Supreme Court of India

Secretary, Ministry Of Chemicals … vs M/S. Cipla Ltd. & Ors on 1 August, 2003

Supreme Court of India
Secretary, Ministry Of Chemicals … vs M/S. Cipla Ltd. & Ors on 1 August, 2003
Author: P V Reddi
Bench: S. Rajendra Babu, P.Venkatarama Reddi, Arun Kumar.
           CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  3375-3384 of 2002

PETITIONER:
Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers	 Government of India


RESPONDENT:
Vs.

M/s. Cipla Ltd. & Ors.    				 


DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/08/2003

BENCH:
S. RAJENDRA BABU, P.VENKATARAMA REDDI & ARUN KUMAR.


JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.

1.1 These appeals by special leave preferred by the Union of

India are directed against the common judgment of the Bombay

High Court in a batch of writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution by the manufacturers/importers of certain bulk drugs

and their formulations. The bulk drugs concerned are seven in

number. They are: Salbutamol, Theophylline, Cyproflaxacin,

Norfloxacin, Cloxacillin, Doxycycline and Glipizide. These bulk

drugs and the formulations made out of them are sold within the

country and part of the quantities produced are also exported

outside the country. The challenge is to the inclusion of the said

bulk drugs in the first schedule to the Drugs (Price Control) Order,

1995 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the DPCO’). Though the fixation of

price pursuant to the provisions of the said Order was also

challenged in some of the writ petitions, that issue was not gone into

by the High Court and at any rate, the mechanics of price fixation is

not the contentious issue before us. However, it may be noted that

the remedy by way of review is available under paragraph 22 of the

DPCO to seek reconsideration of price fixation. The immediate

provocation for filing the writ petitions in the High Court seems to be

the notices issued by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority,

calling upon some of the Respondent-Companies to deposit the

overcharged amounts in relation to the formulations of scheduled

drugs.

1.2 The High Court held that the concerned drugs should not have

been brought within the purview of the DPCO, 1995 and

consequently, there could be no fixation of price in relation to those

drugs. The notices demanding overcharged amounts were

quashed. The writ petitions were thus allowed by the Division Bench

of High Court.

2.1 The DPCO, 1995 which came into force on 6th January, 1995,

was promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of the

powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. It

repealed the earlier DPCO of 1987, under which more number of

drugs were subjected to price control. ‘Drug’ as defined in Drugs &

Cosmetics Act is one of the essential commodities.

2.2 According to Section 2(a) of DPCO, ‘Bulk Drug’ means any

pharmaceutical, chemical, biological or plant product including its

salts, esters, stereo-isomers and derivatives, conforming to

pharmacopoeia or other standards specified in the Second

Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and which is used

as such or as an ingredient in any formulation. ‘Formulation’ is

defined to mean a medicine processed out of, or containing one or

more bulk drug or drugs with or without the use of any

pharmaceutical aids, for internal or external use in the diagnosis,

treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in human beings or

animals.

2.3 Paragraph 3 of DPCO empowers the Central Government to

fix, from time to time, a maximum sale price at which the bulk drug

specified in the first schedule shall be sold, after making such

inquiry, as it deems fit. The opening clause of sub-para (1) spells

out the avowed purpose of price control on the scheduled bulk

drugs. The declared objective is to regulate the equitable

distribution and increasing supplies of the specified bulk drug and

making them available at a fair price. There is a prohibition against

the sale of bulk drug at a price exceeding the maximum sale price

fixed under sub-paragraph (1) plus local taxes, if any. As already

observed, we are not concerned here with the modalities of fixation

of price. The very inclusion of these bulk drugs in the schedule is

being assailed on the ground that it is opposed to the norms laid

down by the Central Government itself in the Drug Policy of 1994

and, therefore, the delegated legislative power exercised by the

Government is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution. The plea of the respondents was accepted by the High

Court.

2.4 In the Drug Policy document issued on 15th September, 1994,

the Central Government noticed that during the last decade, the

drug industry had grown significantly in terms of production of bulk

drugs and formulations and the export performance of the industry

had been commendable. It was said that the pharmaceutical sector

had been able to carve a special niche for itself in the international

market as a dependable exporter of bulk drugs. The drug policy with

regard to pricing has been stated thus in paragraph 9 of the policy

Paper:

“9. Pricing—The aberrations which have come to notice,

in the listing of drugs and their categorization for the

purpose of price control, need to be eliminated by the

use of transparent criteria applied across the board on

all the drugs with the minimum use of subjectivity. The

high turnover of a drug is an index of its extent of usage

and is considered to meet the requirements of objectivity

justifiable on economic considerations. However, the

monopoly situation in cases of drugs with comparatively

lower turnover has also to be kept in view. Also, as an

experimental measure, drugs having adequate

competition may not be kept under price control and if

this proves successful it would pave the way for further

liberalization. In the event, however, of prices of these

drugs not remaining within reasonable limits, the

Government would reclamp price control.”

In paragraph 11, it is stated—

“In the light of the apprehensions expressed in the

Parliament on the likely spurt in the prices of medicines,

it has been felt that it would not be desirable to allow

automaticity in the pricing mechanism. The Government

would set up an independent body of experts, to be

called the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, to

do the work of price fixation. This expert body would

also be entrusted with the task of updating the list of

drugs under price control each year on the basis of the

established criteria/guidelines….”

2.5 The Government’s resolve to closely monitor the trends of

prices of medicines and to take appropriate measures to reclamp

price control in case the prices of such medicines rise

unreasonably, has been stressed in paragraph 12. Then, we come

to the most important paragraph in the Drug Policy i.e., 22.7.2 which

bears the heading ‘Span of Control’. It sets out the criteria for

bringing the drugs under price control. We quote paragraph 22.7.2:-

22.7.2. Span of Control—

(i) The criterion of including drugs under price control

would be the minimum annual turnover of Rs.400

lakhs.

