IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
AS.No. 273 of 2000(E)
1. SANKARANKUTTY
... Petitioner
Vs
1. KOCHAMMINI
... Respondent
For Petitioner :SRI.K.P.SREEKUMAR
For Respondent :SRI.N.P.SAMUEL
The Hon'ble MR. Justice PIUS C.KURIAKOSE
Dated :27/04/2010
O R D E R
PIUS C. KURIAKOSE, J.
------------------------------------------
AS. No. 273 of 2000
-------------------------------------------
Dated this the 27th day of April, 2010
J U D G M E N T
The second defendant in a suit for partition which is
decreed by the trial court is the appellant. The parties will
be referred to as they were before the trial court. The
plaintiffs, two sisters filed the suit arraying their father as
the first defendant and siblings as the other defendants.
2. The case of the plaintiffs as averred in the plaint was
that they and defendants 2 to 8 are the children of the first
defendant and his wife Kochupennu. Kochupennu passed
away on 4-3-1982. As per document No. 2801/1118 M.E. of
the Sub Registry Office, Thrissur, (Ext.A1), Ext.B5 the
properties were acquired by late Kochupennu along with
some other properties. Kochupennu had already assigned
the remaining properties. Kochupennu acquired these
properties with her own funds. Kochupennu had exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the properties till she died.
AS. 273/2000
-2-
She had made valuable improvements in the properties.
She assigned 49 cents of land to the third defendant who
wanted to get her share out of her mother’s properties in
advance. Hence the third defendant is not entitled to get
further share in the property. Upon demise of Kochupennu
the properties devolved upon the plaintiffs and defendants
1, 2 and 4 to 8 who are in joint possession and enjoyment
of the properties. The first defendant was looking after the
properties on behalf of all the co-owners and he was paying
share of profits to the plaintiffs till January, 1983.
Thereafter he did not pay the share of profits. Hence the
plaintiffs sent a notice demanding partition. To that notice,
a reply was sent raising untenable contentions. The parties
are Ezhavas governed by the Hindu Succession Act for
inheritance. The mesne profits from the property per year
will come to Rs.27,000/-. Hence the suit for partition with
future mesne profits.
AS. 273/2000
-3-
3. A joint written statement was filed by defendants 1,
2, 4, 5, 7 and 8. It was contended that it is not correct to
say that Kochupennu acquired the properties with her own
funds and was in possession and enjoyment of the
properties till her demise. The properties were actually
acquired by the first defendant in the name of Kochupennu.
Kochupennu was only a benamidar. The first defendant was
tenant under one Neelakanta Sasthrikal. After the marriage
of Kochupennu, she was residing along with the first
defendant in the house constructed by him. While so, the
suit properties along other 12 acres and 87 cents was
purchased by the first defendant from Neelakanta Sasthrikal
for a consideration of Rs.800/-. Rs.300/- was paid by cash
and the remaining Rs.500/- was raised by executing a
mortgage deed in favour of one Varunni. The first
defendant subsequently redeemed portions of these
properties from mortgage. Even though the documents
AS. 273/2000
-4-
stand in the name of Kochupennu, the properties are in the
possession of the first defendant. The first defendant
caused late Kochupennu to execute a settlement deed in
favour of the third defendant 48= cents in 1981. The
averment that the third defendant was given one share in
the properties is not correct. The properties did not devolve
upon the parties upon demise of Kochupennu. The first
defendant had already given in marriage his daughters
giving ornaments and utensils etc. and all the daughters are
residing in the houses of their husbands. For conducting
marriage of the 7th defendant, the first defendant had taken
a loan of Rs.20,000/- . In 1984, the A schedule property
was settled by the first defendant in favour of second
defendant and in 1985, the B- schedule property was settled
in favour of the 5th defendant. Similarly, the C – schedule
properties were settled in favour of 7th defendant in 1985
itself. The first defendant has executed a Will in respect of
AS. 273/2000
-5-
the properties. These properties will fetch mesne profits
as stated is wrong.
3. The learned Subordinate Judge formulated the
following issues for trial in the suit.
1. Whether the suit properties were acquired and held
exclusively by deceased Kochupennu as is pleaded
in the plaint, or whether the sale deed in her name
was only a benami transaction?
