IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 5959 of 2005
Satyendra Kumar ... ... ... Petitioner
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. ... ... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.G.R. PATNAIK
For the Petitioner : M/s Manoj Kumar
A. Banerjee, Advocates
For the Respondents : J.C. to Sr. S.C. II
08/18.11.2009
: Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner in this writ application has prayed for a
direction upon the respondents to pay him his arrears of salary from
March 2004 as well as his current salary and also to quash the
impugned orders, vide letter No. 1025 dated 08.11.2004 passed by
the District Education Officer (D.E.O.), Dumka, Jamtara and the
letter No. 2365 dated 12.09.2005, passed by the Director (Secondary
Education), Government of Jharkhand, by which a direction was
issued to the concerned authorities to stop payment of salary to the
petitioner and to terminate his services.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
impugned order dated 08.11.2004 (Annexure- 3), directing for
terminating the services of the petitioner, appears to have been
passed on the ground that the B.Ed certificate, produced by the
petitioner was issued by an Institute which has not been recognized
by N.C.T.E. and as therefore, such certificate being invalid, the B.Ed
qualification claimed by the petitioner can not be accepted.
4. Learned counsel explains that in response to the
advertisement published in the local newspaper on 20.11.1993
issued by the Managing Committee of the school namely St. Teresa
Girls High School, Dumka, inviting applications for appointment of
science teacher (trained), the petitioner had applied for the post, he
was called for interview and was selected and upon such selection
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being made, he was given the appointment letter on
05.01.1994, calling upon him to join on the post accordingly.
5. The decision of the petitioner’s appointment was
approved by the Vidayalaya Seva Board, Bihar, Patna and such
approval was communicated by its letter dated 16.01.1996 to the
school.
6. The petitioner had passed his B.Ed examination from
Rashtriya Patrachar Sansthan, Kanpur, which is claimed to be an
Institute recognized as a training institute by the Government of
Uttar Pradesh. In support of the his claim, the petitioner submitted
his B.Ed. training certificate obtained from the aforesaid institute, to
the school management along with his initial application for
appointment.
7. After his appointment, the petitioner was paid his salary
which continued up to February 2004. Thereafter, the petitioner’s
salary has not been paid at all, although his services are being
continuously taken by the school authorities.
8. Referring to the impugned letter of the respondent-
D.E.O., Dumka, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
controversy regarding the validity of the petitioner’s B.Ed. certificate
is totally misconceived, in view of the fact that the provisions of
N.C.T.E. Act, 1995 which came into effect from 01.07.1995, has
been sought to be applied with retrospective date. The petitioner’s
appointment was already confirmed by the school with the approval
of the Vidayalaya Seva Board, Bihar, Patna in January 1994 itself.
Learned counsel argues that the Act, which came subsequently,
could not possibly have been applied retrospectively to defeat the
benefits of his appointment genuinely granted on the basis of a valid
certificate issued by the institute which was duly recognized by the
State Government of Uttar Government.
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9. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the
respondents as also by the respondent Nos. 5 and 6, namely, the
School Management.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 5 and 6
submits that the petitioner’s appointment in the year January 1994
was made after observing of the relevant rules and procedures and
the decision of the petitioner’s appointment was also confirmed by
way of approval by the Vidayalaya Seva Board, Bihar, Patna.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent-State would submit
that besides the stand taken by the respondent-State that the
petitioner did not obtain his B.Ed. training certificate from any
Institute recognized by the N.C.T.E., there appears another fact
namely that that the Institute from where the petitioner claims to
have obtained his B.Ed. certificate was also a bogus Institute which
was not recognized by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh at the
relevant point of time.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner counters the
statement, by referring to Annexure- 10 to the I.A. No. 3545 of 2007
and explains that Annexure- 10 is a copy of the Circular issued by
the Higher Education Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh
dated 06.09.2000 which declares that the Institute, namely, the
Rashtriya Patrachar Sansthan, from where the petitioner has
obtained his B.Ed. degree, was duly recognized by the State
Government of Uttar Pradesh. The Circular was issued by way of
clarification by the concerned department of the Government of
Uttar Pradesh, in pursuance to the order of the Supreme Court in a
case filed before it.
13. Learned counsel further submits that pursuant to
subsequent amendment carried out in the year 2006 in the N.C.T.E.
Act, it has been declared that certificates obtained by the
candidates, prior to the promulgation of the N.C.T.E. Act, from any
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institute which may not have been recognized by the N.C.T.E.,
shall continue to be treated as valid. Learned counsel submits that
under such circumstances, the certificate produced by the petitioner
cannot be treated as invalid and his appointment cannot be
terminated.
14. From the rival submissions and the facts as appearing
in the case, the only ground on which the District Superintendent of
Education, Dumka, and the Director, Secondary Education had
directed the Management of the school to terminate the petitioner’s
appointment is that the petitioner’s B.Ed. certificate is not valid.
15. This ground is apparently misconceived for the three
reasons. Firstly, the petitioner’s certificate was obtained from the
institute much prior to the promulgation of the N.C.T.E. Act and the
provisions of the N.C.T.E. Act cannot be applied retrospectively.
Secondly, as demonstrated by the petitioner by reference to the
Circular of the concerned department of the State Government of
Uttar Pradesh (Annexure- 10) and which has also been
acknowledged by the respondent Nos. 5 and 6, it appears that the
Institute from where the petitioner had obtained his B.Ed.
certificate, was duly recognized by the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
Thirdly, even as per the amendment carried out by N.C.T.E. Act,
such certificates certificate shall have to be treated as valid.
16. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, I find
merit in this writ application. Accordingly, this application is
allowed. The impugned orders, vide letter No. 1025 dated
08.11.2004 passed by the District Education Officer, Dumka and
letter No. 2365 dated 12.09.2005 passed by Director (Secondary
Education), Government of Jharkhand, are hereby quashed.
17. As it appears notwithstanding the impugned order of
District Education Officer, Dumka, the respondent-School
Management has been continuously taking services of the petitioner,
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though not paying him salary from March 2004 onwards till
date. Learned counsel for the respondent-School Management
acknowledges this fact.
18. In this view of the matter, the petitioner’s claim for the
payment of salary for the services rendered by him is a legitimate
claim and cannot be denied to him. I direct therefore that the
respondent-School Management shall forward a letter to the
concerned department of the State Government, informing the
amount of arrears which is payable to the petitioner, as also the
amount of current salary, within one month from the date of this
order and within two months from the date of receipt of the letter,
the concerned authority of the respondent-State Government, shall
release the required funds to the School Management to enable
payment of the amounts due and payable to the petitioner.
19. With these observations, this writ application is
disposed of.
20. Let a copy of this order be given to the learned counsel
of the respondent.
(D.G.R. Patnaik, J.)
Manish