(ii) Drugs of popular use in which there is a monopoly

situation be kept under price control. For this

purpose for any bulk drug, having an annual

turnover of Rs.100 lakhs or more there is a single

formulator having 90% or more market share in

the Retail Trade (as per ORG) a monopoly

situation would be considered as existing.

(iii) Drugs in which there is sufficient market

competition viz., at least 5 bulk drug producers

and at least 10 formulators and none having more

than the 40% market share in the Retail Trade (as

per ORG) may be kept outside the price control.

However, a strict watch would be kept on the

movement of prices as it is expected that their

prices would be kept in check by the forces of

market competition. The Government may

determine the ceiling levels beyond which

increase in prices would not be permissible.

(iv) Government will keep a close watch on the prices

of medicines which are taken out of price control.

In case, the prices of these medicines rise

unreasonably, the Government would take

appropriate measures, including reclamping of

price control.

(v) For applying the above criteria, to start with, the

basis would be the data upto 31st March, 1990

collected for the exercise of the Review of the

Drug Policy. The updating of the data will be done

by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority

as detailed in para 22.7.4(i).

3. The central theme of the arguments is that the norms set out

in sub-Paras (i), (ii) & (iii) have not been adhered to by the

Government while framing the first schedule to DPCO in purported

implementation of the drug policy. There was either deviation from

the criteria set out or there was no scientific or rational assessment

of the factors relevant to the norms. Most of the arguments centered

round the interpretation of the three clauses in para 22.7.2—an

exercise which is usually associated with the construction of

statutes. The sum and substance of the arguments on behalf of the

respondents is that the seven bulk drugs get excluded from the

span of control under one or more norms spelt out in para 22.7.2,

whereas the stand of the appellants is that the concerned bulk

drugs were included in the schedule only after being satisfied that

they came within the ambit of price control criteria. It is also the

contention of the appellant that the Government’s decision to bring

these important bulk drugs within price control is in accordance with

the objectives underlying in Section 3 of the Essential Commodities

Act, particularly, the interests of consumers. Every attempt was

made to examine the facts and figures by an Expert Group of the

standing committee, keeping in view the prescribed norms in Drug

Policy. It is pointed out that the High Court cannot go into the

intricacies of price fixation under Article 226 of the Constitution or sit

in judgment over the exercise done by experts.

4.1 It is axiomatic that the contents of a policy document cannot

be read and interpreted as statutory provisions. Too much of

legalism cannot be imported in understanding the scope and

meaning of the clauses contained in policy formulations. At the

same time, the Central Government which combines the dual role of

policy-maker and the delegate of legislative power, cannot at its

sweet will and pleasure give a go-bye to the policy guidelines

evolved by itself in the matter of selection of drugs for price control.

The Government itself stressed the need to evolve and adopt

transparent criteria to be applied across the board so as to minimize

the scope for subjective approach and therefore came forward with

specific criteria. It is nobody’s case that for any good reasons, the

policy or norms have been changed or became impracticable of

compliance. That being the case, the Government exercising its

delegated legislative power should make a real and earnest attempt

to apply the criteria laid down by itself. The delegated legislation

that follows the policy formulation should be broadly and

substantially in conformity with that policy; otherwise it would be

vulnerable to attack on the ground of arbitrariness resulting in

violation of Article 14.

4.2 In Indian Express Newspapers Vs. Union of India [(1985) 1

SCC Page 641], the grounds on which subordinate legislation can

be questioned were outlined by this Court. E.S. Venkataramiah, J.

observed thus:

“A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the

same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute

passed by a competent Legislature. Subordinate

legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on

which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition it

may also be questioned on the ground that it does not

conform to the statute under which it is made.

*** *** ***

It may also be questioned on the ground that it is

unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not

being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly

arbitrary. In England, the Judges would say “Parliament

never intended authority to make such rules. They are

unreasonable and ultra vires.”

4.3 True, the breach of policy decision by itself is not a ground to

invalidate delegated legislation. But, in a case like this, the

inevitable fallout of the breach of policy decision which the

Government itself treated as a charter for the resultant legislation is

to leave an imprint of arbitrariness on the legislation. When the

selection or classification of certain drugs is involved for the purpose

of price control, such selection or classification should be on rational

basis and cannot be strikingly arbitrary. No doubt, in such matters,

wide latitude is conceded to the legislature or its delegate. Broadly,

the subordinate law-making authority is guided by the policy and

objectives of primary legislation disclosed by preamble and other

provisions. The delegated legislation need not be modelled on a set

pattern or pre-fixed guidelines. However, where the delegate goes a

step further, draws up and announces a rational policy in keeping

with the purposes of enabling legislation and even lays down

specific criteria to promote the policy, the criteria so evolved

become the guide-posts for its legislative action. In that sense, its

freedom of classification will be regulated by the self-evolved criteria

and there should be demonstrable justification for deviating

therefrom. Though exactitude and meticulous conformance is not

what is required, it is not open to the Government to go hay-wire

and flout or debilitate the set norms either by giving distorted

meaning to them or by disregarding the very facts and factors which

it professed to take into account in the interest of transparency and

objectivity. Otherwise, the legislative act of the delegate in choosing

some drugs for price control while leaving others will attract the

wrath of Article 14. That is why the Union of India has taken the

stand throughout that it stood by the policy while framing the

legislation and that there was every endeavour to apply the criteria

spelt out in the Drug Policy of 1994 before including the drugs in

question in the first schedule. The correctness of this contention

should, of course, be examined.

5.1 With this prologue, let us proceed to analyze the three

relevant criteria in the drug policy. According to the first criterion, for

bringing the drugs under the price control, the minimum annual

turnover of the drug should be 400 lacs. However, this requirement

is qualified by and subject to the criteria laid down in (ii) & (iii).

