High Court Kerala High Court

Sankunni vs Abdulrahiman on 3 September, 2010

Kerala High Court
Sankunni vs Abdulrahiman on 3 September, 2010
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

SA.No. 931 of 2000(C)



1. SANKUNNI
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs

1. ABDULRAHIMAN
                       ...       Respondent

                For Petitioner  :SRI.K.RAMACHANDRAN

                For Respondent  :SRI.B.KRISHNA MANI

The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.BHAVADASAN

 Dated :03/09/2010

 O R D E R
                          P. BHAVADASAN, J.
               - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                          S.A. No. 931 of 2000
              - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
           Dated this the 3rd day of September, 2010.

                                 JUDGMENT

The plaintiff in O.S.677 of 1989, who was

non-suited by the courts below is the appellant.

2. The dispute relates to a pathway, which the

plaintiff alleges runs along the southern boundary of the

first defendant’s property. The first defendant has

property on the western side of plaintiff’s property.

Further west is the Peruvalloor-Mattom public road.

According to the plaintiff, the pathway commences from

the said public road, runs through the southern side of

the first defendant’s property and reaches his property.

According to the plaintiff, that pathway is the only means

of access to his property from the outside world. He

claims that the pathway had a width of 3 feet and a

length of 73 feet from the public road to plaint A

schedule property. He claimed that he has got right of

S.A.931/2000. 2

easement by prescription to use the said pathway. It is

also contended that plaint A Schedule property, which is

owned by the plaintiff, B schedule pathway and the

property now owned and possessed by the defendants were

earlier owned by a common owner thereby indicating that

the plaintiff has a claim of easement by necessity also over

the pathway. Claiming that the defendant was trying to

close down the pathway, the plaintiff laid the suit.

3. The first defendant resisted the suit pointing

out that there is no bonafides in the suit and there is no

pathway as alleged by the plaintiff. He had no right in the

property. In fact the plaintiff wanted him to sell the property

to him for the low price offered by him, to which he was not

amenable. Pointing out that there is no pathway as alleged

in existence and also contending that the plaintiff has no

manner of right to use any portion of the property as a

pathway, he prayed for a dismissal of the suit.

S.A.931/2000. 3

4. Second and third defendants, who are the

subsequent assignees from the first defendant, supported

the first defendant.

5. The trial court raised necessary issues for

consideration. The evidence consists of the testimony of

P.W.1 and documents marked as Exts.A1 and A2 from the

side of the plaintiff. The defendants examined D.W.1 and

had Ext. B1 marked. Exts. C1 to C8 are the commission

reports and sketches. On an evaluation of the evidence in

the case, the trial court came to the conclusion that there is

no pathway as alleged in the plaint and the plaintiff had

other means of access to the outside world. Therefore relief

was declined to the plaintiff.

6. In appeal the lower appellate court

independently considered the evidence on record and came

to the same conclusion as the trial court. Accordingly the

appeal was dismissed. The concurrent findings against the

plaintiff are challenged in this appeal.

S.A.931/2000. 4

7. The following questions of law are seen raised

in the Second Appeal:

“A. Were the courts below justified in

mis-appreciating and even ignoring the various

vital facts and datas revealed in the

commissioner’s reports in support of the plaintiff’s

case relating to B schedule way?

B. Did not the courts below err in placing the

entire burden of proof on the plaintiff?

C. Was the court below justified in finding

that prescriptive right can never be acquired over

a ridge in a paddy field?

D. Did not the courts below err in dismissing

the suit?”

