JUDGMENT
Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J.
1. Above two applications were filed on March 17, 2006 and March 21, 2007 respectively by the applicants, inter alia, praying for clarification and/or modification of my order dated February 14, 2006 for fixing an outermost time limit for compliance of the said order and to clarify whether by the said order dated February 14, 2006 I held the respondents guilty of Contempt of Court respectively.
2. Judgment and order dated February 14, 2006 was passed by me, while disposing of a contempt proceeding being CPAN No. 1729 of 2005. By the said judgment and order I disposed of the contempt proceeding after holding that the respondents/contemnors therein from time to time not only misled this Court from one stage to the other but also attempted to withhold the process of consideration of the writ petitioners for employment in compassionate category of land losers despite orders of Court. Even after holding the same, I did not proceed as against them to punish them under the Contempt of Courts Act as I wanted to give them one more opportunity to comply with the orders of this Court. I did not deliberately fix any time schedule as I thought good sense would prevail upon the high officials of the State who would comply with the orders in no time.
3. I feel that instead of reiterating the facts once again for convenience let my judgment and order dated February 14, 2006 be reproduced below:
For the purpose of setting up Bakreswar Thermal Power Station huge area under the District of Birbhum was acquired by the State resulting in loss of agricultural land as well as the homestead of the villagers in a substantial part of the said district. The State Government decided to give employment at least one from each land loser’s family. A committee was set up under the Chairmanship of the District Magistrate for preparation of a panel of land losers. The said committee consisted of several members from different field including representative of West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “WBPDCL”) under whose control the said thermal power station was set up and put under operation. On October 17, 1977 the Labour Department of the State of West Bengal issued a notification wherein all Government employments including employment in local bodies and Government Undertakings were directed to be routed through employment exchange and the employment exchange was asked to categorize, inter alia, the persons who were uprooted from their homestead or whose agricultural land was taken away by the Government for development work in various parts of the State. Those persons were placed by the employment exchange in a special category named as ‘Exempted Category’. 30% of vacancies were earmarked and reserved for exempted category candidate by a subsequent notification dated April 27, 1979. On October 14, 1980 the Government made provisions for direct absorption of the land losers without any reference to the employment exchange. There were subsequent circulars favouring consideration of appointment of the eligible candidates from the uprooted families of various parts of the State. 52 writ petitioners listed their names in such category subject to scrutiny of the special committee formed therefor under the Chairmanship of the concerned District Magistrate. Even then they were not being considered for employment.
They approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 15428(W) of 1998 wherein Altamas Kabir, J. (as His Lordship) then may by His Lordship’s judgment and order dated November 24, 1998 disposed of the said writ petition by recording the submission of learned Counsel appearing for WBPDCL to the effect that ‘after following the procedure for empanelment of such land losers with the intention of providing employment, the names of the petitioners have already been empanelled and they will be provided with employment as and when their turn comes according to serial number in the panel’.
On a plain reading of the said order it is clear that according to WBPDCL all writ petitioners in the said writ petition had already been empanelled and they would be provided employment as and when their turn came. Employment was, however, not given to those 52 writ petitioners despite series of representations made from time to time in this regard.
