JUDGMENT
Mishra, J.
1. A Bench of this Court in a batch of writ petitions in W.P. No. 865 of 1982 etc. and W.P. No. 3137 of 1983, etc. held in its judgment dated 8.1.1988 and 21.1.1988 that a subsequent purchaser of a property notified for acquisition under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 and then followed up by Section 6 declaration, cannot have any locus standi to question the acquisition. Venkataswami, J. and Abdul Hadi, J. found however that they were unable to agree with the said view.
2. Speaking for the Bench in W.P. No. 865 of 1982, Mohan, J. (as he then was) observed:
W.P. No. 865 of 1982: This is a case in which the petitioner with open eyes when the properties have been notified for acquisition by Section 4(1) notification and then followed up by Section 6 declaration which is conclusive under Section 6(3), has come to purchase the property and wants to say that he could question the validity of the acquisition. In support of the argument, a judgment reported in Smt Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality , is cited.
The relevant paragraph on which reliance is placed, is paragraph 17 at page 805; thus reads as follows:
It was urged by Mr. Hazarnavis on behalf of the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, that the three appellants were purchasers of the lands claimed by them after the notification under Section 4 was issued and they had no right to challenge the issue of the notification. If, however, the notification under Section 4 was vague, the three appellants who are purchasers of the land had title thereto may challenge the validity of the notification. The appellants have spent in putting up substantial structures considerable sum of money and we are unable to hold that merely because they had purchased the lands after the issue of the notification under Section 4 they are debarred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from contending that it did not apply to their lands.
3. Venkataswami, J. in the Order of Reference, dated 15.2.1991 has upon this said:
Following the abovesaid ratio, the same Bench has taken the same view in W.P. 3137 of 1983. After going through the judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality , we are unable to agree with the view taken by the earlier Division Bench of this Court holding that the subsequent purchaser has no locus standi to file the writ petition at all. Such a proposition as stated above is too bread in our opinion, having regard to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality . There is a mention in the order of reference of the judgment of this Court in Kuppuswamy v. Special Tahsildar (1967)2 M.L.J. 329, in which a learned single judge of this Court has taken the view that the agreement-holder can challenge the land acquisition proceedings as he stepped into the shoes of the original owner.
4. Article 226(i) of the Constitution nowhere states that the High Court could exercise its power to issue writ only on an application of a person aggrieved. There is no such inhibition even for the exercise of power of superintendence by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This is a concept derived from the English decisions. In Dwarakanath v. Income-tax Officer, Kanpur , it has been explained by the Supreme Court that the founding fathers of the Constitution have designedly couched Article 226 of the Constitution in a comprehensive phraseology to enable the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. In Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar , the Supreme Court has said:
In a sense, the scope and nature of the power conferred by the Article is wider than that exercised by the writ courts in England. Howaever, the adoption of the nomenclature of English writs, with the prefix “nature of superadded indicates that the general principles grown over the years in the English Courts, can, shorn of unnecessary technical procedural restrictions, and adopted to the special conditions of this vast country, in so far as they do not conflict with any provision of the Constitution, or the law declared by this Court, be usefully considered in directing the exercise of this discretionary jurisdiction in accordance with well recognised rules of practice.
This is thus one of the rules of practice that courts ask the question who is the petitioner and how he is aggrieved. A detailed study of this rule of practice has been made by the Supreme Court in Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578, and it is observed:
According to most English decisions, in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an, “aggrieved person” and, in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as, a matter of course, but if he does not fulfil that character, and is a “stranger”, the court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special circumstances.
5. In short, who is a person aggrieved or in other words, who will have the locus standi to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 has been answered by the Supreme Court in several judgments, but in Jasbhai Desai’s case A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578, this has been summarised as follows:
This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter (See State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal ,, Calcutta Gas Company v. State of West Bengal , Ram Umesh-wari Suthee v. Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa (1967)1 S.C.A. 413,Gadda Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh , State of Orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandan-mall , Dr.Satyanarayana Sinha v. S. Dol & Company .
The expression “ordinarily” indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the application has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it.
6. Jasbhai Desai Case , has also taken notice of the practice in the United States of America and stated that in the United States of America also, the law on the point is substantially the same and thus stated,
It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories; (i) person aggrieved; (ii) stranger; (iii) busybody or meddlesome. interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things Which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper notices. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold.
The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; Asolid central zone of certainty, and a gray outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the. central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of ‘persons aggrieved’. In the gray outer-circle the bounds which separate, the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer-zone may not” be “persons aggrieved”. To distinguish such applicants from “strangers” among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person “against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words “persons aggrieved” is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?
7. The principles enunciated in Jasbhai Desai’s case AIR. 1976 S.C. 578, have been reiterated so many times by, now that no one entertained any doubt to the proposition that the meaning of the words “person aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the statute and that even a stranger may be found to have locus standi although he may not have any personal interest of his own, provided he is not a busybody or meddlesome interloper, and although a stranger, he moves the Court for right in common with the general public.
8. The question as to locus standi had arisen in Jasbhai Desai’s case A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578, on the objection that a competitor in a cinema business had no right to invoke the writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court noticed in substance that Jabhai Desai’s stand was that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town would adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and Joss of business from competition and held,
Such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law because it does not, result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest the business competition causing it being a lawful activity the term injuries being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large.
In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on Therefore he is not “person aggrieved” and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No Objection Certificate.
9. The reason why the Supreme Court took the above view in Jasbhai Desai’s case A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 578, is explained by it in these words:
It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular is discretionary. But in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The broad guidelines indicated by us, coupled with other well-established self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc. can go a long way to help the courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money.
While a procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule, the court should not interfere at the instance of a ‘stranger’ unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a stranger, and not a busybody, then also there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellants’ monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 and 2, which they have under Article l9(1)(g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to ‘reasonable restrictions imposed by law.
