Delhi High Court High Court

Savitri Verma vs Karol Bagh Bangiya Sansad on 9 March, 1999

Delhi High Court
Savitri Verma vs Karol Bagh Bangiya Sansad on 9 March, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999 IIIAD Delhi 525, 78 (1999) DLT 835, 1999 (49) DRJ 729, 1999 RLR 218
Author: V Jain
Bench: V Jain


ORDER

Vijender Jain, J.

1. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal of the eviction petition under Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short ‘Act’), the petitioner has preferred this revision petition.

2. Mr. M.L. Lonial, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there was no dispute that the petitioner was a widow and the premises in question was a residential house. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has further contended that the finding of the learned Additional Rent Controller that as the petitioner was residing in House No.C-2/10, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, which was taken on rent, and the eviction petition filed by the landlord of the said house having been dismissed, the requirement of the petitioner was not bona fide, is perverse and untenable in law.

3. On the other hand, Mr.A Bhattacharya, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has contended that in an eviction petition filed under the special category i.e. under Sections 14-B to 14-D of the Act, the petitioner has to state the requirement bonafidely and the instant case the requirement of the petitioner was not bona fide and has defended the impugned judgment of the Additional Rent Controller.

4. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties at length. Section 14-D of the Act reads as under:-

Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow _ (1) Where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her.

5. Learned Additional Rent Controller while applying the ratio of Surjit Singh Kalra Vs. Union of India & anr. , which laid down that tenant was entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of classified landlords, lost sight of the fact that in the case of Section 14-D of the Act, there is no bar for the tenant to raise such pleas, which would show that the premises were not required by the petitioner, which could be used as a residence. The legislative intention of incorporating special class of landlords for which immediate possession has to be delivered in case of a widow, like the present petitioner, would nullify the effect of amending Section 14-D of the Act, if frivolous pleas to delay taking of the possession are permitted by courts, therefore, Supreme Court in V Rajaswari Vs. Bombay Tyres Intl.Ltd. 54 (1994) DLT 494 (SC) held:-

“On a careful consideration of the above arguments, we are of the view that under Section 14-D, the tenant has practically no defense whatever. All that has to be under the said Section which has been extracted above, are; (i) that the landlady is a widow, (ii) the premises are required by her for own residence. In this case, both these requirements are satisfied. As regards the first, we do not want to state the obvious. Regarding the second, the fact that she is living with her daughter or any other person, is no ground to say that the premises in question is not required for her residence. If this be so, we are unable to see as to how her demand for increased rent would militate against her plea. Having regard to this established fact, we think that the trial of the application under Section 14-D before the Rent Controller, will only be redundant. Therefore, we direct eviction of the respondent-tenant under Section 14-D.”

6. Following the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, similar view was taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dipika Arora Vs. S N Sehgal & Ors. 1995 RLR 219.

7. This is one aspect of the controversy, which has been dealt by me, but it is a case where the Additional Rent Controller has dismissed the petition of the widow- petitioner on flimsy grounds. The findings of the Additional Rent Controller that as accommodation at C-2/10, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi was available with the petitioner, as son of the petitioner was a tenant in the said tenanted premises and the eviction petition against the tenant-son of the present petitioner was dismissed, the requirement of the present petitioner was not bona fide, were unnecessary as Additional Rent Controller was not required to take into consideration that the petitioner, i.e.widow lady, was living with her son. That was not a relevant factor for disposing of a petition under Section 14-D of the Act. The whole approach of the Additional Rent Controller was erroneous. In para-13 of the impugned judgment Additional Rent Controller has gone on discussing as to whether after eviction order having been obtained by the landlady in the petition filed, in that eventuality house at Vasant Vihar, New Delhi would be vacated by the petitioner or not. I refrain from saying any more on the subject. The whole approach of the Additional Rent Control was lop-sided and illegal. The revision petition is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. The respondents are directed to hand over the immediate, vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in question to the petitioner within two weeks.

8. Petition stands disposed of accordingly.