Real game started thereafter. A co-operative society was formed in Brkaeswar with several land losers as well as outsiders from the neighbouring villages belonging to a particular political party to which the petitioner did not belong. The said co-operative society was entrusted by WBPDCL to supply unskilled labourers for working in the plant. From the original list 45 persons were given appointment without following seniority. It was alleged by the petitioners that they were superseded as they belonged to a particular political party opposing the present Government in the State. There had been series of meetings and representations to resolve the controversy. However, nothing fruitful happened. Second writ petition was filed on May 16, 2003 being W.P. No. 7976 of 2003. The writ petition was initially moved before Bhaskar Bhattacharjee, J. His Lordship by an order dated May 23, 2003 restrained WBPDCL from appointing any unskilled labour without considering the eligible petitioners. Matter thereafter came up before Arun Kumar Mitra, J. after change of determination when His Lordship extended the interim order passed by Bhaskar Bhattacharjee, J. His Lordship also directed the District Magistrate to prepare a list as per the scheme and send the same to the concerned employment exchange. The District Magistrate was asked to submit a report to the Court. His Lordship reiterated that no appointment would be given by the company till the report of the District Magistrate was considered by the Court and necessary order was passed thereon. The matter again appeared before His Lordship on September 23, 2003 when His Lordship recorded that the District Magistrate despite order of this Court did not submit any report. An application for vacating the interim order was made by WBPDCL which was heard by Jayanta Kumar Biswas, J. on December 16, 2004 when His Lordship gave direction for filing affidavit. The matter thereafter came to me for hearing. I heard this writ petition. In course of hearing I passed an order dated February 24, 2005 when it was submitted on behalf of WBPDCL that they wanted to engage unskilled labour through contractor and for that they floated a tender. The petitioners informed the Court they also applied for setting up a labour co-operative society to which I directed Mr. Fajlul Haque, learned Counsel appearing for the State to take instruction from the Cooperative Department with regard to the registration of the petitioners’ cooperative society. The writ petition along with the application for vacating the interim order was ultimately disposed of by me by my judgment and order dated March 17, 2005.1 recorded that District Magistrate submitted a report in Court wherein it appeared that out of 52 writ petitioners one appeared before the District Magistrate. As such he was unsuccessful in completing the process of scrutiny. I also recorded the submission of the same learned Counsel appearing for the WBPDCL who made earlier submission before Altamas Kabir, J. (as His Lordship then was) to the effect that WBPDCL was in dare need of manpower to complete the extension programme which they had undertaken with foreign collaborator and because of the order of injunction they could not proceed in the matter. An impression was given to me as if WBPDCL intended to appoint unskilled labour force which could not be possible firstly because of the order of injunction and secondly because of the non-co-operation on the part of the petitioner in having their cases scrutinized and considered by the District Magistrate. Considering such submission I observed that the controversy could only be resolved by the District Magistrate by preparing a list in terms of the circular dated August 21, 2002 as directed by this Court in order dated August 18,2003,1 also observed that question of discrimination would be academic in case District Magistrate completes the process of preparation of the list in terms of the earlier direction of the Court. I also directed the writ petitioners to co-operate with the District Magistrate in this regard. I framed a time schedule within which the District Magistrate would send a list to the Director of Employment Exchange for empanelling the writ petitioners in exempted category by the employment exchange so that the employment exchange could recommend those names to WBPDCL maintaining seniority and WBPDCL could in turn give employment adhering to the list to be sent by the employment exchange. I passed an order of injunction restraining WBPDCL to engage any other person in the category of unskilled labour without following the procedure laid down in the notification dated August 21, 2002.
The respondent authorities changed their modus operandi. Initially before Altamas Kabir, J. they made a statement that they would absorb all the writ petitioners in accordance with seniority. They later on changed their stand to the effect that it must be routed through the committee and employment exchange. The second writ application was disposed of by me by directing the District Magistrate to complete the process. The District Magistrate ultimately completed the process, as it now appears, preparing a list of only 8 persons out of 52 writ petitioners. Why others were not listed and why they were not considered in land losers category is, however, unknown. At least this Court was kept in dark. Contempt application was filed before me. The matter was taken up by me on January 17, 2006 when I directed affidavits to be filed and ultimately matter was heard on 2nd February, 2006. In course of hearing, learned Counsel for the WBPDCL handed over a list of 8 persons which was forwarded by the District Magistrate to the Director of Employment Exchange vide his letter dated 27th July, 2005 being eligible to be empanelled. In course of hearing Mr. Fajlul Haque, learned Counsel appearing for the District Magistrate produced in Court a separate list containing names of 6 persons eligible for being enrolled in exempted category. Comparing these two lists it would appear that two common names were recommended in both the lists. Why other six names were removed from the first list and four new persons were subsequently included is a question whose answer is not known.
On perusal of the pleadings filed earlier in the writ proceeding and in this contempt proceeding and on an analysis of the facts it appears to me that WBPDCL changed its stand before this Court from time to time. Such analysis of the chronological events is set down below:
(i) Learned Counsel for WBPDCL made a statement before this Court recorded in the order dated November 24,1998 that they would follow the list strictly as par seniority and give them employment. Such list, according to him, contained names of all the writ petitioners therein.
