JUDGMENT
N.P. Chapalgaonker, J.
1. Rule, taken up forthwith by consent.
2. This writ petition challenges the order passed by the Assistant Register, Co-operative Societies, Bhokardan dated 23-6-1995 convening a meeting of the members of the Committee of Vividha Karyakari Sahakari Seva Sanstha Maryadit, Longaon, Taluka Bhokardan, District Jalna to consider a vote of no confidence against the Chairman of said Society.
3. On 6-6-1995, a requisition purporting to have been signed by six members of the committee of the said Society was submitted in the Office of the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhokardan requesting to call for special meeting of the committee to consider vote of no-confidence. Though this was received in the office of the District Deputy Registrar on 6-6-1995 and it was noticed by the authorities on 7-6-1995, no action was taken to convene meeting within 7 days and as late as on 17-6-1995 District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Jalna was pleased to authorize Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhokardan to hold a meeting for consideration of the said Resolution. It appears that in furtherance of this order, Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhokardan issued a Notice dated 23-6-1995 and convened a meeting which was to take place on 6-7-1995 at 11 a. m. in the office of the Society. This notice was challenged before the Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Aurangabad in Revision No. 115 of 1995 but the learned Divisional Joint Registrar was pleased to reject revision application vide his order dated 4-7-1995. This order is impugned in this writ petition. By way of interim relief, this Court had stayed proposed meeting.
4. The grounds on which the said proposed meeting is assailed are firstly that the requisition is not proper since signatures and thumb impressions on the requisition are not duly attested. Secondly, the meeting was not convened within a period of 7 days from the date of receipt of the requisition and the meeting is not scheduled within 15 days from the date of the requisition. The third ground pressed in service is that the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies had no authority to issue a notice of the special meeting. Said notice should have been issued by the District Deputy Registrar since Assistant Registrar was only authorised to preside over the meeting and not to convene the meeting.
5. Rule 57-A of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 in sub-rule 1 (r) requires that the signatures of the members of the committee on the requisition be duly attested by the Chief Executive Officer of the society or Special Executive Magistrate or Executive Magistrate or any Gazetted Officer of the Government. There is no such attestation on the requisition impugned. Shri. A. H. Kasliwal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that the requirement of sub-rule 1(e) is not mandatory in nature. Language of this sub-rule does not use imperative words like “shall” or “must”. Therefore, the rule is held to be directory. The purposes of this rule is to get satisfied about the truth of the signatures and if the Registrar is satisfied by any other evidence that the signatures are genuine, then attestation is not necessary. Shri Kasliwal further contended that even assuming that the requirement is mandatory, there is sufficient compliance of the requirement inasmuch as one of the signatories namely ; Shri Shankarrao Kabra is the Vice Chairman of the Society, and therefore, he can be said to be Chief Executive Officer of the Society. Shri Kasliwal further contends that in the present case, no dispute has been raised about the signatures by any of the requisitionists. Therefore, merely because there is no attestation, requisition cannot be held to be invalid. “To attest” means “to certify the validity”. Though a particular form of the attestation is not required, it should be evidenced that the person concerned has certified genuineness or the validity of the signatures. On the requisition, I find that Shri Kabra has signed at serial No. 1 as one of the requisitionists and has not said anything about the genuineness of the rest of the signatures. There is no signature of any of the officers of the society much less Chief Executive Officer, certifying that “above signatures are genuine and, therefore, I attest them” or even an additional signature indicating that he has applied his mind and found signatures genuine. Therefore, submission of Shri Kasliwal will have to be discarded.
6. Rules are made for giving effect to purpose of the Act, they will have to be read alongwith provisions of the Act. Section 73-1D provides for the motion of no-confidence against officers of the societies. Sub-section (2) lays down as follows :
” The requisition for such special meeting shall be signed by not less than one-third of the total number of members of the committee who are for the time being entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the committee and shall be delivered to the Registrar. The requisition shall be made in such a form and in such a manner as may be prescribed”.
Therefore, the legislature wanted that the requisition should be in particular form prescribed and delegated power to the State Government to make rule for that purpose. Therefore, mere absence of the imperative words like “must” or “shall” in sub-rule 1(e) of Rule 57-A by itself will not enable me to hold that the rule is directory. If the wish of the legislature is mandatory then the manner prescribed also becomes mandatory. While holding whether particular piece of legislation either principal or subordinate is mandatory or directory apart from the language used, one more factor will have to be considered and that is its purpose or the object to be achieved. The object to be achieved by section 73-1D(2) would be defeated if the rule is held directory. The section itself is mandatory in nature and, therefore, rule prescribing the mode of requisition is also mandatory. There is no scope for any other interpretation. The purpose of sub-rule 1(e) appears to be to protect office-bearers against fraudulent attempts to initiate action of no-confidence. The requisition requires specific number of the members of the committee to sign it and it sets in motion the procedure as is laid down by Rule 57-A. Rule wants that Registrar should satisfy himself about the genuineness of the signature. Since it is not possible for the Registrar to satisfy himself subjectively, therefore, the attestation is provided for and the Chief Executive Officer of the society and the Special Executive Magistrate, Executive Magistrate and Gazetted Government Officer have been authorized to do it. If we read the whole scheme of the motion of no-confidence as laid down in section 73-1D read with Rule 57-A, we find that the attestation is one of the most important requirements. The requisition is required to be signed by not less than one-third members of the committee who are at any time entitled to sit and vote at any meeting of the committee and, therefore, if some signatures are not genuine, it is likely that because of the misrepresentation the requisition can be treated to be valid when in fact it may not be. To prevent this the rule requires that signatures on the requisition should be attested. Looking to this nature, I find that the rule is mandatory and non-compliance of the rule renders the requisition and the consequential meeting invalid.
7. Shri Kasliwal also wanted to contend that Form M-18 appended to the rules does not have a specific column of the attestation. Attestation need not be in the form if the officers empowered puts his signature by writing endorsement of the attestation. I do not find that Form No. M-18 is anyway contradictory to the provision of the sub-rule 1(e) of Rule 57A.
8. Another submission made by Shri Solunke is that meeting was not convened within a period of 7 days and was not to take place within a period of 15 days from the date of requisition. So far as the date of meeting is concerned, law does not require that it should take place within a period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the requisition. What is required by section 73-1D is that the Registrar should convene a meeting within 7 days from the date of receipt of the requisition and the meeting shall be held at a date not later than 15 days from the date of issue of the notice of the meeting. Therefore, the period to be counted for holding a meeting is from the date of convening a meeting and not from the receipt of the requisition. I find that a notice of the meeting was issued on 23-6-1995. Therefore, it was well within statutory limit. Only flaw is that it was not convened within a period of 7 days as is required by law. The requisition was received admittedly on 7-6-1995 and the meeting should have been convened on or before 14-6-1995 but the Registrar failed to do so. Therefore, notice issued and the consequential meeting would be invalid.
9. It is true that inaction on the part of the Registrar would defeat the right of the members to express no confidence on office bearers of the society. Shri Kasliwal also contended that if the members have lost confidence, merely because the Registrar failed to convene a meeting within the statutory period, the officer of the society should not be allowed to enjoy the office of society. If statute would not have imposed that meeting should be called within specified period, greater harm would have been there to the democratic principles. It is not expected that the Registrar will by-pass the statutory requirements and will not convene the meeting as early as possible, under any circumstances, within the limit fixed by the statute. That is the statutory duty imposed on him.
10. The third contention of Shri Solunke is that the notice of the meeting should have been issued either by the Registrar and/or by the District Deputy Registrar and not by the Assistant Registrar is totally unfounded. By order dated 2-6-1988, the State Government has delegated the powers of the Registrar to the Assistant Registrar in respect of all provisions of the Act and the rules barring some provisions specially mentioned in that order. The exclusion of the delegation does not include section 73-1D or Rule 57 and, therefore, the Assistant Registrars in taluka are empowered to exercise powers of the Registrar in respect of these provisions, barring, in respect of Urban Co-operative Banks, as per the said delegation. Therefore, there was nothing wrong for the Assistant Registrar to issue notice. But since I am holding that the requisition itself was invalid, meeting which was to take place on 6-7-1995, would also have been invalid. The date of the scheduled meeting is already over. Therefore, no further directions are required. Petition allowed. Rule is made absolute. No order as to the costs.