ORDER
Raju, J.
1. The above writ petition was connected to W.A. No. 231 of 1989, W.P. No. 7021 of 1989 ere, in the sense that it pertains to the very same acquisition of land and consequently was already directed to be posted together before the Bench along with the writ appeal. Though on 20.12.1990 the other matter came to be disposed of, this writ petition was omitted to be included along with them and, therefore, coming up separately before us for our consideration.
2. The petitioners herein have filed the above writ petition for a writ of certiorarified mandamus seeking to call for and quash the records of the second respondent pertaining to the notice dated 24.10.1987 issued under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and claimed to have been served on them on 28.10.1987 and for a consequential direction for issue of a fresh notice to the petitioners after complying with the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of the said Act. The affidavit in support of the writ petition was filed by the fifth petitioner and he claims to have filed the said affidavit on his behalf and on behalf of the other petitioners as well. In the said affidavit, it is claimed that the petitioners as well as several others are joint and absolute owners of the lands and buildings comprised in S. No. 100/4 of Tiruchengode village, that at the instance of Tiruchengode Municipality, proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were initiated for acquiring the lands for the purpose of expanding the existing Municipal Bus Stand, that overruling the objection, a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been issued, that challenging the acquisition proceedings, writ petitions have been filed and that they were surprised to receive the notice dated 24.10.1987 under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act on 28.10.1987. It was further claimed in the affidavit that a combined reading of Section 9(2) and (3) of the Act shows that the notice shall be served at least 15 days before the date on which the persons concerned have to appear and state their respective interests before the Land Acquisition Officer, that in the present case the notice dated 24.10.1987 was served only on 28.10.1987 calling upon them to appear before the second respondent on 9.11.1987 and that inasmuch as the alleged mandatory requirement of 15 days notice was not adhered to, the said notice is not valid in law and consequently the failure to comply with the statutory provisions cannot be characterised as bona fide. Pursuing the said objection, it is further claimed in the affidavit that all further proceedings pursuant to the impugned notice are invalid in law and that the second respondent, who is obliged to give clear 15 days notice for appearing before him and make representations, should be directed to do so.
3. The respondents have filed a counter affidavit setting out in detail the background of the case, the earlier writ petitions filed and their disposal and the circumstances under which the present writ petition came to be filed. It is also further contended that the impugned notice dated 24.10.1987 was issued under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act calling upon the petitioners and others to appear in person or by authorised agent on 9.11.1987 at 11.00 a.m. for stating or putting in a statement in writing showing the nature of their interest in the lands and the compensation claimed by them. The said notice, as per the claim in the counter affidavit, was got served on all interested persons and also published in the manner prescribed. A specific averment has been made that the said notice was served on the writ petitioners on 24.10.1987, but none of them had chosen to file any statement on the date of the award enquiry on 9.11.1987. It is further claimed therein that there was a clear interval of 15 days and that at any rate the award enquiry was conducted after giving the time specified in Sections 9 and 10 of the Act, that an award has been passed on 12.11.1987 in Award No. 10 of 1987 and that the amount of compensation was also ordered to be deposited in the civil court.
4. In the light of the said averments, the relevant records pertaining to the award enquiry were called for by us and from the same, it transpires that the impugned notice dated 24.104987 was duly published in accordance with the rules on 24.10.1987 and that in respect of some of the interested persons, they were served on 25.10.1987 and others on 26.10.1987. So far as the deponent K. Pichairnuthu is concerned, the endorsement by the Village Administrative Officer on 25.10.1987 on the copy of the notice certified that the notice has been served. In the statement before the second respondent, the Village Administrative Officer appears to have also stated that in respect of 14 person’s including the deponent, the notice in question was served on 24.10.1987 itself.
5. A careful perusal of the endorsement regarding service discloses that the notices have been served on different dates but on and before 26.10.1987. We find, therefore, no justification for the bald claim made by the deponent in the affidavit that 1 he notice was served on 28.10.1987. Not only such a claim appears to be incorrect and false so far as he is concerned, but in the light of the facts placed before us, we cannot also give credence to his claim made regarding the service on behalf of the other writ petitioners. The records produced further disclosed that a petition dated 5.11.1987 purporting to be one on behalf of Vadamalai Chcttiar and others had been filed before the second respondent by one Mr. S. Ramalingam, Advocate, Salem making a bald statement that the petitioners received the notice on 28.10.1987, that the entire papers are before the High Court in the writ petition filed by them, that they have not received them and therefore, they seek four weeks’ time. Another copy of the same petition is also available in the records with additions in ink, in writing, that the notice served on 28.10.1987 was not in accordance with law and each of them should have been given 15 days full time excluding the dates of service and enquiry. At the time of enquiry, as could be seen from a statement given by the Village Administrative Officer also available with the records it appears that some of the persons were present but they declined to give any statements and left the enquiry referring to the claim made through the Advocate Mr. S. Ramalingam. It was also stated by him that the claim that the notice was served on 28.10.1987 was not correct.