(ii) Some appointments were given from the said list without maintaining the serial numbers. The same learned Counsel changed his stand obviously on instruction from WBPDCL before this Court on various dates in the second writ petition and gave an impression to the Court to the effect that they would repair a huge unskilled labour force which was not possible because of the order of injunction. Such submission was categorically recorded by me in my order dated September 17, 2005.
(iii) To avoid the order of injunction WBPDCL decided to engage contract labours and allowed engagement of land losers as also outsiders through the co-operative society alleged to have been supported by a particular political party being in power. I, however, did not give any weightage to such allegation while disposing of the earlier writ petition and asked the District Magistrate to complete the process of scrutiny.
(iv) There are two lists containing 8 persons and 6 persons respectively submitted by and on behalf of the District Magistrate. No explanation was given as to why there were two lists and that too containing only two common persons.
(v) Assuming there were 6 or 8 writ petitioners found eligible for employment in such category no step was taken for their absorption. Again the same learned Counsel assured me in course of hearing that they would take immediate step for their absorption. Apart from making such bold statement no particulars could be produced by him to justify his commitment before this Court.
(vi) With regard to other writ petitioners the District Magistrate did not offer any explanation as to why t hey were not suitable to be empanelled in such category.
(vii) On the issue of engagement of unskilled labour through co-operative society it was later on contended before me at the time of hearing of contempt proceeding on behalf of WBPDCL that those unskilled labour force were being engaged by various contractors performing the job and the WBPDCL had nothing to do with the same. Such stand is totally contrary to the stand taken by the WBPDCL before me while I disposed of the second writ petition.
On analysis of the aforesaid events I am constrained to hold that not only there was an attempt to delay the process of consideration of the writ petitioners for employment for the reasons best known to the respondents but also there was an attempt to mislead this Court from one stage to the other.
I gave ample opportunity to the corporation as well as the State respondents to resolve this controversy. I kept my judgment reserved and gave liberty to the learned Counsel for WBPDCL to inform me whether the controversy could be resolved in between. No fruitful purpose was served.
The authorities are bent upon to discriminate the petitioners from others. They are bent upon to create as many bundle as they can to prevent the petitioners from getting employment.
The petitioners’ means of livelihood was taken away by acquisition. I am told that the highest amount of compensation received by the family members of the petitioners was Rs. 8,000.00. In these hard days of employment the State must look into this aspect. For developmental work State is entitled to acquire as many as land as they want. At the same time the persons who lost their means of livelihood as well as homestead and were uprooted from their origin must be considered for employment in terms of the Government policy declared therefor.
When the contempt application was moved, I gave direction for filing affidavit before issuing any rule of contempt. The matter was heard by me upon completion of affidavits. Although I feel that this Court was mislead by the respondents as discussed above, I wish to give further opportunity to the respondents being the corporation respondents as well as the State respondents to comply with the orders of this Court being order dated November 24,1998 passed by Altamas Kabir, J. (as His Lordship then was) while disposing of W.P. No. 15428(W) of 1998 and order dated March 17, 2005 passed by me disposing of the second writ application being W.P. No. 7976(W) of 2003.1 hope and trust that good sense would prevail upon the officers of WBPDCL as well as the District Magistrate and the other State respondents and they would comply with the orders of this Court in then-true spirit. I do not wish to fix any time schedule. I do not wish to give any specific direction to the respondents. I only wish to observe as I have observed hereinbefore.
Let us see what happens hereinafter.
C.P.A.N. No. 1729 of 2005 is disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs.
Urgent xerox certified copy would be given to the parties, if applied for.
4. It now appears that the authorities are bent upon not to comply with the direction of this Court.
5. The first application was filed by the writ petitioners as they felt difficulty in approaching me with a further application for contempt as there was no fixed time-limit for compliance of the orders of this Court. During the pendency of the said application, the second application was filed by them for a clarification as to whether I held them guilty of Contempt of Court.