2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim partition?
3. What are the correct shares?
4. Whether the documents executed by the 1st
defendant are valid and binding?
5. Equities and reservations?
6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits?
If so, what is the quantum?
7. Reliefs and costs?
The issues were enquired into and at trial the evidence
consisted of Exts.A1 to A3, B1 to B44 and the oral evidence
of the first defendant as DW-1. On evaluating the evidence
the learned Subordinate Judge found that the defendants
AS. 273/2000
-6-
are not entitled to take the benefit of Section 2 of the
Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Property)
Ordinance, 1988. The court also relied on a statement made
by first defendant as DW1 that he has no contention and
that he has simply agreed for passage of a decree as prayed
for. The court went on to find that the suit properties are
partible and hence passed a preliminary decree for partition.
Against that judgment and decree AS. No. 468 of 1990
was filed before this Court by the present appellant himself.
This court set aside that judgment and decree taking the
view on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Nanda Kishore Mehra v. Sushila Mehra (1995) 4 SCC 572
that when Section 3(2) permits a person to enter into a
benami transaction of purchase of property in the name of
his wife or unmarried daughter, the question of punishing
him under Section 3(3) or the question of acquiring the
property concerned under Section 5 can never arise. This
AS. 273/2000
-7-
court accordingly held that there is no valid reason to deny
to a person enforcement of his rights under Section 3(2) of
the Act. This court also relied on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in R.Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini
Chandrasekharan, (1995) 2 SCC 630 and held that since the
suit is of the year 1985, the provisions of the Benami
Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 cannot apply. This
court was not very much impressed by the statement made
by DW1 in his evidence. According to this Court, since DW1
had filed a joint written statement along with the other
defendants, the other defendants should be given an
opportunity to adduce evidence in support of the written
statement. Accordingly, the judgment and decree were set
aside and the suit was remanded to the trial court giving
opportunity to the defendants to adduce evidence regarding
the benami nature of the transaction. It was also ordered
that if the first defendant is not available for evidence the
AS. 273/2000
-8-
other defendants will be allowed to give separate evidence.
After the above order of remand the second defendant was
examined as DW2 and the learned Subordinate Judge would
formulate additional issue No.8 as follows:
“Whether the first defendant has acquired the property
in the name of his wife as benami?
Issue Nos. 1 to 6 and additional issue No. 8 were considered
by the learned Subordinate Judge together. On appreciating
the evidence and by relying on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Jagdagal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra and others
(AIR 1974 SC 171) which lays down the principles to be
kept in mind while finding out the benami nature of a
particular transaction, the learned Sub Judge came to the
conclusion that the purchase of the property under Ext.B5
was made in the name of late Kochupennu and it can never
be treated as a benami transaction. In this regard the
learned Sub Judge relied on Section 3(2) of the Benami
Transaction (Prohibitory) Act also. Accordingly repelling the
AS. 273/2000
-9-
contentions a preliminary decree was passed. It is
assailing the above preliminary decree and judgment that
the present appeal is filed raising various grounds.
4. Before the arguments commenced I noticed that
despite the mandate of Order 32A the possibility of a
settlement between the parties in this case, which clearly
comes within the ambit of Order 32A, had not been
explored. Hence I directed the parties to be present in my
chamber. Accordingly most of the parties and counsel were
present in my chamber on 26-6-2008. I explored the
possibility of a settlement between the parties. I was
convinced that an out of court settlement is not possible and
hence listed the appeal for hearing.
5. Extensive and strenuous submissions were
addressed before me by Mr. K.P.Sreekumar, learned counsel
for the appellant. Equally extensive arguments were
addressed before me by Mr.N.P.Samuel, learned counsel for
AS. 273/2000
-10-
the respondents. Drawing my attention to the averments in
the plaint Mr. Sreekumar submitted that the case pleaded
by the plaintiffs was that the properties were acquired by
Kochupennu and the acquisition of the plaint schedule
property was with the own funds of Kochupennu. He also
pointed out that Kochupennu had assigned 49 cents of land
to the 3rd defendant as per Ext.B13 dated 7-1-1981 and
therefore the 3rd defendant is not entitled to any further
share in the plaint schedule property. Mr. Sreekumar
submitted that the specific contention raised by DW1, the
husband of Kochupennu was that Kochupennu had no assets
at the time when Raman married her. The funds for
acquiring the plaint schedule property was generated by
Raman and the improvements were all made in the property
and the house was constructed by Raman. The learned
counsel would read over to me paragraph 3 of the written
statement where these contentions are raised. Counsel
AS. 273/2000
-11-
submitted that there was a specific contention that the
marriage of the 7th defendant was conducted by raising a
loan of Rs.20,000/- on the security of the properties and
that the first defendant has even executed a Will
bequeathing the properties as desired by him. Mr.