6. After considering the materials as stated above, an award appears to have been already passed on 12.11.1987 and while ordering deposit of the compensation awarded into the court, a reference dated 27.11.1987 appears to have been made by the second respondent to the Sub Court, Salem under Sections 30 and 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. Along with the writ petition, the petitioners also filed W.M.P. No. 17359 of 1987 seeking for stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the impugned notice dated 24.10.1987 relating to the lands of the petitioners pending disposal of the writ petition and this Court while admitting the writ petition on 27.11.1987, granted interim stay reserving liberty for the respondents to move for vacating the stay, if they so choose and further directed the petition to be posted along with the writ petition.
7. Mr. I. Mahaboob Sheriff, learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners, reiterated before us the submission that the issue of a clear fifteen days notice is a mandatory requirement of Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act and this having not been done in this case inasmuch as there was no clear fifteen days, the award enquiry proceedings stood vitiated and all subsequent proceedings were rendered illegal. According to the learned Counsel the whole process has to be redone by issuing fresh notice. The learned Counsel placed reliance upon a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in (1982) 2 L.L.J. 98, in support of his claim. Mr. V. Sridevan, learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents invited our attention to the details regarding the dates of actual service as indicated by us supra with reference to the relevant records and also submitted that the claim of mandatory requirement of 15 days clear notice is baseless and unwarranted by the provisions of Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act and that at any rate the award cannot be said to be vitiated on that ground alone.
8. Section 10 of the Act empowers the Collector to require any person upon whom a public notice under Section 9 of the Act has been served to make or deliver to him a statement containing the details referred to therein. Section 9 of the Act on which the main and only claim of the petitioners is based is as follows:
Notice to persons interested : (1) The Collector shall then cause public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to be taken stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him.
(2) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land so needed and shall require all persons interested in land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned (such time not being earlier than fifteen days after the date of publication of notice), and to state the nature of their respective interests in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests and their objections (if any) to the measurements made under Section 8. The Collector may in any case require such statement to be made in writing and signed by the party or his agent.
(3) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on the occupier (if any) of such land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein, or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, as reside, or have agents authorized to receive service on their behalf, within the revenue district in which the land is situate.
(4) In case any person so interested resides elsewhere and has no such agent, the notice shall be sent to him by post in a letter addressed to him at his last known residence, address or place of business and registered under Sections 28 and 29 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (6 of 1898).
9. A careful reading and analysis of the above provision indicates that under Section 9(1) the publication of a public notice for the purpose indicated therein is contemplated. Section 9(2) stipulates the details of the particulars to be contained in such public notice and the manner of its publication. This provision stipulates that the date for appearance of persons interested in the land shall be so fixed that “such time not being earlier than fifteen days after the date of publication of notice”. Sub-section (3) of Section 9 contemplates the service of notice “to the same effect” on the occupier of the land and all such persons known or believed to be interested therein who reside or have agents within the revenue district in which the land is situate. The said provision, in our view, does not mandate the issue of a clear fifteen days notice to the persons interested as a condition precedent for proceeding further with the award enquiry by the Collector. The decision reported in Periya Angamtnal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1982) 2 M.L.J. 98, does not help the petitioners to substantiate the claim now made before us. That was a case of non-service of notice and in the context of such a situation, the learned single Judge considered the question and expressed the view that causing public notice under Section 9(1) and service of notice under Section 9(3) are mandatory. So far as the case on hand is concerned, the specific case of the petitioners themselves is that the notices dated 24.10.1987 were served upon the petitioners but were so made only on 28.10.1987 and this does not satisfy the requirement of fifteen clear days notice claimed by the petitioners to have been provided for under the provisions of the Act.