Where a monopoly situation prevails in respect of any bulk drug, the

minimum annual turnover requirement gets reduced to 100 lacs.

The monopoly situation is deemed to exist where there is a single

formulator commanding 90% or more market share in the retail

trade (as per ORG data). According to the 3rd criterion, even if

minimum annual turnover exceeds 400 lacs, the drug will be kept

outside price control in case there is sufficient market competition.

The yardstick for assessing whether there is sufficient market

competition, according to clause (iii) is that there are at least five

producers of the particular bulk drug and at least ten formulators

and none of them have more than 40% market share in the retail

trade (as per ORG data).

The said criteria have to be worked out with reference to the

data available upto 31st March, 1990 which means, the relevant

facts and figures relating to the financial year 1989-90 have to be

taken into account. This is not in dispute.

5.2 As already noted, there is no quarrel about the criteria that

has been laid down. It is not the case of the Union of India that any

different criteria had been applied while promulgating the DPCO of

1995. The controversy revolves round its actual application or

methodology of working out the criteria. What is the annual turnover

made up of? In other words, how to work out the turnover figures?

Is there sufficient market competition as contemplated by

clause (iii)? It is with reference to these two aspects that the

Government’s stand has not been accepted and the writ petitioner’s

contention found its acceptance by the High Court.

5.3 First, we shall take up the issue of ‘annual turnover’. The

stand of the appellant, as discernible from the affidavits on record

sworn to by the officials of the Department of Chemicals and

Petrochemicals, Government of India is that the turnover of bulk

drug ought not to be mixed up with retail sale data of the

formulations of that bulk drug; in other words, the retail sale data

pertains to formulations of a bulk drug and not to the bulk drug itself.

The broad manner in which the turnover has been assessed is

indicated in paragraph 8 of the rejoinder affidavit filed in SLPs. It is

stated that the expert group of the Standing Committee which went

into the whole issue of exclusion/inclusion of drugs under price

control “took the data for turnover of the bulk drugs comprising of

the value of its total production in the country and value of weighted

average of landed cost of total imports into the country, as the basis

for viewing the price scenario from different points of view”. It is then

stated in paragraph 10 – “In the further respectful submission of the

petitioner the intent behind using the said word (turnover) has been

to determine the extent of usage of a bulk drug in the country

(emphasis supplied). This was the measure adopted by the expert

group in case of each bulk drug by taking into account the

aggregate of its total imports into the country and its total

indigenous production in the country. This has been the connotation

of the word ‘turnover’ at various levels throughout the deliberations

and in implementation of the policy through DPCO 1995 and was

never confined to the narrow connotation of the word ‘sales

turnover’ “. In short, it is submitted (vide paragraph 13) that the

value of total production plus imports of the bulk drug in the country

determines the annual turnover for the purpose of clauses (i) & (ii)

of para 22.7.2. As a corollary to this stand, the contention advanced

on behalf of the Union of India is that export sales could also be

taken into account in arriving at the annual turnover. According to

the respondents (writ petitioners), the annual turnover could only

mean sales of bulk drug within the country either in the same form

or by way of formulations and it has nothing to do with export sales.

The entirety of production and imports cannot be regarded as

turnover. It is submitted by the respondents that the bulk drugs are

sold mostly in the form of formulations and the quantities of bulk

drugs utilized in such formulations are given in ORG data. From

this, the bulk drug turnover can be easily ascertained. The sales of

the bulk drugs as such to the institutions etc., will be negligible i.e.,

about 15%, as per the certificate issued by ORG in one of the

cases. It is, therefore, commented that the contention that the ORG

data does not afford the basis for ascertaining the annual turnover

of the bulk drug, is untenable.

5.4 The High Court, substantially agreeing with the contentions of

the respondents—writ petitioners held that the expression ‘turnover’

occurring in Drugs Policy can only mean domestic sales figures and

nothing else. Export sales cannot be included within the ambit of

turnover. The High Court observed that the concepts of ‘turnover’

and ‘market share’ are interrelated and inter-dependent. The

expression ‘turnover’, if interpreted in a contextual and purposive

manner, would not include exports. The extent of usage of the bulk

drug in the country would be determinative of turnover. By taking

the export sale figures and the value of entire production of bulk

drugs into account, the Central Government had acted contrary to

its own guidelines contained in Drug Policy, 1994. The High Court

then proceeded to discuss whether each of the drugs concerned

could be brought within the purview of DCPO, 1995 and answered

that question in favour of the writ petitioners.

5.5 Before proceeding further, we may notice that the National

Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) constituted by the

Government of India considered the representation of Bulk Drugs

Manufacturers Association (BDMA) on the subject of

inclusion/exclusion of drugs under DPCO. The NPPA passed a

reasoned order rejecting the representation on dt. 6.4.1998. In that

order, the issues raised by BDMA regarding exclusion of six out of

eight drugs with which we are concerned, were considered by the

said authority. There was however no consideration as regards two

drugs, namely, Doxycycline and Glipizide, probably because the

representation did not cover those two drugs.

5.6 Before we take up the issue of export sales, it is necessary to

understand the true import and expanse of the expression ‘turnover’

occurring in clause (i) of para 22.7.2 of the Drug Policy, 1994. What

is the ‘turnover’ contemplated by the said paragraph? Can it be

equated to the value of imported bulk drug and its production, as

contended by the appellant OR should it be equated to the actual

sales within the country? Should the export sales be included in

turnover? These are the questions to which this Court has to

address itself.

5.7 ‘Turnover’ in its ordinary sense connotes amount of business

usually expressed in terms of gross revenue transacted during a

specified period (vide Collins Dictionary). Broadly speaking, it

represents the value of the goods or services sold or supplied

during a period of time. The amount of money turned over or drawn

in a business during certain period, is another shade of meaning.