10. It is also useful to refer to a judgment of a Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Gupta v. Union of India A.I.R 1982 S.C. 149, wherein the Supreme Court has pointed out the exceptions to the rules relating to affidavit, locus standi and the like in the case of a class of litigations which have acquired classification as public interest litigation’ that is, where the public in general are interested in the vindication of some right or the enforcement of some public duty. Following the observation of the Supreme Court in Gupta’s case A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 and its reiteration in Sheela v. State of Maharashtra and Veera v. State of Bihar , High Courts have started entertaining such applications where public interest is undermined by arbitrary, and, perverse executive action. But even in such case, the courts have insisted that, there should be satisfactory credentials of the petitioner, that the nature of information given by him is at least prima facie true and is not vague and indefinite, that the information is grave or serious and that there are clear circumstances to show that the Court should intervene.
11. In Chaitanya v. State of Karnataka , it has been pointed out that in a public interest litigation, the Court has to strike a balance between two conflicting interests; (a) Nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (b) avoidance of public mischief and to prevent publicly mischievous executive actions. In such cases, however, the court cannot afford to be liberal. They have to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressings public grievance, it does not fencroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature.
12. With the above rule of practice as to locus standi of a petitioner in view when such a question is asked with respect to any notification, declaration or proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, one has to take notice of the fact that this law is made for compulsory acquisition of land by the State for public purposes. There can be no acquisition unless there is a publication of a preliminary notification, that the land in any locality was needed or was likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company. Upon such a publication of a preliminary notification, it shall be lawful for any officer either generally or specially authorised by the appropriate Government in this behalf and for his servants and workmen to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality to dig or bore into the sub-soil, to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of work, if any, proposed to be made thereon; to make such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle; provided that to do so, it will not be lawful to enter into any building or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling-house, unless with the consent of the occupier thereof, without previously giving such occupier at least seven days’ notice in writing Of his intention to do sq. The provisions of this Act have a scheme of giving opportunity of being heard to any person interested in any land and only thereafter to make declaration of intended acquisition under Section 6 of the Act followed by an order for acquisition and notice to persons interested for final claims to compensation, for all interests in such land, enquiry and award of compensation with the exception of the cases falling under Section 17 of the Act under which in cases of urgency, the appropriate Government may direct the Collector to take possession of any land needed for a public purpose or for a company. The Land Acquisition Act contains a definition of the expression “person interested” in these words:
The expression “person interested” includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and person shall be deemed to be interested in an easement affecting the land;
13. Except in cases of urgency, the ownership of the property and that interest in the property is not transferred to the Government until award under Section 11 of the Act is made. Section 16 of the Act states,
When the Collector has made an award under Section 11 he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.
Section 17 is couched in such words that unless the Government takes possession of land needed for a public purpose, the ownership does not vest in the Government:
14. The expression “Vest absolutely in the Government” on taking possession of the same in Section 16 of the Act fell for consideration by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Dr. G.H. Grant A.I.R. 1960 Pat 382. The question posed was:
In a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, does title to the land pass to the State as soon as award under Section 11 is made and filed under Section 12 or is it deferred till possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act.
The Patna Full Bench has said:
On consideration of the various provisions of the Act, my concluded opinion is that title to the land acquired vests in the Government only when possession of the same is taken by the Government, and not on the making of the award itself. This view gains support from a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Nrishinha Charan Nandi v. Nagendra Bala A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 522 in that case, the respondents were owners of a certain tauzi, and were also gantidars of the lands in a village lying within that tauzi. On the 11th of December, 1924, some lands of that village were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. On 28.3.1925, there was default in payment of the arrears of revenue by the Proprietor of the tauzi, and the same was sold and purchased by the appellant on 18.9.1925. Two days before that, that is, on 16.9.1925, the Collector took possession of the tauzi and possession over the rest of the lands acquired, was taken by him on 22.12.1925. The award of the Collector gave to the respondents certain amount of compensation as proprietors of the tauzi, and some further amount of compensation for their gantidari interest. On the 3rd of October, 1925, the appellant applied to the Collector for a reference to be made to the Court praying that the whole amount of compensation awarded by the Collector was payable to him. The District Judge allowed compensation for the proprietary interest to the appellant and that for the gantidari interest to the respondents. On appeal, the High Court held that the respondents were entitled to proprietary compensation for the lands of which possession was taken by the Collector before the revenue sale, but the compensation for the proprietary interest with respect to the lands of which possession was taken by the Collector after the revenue sale was payable to the appellant. The High Court, therefore, accepted the principle that title to the lands acquired vested in the Government only on taking of possession of the same, otherwise the compensation money could not have been awarded to both the respondents and the appellant accordingly as possession was taken by the Government before or after the revenue sale. The case of 1959 Pat. L.R 1 : A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 343, therefore, has in my opinion, been rightly decided. I would accordingly answer the question referred to the Full Bench as under:
In a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, title to the land does not pass to the State as soon as award under Section 11 is made and filed under Section 12, but it is deferred till possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act. 15. It is not necessary to refer to a large number of decisions on the point of different High Courts as some landmark judgments of this Court and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinbo , have almost settled the dispute in this regard. In M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar (1967)1 M.L.J. 329 : 80 L.W. 114, a judgment of this Court which learned Judges making the instant reference have also noticed, has proceeded upon the definition in Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is observed in the said judgment.
The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether petitioner is a person interested, as defined in Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.
The definition sections says that the expression ‘person interested’ includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act. The expression ‘person interested’ is very comprehensive and it does not profess to give an exhaustive definition. The expression ‘person interested’ has been interpreted by various Courts, and the trend of the opinion seems to be that I should give a liberal interpretation.
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On a review of the case-law on the subject, it seems to me that the expression ‘person interested’ does not require that a person must really have an interest in the land sought to be acquired. It is enough if he claims an interest in compensation, as distinguished from an interest in the property sought to be acquired. As long as a person claims an interest in the compensation, he is a person interested within the meaning of the definition of the expression.