6. Mr. Kalyan Bandapadhyay, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners did not seriously press the first application and made submissions of the second application. His contentions were as follows:
i) Once the Court found that the contemnors misled the Court, there was no other option left to the Court but to hold them guilty of contempt and proceed accordingly.
ii) The Court by mistake or otherwise did not fix any outer time-limit within which order was to be complied with. The respondent/contemnors thereby took advantage of the mistake of the Court which the Court must correct at the earliest opportunity.
iii) In a contempt proceeding either the Court should hold the contemnors guilty of contempt or to hold that there was no act of contempt so that the petitioners could seek their remedy elsewhere. Having not done so, the Court in reality put the petitioners in difficulty as they became remedyless.
7. In support of his contention Mr. Bandapadhyay cited the following decisions:
(i) 2007 AIR SCW Page 1739 All Bengal Excise Licensees Association v. Raghavendra Singh and Ors.
(ii) T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot and Anr.
(iii) Rajendra Singh v. Lt. Governor Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Ors.
(iv) A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr.
8. Mr. Aninda Kumar Mitra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/contemners other than the respondent No. 1 contended as follows:
i) Once the Court disposed of the contempt proceeding by judgment and order dated February 14, 2006 the applications made by the petitioners were misconceived being not maintainable.
ii) Both applications of the petitioners were in the nature of review which was not permitted in law. In any event, those applications being not in the form of review were liable to be dismissed in limine.
iii) Having disposed of the contempt proceeding, this Court became functus officio and the prayers of the petitioners could not be considered by the Court save and except exercising its review jurisdiction. Since the applications were not for review those were liable to be dismissed.
iv) The order of this Court dated November 24,1998 was not available for making any application for contempt as being barred by the laws of limitation so was the order dated March 17, 2005.
v) Since there was no allegation of ambiguity in the order prayer for clarification was not maintainable.
vi) By the judgment and order dated February 14, 2006, this Court did not hold the respondent guilty of contempt specifically. Hence, the petitioners were not entitled to force the Court to proceed further in contempt under the guise of clarification.
vii) The land losers did not have any fundamental right to get employment. They were appropriately compensated by payment of compensation. If they were dissatisfied with the amount of compensation they should approach the appropriate authority for enhancing the amount of compensation.
viii) Petitioners did not prefer any appeal from the judgment and order dated February 14, 2006. Hence, they were not entitled to make any complain either with regard to non-fixation of any outer limit or with regard to holding the contemnors guilty of contempt.
ix) Both the applications were abuse of process of Court and should be dismissed.
9. In support of his contentions Mr. Mitra relied on the following decisions:
i) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma and Anr.
ii) 2004 Volume 106 (4) Bombay Law Reporter Page 639 Metal Box India Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
iii) AIR 2001 SC Page 2763 Pallav Singh v. Custodian and Ors.
iv) 2002 Volume 1 CHN Page 404 Abu Bakkar Siddiqui v. Director WBSEB and Ors.
v) 2006 Volume III Calcutta Law Times Page 154 Maheshivari Brothers Ltd. v. National Highway Authority of India
10. Mr. Bandapadhyay, in course of his argument made it clear that he was not inviting this Court to exercise its review jurisdiction. Hence the contentions of Mr. Mitra on review need not be gone into.
11. Both the applications were filed for clarification and/or modification of an order passed in contempt jurisdiction. Hence, I need not deal with the argument of Mr. Mitra on merits. In my view, only question germane herein is whether this Court can clarify its own order and, if so, whether I should do it in the present case or not.
12. A matter was disposed of by delivery of judgment and order by this Court in a contempt proceeding emanated from a writ proceeding. Writ Court being a Court of Equity in my view should not go into the technicalities and if the Court finds that there is any ambiguity and/or mistake in its own order, the Court has every right to clarify and/or correct and/or modify its own order. Hence, the applications are maintainable.
13. This leaves us with the question whether my judgment and order dated February 14, 2006 needs any clarification at all or not.
14. In the case of All Bengal Execise Licensees Association (supra), the Apex Court held that once the High Court found that the officials were guilty of contempt, they should not be given any benefit of doubt as they were literate, qualified officials. The Apex Court considering the facts and circumstances held that the respondents ‘deliberately’ and with ‘mala fide’ motive committed contempt. Hence, they should not be allowed to take “unfair advantage” by committing breach of an interim order and escape the consequences thereof. By pleading misunderstanding and thereafter retaining the said advantage gained in breach of the order of the Court should not be permitted to hold good. Such violations should be put to an end with an iron hand.