8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant

pointed out that the courts below were not justified in

non-suiting the plaintiff. It was contended that on going

through the commission report, it can be seen that the

pathway as alleged does exist. There is nothing to indicate

that the plaintiff has any other means of access to the

outside world. It was contended that the pathway made

S.A.931/2000. 5

mention of in Ext.B1, of which considerable reliance was

placed by both the courts below is for the inter se use of the

sharers of that deed and does not provide access to the

outside world. It was also pointed out that in the plaint it

was averred that the plaintiff and his predecessors have

been using the way for a long time and they have acquired

prescriptive right of easement to use the same. There is no

denial of this pleading in the plaint in the written statement

filed by the defendants and therefore it can be taken as

admitted. These vital aspects were omitted to be noticed

by the courts below and according to learned counsel the

judgment and decrees are clearly unsustainable both on

facts and in law.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents

on the other hand pointed out that the courts below have

considered all the aspects. It is not correct to say that the

way made mention of in Ext.B1 is for the inter se use of the

sharers under that deed. It provides access to the outside

world. Attention of this court was drawn to Exts.C3 to C8

S.A.931/2000. 6

and it is pointed out that the way made mention of in the

partition deed is the way which gives access to the plaintiff

to the outside world. Learned counsel drew the attention of

this court to the evidence of P.W.1 and it is pointed out that

in fact the plaintiff admits existence of other ways. But he

says that he is not willing to use those ways. It was pointed

out by learned counsel for the respondent that the

ingredients necessary to attract easement by necessity or

easement by prescription are not available in the case on

hand and both the courts below were justified in holding so.

It is significant to notice, according to learned counsel that

the plaintiff started residence in plaint A schedule property

only in 1979 and the suit had been laid in 1989. The

statutory period so as to attract prescriptive right of

easement is therefore not completed. There is no definite

pleading or evidence on record to justify a claim of

easement by necessity also. According to learned counsel,

therefore both the courts below were justified in dismissing

the suit.

S.A.931/2000. 7

10. The courts below have placed considerable

reliance on the commission reports and plans. They have

also relied on the recitals contained in Ext.B1. It is true that

the lower courts have also adverted to the boundaries of the

property owned by the plaintiff which was allotted to him as

per Ext.B1 partition deed. Both the courts below have found

that the western boundary of item No.1 in A schedule to the

partition deed is shown as plaint B schedule, which was a

paddy field and they came to the conclusion that there

could not have been a way as alleged by the plaintiff.

11. One of the main contentions taken by the

appellant is that the pathway made mention of in Ext.B1 is

for the use of the sharers made mention of in Ext.B1 and it

does not provide access to the outside world. B schedule

pathway had a width of 3 feet and a length of 73 feet. As

per the plaint, it runs along the southern side of the first

defendant’s property. The defendant’s property lies on the

western side of the plaintiff’s property and further west is

the road.

S.A.931/2000. 8

12. One of the main contentions taken is that in

paragraphs 4 and 5 of the plaint it is averred that the

plaintiff as well as his predecessors were using plaint B

schedule pathway. It needs to be noticed that the plaintiff

claims both easement by prescription and easement by

necessity. One may at once notice that the pleas are

inconsistent. While one has its statutory origin, the other

has its origin in doctrine of lose grant. It may be possible to

say that the plaintiff can take inconsistent pleas in the

plaint. But at the time of evidence, he has to select one. He

has not done so in the present case. The origin, nature, use

and termination of the two types of easement are totally

different. It is also necessary to notice that nowhere in the

plaint the ingredients necessary to attract easement by

necessity is seen pleaded. In the written statement filed by

the first defendant he has stated that through his property,

which is situate on the northern side of the property

assigned to the second defendant, there was a way running

through its northern side and it continues to exist. That was

S.A.931/2000. 9

the way used by the plaintiff and his brothers and it is

pointed out by the defendants that it is that way made

mention of in Ext.B1 partition deed.

13. The plaintiff places considerable reliance on

Exts.C1 and C2 report and sketch. That report was an ex

parte report and it is true that it mentions about existence of

B schedule pathway. It also mentions about a branch from

that way leading to the well in the compound of the Mosque

situate on the southern side of plaint A schedule property.

Exts. C3 to C8 show the alternate ways from the way made

mention of in Ext.A1, which provides access to the plaintiff

to the outside world. It can be seen from these reports and

plans that a way starts from Mattom-Elavally road on the

western side, runs through the property of the first

defendant on the northern side, goes towards east and

reaches the house of Govindan, who is none other than the

brother of the plaintiff. The way continues through the

property of Govindan and ends on the northern boundary of

the plaintiff’s property. That is shown as ABC. It has 4 feet

S.A.931/2000. 10

width and 51 feet length. The commission report shows that

there is an opening on the northern boundary of the

plaintiff’s property where the way terminates. It is true that

the commission report has stated that there is no way in

continuation thereof. Exts.C3 and C4 also indicate that the

said way leads to the property of Madhavan, yet another

brother of the plaintiff, who got the properties under Ext.B1.

It proceeds further and reaches the property of Pandiyarth

Mohanan.

14. In Exts. C5 and C6 survey plans, alternate way

as shown by the defendant is shown in green colour. It is

mentioned that the said way starts from the public road on

the western side and reaches the property of the plaintiff.

