market value of the land under acquisition in year 1985 would come to Rs. 5.10 paise. We agree with the Counsel for the respondents that deduction on account of development charges from the price fixed cannot be made as the base price of Rs. 3/- had been determined in the earlier cases after taking into account the development charges.
14. Taking an overall view of the matter, we fix the value of the land at Rs. 5/- per sq. ft. instead of Rs. 5.50 per sq. ft. which was fixed by the Referecne Court and upheld by the High Court. The appeal is partly accepted. The market value is fixed at Rs. 5/- per sq. ft. In addition, the claimants would be entitled to the statutory benefits of solarium and interest etc. These group of appeals before us shall stand allowed to that extent in view of the modification made in the market value to be adopted.”
8. That apart, Mr. Poddar has also raised a valid preliminary submission to the effect that the petitioner did not file any objections under Section 5A of the Act pursuant to the notification dated 7.5.2003 issued under Section 4 of the Act. Therefore, in the absence of such objections it is not permissibe for him to file the present as held in the case of Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors., . Paras 52 and 53 of the said judgment are relevant, which read as under:
“52. In Abhey Ram 3 as well as in the judgment in the civil appeals, it has been clearly stated that those claimants who have not filed objections to the Section 4 notification cannot be permitted to contend before the Court that Section 5A inquiry is vitiated so far as they are concerned. Nor can they be permitted to seek quashing of Section 6 declaration on that ground. We shall elaborate this aspect further.
53. Now objections under Section 5A, if filed, can relate to the contention that (i) the purpose for which land is being acquired is not a public purpose; (ii) that even if the purpose is a public purpose, the land of the objector is not necessary, in the sense that the public purpose could be served by other land already proposed or some other land to which the objector may refer; or (iii) that in any event, even if this land is necessary for the public purpose, the special fact-situation in which the objector is placed, it is a fit case for omitting his land from the acquisition. Objection (ii) is personal to the land and Objection (iii) is personal to the objector.”
9. Furthermore, it is evident that the petitioner purchased this land in the year 1990 when it was already in occupation of the CRPF and his predecessor had given notice on 19.7.1998 for acquisition of the land thereby implying that he was interested in compensation. The petitioner would receive the compensation which would be determined in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act.
10. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to go into the question of the user of land as per the Master Plan. In any case if the respondents do not use the land in accordance with the Master Plan, it is always open to the petitioner to take recourse to an appropriate remedy as may be availabe to him in law.
11. The writ petition, thus, devoid of any merit, is dismissed in liming.