We need not refer to the definition of ‘turnover’ in Sales tax and

other fiscal enactments—reliance on which was placed by some of

the learned counsel as they are not quite relevant for the purpose

of understanding the expression ‘turnover’ occurring in a policy

document. Nor should we seek any assistance from the definition of

‘sale turnover’ occurring in DPCO in a different context and for a

different purpose. Going by its ordinary meaning and the way in

which it is commonly understood in trade and commerce, it is

difficult to equate turnover to the value of stock acquired either by

means of imports or production. For instance, the entire stock in

trade, say, lying in a godown and not circulated in business, cannot

be regarded as turnover, even giving broadest meaning to the

expression ‘turnover’. The reasoning which could be spelt out from

the order passed by NPPA (referred to supra) and in the counter

affidavits filed by the appellants that indigenous production plus

imports furnishes an indicia of the total business in the country in

relation to a particular bulk drug, cannot be accepted. It is only what

is sold out and marketed that could be legitimately regarded as

turnover of the specified drug. It may be that in the absence of

availability of reliable data regarding sales, the import value and

production value could be the basis to estimate the sale value after

giving due allowance to various factors such as wastage, unsold

stocks etc. But, treating the turnover as nothing but the value of

stock produced or imported during a given period will be doing

violence to the ordinarily accepted meaning of the expression

‘turnover’. There can be no presumption that the entire stock of

bulk drug produced or imported during the year had been sold out

during that year either in the form of formulations or otherwise.

However, we would like to make it clear that the production and

import statistics are not altogether irrelevant. They are relevant in

the sense that they furnish some basis for estimating the sales

when there is no other reliable and comprehensive data of sales

available.

5.8 The question whether export sales should also be taken into

account in computing the annual turnover needs to be discussed

now. There can be no doubt that the meaning of the expression

‘turnover’ either in its ordinary or legal sense includes export sales.

But, we must have regard to the terms and objectives of the policy

and try to understand that expression accordingly. Para 9 of the

Drug Policy, 1994 makes it clear that the high turnover of a drug is

an index of its extent of usage. ‘Usage’ has obvious reference to

consumption and consumption within the domestic market. Whether

the drug is extensively used within the country is one of the

considerations kept in view to clamp price control. The export

potential of the drug or its usage in foreign countries could not have

been the reason to notify the specified drugs for price control. If

there is any doubt in this regard, it is dispelled by what is stated in

paragraph 10 of the rejoinder affidavit which we quoted supra. To

repeat, it was stated therein that the intent behind using the word

‘turnover’ has been to determine the extent of usage of a bulk drug

in the country. It is also pertinent to note that the Govt. of India has

not come forward with any explanation as to why export sales also

should be taken into account in assessing the turnover as per the

criteria laid down in the Drug Policy. For all these reasons, we are

in agreement with the High Court that the export sales ought to

have been excluded while calculating the turnover. How far the

exclusion of export sales would make any difference is a different

matter.

5.9 Another grey area which has surfaced in the backdrop of the

Drug Policy, 1994 is whether for the purpose of clause (iii), the

expression ‘formulators’ should be confined to single ingredient

formulators or it should extend to multi-ingredient formulators as

well. The NPPA while rejecting the representation of the Bulk Drug

Manufacturers’ Association, referred to the clarification issued by

the Government of India in its communication dated 10.6.1997

addressed to one of the writ petitioners which is as follows:

“The basis of the single ingredient formulation as against

that of the combination formulation (for purpose of

calculating market share), is not only justified on account

of predominance of single ingredient formulation, on

over all basis, but also vindicates the objective of

“promoting the rational use of drugs in the country”

mentioned in paragraph 1(b) of the “Modifications in

Drug Policy, 1986″. The Principle of covering only single

ingredient formulations, for purposes of calculating

market share is a transparent, objective and verifiable

principle and hence suitable for policy issues.

Formulations of a bulk drug, containing one or more

other bulk drug are not comparable in terms of their

sales values. Therefore, it is practically not possible to

apply the criteria relating to market share of a formulator

of a bulk drug on the basis of data of its combination

formulations, across the board, in a transparent,

objective and verifiable manner as required for policy

issues.”

It is, therefore, contended by the Union of India that only

single ingredient formulations have to be taken into account for the

purpose of working out the criterion in clause (iii) and that the

number of single ingredient formulators of the concerned bulk drug

is not discernible from ORG data. Of course, it is the contention of

the respondents that no such distinction can be drawn. It is

contended that such distinction is irrational.

In our view, the clarification given by the Government of India

reflects a reasonable view point and it cannot be said that by

adopting such approach, a distorted meaning is given to the

expression ‘formulator’ much against the spirit of the policy. At any

rate, two views are possible and it is not for the Court to decide

which view is preferable.

6. Before closing the discussion on the controversies

surrounding the criteria evolved in the Drug Policy, there is one

argument of the learned Solicitor General which we would like to

refer to. The learned Solicitor General argued that the expression

‘may’ occurring in clause (iii) of para 22.7.2 of the Drug Policy

confers discretion and flexibility in approach to the Government of

India. Even if a particular bulk drug stands outside price control by

the application of such criteria, the discretion is still left to the

Government to include the drug in the Schedule for good reasons.

This argument cannot be countenanced for the simple reason that it

is not the case of the Government that for any particular reason or

reasons, the bulk drug concerned was brought within the purview of

price control, though the drug qualifies for exclusion under

clause (iii). Even assuming that the discretion is available in terms

of the policy, the factum of exercising such discretion for relevant

reasons should be disclosed. In the absence of such disclosure, the

Court must proceed on the basis that the Government stood by the

criteria and saw no need to deviate therefrom.

