High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

Saroj vs Murti Devi And Ors. on 14 November, 1990

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Saroj vs Murti Devi And Ors. on 14 November, 1990
Equivalent citations: I (1993) ACC 570
Author: S Sodhi
Bench: S Sodhi


JUDGMENT

S.S. Sodhi, J.

1. The contest here is between the widow and the mother of an Army Sepoy Mohinder Singh, with regard to the amount that became payable consequent upon his death under the Army Group Insurance Scheme.

2. On the death of Mohinder Singh on April 29, 1982, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- became payable to his heirs under the Army Group Insurance Scheme. An application was filed for the grant of succession certificate in respect of this amount by his parents, Saroj and Munshi Ram. This application was contested by Murti Devi, the widow of the deceased on the plea that being the nominee of the deceased, she alone was entitled to receive the said sum. The trial court held that both the widow and the mother, being class I heirs under the Hindu Succession Act, were entitled to the said sum in equal shares. On appeal, however, the widow succeeded and it was held that she was entitled to the entire amount. This is what constitutes the challenge in revision now.

3. In dealing with this matter, regard must be had to terms and conditions of the Army Group Insurance Scheme. A reference to the Special Army Order in this behalf shows that this insurance scheme was introduced in January 1976 under the authority of the Government of India, Ministry of Defence No. PCA/37586/AG/PC and JEC/9302/D (Pay/Services) dated December 15, 1975. It has been specifically pointed out there that the Scheme is totally department and is run by the Army Group Insurance Directorate at Army Headquarters. The main objects of the Scheme being: (a) to provide speedy financial assistance to the families of those Army personnel who may die while in service; (b) to provide lump sum terminal benefit at the time of retirement; and (c) to provide other benefits/assistance as may be decided by the Board of Trustees from time to time.

4. Under the Army Group Insurance Scheme it has been rendered obligatory for all ranks to make a nomination of persons who would be entitled to receive the benefits thereunder. This has been so provided by Rule 9 thereof. In the case of married personnel, Rule 10 lays down that the nomination has to be made in favour of only any of the following persons, namely:

(a) Wife/husband;

(b) Sons and daughters (including step and legally adopted children).

While according to Rule 11, besides these persons, an individual may nominate dependant parents/brothers/sister, with the provision that their aggregate share shall not exceed 20 per cent of the benefit.

5. Next to note is Rule 43 which deals with payments of insurance claims where no nomination has been made or it does not subsist. According to this rule, if no nomination has been made or subsists, and the deceased is survived by wife/husband/sons and daughters, it shall be paid to the widow and it is only if the wife had predeceased that the amount shall be paid his above mentioned surviving members in equal shares. Further, the parents of the deceased become entitled to this amount only if the deceased died without leaving behind his widow and children.

6. In the face of the clear provisions of the Army Group Insurance Scheme, there can be no escape from tie conclusion that in the presence of the widow, the mother has no right to claim any amount payable thereunder.

7. Faced with this situation, Counsel for the mother sought to press in aid the provisions of Insurance Act, 1938 (Act No. IV of 1938) and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sorbati Devi v. Usha Devi 1984 ACJ 138 (SC), where it was observed:

A mere nomination made under Section 39 does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life Insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the head which is authorised to receive the amount on the payment of which the insurer insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.

The summary of the relevant provisions of Section 39 establishes clearly that the policy holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy holder. If that be so, on the death of the policy holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by ‘lie law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a ‘statutory testament. The provision in Sub-section (6) of Section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to sine nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. The language to Section 39 is not capable of altering the course of succession under law.

8. Counsel further contended that as under the Hindu Succession Act, both the widow sad the mother were class I heirs, they were entitled to share the amount under Group Insurance Scheme in equal shares.

9. The contention raised by the Counsel for the petitioner, though attractive on the face of it, cannot stand scrutiny, as admittedly, the insurance in the present case was not one to which the provisions of the Insurance Act, 1938 (Act No. IV of 1938) applied. This being so, the observations of the Supreme. Court in Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi 1984 ACJ 138 CSC, are, therefore, clearly not applicable. The matter has thus to be considered and decided in the context of the provisions of the Army Group Insurance Scheme and these as mentioned ear liar, dearly provide that it is the widow who is entitled to the amount payable thereunder and not the mother.

10. Such thus being the unambiguous position in law, no exception can be taken to the impugned order of the lower appellate Court, which is accordingly hereby upheld and affirmed. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs.