JUDGMENT
Suresh, J.
1. This petition has been filed by the original tenant in the following circumstances:
2. The original petitioner-tenant had taken a house, owned by the respondent bearing Municipal Registration No. 71, on monthly rent. This was in the year 1964. The rent was Rs. 80/- per month till about March 1973 and thereafter it was increased to Rs. 110. A per month from April 1973. Some time in July 1976 the original petitioner received from the Court of the Rent Controller, South Goa, a notice in case No. 81 of 1976 in the matter of an eviction application filed by three persons as plaintiffs. Amongst them was one Candida Pinto who is presently respondent No. 3 in this petition. The allegation was that the petitioner had neglected to pay the rent of the premises from April 1976 to August 1976 amounting to Rs. 400/- and that the applicants require the said premises for their bona fide personal use and occupation. In the said application the said respondent No. 3 filed an affidavit dated November 16, 1976 in which she stated that the said eviction proceedings had been instituted without her consent. She also gave evidence in those proceedings. It appears that in the said proceedings she admitted the receipt of rent from the original petitioner upto March 1981. That is how the said application was dismissed by an order dated September 12, 1983.
3. It appears that the petitioner had continued to pay the rent to the third respondent during the pendency of the eviction proceedings. Thus, she had received the rent upto December 1982. However, thereafter she refused to accept the rent, whereupon the petitioner began sending the rent by money order from January 1983 onwards, which also was refused by the third respondent. Thereafter in November 1983 the third and fourth respondent herein filed an eviction application in the Court of the Rent Controller South Goa, Margao in Case No. 37/RC of 1983 on certain grounds. One of the grounds was again the ground of arrears of rent alleging that the rent was in arrears from April 1976 to October 1983. The notice in the said suit was received by the petitioners on February 3, 1984. On March 12, 1984, the original petitioner made an application under Section 32(3) of the Goa, Daman & Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter called “the Act”), seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent and raising a dispute as to the claim made by the third and fourth respondents. According to the petitioner the Court allowed the said application and the first petitioner accordingly made the deposit. The petitioner thereafter continued to deposit monthly rent every month in the Court of Rent Controller.
4. However, in May 1984, respondent Nos. 3 & 4 made an application dated May 15, 1984, purporting to be an application under Section 32(4) of the Act on an allegation that the application made by the petitioner in March 1984 was 9 days after the prescribed period of limitation. A notice was issued on this application to the petitioner. The Rent Controller heard the parties and by his order dated August 10, 1984, came to the conclusion that the arrears deposited were 9 days beyond the prescribed period of thirty days and that the petitioner had not shown any sufficient cause as to why the deposit was not made in time. Accordingly he stopped all further proceedings and an order of eviction of the petitioner was passed. It was pointed out that as on that date the petitioner was not in arrears of rent.
5. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred appeal before the Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated October 4, 1988, dismissed the appeal. It is against these two orders, the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners.
6. Mr. Dias submitted that when the application was made under Section 32(4) of the Act, there were no arrears of rent at all and that, therefore, no eviction order could have been passed under the said provision. He also submitted that the application made by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 alleging that the petitioner was in arrears of rent from April 1976 was patently mala fide inasmuch as the rent had been paid to respondent No. 3 till about December 1982 and thereafter the amounts have been sent by money order from time to time and she had refused to accept the same. Mr. Dias, therefore, submitted that in these circumstances it should be held that the tenant had shown sufficient cause as to why eviction order should not be passed and that, therefore, the order of the Rent Controller as also of the Administrative Tribunal should be set aside.