7.1 Now it is necessary to advert to the nature of the claim made

by the writ petitioners in relation to each of the bulk drugs, the stand

taken by the Union of India and the conclusions of the High Court.

7.2 Salbutamol: According to the writ petitioner-Company, the

annual turnover for the year ending March, 1990 was Rs.171.17

lacs based on the ORG data. The sales of formulations in domestic

market has been taken as the basis to calculate the consumption. It

is then multiplied by the notified price prevalent during the relevant

period. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that there were as

many as 24 formulators including the petitioner, none of whom had

the market share of more than 40%. Admittedly, there were more

than five bulk drug producers. The writ petitioner-Company,

therefore, claimed the benefit of exclusion both under clause (i) and

(iii) of para 22.7.2 of the Drug Policy, 1994. The Government of

India took the stand that the bulk drug turnover was Rs.11.50 crores

based on the value of domestic production and imports. Moreover,

there were only seven known formulators of the bulk drug.

Therefore, it is contended that the drug Salbutamol does not qualify

for exclusion either under clause (i) or (iii). The High Court accepted

the claim of the petitioner-Company on the ground that in the

counter-affidavit filed by the Union of India, there was only a bald

denial and the details given by the writ petitioners were not

controverted.

7.3 Theophylline: The writ petitioners claimed exclusion under

clause (iii). The names of six bulk drug producers and 31

formulators were given in the writ petition. In the counter-affidavit, it

was merely stated that there were less than five known

manufacturers of bulk drug and less than 10 known formulators of

the bulk drug and therefore the drug Theophylline did not qualify for

exclusion under clause (iii). The High Court observed that the

particulars furnished by the petitioner were not effectively

controverted, there being only a bald denial. It was therefore held

that the drug ought not to have been brought under price control.

As per the statement furnished by the learned Solicitor

General at the time of hearing, the fact that there were more than

five bulk drug producers, was accepted but the number of

formulators was given as seven. Therefore, the dispute is confined

to the number of formulators, the term ‘formulator’ being understood

in the sense in which the Government of India explained in its

clarificatory letter dated 6-4-1998.

7.4 Cloxacillin : The writ petitioners concerned are said to be the

manufacturers of formulations made out of Cloxacillin. There is no

dispute that the annual turnover at the relevant time was much more

than 400 lacs. The writ petitioners claimed exclusion of the drug

Cloxacillin on the basis of clause (iii) of para 22.7.2. According to

them, there were as many as 16 bulk drug producers and 23

formulators in respect of Cloxacillin and none of the formulators had

more than 40% market share as per the ORG figures for the year

1989-90 (upto March 1990). The High Court accepted the case of

the petitioners on the ground that the factual particulars were not

controverted, but there was only a bald denial in the counter

affidavit filed by Union of India. The counter-affidavit of Union of

India is not found either in S.L.P. paper books or the original record

of High Court. However, the stand of Union of India, as is clear from

the reply dated 6.4.1998 of the NPPA sent to the Bulk Drug

Manufacturers’ Association as well as the Grounds of SLP is that

the number of single ingredient formulators of the drug was less

than 10. According to the statement furnished by the learned

Solicitor General in the course of the arguments, the number of

formulators were only two. The NPPA clarified the position thus:

“The Association has claimed that the highest market share of

single formulator is 21.89%. This claim is based on consideration of

sale values of both single ingredient and combination products of

Cloxacillin. However, the highest market share of single drug

ingredient formulation of a particular formulator works out to 93.07%

which is more than the stipulated level of 40%.”

Thus, there is controversy regarding the number of

formulators and their market share.

7.5 Cyproflaxacin: The 2nd petitioner in writ petition No. 3449 of

1996, namely, Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. produced the said bulk

drug during the relevant period and captively consumed the same in

the manufacture of formulations marketed under the brand name of

Cifran both in India and foreign countries. The petitioner in W.P.No.

1974 of 2000 is Cipla Ltd. Inter alia, it is engaged in the

manufacture and sale of formulations of the drug Cyproflaxacin.

According to Ranbaxy Ltd., the annual domestic turnover of the

drug for the year ending March, 1990 was Rs.238 lacs and

according to the Cipla Ltd., it was Rs.243 lacs excluding the hospital

and institutional sales to the extent of 15%. It is therefore contended

that the drug stands excluded under clause (i) of para 22.7.2 of the

Drugs Policy. It is their further contention that there was no

monopoly situation as contemplated by clause (ii) inasmuch as

there was no single formulator having 90% or more market share in

the retail trade as per ORG data. The said turnover was calculated

on the basis of estimated consumption purportedly arrived at with

reference to the data relating to sales formulations given in ORG

publication. The quantum of consumption was then multiplied by

the then prevailing market price. However, a different method of

calculation of turnover was spelt out in the representation dated

7.3.1995 submitted by Ranbaxy Ltd., to Government of India (vide

Ext.B in W.P.No. 3449 of 1996). According to that calculation, the

turnover is Rs.280 lacs.

In the counter-affidavit, the turnover given by the writ

petitioners has been disputed. It is stated that ORG data relates to

formulation sales and it does not give data in regard to quantities

and values of bulk drug involved. It was also stated that

Cyproflaxacin was included in the first schedule on the basis of

criterion in clause (i) since the turnover in 1989-90 was taken as

Rs.990 lacs based on the landed cost of imports of the drug. It is

then stated that the data in regard to indigenous production is not

available.

The High Court merely referred to the contention of the writ

petitioners regarding the turnover and accepted the same on the

ground that there was only bald denial in the affidavit in reply.

Surprisingly, the High Court extended the benefit of exclusion under

clause (iii) also, though it was never the case of the writ petitioners.