Petitioner in the said case was a person, who had entered into a valid registered agreement to purchase the property from the original owners of the property. He had paid a sum of Rs. 3,000 towards the sale price. He had also spent considerable amount in improving the property. When the property was acquired thus, he was a person interested in the compensation amount. This court held that he was thus a person interested to claim compensation along with others. This judgment this court has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinbo . The appellant Company therein had moved the Government for acquiring additional land for the purpose of its existing factory and accordingly notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were duly issued and the proceeding culminated in an award under Section 12 of the Act. This acquisition was challenged by some of the land owners by way of a writ petition in the Bombay High Court inter alia on the ground that the land was not required for any public purpose as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act and Government was not competent to acquire the same for the purpose of a company, which could not be said to be a public purpose. In this writ petition, the appellant company was impleaded as a party though expressly no relief was claimed against it. The learned single judge, before whom the matter came initially, quashed the acquisition proceedings. The appellant company then preferred a Letters Patent Appeal. Therein an objection was taken on behalf of the respondents that the appellant company had no locus standi to maintain the Letters Patent Appeal. This objection was upheld by the Letters Patent Bench primarily on the ground that the appellant Company as such was not a ‘person interested’ within the meaning of Section l8(1) of the Act. The appellant Company moved the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in its judgment said,
It seems to us that the definition of ‘person interested’ given in Section 18 is an inclusive definition so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all.
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Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of ‘person interested’ must be liberally construed so as to include body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired. and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a ‘person interested’ even though its stake may be extremely vital?
16. In Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinbo , the expression ‘person interested’ in Section l8 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act had fallen for interpretation, which section says,
Any person interested, who has not accepted the award, may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
This section, according to the Supreme Court, has envisaged that there can be more than one person interested in the compensation. 17. In coming to the above concluded view besides the judgment of this Court in the case of M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar (1967)1 M.L.J. 329 :90 L.W. 114, the Supreme Court also took notice of similar views expressed in the case of Sundarlal v. Paramusukhdas , in Hindustan Sanitary were and Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana , and Comilla Electric Supply Limited v. East Bengal Bank Limited Camilia A.I.R. 1939 Cal 669. 18. Precedent so far has not taken a contrary view except some observations in a short order passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandhulal Shamaldas Patel . The total discussion in the Supreme Court’s order in this case is as follows:
The Municipal Corporation was impleaded as the fourth respondent before the High Court, but no relief was claimed against the Municipal Corporation. The property, it is true, was notified for acquisition by the State Government for the use of the Municipal Corporation after it was acquired by the Government, but that, in our judgment, did not confer any interest in the Municipal Corporation so as to enable it to file an appeal against the order of the High Court allowing the petition. Substantially grounds on which the petition was filed were that the notifications were invalid on account of diverse reasons. Some of these reasons have been upheld and some have not been upheld, but all those grounds related to the validity of the Notifications issued by the Government of Bombay and the Government of Gujarat. Not even an order of costs has been passed against the Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad. We fail to see what interest the Municipal Corporation has, which would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the first respondent.
19. Some Courts, particularly, the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Amar Singh Yadav v. Shanti Devi , noticed a direct conflict on the question of locus standi of the Government or the corporation for whose benefit the acquisition was made between the view expressed in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandhulal Shamadas Patel and Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinbo . To us, it however, appears that there is no conflict at all. A question of this kind in an appeal against a judgment of the court allowing a writ petition will be different from a question as to locus standi to invoke writ jurisdiction. While in the former, the Court may reject the appeal even in limine at the Supreme Court did on the ground that there was nothing against the appellant in the impugned order, in the latter case such a person for whose benefit acquisition is made would undoubtedly be a ‘person aggrieved’. Even though this appears to be the correct legal position, in Amar Singh Yadav v. Shanti Devi , a Patna Full Bench made a long exercise how to resolve a conflict between the two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by co-equal Benches and stated as follows:
From the aforesaid discussions it would be manifest that the theory of pre-eminence of a judgment by virtue of its time and the latest alone has now been conclusively laid to rest. In the present context also the anomalies inherent in such a rule would interestingly be highlighted, if one were to interchange the dates of the two judgments in Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinbo , The City of Ahmedabad v. Chandhulal Shamadas Patel 1970 S.C.W.R. 183. If the judgment in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad had been delivered later, then on the time theory had to be followed, even though no intricate question of law had been considered, while disposing of a preliminary objection. With great respect, doing so, in my view, can hardly be justified and would tend to make a mockery of the theory of precedent, which is necessarily rested on the logic, reasoning and the ratio of a judgment. Therefore, when such a divergence arises and the litigant’s fortune depends thereon, the issue has to be frontally adjudicated upon. Obviously, in such a situation, it is not the province of the High Court or the Subordinate court to comment on the judgments of the Supreme court which are patently entitled to respect, is to respectfully follow that which appears to it to state the law accurately or, in any case more accurately than the other conflicting judgment. The view I am inclined to take is not only fortified, but in a way derived from the Full Bench judgment in Indo Swiss Time Ltd. v. Umsrao . It perhaps, deserves highlighting that though on another point the learned Judges of the Full Bench differed but on this particular momentous issue there was an absolute unanimity. The subsequent Full Bench decision in Kulbushan Kumar & Company v. State of Punjab , is also in a way relevant and instructive.
To conclude on this aspect, it is held that where there is a direct conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by co-equal Benches, the High Court must follow that judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and accurately.
The Patna Full Bench thus pronounced on the concept of the, ‘person interested’ as follows:
Once the issue of precedent is out of the way, then, in the light of the preceding discussions, it is to be held that the concept of the person interested in the Land Acquisition Act, has to be construed somewhat widely and literally. The mere fact that a person or a party may not have been before the Land Acquisition Officer would not by itself conclusively bar and exclude him the ambit of being a person interested.