In the instant case, there had been a continuous breach, even then I wish to give them an opportunity to comply with the order of the Court. I did not leave them scot free. I simply delayed the process hoping that they would purge the contempt. I deliberately did not fix any time limit as I thought that high officials like the District Magistrate of the concerned district as well as the Managing Director of the statutory corporation would comply with the direction of this Court in its true letter and spirit. Considering such fact, neither I fixed any time-limit nor I proceeded further in contempt. I thought that good sense would prevail upon them and they would carry out the direction of this Court. It might be a wrong judgment on my part but there was no ambiguity on that score. Hence, I feel that no order need be passed on either of the said applications. I, however, take note of the sequence of events subsequent to delivery of judgment and the order dated February 14, 2006 as surfaced in various pleadings filed by the parties before me.
15. CAN No. 2169 of 2006 and CAN No. 2327 of 2007 are disposed of accordingly.
16. There would be no order as to costs.
Contempt Proceedings. Suo motu
17. In 1998 the respondents made a categorical statement before the learned Single Judge that they would absorb all the listed candidates including the petitioners herein at the appropriate stage. They neither initiated the process for absorption nor took any step to honour their statement made before the Court.
By interim order dated May 23, 2003 passed in W.P. No. 7976 of 2003 the respondents were restrained from appointing any unskilled labour without considering the eligible petitioners. Further direction was given to the District Magistrate being the respondent No. 1 to prepare a list as per the scheme and send the same to the concerned employment exchange.
18. Matter again appeared before the learned Single Judge on September 23,2003 when His Lordship recorded that the District Magistrate, despite order of the Court did not submit any report.
19. On February 24, 2005 while hearing the writ petition, I passed an order directing the petitioner to form a Labour Co-operative Society so that the petitioners could be engaged through the said co-operative society as submitted by the corporation before me.
20. On March 17, 2005 I disposed of the writ petition along with the application for vacating interim order whereby I recorded that the District Magistrate submitted a report that out of fifty-two petitioners only one appeared before me and as such he could not scrutinize their cases. I also recorded the submission of the corporation that they were in dire need of manpower and they could not proceed any further due to the order of injunction. I directed the District Magistrate to prepare a list in terms of the circular dated August 21, 2002 as directed by the earlier order dated August 18, 2003.1 always framed a time schedule by which the entire process would be completed by the District Magistrate by sending a list to the Director of Employment Exchange so that the exchange could forward the eligible candidates to the corporation who could, in turn, give employment to the eligible candidates. I passed the order of injunction restraining the corporation from engaging any other person in the category of unskilled labour without following the procedure laid down under the said notification dated August 21, 2002.
21. The aforesaid orders were performed in breach.
The District Magistrate completed the process by listing only eight persons out of fifty-two petitioners. No reason was assigned while the others were rejected. Moreover, there had been discrepancy with regard to listing of those eight names as it did not tally with a separate list containing six names handed over by the learned Counsel appearing for the District Magistrate.
22. The learned Counsel for the corporation undertook before this Court that they would give appointment as per the list strictly mamtaining seniority. No such appointment was given after my order dated March 17, 2005.
The Corporation thereafter continued to engage unskilled labours through a co-operative society allegedly having patronage of a political party being in power. As and when matters appeared before me from time to time assurances were given that the petitioners would be engaged. Corporation took the plea that the list was not forwarded by the District Magistrate. The corporation however, could not assign any reason as to why the list of eight or six persons sent by the District Magistrate through the employment exchange was not considered for employment as an interim measure. The petitioners were also not given any casual employment although categoric statement was made in Court that they were in dire need of additional work force because of the extension programme.
23. Considering the above backdrop, I observed that the respondent/contemnors, from time to time, misled this Court and attempted to delay the process of consideration of the petitioners for appointment in land losers category. While observing as such, I gave further opportunity to the contemnors as I thought that high officials like the District Magistrate and the Managing Director of the WBPDCL would initiate the process by taking effective steps in the matter.
