JUDGMENT
H.L. Agrawal, J.
1. The plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession or, in the alternative, for recovery of possession in respect of an area of 0.2 acres of agricultural lands appertaining to survey plot No. 865 in Khata No. 120 of village Dariapur Sibala under Dinapur police station.
2. The plaintiff claimed title to the suit land on the basis of a registered deed of sale dated the 19th September, 1960, executed by the heirs of Kheyali Rai and Punit Rai who had purchased it in the year 1949 by another registered deed of sale from the heirs of the recorded tenants of the said Khata, who were in exclusive possession of the said plot. After tracing the title of his predecessor-in-interest who, according to him, had been in possession of the suit land throughout, he claimed to have got possession of the land on the basis of his purchase. His further case was that the defendants were also competing with him to purchase the suit land, and having failed in their effort, they started interfering with his possession which led to the initiation of a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. During the pendency of the said proceeding itself, the present suit was instituted.
3. The suit was contested by defendants 1 to 3 and 6 who disputed the genuine title as well as possession of the plaintiff.
According to their case, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff had abandoned the suit land along with his house which was resumed by the landlord, who settled the same in the year 1925-26 with Ramdahin Bhagat and his brother Mangru Bhagat, and on their death, Munni Bhagat, the sister’s son of Mangru Bhagat, inherited the property and amalgamated the same with his ancestral plot No. 866; and, after his death, the defendants being his sons and other heirs came in possession over the land in question. According to their case, all the rent receipts and chaukidari receipts with respect to the said house constructed by Ramdahin and Mangru were issued in their favour. On these allegations, the defendants claimed to be in possession of the suit lands. In the alternative, however, it was also pleaded that they, having remained in possession of the suit land a long time, acquired an indefeasible title in the suit lands.
4. The trial court dismissed the suit finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove either his title or possession over the suit land. On appeal by him, the lower appellate court, however, reversed the said finding and decreed the suit in his favour.
5. The defendants-appellants came up to this Court in Second Appeal No. 267 of 1966 which was heard by A. B. N. Sinha, J. (as he then was). His Lordship, however, remanded the appeal to the court of appeal below with certain directions. The learned Judge, however, at the same time, affirmed some of the findings in favour of the plaintiff, holding, (1) that the finding of the appellate court to the effect that the plaintiff had acquired a good title to the suit land by virtue of Ext. 1 (a), the sale deed dated the 19th September, 1960, was a good finding and it must, therefore, be affirmed; (2) that the story of settlement by the landlord of the suit land in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants was a false story; and (3) that the finding of the appellate court that the rent receipts filed on behalf of the defendants were fabricated for the purpose of this suit was not open to interference. Finally, the learned Judge, while remanding the case, directed the lower appellate court to come to a fresh finding on the question of possession as put forward by the respective parties on the materials already on the record including the Chaukidari receipts (Ext. B series) but excluding the rent receipts filed by the defendants and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law.
6. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, this time, in pursuance of the directions of this Court, reheard the appeal and again decreed the plaintiffs suit on recording a clear finding as regards possession in favour of the plaintiff and held that prior to him his vendors were in possession of the suit land and that the defendans were never in possession of the suit land as alleged by them. The plea of adverse possession set up by the defendants was, accordingly, negatived.