15. It has also come out in evidence that the

property of the defendant is located in 186/7 and there also

along its southern boundary a beaten track is seen on the

road on the west and ends on the plaintiff’s property.

Further there are steps seems to enter plaint A schedule

property from plaint B schedule property.

S.A.931/2000. 11

16. Exts. C7 and C8 do not differ much from

Exts.C5 and C6. The other way available to the plaintiff is

shown in blue colour. There is nothing in the evidence to

show that any hindrance has been caused to the use of the

said way by the plaintiff. It is also interesting to note that in

Exts.C7 and C8 a portion of the defendant’s property is

shown in the actual possession of the plaintiff.

17. It is important to notice that Ext.B1 was

deliberately withheld by the plaintiff. The case now is that

the way made mention of in the said document does not

lead to the road on the west, but it is only an internal

arrangement by the sharers under Ext.B1 to go to each

other’s property. If that is the case of the plaintiff, he ought

to have got it noted by the commissioner, who went to the

site several occasions. There was no attempt from his side

to have the way made mention of in Ext.B1 located .

18. There is nothing to indicate that the

predecessor in interest of P.W.1, who is the plaintiff, had

ever used B schedule pathway. It is true that in the plaint it

S.A.931/2000. 12

has been stated that the plaintiff and his predecessors in

interest have been staying in plaint A schedule property.

But that does not lead to the conclusion that they have been

using the B schedule way. It is significant to notice that no

evidence was adduced by the plaintiff in support of his

claim. In fact on going through the evidence of P.W.1 it can

be seen that apart from B schedule now claimed by him, he

has got two other ways to his property. But interestingly

enough what he says is that he is not interested in using

those pathways. He insists on the use of B schedule

pathway.

19. In order to attract easement by necessity

severance of tenement should be specifically pleaded and

proved. There is no such pleading or proof in the case on

hand. Ext.B1 is of the year 1979. It is by virtue of that

document that the plaintiff comes into possession of plaint A

schedule property exclusively. As already noticed, there is

nothing to show that the other way shown in Exts.C3 to C8 is

S.A.931/2000. 13

not the way made mention of in Ext.B1 for the use of sharers

including the plaintiff.

20. It is true that in his evidence P.W.1 says that

for the last 40 years he has been using the B schedule way.

But nowhere in his chief examination he says that there was

an old house in plaint A schedule property. Admittedly the

present plea has been developed later. He has no case in

his evidence that the members of his family prior to 1979

had used plaint B schedule pathway. He confines the use of

plaint B schedule pathway to himself. In the light of the

specific stand taken by P.W.1, the claim now made by the

learned counsel that the predecessors in interest of the

plaintiff have also been using the pathway cannot be

countenanced.

21. It is true that the commission reports and

plans do show the existence of a way as claimed by the

plaintiff through the southern portion of the first defendant’s

property. But merely because there is a way, it does not

mean that the plaintiff is entitled to use the same. He has to

S.A.931/2000. 14

establish the right to do so. He admits that there are other

means of access to his property, but he says that he is not

willing to use those ways. He claims right to use B schedule

pathway, for which, unfortunately he has no manner of right.

22. Faced with the above situation, learned

counsel for the appellant pointed out that on going through

the evidence adduced by the defendants, it can be seen that

a way is conceded by them. At least that way may be made

available to the plaintiff.

23. First of all, it is too late in the day now for the

plaintiff to contend that the way other than the way claimed

by him may be provided. Moreover, the location of the other

way is not definite and certain. Exts.C3 to C8 as already

noticed by the plaintiff do indicate that there is means of

access to the plaintiff to the outside world, which is in

consonance with the way provided under Ext.B1.

24. Learned counsel for the appellant prayed for a

remand for adducing further evidence and also to establish

that the plaintiff has no way other than B schedule pathway.

S.A.931/2000. 15

25. The suit is of the year 1989. 21 years have

elapsed. The plaintiff had failed in the suit, he carried the

matter in appeal and then in second appeal insisting on

untenable grounds. There is no equity in his favour. It will

be doing injustice to the respondents to remand the case to

the trial court. As already noticed it is not as if any injustice

has been done to the plaintiff. In fact he has another way.

No grounds are made out to accept the contention made by

the counsel for the appellant against the concurrent findings

of the court below.

The result is that this appeal is without any merits

and it is liable to be dismissed. I do so with costs to the

respondents.

P. BHAVADASAN,
JUDGE

sb.