24. More than one year has passed after my judgment.
25. I gave directions for filing affidavits in this second application. The District Magistrate even did not find any time to affirm the affidavit. Mr. Haque handed over a draft affidavit in Court. He contended that it could not be affirmed and filed as the District Magistrate did not find any time to do so. On a perusal of the draft affidavit, it appears that vague statement with regard to purported compliance was sought to be made. Paragraph 9 of the said draft affidavit is reproduced below:
With reference to the statements made in paragraphs 2.22 to 2.45 of the said application, save and except what are matters of record, I deny and dispute the allegations as contained therein. It is denied and disputed that the District Magistrate was also to prepare the priority list where it had not been prepared and similarly to forward such new priority list in such cases where the same had not been prepared earlier. I state that the procedures for preparing the priority list of the land losers family are being maintained properly and sent to the Director of Employment Exchange, Kolkata for enrolling their names as exempted category in terms of Govt. Notification No. 301 dated 21.08.2002.1 state that in compliance with the order of the Hon’ble Court passed in W.P. No. 7976 (W) of 2003 dated 18.08.2003 and 23.09.2003 a meeting was held on August 5, 2004 and a committee was formed A.D.M.(G) being the Chairman and it was decided that committee would issue to all the writ petitioners by registered post to appear before the committee to furnish particulars as required for preparation of the list. It is emphatically denied and disputed that the district Magistrate, Birhhumhas not complied with the order of the Hon’ble Court. I state that the District Magistrate, Birbhum took step to comply with the order of the Hon’ble Court. I state that in compliance of the order dated 17.3.2005 passed by the Hon’ble Court notices were issued to all the writ petitioners for hearing and after hearing the writ petitioners and considering the land losers’ applications lying pending with the District Magistrate, Birbhum, B.D.O., Suri-1 and B.D.O., Dubrajpur, the priority list of 318 eligible candidates including eligible writ petitioners have been made strictly in pursuance of Notification No. 301/EMP/IM/10/2000 dated 21.8.2002 read with EMP No. 303/IM/10/2000 dated 21.08.2002 and sent to the Director of Employment Exchange, Kolkata for enrolling their names as exempted category vide office Memo No. 1400/RG/VI-10 dated 18.08.2006. I further state that the District Magistrate, Birbhum has sent the priority list of land losers of DKTPP totaling 318 eligible land losers including the eligible names of the writ petitioners in pursuant of the aforesaid Notification Nos. 301 and 303.
26. In course of hearing Mr. Haque appearing for the respondent No. 1 could not make any submission as to what step the respondent No. 1 took after my judgment and order dated February 14, 2006. Even on perusal of the paragraph quoted (supra) it would appear that a list of 318 eligible candidates were sent by the District Magistrate on August 18, 2006. It did not specify which writ petitioners became fortunate enough to have their name enlisted in the said list. Copy of the list was also not produced in Court.
27. In course of hearing, I specifically asked Mr. Mitra to take instruction as to what steps corporation/respondent took after my judgment and order dated February 14, 2006. On instruction, Mr. Mitra contended that since no list came to the corporation after the said judgment and order no step was taken. He, however, coukt not give any detailed information as to what steps the corporation took to have the earlier orders of this Court complied with in their true letters and spirit.
28. The petitioners loss their livelihood as also their homestead. They might have been paid compensation being the value of the land assessed by the State. They were assured employment. For about two decades they were ventilating their grievance. The Court cannot direct employment to be given to them. In fact, Court did not give any such direction at any point of time. The petitioners wanted a fair and transparent approach of the State in considering their cases for compassionate appointment in terms of the policy of the Government. Series of litigations were filed one after the other by this group of unemployed youths. How many more they would have to file, at least to know whether they are legitimately entitled to be considered for employment in land losers category? They are knocking at the door of the temple of justice time and again. This Court from time to time directed consideration of their prayers, but in vain. This Court directed District Magistrate to submit report as early as in 2003 so repeated in the order dated March 17, 2005. The District Magistrate was duty-bound to assist the Court by giving all relevant particulars so that the Court can effectively adjudicate the issue brought before it by the petitioners. Similarly, the petitioners must know as to who out of them would be eligible for employment and if so when? Similarly, as per the directions of this Court the petitioners by way of an interim measure should have been considered for casual employment. I specifically restrained the corporation by an order of injunction from engaging any other person in the category of unskilled labours save and except following the procedure laid down in the notification dated August 21, 2002. Even in the case of casual employment such order of injunction was performed in breach by adopting a circuitous method of engaging other perbons through a Labour Co-operative Society allegedly having the patronage of a political party in power.