20. Having thus stated the law as above, the Patna Full Bench examined the question whether in the absence of any appearance before the Land Acquisition Officer, a person can claim to be a party before the Court in a proceeding arising entirely from a reference made under Section 18 of the Act by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Full Bench after taking notice of the requirements of Section 18 of the Act and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer , stated,
It would thus appear that the very requirements of Section 18 are clearly indicative of the assumption that the person claiming a reference has been before the Collector and is a ‘person interested’ who has not accepted the award and has specific objections to make with regard thereto.
Now apart from the above a combined reading of Sections 19 and 20 is equally instructive. For making the reference the Collector is enjoined to indicate the name of the person who, he has reason to think is interested in such land and shall also attach a schedule giving particulars of the notices served upon and the statement in writing made or delivered by the parties interested respectively. This in a way is again a pointer to the fact that the parties before the court are those which have been before the Collector whom he either things to be ‘persons interested’ or who have already been duty served with notices in the proceeding. Yet again, the service of notice by Section 20 is enjoined only upon the applicant, the person interested in the objection, and the Collector, if necessary. On the basis of these provisions it was argued and, in my view rightly, that the lis before the Court is in a way confined to the person indicated in Sections 19 and 20 and rank outsiders cannot later trespass into the special jurisdiction on the plea of being persons interested despite the fact that they may have never chosen to appear before the Collector.
21. Proceeding further to examine the provisions of Sections 21 and 25 of the Act, the Patna Full Bench observed,
It seems somewhat patent that entertaining and allowing persons who were not before the Collector to become parties to the proceeding before the District Judge would run counter to the letter and spirit of the statute and is bound to enlarge the arena and bring in issues which would be extraneous to what had been earlier considered by the Collector. Doing so would be deviating from the very nature of the special jurisdiction, and would, thus, be opening a Pandora’s Box of ills on which later the lid cannot be pressed down. Learned Counsel form the opposite parties were at pains, therefore, to highlight the difference between the general proceedings in a civil suit governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and the special nature of the proceedings under the Act under Sections 18 to 25. These in essence provide for Land Acquisition Judge as a special court in a limited jurisdiction confined to the matters specifically referred by the Collector based upon the application by the objector. This has to be kept in focus because if it were not to be so, then there would remain no difference in essence between a title suit by the parties laying out claims and rights quo the acquired land and a reference under Section 18 specifically.
22. The Patna Full Bench also took notice of the difference in the two provisions, namely, Sections 18(1) and 30 of the act and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. G. H. Grant v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 237, in which the difference between the two provisions had been pointed out in these words:
There are two provisions, Sections 18(1) and 30, which invest the Collector with power to refer to the Court a dispute as to apportionment of compensation or as to the persons to whom it is payable. But by Sub-section (1) of Section 18 the Collector is enjoined to refer a dispute as to apportionment, or as to title to receive compensation, on the application within the time prescribed by Sub-Section (2) of that section of a person interested who has not accepted the award. Section 30 authorises the Collector to refer to the Court after compensation is settled under Section 11 , any dispute arising as to apportionment of the same or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. A person shown in that part of the award which relates to apportionment of compensation, who is present either person-ally or through a representative, or on whom a notice is served under Sub-Section (2) of Section 12, must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under Section 18(2) to refer the matter to the Court. But a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable, and apply to the court for a reference under Section 30, for determination of his right to compensation which may have existed before the award, or which may have devolved upon him since the award. Whereas under Section 18 an application made to the Collector must be made within the period prescribed by sub-Section (2), Clause (b), there is no such period prescribed under Section 30. Again under Section 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested. The Collector is under Section 30 not enjoined to make a reference, he may relegate the person raising a dispute as to apportionment or as to the person to whom compensation is payable, to agitate the dispute in a suit and pay the compensation in the matter declared ‘by his award,
and concluded as under:
In our judgment the powers exercisable by the Collector under Section 18(1) and under Section 30 are distinct and may be invoked in contingencies which do not overlap.
23. The Patna Court thus came to the conclusion, “It is held that person who was not before the Land Acquisition Officer cannot successfully maintain an application for being impleaded as a party under Order 1, Rule 10 of the C.P.C., in the reference proceedings before the District Judge under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
24. A Full Bench of this Court in Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Rangaswami (1989)2 L. W. 381, held that a ‘person interested’ as defined in Section 3(b) of the act will not include a person for whose benefit lands are acquired. Neyveli Lignite Corporation for whose benefit land had been acquired raised the following points in the writ petitions filed in this Court on its behalf.
(1) Under Section 3(b) of the Act, the Corporation is a person interested in the fixing of the compensation and, therefore, notice ought to have been issued to it as required under Section 20(b) of the Act.
(2) Since the Collector overlooked this mandatory provision, the awards were liable to be quashed, and
(3) No compensation could be fixed or arrived at by a Tribunal acting under the Land Acquisition Act without the presence of the Corporation which is a statutory mandate.
