JUDGMENT
Dalveer Bhandari, J.
(1) The appellant Smt. Santosh Tuli, the youngest daughter of late Shri Labh Chand Passi, who passed away on 26th of January, 1983, intestate, leaving behind two daughters, two sons and a widow, filed a civil suit for partition in this court. In the plaint filed by the appellant, it is stated that her late father owned a house in Karol Bagh over a plot of 150 sq.yds. There are two shops in this building. One shop is with Lamba Jewellers on a monthly rent ofRs.l50.00 , and in the other shop, defendant no. I and 2 are running their business of book selling and publication in the name and style of Rama Brothers book sellers and Rama Brothers Public divison. Both sons of Labh Chand Passi and his widow arc living in the said house. During the pendency of this petition, the appellant who was the plaintiff in the suit moved an application for compromise under Order 23 Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code .
(2) The suit had been compromised between the parties before the learned single Judge on 7.11.89. The Suit was also disposed of in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties.
(3) The learned Judge has recorded the statements of the appellant Mrs. Santosh Tuli, Mrs. Prem Vinayak, Krishan Kumar Passi and of Miss Hema Kohli, the learned counsel for defendant no.1.
(4) The appellant Mrs. Santosh Tuli, in her statement recorded on 7.11.1989 clearly stated that “on payment of Rs.50,000/=, which is paid by defendant no.1 to 3, I shall have no claim of any kind, nature, description vis-a-vis property no.2629/4, Beadonpura, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.” It is also incorporated that a pay order for a sum of Rs.50,000.00 drawn on the Bank of India has been received by her. It is also mentioned in the statement that “I shall raise no objection to the grant of probate of the Will dated 1st May, 1972 executed by Shri Labh Chand Passi”. It is also mentioned in the statement that “I give up my claims in property and also give up my claim towards Rama Brothers and Rama Brothers Publication Division.” She had also mentioned that “I give up my claims in or against any movable or immovable property left by my father” and she prayed that the Suit be decreed in terms of the compromise be tween the paratics. Similarly, Smt. Prem Vinayak also got her statement recorded before the court. On 15.7.1991, the appellant moved an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Order 23 Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the compromise recorded on 7.11.1991. A notice was issued on this application. The application was dismissed by the learned single Judge on 7.3.1994.
(5) The appellant aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge filed this appeal against the order passed in application. The F.A.O. was filed after the period of statutory limitation with an application for condensation of delay in filing the appeal. Reply was filed on behalf of the respondents. In the reply, it is stated that the appeal against the judgment of 7.11.1989 is barred by limitation by about 5 years. It is also mentioned in the reply that the appellant had availed of the remedy under Order 23 Rule 3-A of the Code, treating it as a review application under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No appeal lies against the review order rejecting the review application. The appeal lies under Order 43(1) (c) against the order under Order 47(4), granting an application for review. Therefore, the present appeal filed against the order passed in review application is not maintainable.
(6) It is also mentioned in the reply that the present appeal is nothing but an arm- twisting lactic on the part of the appellant to extort more money from the answering respondents. The appeal is neither bona fide nor the appellant approached this court with clean hands. After deriving the benefit from the earlier order by taking much more amount than what has been stated in the order/judgment dated 7.11.1989, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to challenge the same. In reply, it is also contended by the respondents that the delay in fling the appeal has not been explained and there is no ground for condensation of delay in fling the appeal in the facts of this case.
(7) While dealing with the application for condensation of delay in filing the appeal, we have also examined the facts and circumstances of this case in great detail. There is no doubt that during the pendency of the Suit, an application for withdrawing the suit on the basis of compromise was filed by the present appeallant. The appellants’ detailed statement was also recorded by the learned single Judge. He has also recorded the statement of other defendants in the Suit. On the basis of the application filed in court and statement recorded, the learned single Judge disposed of the Suit in terms of the compromise.
(8) A short question which arises for consideration before the Court is, whether after a lapse of such a long time whether, this court should recall the order by which the compromise was entered into between the parties? The order was passed on 7.11.89, more than six years ago, particularly when the appellant has derived the benefit and received money in accordance with the terms and conditions of the compromise.
(9) In this case, the appellant was represented by a counsel. The application for recording the compromise was also filed at her instance. She had also made statemen before the court. Similarly, other defendants along with the appellant have also made statements before the Court. In view of these facts and circumstances, the matter pertaining to compromise between the parties has acquired finality on 7.11.89. There cannot be any question of any undue influence, inducement or force in the facts and circumstances of this case because the learned Judge has recorded the statements in court. The compromise was arrived at between the parties after careful deliberations. It seems that now because the value of the property in question has appreciated, therefore, the apellant. wants to take undue advantage of that situation.
(10) We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, examined documents on record. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the appellant ought not to-be permitted to reopen the compromise arrived at in the year 1989 after almost 6 years. In a case where the compromise has been arrived at between the parties after following the entire procedure. The court did not permit compromise only on the submissions of the learned counsel but the statements of the appellant and respondents were also recorded by the learned Judge. Not only this, the appellant has admittedly received the entire consideration, therefore, now to permit the appellant to resile from the terms of the compromise would certainly lead to grave injustice and encourage honest people to turn dishonest because of appreciation in the value of the properties leading to tremendous conflict and disharmony in society. There has to be sanctity and finality of the court order. If compromises arrived at amongst the parties in court after following elaborate procedure and recording of the statements of the parties arc recalled, then not only that no court order/judgment would acquire finality and certainty but eventually lead to miscarriage of justice.
(11) The appeal filed by the appellant is devoid of any merits and is accordingly dismissed. The parties are directed to bear thier own costs.