7. The defendants have again come up to this Court in second appeal.
8. Mr. Gauri Shankar Prasad, learned Counsel, appearing for the appellants, has raised this time an interesting question for consideration of this Court. Learned Counsel contended that in spite of the order of confirmation in respect of some of the findings by this Court in the earlier appeal, the Court of appeal below should have proceeded to hear the entire appeal and that the direction of this Court to hear the appeal on a limited question was not a valid order. According to him, the limited remand was not supported by any of the relevant Rules of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. It is difficult to accept this contention of the learned Counsel. The appellants had already failed on the earlier occasion also and the order of remand was partly in their favour, which was made by this Court on the contentions raised on their behalf. They are therefore, entirely bound by the previous judgment. If actually they were aggrieved by an order of a limited remand, it was open to them to have challenged the said judgment in appeal under the Letters Patent or in the Supreme Court. They, having accepted the judgment then, which was to some extent to their advantage cannot now challenge the same before me, being a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. I find ample support for my view from a series of decisions of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court. In the case of Sundar Ahir v. Mst. Phuljharia, 1957 BLJR 603 = (AIR 1957 Pat 534) a Bench of this court held that even if the order of remand by this Court is not covered by any of the Rules of Order 41 of the Code or was under exercise of its inherent power, the matters finally disposed of cannot, any of them be reopened when the case comes back from the lower court. It was further held that if a Judge on appeal decided certain points and remanded the case, his decision was binding on his successor, before whom the case came up again on appeal from the judgment after remand, because such a court is a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction and, therefore, he cannot go behind the earlier final decisions of his predecessor before remand. It is not the case of the learned Counsel that the findings of fact which were earlier affirmed by this Court were not finally determined or were in the nature of mere observations. This Court had to consider a somewhat similar question in a Full Bench case of Bandhu Kunjra v. Rahman Kunjra 1966 BLJR 270 = (AIR 1966 Pat 209). In this case, the defendants having lost in both the courts below had come to this Court in second appeal. Sahai, J. (as he then was) on hearing the appeal, however, remanded the case to the court of appeal below for deciding the appeal afresh in accordance with law keeping in view certain observations given by him. This time, the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed, and he came to this Court in second appeal. The case was referred by a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench; and, perhaps, on one of the grounds urged before the Division Bench that Sahai, J. had no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the court of appeal below and therefore the judgment of the court of appeal below after the order of remand must be set aside, the matter was referred to a Full Bench. While answering the contention raised before the Full Bench that the order of remand passed by Sahai, J. was void and had no existence in the eye of law, it was held that the learned Single Judge who referred the case to a Division Bench, being a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, could not question the validity of the order of remand. This Court again in the case of Sugauli Sugar Works (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India. (1969 BUR 457) has laid down that if a Bench remands a case to the lower court either under Order 41, Rule 23 or under Order 41 Rule 25 or under the inherent powers of the Court the matters finally disposed of by the order of remand cannot, any of them, be reopened when the case comes back from the lower court.
10. In my opinion, not only the matter already decided by the order of remand cannot be reopened, but the lower court where the case goes after remand is bound to carry out all the directions given by the superior court as also by the findings which are affirmed by that Court. In the case of Konappa Mudaliar v. Kusalaru, ATR 1970 Mad 328, it was held that it was not open to the lower Court, when an appellate court remanded the case to it, to do anything but to carry out the terms of the remand even if it considered that the order of remand was not in accordance with law. The lower court cannot apply what it might consider the correct position of the law. I feel myself in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Madras High Court and overrule the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that in spite of the confirmation of some of the findings by this Court, the court of appeal below was authorised to hear the parties on those questions to come to its own decision. It is not necessary to multiply the decisions, but I would refer to one decision of the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941, where it was held that the principle of res judicata applied also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way would not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings.
11. In view of the discussions above, the question, of law raised on behalf of the appellants has, therefore, got no force, and it must be rejected.
12. It was next contended that the finding of possession recorded by the court of appeal below was vitiated as the evidence and the materials on the record were not properly appreciated, Learned counsel contended that the trial court recorded the finding on this issue against the plaintiff after weighing the evidence and disbelieving the witnesses of the plaintiff as it had the advantage of marking the demeanour of the witnesses and, as such, the said finding should not have been brushed aside by the court of appeal below. It is no doubt true that the trial court had got the advantage of seeing the witnesses but that does not take away the right of the final court of fact to come to a different conclusion if it feels so satisfied on the appreciation of the evidence as that court is fully competent to enter into all questions of fact and record a final finding on all those questions including the appreciation of the trial evidence.
13. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellants. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.