The matter, however, came up before the Full Bench as a Division Bench of this Court in Indian Rare Earths Ltd. v. The Special Collector and Acquisition Officer 1986 Writ L.R. 146, had held that the award passed by the civil court under the Land Acquisition Act were liable to be quashed inasmuch as those awards were passed without giving notice as contemplated under Section 20(b) of the Act to the entity on whose behalf the land was acquired. The corporation which had lost the battle in the proceedings under the Act and in getting orders of stay in the proceedings of this Court as a learned single Judge of this Court directed it to deposit the entire compensation amount with liberty to the land owners to withdraw 50% of the amount without security and the balance with security and the same was confirmed by a Division Bench. On appeal, it seems, thought that it could take advantage of the judgment in Indian Rare Earths Ltd. v. The Special Collector and Acquisition Officer 1986 Writ L.R 146, and get the awards nullified by the Order of the Court in the writ petitions. Indian Rare Earths case as well as the Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinbo A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1118, about which an elaborate reference had been made in the judgment of the Patna Full Bench referred to above, were pressed to contend that there being no substantial difference between the acquisition made under Part II and Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, the rule stated in Himalaya Tiles case thus must hold the field and the Corporation accepted as a person interested. The observations of the Full Bench in this regard are as follows:
Mr. U.N.R. Rao learned Counsel appearing for the Neyveli Lignite Corporation, who are the petitioners in these writ petitions, raised three propositions for the consideration of this Bench. Firstly, he contended that the Sub Court, which decided the reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer, is only a Special Tribunal and, therefore, it is amenable for jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This submission found favour in the decision in Indian Rare Earths case and the said decision is squarely relied upon by him. Further reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra . In that case, the question arose was whether the reference made beyond the period prescribed by the proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 18 of the Act is valid and whether the Court can go behind the reference made by the Collector and the application on which reference has been made is beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein. In answering the question, the Supreme Court held that the Collector acting under Section 18 of the Act is nothing but a statutory authority exercising his own powers under the section and, therefore, the fulfilments of the conditions particularly the one regarding limitation, are the conditions subject to which the power of the Collector under Section 18 to make the reference exists. It was further held that the making of an application for reference within the time prescribed by Proviso to Section 18(2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. In that context, the Supreme Court held that the Court functioning under the Act being a Tribunal of Special jurisdiction, it is its duty to see that the reference made to it by the Collector under Section 18 complies with the conditions laid down therein so as to give the court jurisdiction to hear the reference. It was further observed that in such case the court is certainly not acting as a Court of appeal and that it is only discharging the elementary duty of satisfying itself that a reference which it is called upon to decide is a valid and proper reference. It was, therefore, held that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was made beyond the period prescribed by the Act. We are unable to understand how the said decision will be of any use in so far as the points raised in these writ petitions are concerned. In that decision, the Supreme Court has not gone into the question of right of the persons for whose benefit acquisition proceedings are taken and whether such persons are entitled to challenge the quantum of compensation awarded by the Court on reference and they are entitled to be served with notice in such proceedings. Secondly, Mr. Rao submitted that a beneficiary like the petitioner company is an interested person eligible to participate in the compensation proceedings, and therefore, it is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the award passed by the Court. Thirdly, he submitted that such a beneficiary is entitled to file an appeal against the quantum of compensation awarded “by the sub court as decided by the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles Case. In this connection, he referred to the later decision of the Supreme Court in Toshiba Anand Lamp Ltd. v. Verghese and Ors. , wherein the Supreme Court simply followed the decision of Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinbo A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1118: 93 L.W. (S.C.) 35 (S.N.), and held that it is riot possible to sustain the view taken by the High Court that the appellant had no locus standi to maintain the appeal before the High Court. Further reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Kassappa Madivallappa Kulkarni 1990 Scale 546, reported wherein the Supreme Court, while dismissing the Special Leave Petition, made an observation that the view of the High Court was in error in holding that the Union of India for whose benefit the acquisition was made by the State Government was not entitled to prefer an appeal against the award made by the Civil Judge. We find that in those two cases, the Supreme Court has not considered the questions raised in these cases, especially in the later case reported in Union of India and Ors. v. Kassappa Madivallappa Kulkarni J.T. 1987(2) S.C. 390, the Supreme Court has not referred to any of its other decisions referred to above.
For the above conclusion, however, the Court found support from the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act before the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 and then observed:
The main controversy that arises for consideration in all these cases, relates to the expression “Person interested” found in Section 3(b) of the Act as noticed above. A plain reading of the said definition shows that the expression “person interested” refers to the persons interested in compensation to be made on account of acquisition of land, and therefore there is no scope for holding that the said terms would take in the persons who are liable to pay compensation and enhanced compensation. This expression should be read along with the expressions . used in Section 5A(1) of the Act. That section speaks about the hearing of objections and, therefore, these two sections should be read conjointly, to understand the real meaning of the expression “person interested”. As per Section 5A(1) of the Act any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4(1) may object to the acquisition of the land. Therefore notice is expected to be given to the persons who are entitled to raise objections for the acquisition. Therefore, there are two types of persons interested, one a person who is interested in compensation and another, a person interested in the land. There may be cases where a person may not be interested in the land but may be interested in the compensation alone. We find that the expression “persons interested” in “compensation” is confined to Section 5A(3) of the Act. When we look at the subsequent provisions of the Act, we find Section 9of the Act contemplates, issuance of notice only on the persons who are interested in the land under acquisition including the occupier, if any. Statement are required to be given only by the persons who have got some interest in the land. The procedure for an award enquiry under Section 11 contains no provisions for hearing persons for whose benefit lands are sought to be acquired. The Land Acquisition Officer is not expected to deal with the interest of such persons in the award to be passed by him. It is specifically declared under Section 12 that the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer is final between the Collector and the persons interested in the land and in receipt of the compensation. Coming to Section 18(1) of the Act, we find that right is given under that section to ask for reference to the Court against the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer only to the persons interested in the land and the persons who are entitled to receive compensation. Therefore, if a beneficiary is not treated as a party to the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, he cannot be deemed to be a person interested in the payment of compensation as is already seen from the provisions of Sections 9 to 12 and 18(1) of the Act. Therefore, the entire scheme of the abovesaid section deals with only the persons who are entitled to accept the award or refuse to accept the award passed by the Collector as could be seen under Section 18(1) of the Act. Once it is found that the beneficiaries like the petitioner Corporation who are not expected to accept the award being not a party to the same are not entitled to ask for reference under Section 18 of the Act, they would not come under the definition of ‘person interested’ found in Section 3(b) of the Act. A clear indication can be seen from Section 19(1) of the act where under the Collector is expected to send a statement to the court only with reference to the details of the land acquired, the names of the persons who are interested in such land, the amount awarded as compensation and if the objection be to the amount of the compensation the grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined. There is absolutely no scope for considering the claims of the beneficiaries like the petitioner Corporation as to the quantum of compensation. This is followed by Section 20 of the Act which says that after the receipt of the said statement from the Collector, the Court shall issue a notice to the person who had asked for reference and all persons in the said objection except such of them as have consented without protest” to receive payment of the compensation awarded. The expression “all the persons interested in the objection in Section 20(b)” cannot be read in isolation, but on the other hand, it has to be understood in the light of the subsequent expression “except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded.” Therefore, what is contemplated under this provision is those persons who have already objected to the acquisition excepting those persons who have received compensation without protest are alone entitled to receive notice. Section 20(c) makes the position clear by stating that if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation, notice must be given to the Collector, Section 20 has to be read together with Section l9of the Act. If it is understood in the said manner, there is no scope for issuing any notice to anybody else like the petitioner/Corporation and other similarly situated persons. To put in other words, notice is contemplated under Section 20 only to the persons who have raised objection and who are really interested in such objections but not to any other person who was neither interested in the land nor in the compensation and who was not a party to the award. Only in cases where the quantum of compensation is objected to, notice should go to the Collector who made the award, and not to any other person for whose benefit the lands were acquired. Again we find that the scope of the enquiry under Section 20(1) of the Act conducted on a reference from the Collector is restricted only to the persons who have raised objection and who are likely to be affected by any decision on such objection.