7. In this connection, Mr. Dias drew my attention to the case of Sarpanch Lonand Gram Panchayat v. Ramgiri . This is for the purpose of showing as to how the Court should exercise judicial discretion whenever a party is called upon to show sufficient cause with regard to any delay in complying with the requirements of law. The discretion is to know, through law, what is just. The words “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant. He also drew my attention to the case of Joae X. Pinto v. Oswald J.C. Velhe (1960) 1 Goa Law Times 116, for the purpose of determining the scope of Section 32(4) of the Act. Mr. Dias, therefore, emphasised that the Act being beneficial legislation, an interpretation that advances the object of the Act must be taken and it is in this context he submitted that under Section 32(4), cause has to be shown not for the purpose of explaining the delay but for the purpose of showing as to why eviction order should not be passed.
8. As against this Mr. Khandeparker submitted that the application made in the month of March 1984 by the petitioner was patently beyond thirty days. He, therefore, submitted that under Section 32(1) of the Act, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to deposit all arrears of rent within one month from the date of receipt of the notice. He also must continue to deposit future rent also from time to time. He further submitted that in the present case when the application was made, it was 9 days after the prescribed period of 30 days and no explanation has been given as to why the amount was deposited after such delay. Mr. Khandeparkar also submitted that even after the respondents made an application on May 15, 1984 purporting to be an application under Section 32(4) of the Act, the petitioner did not show any cause and there is nothing on record to show that he filed any affidavit-in-reply to such an application. He, therefore, submitted that it is a clear case where despite opportunities being given to the petitioner, the petitioner failed to show cause and that, therefore, the Court had no choice but to pass an order of eviction. In this connection, he drew my attention to the case of Ganpat v. Sashikant . This is for the purpose of showing that if a tenant does not fulfil the conditions as prescribed under the statute, he cannot claim any protection under the law and a decree for eviction will have to be passed as against such a tenant. He also relied on the case of Arjun Khiomal Makhijani v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani again for the purpose of showing that if the arrears are not paid within one month of the notice of demand served on the tenant, then in such a case, the Court will have no choice but to pass a decree of eviction.
9. In my view, Section 32(4) of the Act must be resorted to sparingly. It is a provision applicable in terrorem. It is only to check and to correct contumacious conduct on the part of the tenants. It is applicable only in such cases where the tenant despite opportunities being given to him and despite the order to deposit, refuses or neglects to deposit the rent then due in Court. Again, if the tenant, on receipt of such show cause notice pays the entire arrears then due and assures further payment regularly, there can be no order for eviction just because he had delayed in deposit, in the past. In the present case, on the tenant making an application under Section 32(3) of the Act, the Court allowed him to deposit the amount. There is nothing on record to show that as to what enquiry was held under Section 32(3) of the Act. The record also shows that thereafter the petitioner continued to deposit the amount of rent from time to time. Therefore, when the application was made on May 15, 1984, under Section 32(4) accepting the fact that there was a delay of 9 days in the deposit of the amount in the month of March 1984, there was no other material before the Rent Controller. Under Section 32(4) the Controller gets a jurisdiction to pass an order to stop all proceedings and to evict the tenant summarily, only if the tenant fails to deposit the rent amount and further fails to show sufficient cause as to why eviction order should not be passed against him. In other words, if on the date of the application the tenant has deposited all the rent due, there is no question of the Rent Controller passing any further order, virtually evicting a tenant without a trial. In the present case, what appears to have been argued before the Tribunal was that the tenant had not explained the delay in depositing the amount of rent. In my view, that is of no consequence inasmuch as very much before the application was made, the tenant had been permitted to deposit the full rent then due and, therefore, there is no question of showing any sufficient cause in the delay as such. Even other wise the delay being of a very short period of nine days, should have been condoned by the Rent Controller as the object of the law was to do justice for both the parties, by compelling the defaulting tenant to deposit all rent from time to time, on a threat of summary eviction. In any case, while exercising discretion, the Controller could not have overlooked the fact that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had come with a case which is apparently false inasmuch as there were no arrears of rent due and payable from April 1976.
10. In the result, I pass the following order:
Rule is made absolute, Orders dated August 10, 1984 and October 4, 1988 are hereby set aside. The matter is restored back to the court of Rent Controller for proceeding further with the application for eviction.
11. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