Sreekumar would paraphrase issue No.1 remanded by this
court by judgment in AS. 468 of 1990 and submit that the
above issue has two parts. According to him the two parts
contemplated by this issue are as to whether the
acquisition is exclusively by Kochupennu or whether the
acquisition is benami for the 1st defendant. According to
Mr. Sreekumar, it cannot be contended that the plaintiff has
no burden of proof in view of the nature of the issue
settled. Counsel highlighted that the plaintiff had no case
that the issue was wrongly settled and the same is to be re
-cast before the trial started. Counsel argued that a party
accepting the onus without demur cannot object at a later
AS. 273/2000
-12-
stage that the onus was wrongly put on him. According to
Mr. Sreekumar, there is absolutely no evidence on record
that at the time of marriage Kochupennu was given money
as a wedding gift. There is no evidence on record to show
that after the marriage and when she started staying with
Raman she engaged herself in any avocation such as
vending milk, rearing goats, poultry to augment the income
of the family and while doing so she could save money
with which she could acquire Ext.A1 properties. Counsel
submitted that it was not the case pleaded by the plaintiffs
that there was financial help rendered to Kochupennu from
her family to acquire Ext.A1 properties. According to Mr.
Sreekumar, the crucial question is what is the presumption
in respect of a lady who had no job, no private avocation, no
family help acquiring property in her name. The learned
counsel would ask whether it is to be presumed that the
property was acquired with the funds generated by her
AS. 273/2000
-13-
husband as claimed or the case of acquisition with the own
funds as pleaded in the plaint, for, the documents stands in
her name. Counsel submitted that it is a well established
principle of law that a person seeking partition of property
must establish his right to demand partition. According to
him, the right of the plaintiff to get partition will stand
established only on establishing the fact comprised in the
aforesaid issue, viz., whether the properties were acquired
individually and held by Kochupennu. Placing strong
reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao, (AIR 1999 SC 1441) Mr.
Sreekumar submitted that the non examination of the
plaintiffs in this particular case will justify drawal of adverse
inference against them. The learned counsel blamed the
court below for not entering in a finding on the question as
to whether the plaintiffs’ case that the property has been
acquired by their mother with her own funds is correct. The
AS. 273/2000
-14-
court below considered only the second part of the first
issue and omitted to consider the first part. This has
resulted in serious prejudice to the interest of the appellant.