29. I am, therefore, prima facie of the view that the continued wrongful act and conduct of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 being the District Magistrate and the Managing Director of the WBPDCL the smooth process of adjudication of the controversy between the parties is obstructed and/or delayed which amounts to interference with the due course of judicial proceeding and administration of justice. I am, therefore, of the view that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 should be proceeded with by this Court under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act of 1971) in its criminal contempt jurisdiction as defined in Section 2(C) of the said Act of 1971 to uphold the Magistry of this Court.
30. I get support from the Apex Court decision in the case of Dr. Roshan Sam Joyee v. S.R. Cotton Mills Ltd. and Ors. . Paragraph 8 & 9 of the said decision being relevant herein are quoted below:
In the circumstances set out earlier, although the learned Judge of the High Court might have fell constrained by what the considered to be the limits of his jurisdiction in a contempt proceeding, we feel that our hands are not so tied and, where there is patent dishonesty on the part of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 writ large on the face of the record the law does not require that we should sit back with folded hands and fail to take any action in the matter.
We find that under Clause (1) of Article 142 of the Constitution, it is provided that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforced throughout the territory of India in the manner set out therein. In the circumstances which we have already set out earlier, we are of the view that respondent No. 1 is guilty of misconduct amounting to contempt and must be held to have committed contempt by giving the said undertaking and instructing its Counsel to give the clarification of the meaning of the said undertaking as aforestated knowing fully well that it was not in possession of the suit premises and was not in a position to give possession of the suit premises to the appellant in execution of the decree in favour of the appellant or otherwise. It is significant that the claim of sub-tenancy set up by respondent No. 2 is pursuant to an alleged resolution of respondent No. 1. We have also not doubt that respondent No. 2 was a party to this breach of the undertaking being committed and, in fact, it was he at whose instance respondent No. 1 committed the breach of the undertaking as aforestated. We are, of course, quite conscious of the fact that the proceedings in the contempt are quasi-criminal in nature, that the law of contempt has to be strictly interpreted and that the requirements of that law must be strictly complied with before any person can be committed for contempt. However, as we have pointed out, respondent No. 1 gave an undertaking based on the implication or assumption which was false to its knowledge and to the knowledge of respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 was equally instrumental in the giving of this undertaking. This implication or assumption was made explicit by the clarification given by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 as set out earlier. Respondent No. 2 was equally responsibly for instructing Counsel to give this clarification which was false to the knowledge of both, respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Both respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 have tried to deceive the Court and the appellant. In view of this, we fail to see how it can be said that they are not guilty of contempt. Even assuming that a view were to be taken that no contempt has been technically established against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (with which view we do not agree), we cannot allow the matter to rest there and fail to take any action and, in particular, we cannot allow respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to thwart the execution of the decree in this manner at this stage and continue to remain in possession of the suit premises. We find some support for the course of action which we are taking from the decision of this Court in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. Sh. K.M.M. Shetty where, on facts which bear some similarity to the facts of this case, a Division Bench of this Court held that ‘it is settled law that breach of an injunction or breach of an undertaking given to a Court by a person in a civil proceeding on the faith of which the Court sanctions a particular course of action is misconduct amounting to contempt.’ At the same time, we are conscious of the fact that we cannot altogether foreclose the claim set up by respondent No. 2 in the declaratory suit filed by him in the Court of Small Causes to establish that he is a sub-tenant of the suit premises and entitled to the protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. However, we are firmly of the view that by reason of any interim order obtained in that suit and till that claim is finally established, the appellant can no longer be deprived of the possession of the said premises pursuant to the decree for eviction obtained by her. All the necessary parties to that suit are before us and have had and adequate opportunity to be heard.
31. Appropriate rule NISI be issued calling upon the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 why they should not be proceeded for criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(C) of the said Act of 1971 on the ground mentioned above. Returnable September 3, 2007 before the Bench presided over by the Hon’ble Chief Justice taking up criminal contempt matters.
32. Urgent xerox certified copy would be given to the parties, if applied for.