ORDER
Jayanta Kumar Biswas, J.
1. By order dated January 7, 2002 this writ petition was admitted only regarding its prayer (d). The petitioner abandoned other prayers.
2. Prayer (d) of the writ petition reads as follows:
“A Writ in the nature of prohibition prohibiting the respondents in (sic) withholding payment of subsistence allowance on the basis of revision of pay”.
3. I find that while arguing this case, learned advocates were oblivious of the order dated January 7, 2002. At the time of preparation of the judgment it has come to my notice from the records of the case.
4. In view of the order dated January 7, 2002 there is no necessity at all to consider the arguments regarding prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the writ petition.
5. The only issue that requires decision is whether with respect to subsistence allowance the petitioner was entitled to get the benefits of the revisions of pay.
6. The petitioner was suspended with effect from July 6, 1995. After his suspension the pay scale was revised twice. The first revision was made effective from April 1, 1992, and the second one was made effective from April 1, 1998, He was paid subsistence allowance on the basis of the basic pay he was getting on the date prior to the date of his suspension.
7. Learned advocate for the petitioner has contended that the benefits of the revisions of pay were to stand automatically extended, since the petitioner, though suspended remained in service of the respondent bank. He has relied on the decisions reported at Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi Sumer Chand Khajuria v. State 1992- II-LLJ-723 (J&K) and Umesh Chandra Misra v. Union of India 1993 Supp (2) SCC 210 : 1993-I-LLJ-187.
8. Learned advocate for the respondents has contended that subsistence allowance was payable to the petitioner in terms of Regulation 14 of Punjab National Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations. 1977, which are statutory regulations, and under it he was not entitled to get the benefits of the revisions of pay. He has also relied on the circular dated March 28, 2000, whereby the position was made clear by the respondent bank. He has given me the decision reported at Dena Bank v. Kiritikumar T. Patel .
9. I find that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The following are my reasons.
10. The decisions in Bharat Singh (supra) and Umesh Chandra Misra (supra) cases do not help the petitioner. It was not held in them that benefits of revision of pay would, of course, stand extended to a suspended employee for determining the amount of subsistence allowance.
11. The proposition laid down in the single Bench decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Sumer Chand Khajuria (supra) case, however, lends supports to the petitioner’s claim. Relevant portion of paragraph 7 of the report reads as follows 1992-II-LLJ-723 at p. 725:
“7. ……… The suspended employee continues to remain bound by the Service Rules and under an obligation to follow them till he is removed from service. A corresponding obligation is, therefore, cast upon the administration to treat the suspended employee in the service of the Government and confer upon him such benefits to which he would have been entitled, had the order of suspension not been passed against him. Revision of grades is a benefit conferred upon the State employees which cannot be denied to a particular employee only on the ground of his suspension. Depriving the suspended employee of the salary benefits to which the other employees similarly situated are entitled, may amount to punishment not permissible under the service rules applicable without holding a proper enquiry and may independently amount to punishment under those rules……….”
12. With great respect, I am unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge In Sumer Chand Khajuria (supra) case, suspended employees form a distinctly separate class; they are not similarly situated with the other employees who enjoy the right to serve and be rewarded.
13. When duly framed rule governs the issue regarding payment of subsistence allowance, there is no scope at all to claim it at any rate higher than the one specified in the rule. The terms and conditions specified in the rule bind both the parties, and they cannot be varied to the disadvantage of any party during the period the contract of service remains suspended.
14. Although during the period of suspension the master-servant relationship between the parties does not cease, since the master lawfully decides not to take the service of the servant, the servant is not entitled to normal benefits of the pay and allowances. Subsistence allowance is payable strictly in terms of the relevant provision when there is one.
15. In Dena Bank (supra) case the Supreme Court was considering the scope and purport of the phrase “full wages last drawn” employed in Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Their Lordships held that the payment to be made being in the nature of subsistence allowance, the phrase would not admit of an interpretation to mean the last wages the workman would have drawn. In my view, the proposition is equally applicable to all cases where subsistence allowance rate is specified in the relevant provision.
16. In this case the petitioner was to get subsistence allowance in terms of provisions in Regulation 14 of Punjab National Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977. He was entitled to receive the specified portion of the basic pay which he was receiving on the date prior to the date of his suspension. The rule does not say anything about the effect of subsequent revision of pay scale. So under the rule the petitioner is not entitled to get subsistence allowance on the basis of the revised basic pay. The position was made clear by the respondent-bank by issuing the circular dated March 28, 2000.
17. There is no dispute that the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance on the basis of the basic pay which he was receiving on the date prior to the date of suspension. Hence I find that the petitioner is riot entitled to any other amount towards subsistence allowance.
18. For the above reasons, I find no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly hereby dismissed. There will be no order for costs.
19. Urgent certified xerox copy of this judgment and order may be supplied to the parties, if applied for.