Mr. Sreekumar would assail the conclusions of the learned
Sub Judge based on Section 3(2) of the Benami
Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. According to him, while
properties purchased by one in the name of his wife or
unmarried daughter the presumption can be that the
purchase was for the benefit of wife or unmarried daughter
unless the contrary is proved. In the instant case
Mr.Sreekumar referred to Exts.B14 to B16, the three
assignment deeds and the recitals therein and argued that
those documents and the recitals therein will amount to
proving the contrary for the purpose of Section 3(2). He
referred to Ext. B19 and B17 also and submitted that though
A1 stood in the name of Kochupennu alone all the
subsequent dealings in relation to the property, Raman also
AS. 273/2000
-15-
was participating with Kochupennu. After the death of
Kochupennu, Exts.B14 to B16 were executed asserting his
rights as the real owner. A state of things is shown to
have existed throughout. Hence the presumption will move
forward and backward. For this proposition the learned
counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR
1996 SC 605.
6. Sri.N.P.Samuel was able to meet all the submission
of Mr.K.P.Sreekumar to a considerable extent. Mr.Samuel
referred to Section 3(1) and (2) of Benami Transaction
(Prohibition) Act and submitted that since in the instant case
the purchase of the property by Kochupennu as contended
by the defendant was effected before the commencement of
the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, Section 3(1)
cannot have any application regarding this case. What the
learned counsel argued is that the burden to prove that a
purchase of a property is benami as always on a person
AS. 273/2000
-16-
who asserts it to be so and this burden can never shift. Even
if an issue was wrongly framed casting burden on the
plaintiff as is done in the present case, the onus will not
shift. Counsel referred to paragraph 5 of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in AIR 1974 Page 171 and submitted
that “the essence of a benami is the intention of the party or
parties concerned and not unoften such intention is
shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced
through”. But such difficulty will not relieve the person
asserting the transaction to be benami from the obligation
of establishing that the transaction is benami. Referring to
the same judgment Mr.Samuel highlighted that a registered
document is a solemn document prepared and executed
after considerable deliberations and that if so, the person
expressly shown as the purchaser or transferee in the
document always enjoys the initial presumption in his favour
that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs.
AS. 273/2000
-17-
Mr.Sreekumar referred to the judgment of the Allahabad
High Court in AIR 1979 page 47 and submitted that a
registered sale deed carries a presumption of genuineness
regarding the correctness of the recitals and the burden to
prove that the sale is not a real and that the document is
executed benami for the benefit of somebody else is on the
person who alleges the same. Referring to the judgment of
the Patna High Court in AIR 1964 Page 543 Mr.Samuel
submitted that there is no presumption in Hindu Law that
the transactions standing in the name of wives are
transactions belonging to their husbands. Mr.Samuel
reiterated that the defendants have not discharged their
burden of proof in this case. Mr.Samuel submitted that after
acquiring the suit property under Ext.A1 in the year 1118
ME late Smt.Kochupennu had purchased property in the
year 1123 also by paying sale consideration. Ext.B11 was
referred to. It is submitted that extent of 2 acres and 4
AS. 273/2000
-18-
cents of land with a house and a well is purchased by
Kochupennu and the learned counsel highlighted the recitals
in the document that the sale consideration is paid by
Kochupennu and her possession of the property is delivered
to Kochupennu. Mr.Samuel highlighted that in the joint
written statement filed by D1, D2, D4, D5, D7 and D8, it
was never claimed that Ext.B11 property purchased by late
Kochupennu is a benami transaction and that it was Raman
who paid the sale consideration and purchased the same in
the name of Kochupennu. Ext.B11 was more than sufficient
evidence to show that Kochupennu had her own funds for
purchasing properties and that there is nothing incredible or
improbable about Kochupennu purchasing the plaint
schedule properties with her funds as recited in Ext.A1.
Mr.Samuel highlited that till Smt.Kochupennu passed away
it was she who exercised the rights over ownership of the
property and her husband never questioned the same.
AS. 273/2000
-19-
Ext.B13 settlement deed dated 07/01/81 executed by
Kochupennu regarding an extent of 48 1/8th cents of
property covered by Ext.A1 is highlited by Mr.Samuel.