The High Court stated that there were admittedly 16 bulk drug

producers and 20 formulators, though, no such case was set up by

either of the writ petitioners. In the ORG data furnished by the

petitioner in W.P.No. 3449 of 1996 and in the representation

submitted to the Government of India, only the names of seven

formulators was mentioned. Thus, there was an obvious error in the

High Court’s judgment. The plea of discrimination which was raised

for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit filed in W.P.No. 3449 of

1996 also found favour with the High Court.

7.6 Norfloxacin : The writ petitioner seeks exclusion from the

purview of DPCO on the basis of clause (iii) of para 22.7.2 of the

Drugs Policy. It is the case of the petitioner that there were at least

28 bulk drug manufacturers and 20 formulators and no single

formulator had more than 40% market share as per the ORG

figures. The names were given in the writ petition. However, the

stand taken in the counter- affidavit filed by the Government of India

is that there were only three manufacturers of the bulk drug and the

ORG data does not disclose the number of bulk drug producers. As

regards the formulators, the stand taken is that the number of single

ingredient formulators using the said bulk drug is not discernible

from the ORG data. It is, therefore, contended that the twin

conditions of a minimum of five bulk drug producers and at least 10

formulators are not satisfied. The High Court accepted the plea of

the writ petitioner on the ground that there was only a bald denial in

the counter-affidavit and no specific particulars were given to

controvert the contention of the petitioner. In the order passed by

NPPA in response to the representation of Bulk Drug

Manufacturers’ Association, it is stated that as per the records

available, there were only three bulk drug manufacturers in the

country during 1989-90. However, the names were not furnished

either in this document or the counter affidavit.

As per the ORG data, the market share of the formulation sold

by the petitioner-Company was 39.56% (vide annexure at page 38

of the original writ petition record) which, as pointed out by NPPA, is

technically lower than 40%. We may add that it is perilously close to

40%. It should also be noted that the writ petitioner did not furnish

any details of production to show that the bulk drug manufacturers

mentioned by it or at least five amongst them actually produced the

bulk drug.

7.7 Doxycycline : It is the case of the writ petitioner that it

manufactures and sells single ingredient formulation containing the

bulk drug Doxycycline in a concentration of 100 mg per capsule

under the brand name of Doxy-1. The annual turnover of the bulk

drug Doxycycline, according to the writ petitioner, was Rs. 316 lacs.

It is seen from the tabular statement appended to Annexure-A to the

writ petition at pages 85-86 of the original record, the petitioner

arrived at the total domestic consumption of the bulk drug with

reference to the ORG data pertaining to sales of formulations in the

market. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that as per ORG

data, there were at least 19 formulators producing Doxycycline

based formulations and none of them had more than 40% of market

share in retail trade. Therefore, the petitioner claimed that the bulk

drug Doxycycline should have been excluded from the purview of

price control in terms of under clause (i) & (iii) and that monopoly

situation contemplated by clause (ii) has no application because no

single manufacturer had 90% or more market share in retail trade.

The stand of the Government has been that the turnover of

Doxycycline was above 400 lacs during the relevant period and

therefore it comes under price control. Further, it is their case that

clause (ii) has no application because the turnover is above 400

lacs. It is also averred in the counter affidavit that the retail trade

sale data is not relevant since the need to calculate market share

does not arise. Moreover, since undisputably, there is only one

manufacturer of the bulk drug, i.e., Ranbaxy Limited, the exclusion

criteria laid down in clause (iii) of para 22.7.2 is not applicable.

In paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal, the High Court

having merely referred to the arguments of the learned counsel for

the petitioner, accepted the case of the petitioner on the ground

that in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Government, there was only

bald denial and that the particulars were not controverted.

Moreover, the High Court was under an apparent misapprehension

that the Writ Petitioner sought the benefit of exclusion under

clause (iii) also. The core controversy, as already noticed, is

regarding the quantum of turnover. The Union of India took the

stand that the turnover was above 400 lacs. In the statement filed

by the learned Solicitor-General at the time of argument, the figure

was given as 471.77 lacs. However, the appellant did not furnish

any details as to the calculation of turnover.

7.8 Glipizide: The writ petitioner—USV Limited is a manufacturer

of the bulk drug ‘Glipizide’ which is sold under the brand name of

Glynase. It does not appear that there was any other producer of

bulk drug during the relevant period. It is the case of the writ

petitioner that the annual turnover for the year ending 31st March,

1990 was only Rs. 82 lacs and that clause (ii) is not therefore

attracted. The writ petitioner estimated the turnover figure by

arriving at the consumption of the bulk drug in various formulations

and by multiplying the same by the MRP (Maximum Retail Price).

The ORG data relating to sales of formulations was furnished.

The stand of the Central Government is that production data

was not available for the year 1989-90 and the turnover of the bulk

drug was determined by the expert group on the basis of the landed

cost of imports during the year to the tune of Rs.322.50 lacs. As

there was only one formulator as reported in ORG survey of March,

1990, monopoly situation was considered to be existing “since one

formulator was having 100% market share as on 31.3.1990”.

Disputing the assertion of the writ petitioner that as per ORG data

furnished in Ext.F to the writ petition, there was no single formulator

having 90% or more market share in retail trade, it is pointed out in

Paragraph (iv) of the counter-affidavit that Ext.F includes

formulations based on the bulk drugs other than Glipizide. It is

further stated in the same para of the counter that there is only one

formulation, namely, Glynase based on Glipizide and in respect of

that, the writ petitioner had 100% market share.

Thus, the dispute mainly centers round the quantum of

turnover.

The High Court observed that “even assuming that the

petitioners were the sole manufacturers of the said drug, as the

turnover was below Rs.100 lacs, the monopoly situation, as

envisaged in para 22.7.2 (ii) of Drug Policy, 1994 does not apply

and as such the said drug ought to be kept out of the purview of

DPCO, 1995”. The plea of discrimination between this drug and

another anti- diabetic drug known as Insulin also found favour with

the High Court.