The Full Bench then noticed that the only right to which the petitioner Corporation and other beneficiaries were entitled to, was the one given under Section 50(2) of the Act which occurs after various provisions relating to acquisition for a public purpose under Part II of the Act and for Companies under Part VII of the Act and thus said:
As already pointed out, the person interested has been clearly indicated in the said provisions and nowhere we find that any right has been conferred on the company to take part in the award proceedings or to seek a reference to the Civil Court against the award. That position is reiterated in this Sub-section, which clearly says that in any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of-compensation. The Proviso to this Sub-section makes the position clear beyond any doubt. It says that no such local authority or company shall be entitled to demand a reference under Section 18. When there is such a clear embargo on the rights of the Company, we fail to understand how the Company can be treated as a party who is entitled to notice in the proceedings arising out of such reference. The principle underlying this provision is that the Government is acquiring the land for the benefit of the company and they are expected to take care of the interest of the Company or the local authority, as the case may be, and therefore there is identity of interests between them. As a matter of fact, that lands are acquired by the Government arid then only they are transferred to the Company as per the agreement entered into between them.
The Court also said that it will not be possible to invoke O. l Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to implead any person for whose benefit the land is acquired for the reason of the provisions in Section 53 of the Act which reads as follows:
Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act.
and held:
Therefore, once it is found that the provision in Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. is inconsistent with the provisions under the Land Acquisition Act, there is no scope for invoking the said provision. Therefore considering the scheme of the Act in its entirety, we find no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the beneficiaries are not entitled to be impleaded as parties and they have no right to challenge the correctness of the compensation amount fixed by the Civil Court, by way of appeal or writ petition.
The above view of the Full Bench of this Court is in tune with the view of the Supreme Court in Santhoshkumar and Ors. v. Central Warehousing Corporation and Anr. . The principal question raised before the Supreme Court in that case was that the High Court was wholly in error in entertaining the writ petitions to challenge the award made by the Collector on the ground that the same was excessive and that too not at the instance of the Government, but at the instance of the corporation at whose request the acquisition was made. The Supreme Court held as follows:
In our view there cannot be any possibility that the scheme of the Act is that, apart from fraud, corruption or collusion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act may not be questioned in any proceeding either by the Government or by the Company or Local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made. Section 50(2) and Section 25 lead to the inevitable conclusion. Surely what may not be done under the provisions of the Act may not be permitted to be done by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. Article 226 is not meant to avoid or circumvent the processes of the law and the provisions of the statute. When Section 50(2) expressly bars the Company or local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made from demanding a Reference under Section 18 of the Act, notwithstanding that such company or local authority may be allowed to adduce evidence before the Collector, and when Section 25 expressly prohibits the Court from reducing the amount for compensation while dealing with the Reference under Section 18, it is clearly not possible for the Company or local authority to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 to challenge the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector and to have it reduced.
25. It is indeed intrinsic in the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act that the Collector must notice the person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4, Sub-Section (1) to object to the award under Section 5-A if it is not an emergency proceeding under Section 17 of the Act and in all cases for compensation under Section 9 of the Act of the Government’s intention to take possession of the land to afford an opportunity to the person interested to claim compensation. Any person falling in its category and duly noticed thus will be before the Collector and thus a party to the reference under Section 18 of the Act in case an award is not acceptable to them. Others who will be strangers until that stage however will still have a right to raise a dispute as to apportionment of compensation under Section 30 of the Act. Section 30 of the Act states,
When the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court.
While there is a time limit for purposes of proceeding under Section 5-A of the Act or for all proceedings before the reference to Court under Section 18 of the Act, there is no time limit for a dispute under Section 30 of the Act. The Supreme Court in Dr. G. H. Grant v. State of Bihar , has clearly indicated that a person shown in that part of the award, which relates to apportionment of the compensation, who is present either personally or through a representative, or on whom a notice is served under Sub-Section (2) of Section 12, must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under Secl8(2) to refer the matter to the Court, but person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable and apply to the court for a reference under Section 30, for determination of his right to compensation which may have existed before the award, or which may have developed upon him since the award. A person in whom a right to compensation has existed or accrued after the award may also as, observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. G. H. Grant v. State of Bihar , be relegated by the Collector to agitate the dispute in a suit, but it is obvious, the suit would be for apportionment of the compensation or the right to receive compensation but not as to the acquisition.