Mr.Samuel submitted that Ext.B13 is executed only by late
Kochupennu and Raman is not a co-executant. Raman who
was aware of the execution of Ext.B13 had no demur
against Ext.B13 or the assertion of ownership by Ext.B13
over the property covered by Ext.B13. Mr.Samuel submitted
it was after the demise of Kochupennu and after receiving
Ext.A4 demand for partition on 16.07.1984 Ext.DW1 Raman
came out with the case of Benami for the first time. Till
Kochupennu died Raman never claimed that it was he who
paid the consideration for purchase of Ext.A1. It is after his
wife passed away that Raman declared himself as the owner
and started transferring properties by executing settlement
deeds. Exts.B14, B15 and B16 settlement deeds executed
by Raman in favour of his children are the documents
AS. 273/2000
-20-
through which Raman introduced the theory of benami for
the first time. Mr.Samuel submitted that in the written
statement no reason is stated as to why Kochupennu
transferred the property in favour of one of the daughters
by Ext.B13. The reason brought out in evidence is that the
transfer became necessary as the properties stood in the
name of Kochupennu. But this is only a lame reason. The
properties covered by Exts.B14 to B16 also stood in the
name of Kochupennu. After the demise of Kochupennu
Raman can claim only co-ownership along with the other
legal representatives of Kochupennu. The action of Raman
in executing Exts.B14 to B16 declaring himself to be the
owner without support of any court verdict came up for
severe attack at the hands of Mr.Samuel. According to him,
it is after the issuance of Ext.A4 partition notice that Raman
usurped the power of court to declare himself as the owner
of the property. According to Mr.Samuel the junction of
AS. 273/2000
-21-
Raman also to the mortgage deed executed by Kochupennu
in spite of Raman having no right over the property is easily
explicable. Counsel submitted that Raman was the
subscriber to the Kuri conducted by Guruvijaya Kuri
Company and Smt.Kochupennu’s liability was only as
mortgagor. Therefore, in order that Raman also became
personally liable it was absolutely necessary that Raman
also joined the mortgage deed. Answering the argument
that Kochupennu had no funds Mr.Samuel would refer to
various aspects of the evidence and argue that the evidence
is to the effect that Raman was in considerable financial
difficulties and had no funds to purchase the properties. As
for Kochupennu’s financial ability Mr.Samuel argued that the
recitals in the registered document arouses a presumption
that consideration was paid by the purchaser Kochupennu
and the evidence in the case falls short of holding that such
presumption has been rebutted by acceptable legal
AS. 273/2000
-22-
evidence.
7. I have very anxiously considered the rival
submissions addressed at the Bar. I have made a thorough
re-appraisal of the entire evidence available in the case. I
have gone through the impugned judgment as well as the
earlier judgment of this Court in A.S.468/90 by which the
case was remanded to the Sub Court for fresh decision.
8. The submissions of Sri.K.P.Sreekumar, the learned
counsel for the appellant that issue No.1 which was
remanded to the court below for re-consideration
contemplates two parts and that the court below has
considered only the second part is attractive, but if one goes
deeper it will be seen that the attractiveness is superficial.
According to me, in the light of the pleadings raised once
the so called second part of the issue as to whether the sale
deed in favour of the Kochupennu is a benami transaction is
answered against the contesting defendants it has to follow
AS. 273/2000
-23-
that the apparent tenor of the title document Ext.A1 under
which absolute ownership and possession of the property is
conveyed to the purchaser Kochupennu is real. The manner
in which the issue is framed and the use of the word or
between what Mr.Sreekumar described as the two parts of
the issue will show that the decision on the so called second
part will have its inevitable effect on the first part also.
9. In order that the scope of the remand order is
understood correctly it is necessary to read the remand
order itself. A careful reading of the remand order will show
that the point which is relegated to be re-considered is the
point whether the purchase covered by Ext.A1 is a purchase
by the first defendant in the name of his wife Kochupennu
benami for him and for his benefit. Permission is granted to
the defendant’s alone to adduce evidence regarding the
benami nature of the transaction and other defendants have
been permitted to give separate evidence if the first
AS. 273/2000
-24-
defendant is not available for adducing further evidence.
Once the scope of the remand oder is understood correctly
then the only question that arises is whether the defendants
were successful in establishing that purchase under Ext.A1
was a purchase actually by the first defendant in the name
of his wife Kochupennu for his benefit.
10. The observations of the Supreme Court in 1974 SC
171 at paragraph 5 are significant.
“The essence of a benami is the intention of
the party or parties concerned and not unoften
such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which
cannot be easily pierced through. But such
difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the
transaction to be benami ….. …… . The reason is
that the deed is a solemn document prepared and
executable after considerable deliberations, and
the person expressly shown as the purchaser or
the transferee in the deed, starts with the initial
presumption in his favour that the apparent state
of affairs is the real state of affairs.”
(underline supplied).
11. The burden to prove that a purchase of a property
is benami for the benefit of another person is on that person
AS. 273/2000
-25-
who asserts the same to be benami and this is a burden that
will seldom shift. Any difficulty in the framing of the issue
will not relieve the person on whom the onus rests to prove
the transaction to be a benami, of such onus. That
registered sale deed carries a presumption regarding the
correctness of the recitals therein (rebuttable though the
same may be) is also settled by a line of decision including
the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1979
Allahabad 47 relied on by Mr.Samuel.