8.1 We are of the view that the approach of High Court in

considering the question of applicability of criteria laid down in the

Drugs Policy in relation to each of the above drugs is not correct

and the High Court failed to address itself to various crucial aspects

as indicated below:

8.2 ORG data does not give full and clear picture of the turnover

of bulk drug. ORG data relates to sales of formulations made either

exclusively out of the bulk drug or in combination with other drugs.

The formulations containing the particular bulk drug either wholly or

in part reach the consumers through normal trade channels. The

particulars of sales of such formulations entering the retail market

are compiled by ORG. Bulk drug sales as such are not covered by

ORG data. At best, from ORG data, it may be possible to deduce

the consumption of bulk drug on estimated basis especially if it is

the only drug used in that formulation. Moreover, direct sales to

institutions such as hospitals and Government organizations are not

reflected in ORG compilation. According to the certificate filed in

some of the cases, such sales would be about 14%. It is also borne

out by the same certificate issued by the Associate Research

Director of ORG (Ext. ‘C’ to W.P.No. 1974 of 2000 and Annexure-I

to written submissions) that out of this 86%, the ORG data covers

about 90% of the retail market sales. This is what the certificate

says:—

“The Retail Pharma Market in India contributes to 86%

of the total market and the remaining 14% towards

Hospital and Institutional sales.

I would like to confirm that out of this 86% of Retail

Pharma Market, ORG-MARG covers around 90%

through the Retail Store Audit (RSA).”

8.3 One more aspect which deserves notice is that from the ORG

data, it may not be possible to ascertain whether the formulation is

made up of single ingredient of the bulk drug or it has multi-

ingredients. We have held that the Government of India’s view that

single ingredient formulators alone should be taken into account for

the purpose of the criteria in clause (iii) of para 22.7.2 of Drugs

Policy cannot be said to be against the policy or otherwise

unreasonable.

8.4 Sales of bulk drugs effected during the year by bulk drug

producers including some of the respondents herein would have

furnished the best indicia of domestic sale turnover of bulk drug.

But, those details were not disclosed. Secondly, if the bulk drug

produced was consumed by any bulk drug producer or importer and

the drug was sold in the form of formulations, the statistics

regarding the quantum of bulk drug utilized in such formulations and

the value thereof must have been within the knowledge or reach of

writ petitioners and there is no good reason why they should

withhold all this relevant information and harp on ORG data. There

is no need to resort to guess-work when the actual figures are

available at the doorsteps of the respondents. Moreover, some of

the respondents have arrived at the estimates by varying methods

without reference to actual data available with them. For instance, in

the case of the drug Cyproflaxacin, we have adverted to different

methods of calculation given by the writ petitioners which yield

different results. If we go by the estimates of turnover made by the

respondents, there is vast difference between the value of the bulk

drug worked out by them and the sale value of formulations.

Moreover, in relation to some of the drugs, there is vast variation

between the quantity produced and imported and the quantity said

to have been utilized in formulations sold in the market. These

factors should have put the High Court on guard to subject the

petitioners’ version to close and critical scrutiny.

8.5 When the burden was on the writ petitioners to substantiate

their plea of violation of Article 14 and when the plea predominantly

rested on facts and figures, the High Court should have examined

the intrinsic worth and credibility of the version put forward with

regard to the turnover figures. The High Court oversimplified the

whole issue by addressing itself to the only question whether there

was effective rebuttal of the averments by the Union of India. The

callousness on the part of the officials concerned in not meeting the

points raised squarely and leaving the scope for ambiguity should

not, in our view, be a ground to accept whatever is falling from the

writ petitioners. The material placed before the Court should have

been critically examined before reaching a conclusion that Article 14

is violated. The High Court should have also examined whether the

writ petitioners withheld the relevant data which they were in a

position to produce and if so, what would be its effect. None of

these aspects received attention of the High Court. Before striking

down the legislation, the High Court should have realized that those

who challenged the legislation should lay firm factual foundation in

support of their plea. The complaint of violation of norms set out in

the policy leading to the alleged infraction of Article 14 depends, in

the ultimate analysis, on facts and figures. As already observed,

ORG data is neither comprehensive nor conclusive and moreover in

regard to some of the drugs, the data does not in unequivocal

terms, support the case of the writ petitioners. In such a situation,

further probe and analysis was required which the High Court failed

to do. The version of writ petitioners regarding the quantum of

turnover was accepted to be correct on its face value. That apart, in

the light of the clarification given by us that single ingredient

formulators alone could be legitimately taken into account in the

context of clause (iii), the need for reconsideration by the High Court

becomes inevitable. We are, therefore, of the view that the crucial

issues regarding the applicability of criteria laid down in para 22.7.2

of the Drugs Policy require reconsideration by the High Court from

various angles indicated supra in the light of the legal position

enunciated and the observations made in this judgment.

8.6 We have broadly indicated the aspects on which the High

Court could have focused its attention before reaching the

conclusion it did. Nothing precludes the High Court from having

regard to other aspects or material which it considers relevant to

test the correctness of the writ petitioners’ claims. However, we

would like to clarify one thing. If, on reconsideration, the turnover of

any drug is found to be very close to the figure—400 or 100 lacs, as

the case may be, the relevant criterion must be deemed to have

been satisfied. As we said earlier, mathematical accuracy is not

what is required.

8.7 There is one more point which we have to deal with, i.e., the

alleged discrimination between one drug and another. The High

Court upheld such plea raised in rejoinder affidavit in relation to the

drugs ‘Cyproflaxacin’ and ‘Glipizide’. We unhesitatingly vacate the

findings of the High Court in this regard because we are of the view

that the reasons given by the High Court for upholding such plea

are too tenuous to merit even prima facie acceptance.