26. The Supreme Court in GunwantKaur v. Bhatinda Municipality , considered the appeal of persons who had purchased the land after the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. They raised their objections and alleged that the substance of the notification under Section 4 and its corrigendum was not published by the Collector in the locality, that the proposed land sought to be acquired was not demarcated at site under Section 4(2) of the Act that the procedure laid down in Section 5-A was not followed, that the notification was vague and since the land sought to be acquired was not fully described in the notification, the interested persons could not file their objections against the requisition; that Khasra No. 2030 was a very large plot of land consisting of several building plots which were all part of the main Khasra No. 2030 and the original owners of this field number had divided this field into several abadi plots and had sold them to different persons before the notification and unless the portions of Khasra No. 2030 sought to be acquired were specified by reference to certain areas thereof the owners could not be deemed to have intimation that their plots were to be acquired and that the notification issued by the Government under Section 6 and the plan accompanying thereto did not tally with the alignment of the roads as originally intended to be laid or subsequently modified by the Municipal Committee. The High Court, while dismissing the petition in limine, observed
The grievance of the petitioner’s complaint is that the area now sought to be taken possession of was not included in the acquisition notification of 1959. In the elaborate order of the Collector the condition is, “I am satisfied that the true area of land demarcated corresponds to the area notified and that it has been demarcated on the ground with as much accuracy as was reasonably possible.” This Court cannot determine disputed question of fact and this petition is dismissed accordingly.
Saying that the High Court was not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution merely because in considering the petitioner’s right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined and that the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law, and noticing that it was urged on behalf of the Municipal Committee before the Supreme Court that the three appellants were purchasers of the lands claimed by them after the notification under Section 4 was issued and they had no right to challenge the issue of the notification. The Supreme Court said,
If, however, the notification under Section 4 was vague, the three appellants who are purchasers of the land having title thereto may challenge the validity of the notification. The appellants have spent in putting up substantial structures considerable sums of money and we are unable to hold that merely because they had purchased the land after issue of the notification under Section 4 they are debarred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from contending that it did not apply to their lands.
This is thus an authority that a purchaser after the notification under Section 4 can have locus standi. But then the challenge to the notification by such a person can well be under Section 5-A of the Act if the purchase is before the publication of the notification as required under Section 4 of the Act. Since the ownership is not transferred until possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act and there is not absolute vesting of the land in the Government free from all encumbrances until the Collector after making the award under Section 11 takes possession of the land, it is not difficult to visualise that a purchaser after notification under Section 4 or even declaration under Section 6 of the Act can be a ‘person interested’. If, however, the owner had the notice of the notification under Section 4 of the Act or the declaration under Section 6 of the Act and he sold the land concealing this information, would he create in the purchaser a right to seek a de novo hearing under Section 5-A of the Act. That obviously cannot be allowed. Such a purchaser, therefore, may be found to be a stranger, who would be raising a controversy as to the objections which were to be raised by the owner under Section 5-A of the Act. He, however, shall still have the locus standi as a person interested to object to the award until the proceeding reached the stage of reference under Section 18 of the Act. Beyond Section 18 reference also, there can be a third party right, but that will be for the purpose of Section 30 only as to apportionment of the amount of compensation. In these cases, the court shall not be wrong in asking the petitioner how he claimed any right in the property acquired and refusing to interfere with the notification for the reason that the vendor could not create a right in the vendee that stood extinguished after the expiry of the statutory period of 30 days from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. A notification, however, may be found to have been issued in violation of such mandates of law, which unless complied with, would render the notification voidab initio. Determination of such a question will be done some times on pure reading of the law and some times on facts alleged in the petition. Facts which go to the root and upon which the jurisdiction to proceed under a special statute, depends, are called preliminary facts, collateral facts and or jurisdictional facts. If such facts are found non-existing, all acts done under the Act would be without jurisdiction. The judgment in Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality , has to be under-stood in this light. The judgment gives a clear indication that a purchaser of a land under the notification under Section 4 of the Act will have locus standi to challenge the validity of the notification and if he is able to show that the notification is invalid, then he has established his claim to the land free from acquisition.
27. Much stress has been laid before us on the ground of vagueness. Since we are not entering into the facts, we do not wish to state now vagueness of the notification will affect its validity, but then it is always possible to find vagueness going to the root of the notification as has been found by the Supreme Court in one of its latest judgments in the State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. A. Mohammed Yousef seven Ors. . That was a case relating to the acquisition proceeding started for obtaining land for construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board constituted under Section 3 of the Madras State Housing Board Act, 1961 Madras Act 17 of 1961. This fact was mentioned in the impugned notification. The High Court held that the public purpose mentioned in the notification was too vague in absence of details relating to the scheme for which the acquisition was sought to be made, and consequently, the land owners could not effectively avail of the benefits under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act by filing their objection. The Supreme Court formulated the question in these words:
The question for decision is whether the acquisition proceeding, can be initiated only after the framing of the proposed scheme and not earlier.
The State’s contention before the Supreme Court was that having regard to the provisions of the Act and the other relevant considerations, it must be held that the procedure in regard to the preparation of the scheme had to await the conclusion of the land acquisition proceeding. It was only after the possession of the land was delivered to the Board that its engineers and other experts could go over the land, make necessary inspection and collect vital data on the basis of which the scheme could be drawn up. It was essential according to the State, to have a clear idea of the area of the land, its boundaries and the nature of the soil for deciding about the details of the proposed scheme, and this was not possible so long as the owner of the land continued in possession. Any attempt to draw up a scheme earlier according to the State, had been an exercise in futility. It was alternatively argued that if it was possible to frame the scheme without waiting for the acquisition and possession of the land, it could not be further assumed that the land acquisition proceeding had to await the finalisation of the scheme. The Supreme Court answered this contention saying:
The order, in which the different steps for the preparation of the scheme and the acquisition of the land, is suggested on behalf of the petitioners to be taken, appears to be impractical and defeating the purpose of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. If the notification under Section 4 under the Land Acquisition Act is published without waiting for the scheme, as has been done in the present case, it will not be possible for the land owners to object to the proposed acquisition on the ground that the land is not suitable for the scheme at all, and therefore does not serve any public purpose, or that another piece of land in the area concerned, is far more suitable, leading to the conclusion that the proposed acquisition is mala fide. We, accordingly, hold that a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 70 of the Madras Housing Board Act, can be commenced only after framing the scheme for which the land is required. The notification issued under Section 4 in the present case must, therefore, be held to be premature, and it was rightly quashed by the High Court.