12. There is evidence in the case to hold that even
after acquiring the property under Ext.A1 in the year 1118
M.E. late Smt.Kochupennu had purchased the property in
1123 also by paying sales consideration. Ext.B11 is
document executed by one Rajan Menon in favour of
Kochupennu in 1123 in respect of a fairly extensive area of
land with building. It is seen that no contention is raised by
Raman in his written statement that Ext.B11 property was
AS. 273/2000
-26-
also purchased by him in the name of Kochupennu as a
benami transaction. This according to me is a circumstance
which supports the case of the plaintiff that Ext.A1
transaction is not a benami transaction.
13. Ext.B13 settlement deed executed by
Smt.Kochupennu on 07/01/81 in favour of her daughter
Parukutty with respect to an extent of 14 and 1/8th cents of
the property from out of the properties covered by Ext.A1 is
again a circumstance which will show that Kochupennu was
asserting her ownership rights over the property covered by
Ext.A1 during her life time. Significantly in Ext.B13
Kochupennu is the sole executant though Raman’s
contention is it was at his instance that Ext.B13 is executed
there is no evidence to support the above contention.
14. The one circumstance which is highlighted by
Mr.Sreekumar to show that Kochupennu herself conceded
Raman’s interest over the property is the junction of Raman
AS. 273/2000
-27-
to Ext.B19 mortgage deed. But I am of the view that the
circumstance of Raman also joining Ext.B19 mortgage deed
has been satisfactorily explained. The mortgage deed is
executed as a Kuri security mortgage in favour of
Guruvijaya Kuri Company where Raman was the subscriber.
It was to facilitate payment of the Kuri amount due to
Raman that the mortgage became necessary. In fact the
recitals in Ext.B19 itself are to the effect that the property
covered by the mortgage deed belongs absolutely to party
No.2 namely Kochupennu alone. The explanation that it was
for the purpose of fastening Raman the subscriber and
Parukutty, co-guarantor with personal liability that they also
joined the mortgage deed is convincing.
15. Ext.B19 can be safely relied on to conclude that
even Raman had admitted that as on the date of that
document his wife Kochupennu was the person in
possession and enjoyment of the property in question.
AS. 273/2000
-28-
16. Now we will consider whether any evidence has
been adduced by the contesting defendants to show that
Raman was having funds with him to advance to his wife for
the purpose of purchasing the property. Ext.B17 is another
mortgage deed executed by Kochupennu in which also
husband Raman is a co-executor. Ext.B17 is executed for
the purpose of securing the amounts borrowed from
Smt.Devaky Amma for discharge of the debts inclusive of
Rs.1,000/- borrowed for giving in marriage to one of their
daughters. This document will also show that the co-
mortgagor Raman has admitted that the property is
mortgaged belonged to Kochupennu.
17. The oral evidence of DW1 continues to be a very
relevant piece of evidence for resolving the issue. Raman
admitted that plaintiffs can be given 40 cents each from out
of the plaint schedule property. In cross examination, he
further admitted that he has no objection whatsoever in the
AS. 273/2000
-29-
suit being decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. Of course, this
Court while passing the remand order has permitted the
other defendants to substantiate the contention that the
purchase was by Raman for Raman’s benefit in the name of
Raman’s wife. Let us examine the evidence adduced by
them after remand. DW2 Shankarankutty son of Raman is
examined after remand. He had no explanation to offer as to
why the property was purchased in the name of mother
rather than in the name of father himself. He stated that he
has not come across any document which will show that his
father was having income. He also stated that father did not
maintain any income and expenditure accounts. He further
stated that his father had no bank deposit. He also did not
deny the suggestion that his father was hard pressed for
money. I do not find any evidence which will show that it
was Raman who advanced the consideration recited in
Ext.A1.
AS. 273/2000
-30-
18. Under the above circumstances, I do not find any
warrant for interfering with the preliminary decree for
partition passed by the court below. The appeal fails and will
stand dismissed. However, considering the relationship
between the parties I refrain from awarding cost to the
respondent.
PIUS C.KURIAKOSE, JUDGE
ksv/kns-
AS. 273/2000
-31-
PIUS C.KURIAKOSE, J.
AS. No. 273 of 2000
JUDGMENT
27th April, 2010