8.8 In the case of Cyproflaxacin in W.P.No. 3449 of 1996 it was

contended that two bulk drugs, namely, Mefenamic Acid and

Amikacin Sulphate were wrongly and arbitrarily deleted from the

DPCO, 1995. It is difficult to comprehend as to how there could be

infraction of Article 14 merely because a few bulk drugs were

excluded from the purview of DPCO on a reconsideration. The

exclusion of some drugs, even if such exclusion is unjustified,

cannot be a ground to claim exclusion of other drugs on the so

called principle of parity. Logically, if the High Court’s view has to

be accepted, the entire Schedule should be invalidated for the

simple reason that one or two drugs, which were not eligible for

exclusion in the light of the policy guidelines were excluded. It would

then lead to a startling result frustrating the very objective of

regulating the price of essential drugs. That apart, the turnover

figures of the said two drugs furnished by the writ petitioner and

referred to by the High Court, do not establish that they fall within

the policy guidelines. Regarding Mefenamic Acid, what all is stated

in paragraph 16 of the rejoinder affidavit is that the turnover of this

drug has been “over Rs.4 crores between 1988-89 to 1991-92 and

yet it was excluded for reasons not known to the petitioners”.

Nothing has been stated as to how the turnover for the relevant year

was arrived at. No information was furnished regarding the number

of bulk drug producers and formulators and their market share.

Evidently, the petitioner made only a halfhearted attempt to put

forward a plea of discrimination, but, it succeeded in its attempt.

Coming to the other drug Amikacin Sulphate, even according to the

petitioner, the import value of the drug in 1989-90 was Rs.3.5

crores, which is much below the limit of Rs.4 crores and even if

there was a single formulator having a market share in excess of

40%, that does not make any difference. That apart, the

Government of India clarified in one of the counter affidavits filed in

the High Court that on the scrutiny and verification of details

submitted by the manufacturers, these two drugs were

subsequently deleted from the First Schedule having regard to the

criteria laid down in the policy.

We have, therefore, no hesitation in reversing the conclusion

of the High Court that the exclusion of the said two drugs from

DPCO amounted to hostile discrimination.

8.9 Regarding ‘Glipizide’, the plea of discrimination between this

drug and another anti-diabetic drug known as Insulin, found favour

with the High Court. The High Court, in paragraph 90 of the

judgment referred to the argument that Insulin having 441 lacs

turnover as on 31st March, 1990 was included in DPCO of 1995, but

subsequently excluded from price control and held that there was

discrimination on that account. The High Court evidently proceeded

on an erroneous assumption that Insulin was excluded from the

schedule. The averments in paragraph 22 of the writ petition

No.5219/1996 are otherwise. The plea of discrimination was aimed

at the drug known as Glibelclamide, which was excluded from the

DPCO of 1987 and continued to remain excluded from the DPCO of

1995. The respondent did not even aver that the said drug had the

turnover of more than 100 lacs and therefore it would fall within the

mischief of clause (ii). On the basis of a bald plea, the infraction of

Article 14 ought not to have been countenanced. The finding of the

High Court in this regard is palpably wrong.

9. We now summarize the conclusions as under:

1. Where the Central Government as the delegate of legislative

power announces a rational policy in keeping with the

purposes of enabling legislation and even lays down specific

criteria to promote the policy, the criteria so evolved become

the guide-posts of its legislative action. While classifying the

drugs for the purpose of price control, it is not open to the

Government to flout or debilitate the set norms which it

professed to follow in the interest of transparency and

objectivity. Otherwise, there will be an element of arbitrariness

and the delegated legislation will not withstand the test of

Article 14.

2. The expression ‘turnover’ in Drug Policy, 1994 represents the

sale value of bulk drug sold as such or in the form of

formulations.

3. Export sales should not be taken into account while computing

turnover.

4. The sum total of production and imports of bulk drug cannot

be equated to turnover, though they are not altogether

irrelevant in calculating the turnover.

5. ORG data does not give exhaustive account of turn over of

bulk drug. It may furnish the basis for estimating the turnover,

but is not the sole guide.

6. For the purpose of criterion No.(iii) of the Drug Policy, the

single ingredient formulators alone ought to be taken into

account as clarified by the Govt. of India.

7. Burden lies on those who challenge the legislation on the

ground of violation of Article 14 to make out their case by

furnishing all the relevant material which is within their reach

and knowledge. There should be frank disclosure of material

facts, more so, when the plea is founded on certain factual

aspects. The mere vagueness or lack of clarity in the stand

taken by the Union of India does not by itself advance the

case of the writ petitioners.

8. The plea of writ petitioners ought to have been tested and

subjected to scrutiny in the light of all relevant factors instead

of merely considering whether the particulars furnished by the

petitioners were effectively controverted or not. Such an

approach of the High Court is wholly impermissible while

deciding the validity of legislation—plenary or delegated, from

the stand point of Article 14.

9. The plea of discrimination between one drug and another is

unfounded and should not have been accepted by the High

Court.

10. In the result, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and

the writ petitions out of which these appeals arise shall stand

restored to the file of the High Court and the High Court will have to

consider afresh the relevant aspects concerning the criteria laid

down in para 22.7.2 of the Drug Policy, 1994 in relation to each

drug, having due regard to the observations made in the judgment.

The High Court may endeavour to expedite hearing of the writ

petitions.

11. The appeals are accordingly allowed without costs. We also

consider it just and proper to give liberty to the appellant and the

concerned statutory authorities to recover 50% of the ‘over

charged’ amounts pending fresh determination by the High Court.

Accordingly, we direct stay of recovery of 50% of the ‘overcharged’

amount subject to the payment of remaining 50% within the period

of four weeks from the date of communication of the amount

payable by each of the writ petitioners.