The Supreme Court, however, observed:
We do not think that as a result of this judgment the concluded land acquisition proceedings can be allowed to be re-opened. Although we have held that the initiation of the proceeding for acquisition has to await framing of a scheme, it does not mean that the concluded acquisition proceeding can be condemned as void so as to be ignored later. However, to avoid unnecessary controversy we are hereby clarifying the position that a ground based on the present judgments shall be available to the land owners only for such land acquisition proceedings, which are under challenge and still pending decision.
The Supreme Court thus on the one hand took notice of the infirmity in the land acquisition proceedings and the denial to the land owners of their right to raise objections under Section 5-A of the Act and on the other hand, cautioned that concluded acquisition proceedings should not be allowed to be condemned as void even though there had been such infirmity.
28. A Bench of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question as to who the ‘person interested’ is in Central Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society v. Wahab Udain , and took notice of the following circumstances:
(1) A sale certificate had been issued to the first respondent, Wahab Uddin, after the purchase of the land in auction sale held in 1962;
(2) The Collector, Agra, knew that first respondent had purchased the land in auction for he had himself filed a suit for ejectment from the land in question under Section 171 of the Tenancy Act against the first respondent, and that the suit was dismissed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Class, the appeal preferred against the said order had also been dismissed by the Commissioner;
(3) The Collector issued notice under Section 9(3) of the Act calling upon the first respondent to prefer his claim, if any, for compensation of the land acquired;
(4) and that in the counter-affidavit filed by the Collector, in reply to the affidavit filed by the first respondent before the High Court, the claim of the petitioner to get compensation for the rights acquired by the Government was not denied by the appellant.
The Supreme Court on that basis said that, we agree with the High Court that the first respondent was a ‘person interested’ within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act.
29. The case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay v. Godrej & Boyce , had been cited at the Bar, but, this however, is not relevant on the question that we are considering here.
30. The position thus in cases of acquisition of land is that the interest therein can be transferred by the owner thereof to a purchaser and/or that besides the owner, there could be another person interested in the property, which logically can also extend to any other right accruing during the pendency of the acquisition proceeding to a third party by transfer or otherwise. This will be so even in cases of acquisition under Section 17 of the Act and/ or Section 17-A of the Act, because ownership is not disturbed until the Collector takes possession of the land. This has been the consistent view of all the courts in India including the Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Dr. G. H. Grant , the Calcutta High Court in Nrisingha Charan Nandi Choudhuri v. Nagendra Bala Debee A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 522, the Allahabad High Court in Union Sugar Mills Company v. U. P. Govemment , the Rajasthan High Court in Neelkanth Mali v. Jagannatha Singh , and Calcutta High Court in the case of Benarasi Sha v. Lakshmi Rani Deve Sankar (1964) I.L.R. 2 Cal. 662.
31. We have already seen that the concept of person aggrieved is not in any way different from a person interested and that there can be a variety of interests and different persons may have different interests. It is also possible that a person surrendered some interests but fought for the other interests, such as the owner found no tenable objection to the acquisition but questioned the adequacy of the compensation. The locus standi to question the acquisition thus will not be available to him. He can, however, question the quantum of compensation. Similarly a purchaser of a piece of land under acquisition, who came in the picture only after the stage of objection under Section 5-A but before the dispute of compensation was decided, may enter into the proceeding and question the compensation amount but may not demand inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. If he purchased after the notification under Section 9, he cannot be heard to say that he was entitled to a notice. A purchaser may have a right to raise objections to the award and/or even acquisition such as the objection that the proceeding elapsed because the award was not made within the stipulated period and like but not the objections which the owner availed or had opportunity to avail under Section 5A of the Act. If his purchase is after the award but before possession is taken by the Collector, he may not be heard to question the acquisition because his vendor never questioned the acquisition. These, however, will depend upon facts as well as law attracted to the fact situation of each case. Thus it will be a misconception to say that a purchaser shall have no locus standi. But it will be equally misconceived if it is said that the purchaser shall have locus standi in all circumstances.
The circumstances of each case will thus show how far the Court can go to accommodate the purchaser/petitioner and what is the extent of his right in jeopardy. If he is coming to meddle in the proceeding in which his vendor had notice and/or participated, he would only be seeking a re-commencement of the proceeding. That will not be permissible. He shall be thus exhibiting as noticed in the case of Coleman v. Miller (1939)307 U.S. 433, that he has got no standing to sue for judicial relief. Courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded. Legal wrong requires a judicially enforceable right and the touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right. In all cases, the Courts shall refuse to recognise the right which has got an illegal effect and decline for that reason to recognise the standing of the petitioner. In short, if the purchaser/petitioner is in a position to show that something has been done contrary to law in the name of the land acquisition proceeding under the Act, he can maintain a writ petition and he shall have locus standi, otherwise not. As observed in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar :
It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general and certiorari in particular is discretionary. But in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon.
It should be seen whether the petitioner has been deprived of a legal right and/or has sustained injury to any legally protected interest or, in other words, whether he has been subjected to a legal wrong or Suffered any real grievance According to the Supreme Court, if he has not legal peg of a justiciable claim to hang on, he is not a person aggrieved and has no locus standi to challenge.
32. Thus the Court must ask the questions from all such persons as indicated above and if questions asked show that he has challenged the acquisition for (1) it is void for a valid reason, the Court shall protect his interest; (2) otherwise, the court shall take notice of the legal injury, if any, and see whether it can remedy it and if there is no legal grievance, hold that he is not the person aggrieved and thus got no locus standi.
33. The reference is answered accordingly.