10. The question as to whether the service of notices contemplated under Section 9 of the Act is mandatory need not detain us further in this case since having regard to the facts of this case, such an issue does not arise. But, the same may have some incidental relevance, in that, if the notice itself is not mandatory, the period of notice stipulated would equally be so. Prima facie, we are of the view that the notice contemplated under Section 9(1) and (2) on the one hand and the notice under Section 9(3) are not one and the same. Both in sequence and significance, the public notice contemplated under Sections 9(1) and 9(2) appears to be the primary and important one and the provision of Section 9(3) merely contemplates a personal notice also, on the occupier or persons known or believed to be interested in the land. Having regard to the purpose of the award enquiry, the consequences of passing of an award and the right of the owner to have the matter referred to court for proper adjudication of the value and the scheme underlying the provisions for acquisition under the Act as well as the weight of precedents, we are unable to share the view that the failure to serve or non-service of notice under Section 9(3) ipso facto vitiates and invalidates all proceedings subsequent to that stage.
11. Now it becomes necessary for us to consider the question as to whether there was any contravention of the provisions of Section 9(3) of the Act as claimed by the petitioners and if so what are the consequences of such contravention on the subsequent proceedings which resulted in an award under Section 11 of the Act. Let us assume for purposes of our consideration that the personal notice contemplated under Section 9(3) must have been also served leaving 15 days time for the persons concerned to enable them to appear and submit their claims for compensation or put forward their objections at the award enquiry. The facts on record referred to supra would go to show that in respect of some, the period of 15 days fell short by one or at the most two days. If that be so, can it be said that the subsequent proceedings culminating in the award are rendered invalid or void? The decision on this will depend upon the issue as to whether the requirement regarding the number of days of service is mandatory or merely directory.
12. No universal rule or formula can be laid down to be an invariable test for determining whether a provision or stipulation contained has to be treated as mandatory or directory. But there could be no controversy over the fact that it may be relevant to have regard to the context, the subject matter and the object of the provision concerned. Equally, it cannot be postulated as a general rule of universal application in the statute or statutory rule ipso facto implies an inevitable nullification of the action taken in disobedience thereof. The real intention of the Legislature has to be ascertained by the court by an overall analysis of the scheme underlying the Legislation concerned as well as such a provision. It is by now well-settled that a breach of a mandatory provision renders the resultant action invalid. But non-compliance with n directory provision may give rise to any other relief except by itself invalidating the action taken. That apart, a substantial compliance, at any rate, has always been considered to be sufficient compliance of the provision which in its true nature and character is directory. Viewed in the light of the said principles, it becomes necessary for us to consider as to the Scheme underlying the provisions relating to the passing of the award under the Act as well as the object of notice under Section 9(3) of the Act.
13. A mere reading of the provisions of Section 9 and the various stipulations contained therein will go to show that both the object of providing for a publication of notice under Section 9(2) or service of an individual notice under Section 9(3) is only to enable the persons interested to make their respective claims to compensation for such interests they claim in the property acquired and their objections, if any, to the measurements given. That apart, an award passed under Section 11 by the person exercising the powers of the Collector has been held to be only in the nature of a mere offer by the Collector on behalf of the State binding on them only as to the sum to be tendered for the owner and not any to be considered as an order or judicial proceeding per se binding on the person interested m the land. The person interested may accept the offer but is not bound to so accept and he may either ask for a reference under Section 18 or accept the compensation under protest and yet ask for a reference under Section 18. Vide : G.H. Grant v. State . As a matter of fact under Section 12 of the Act, an award passed under Section 11 is given finality to the extent except as “hereinafter provided” whether the persons interested have respectively appeared before the Collector or not. On the passing of the award, a notice under Section 12(2) is contemplated to the persons interested of the passing of the award. Section 18 provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurements of the land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Once a reference is sought within the period stipulated therein, the Collector had no option but to refer the matter to the Court and the Civil Court to which a reference is made, is obliged to go into all the issues and questions which could be raised as contemplated under Section 18 of the Act as if it were original proceedings and determine the same on the basis of the materials and evidence placed on record by either of the parties. It becomes necessary at this stage to refer to the provision of Section 25 of the Act also under which when an applicant has made a claim to compensation pursuant to any notice under Section 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section ll. Further, it is stated therein that when an applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted “without sufficient reason” to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector and that when the omission was found to be for sufficient reason, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not be less than but may exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. While construing the provision contained in Section 25 of the Act, Courts have often held that meticulous non-compliance with the stipulation contained constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 25(2) and that the person concerned is at liberty to have his claim determined before the civil Court without being subjected to the limitation contained under Section 25 regarding the quantum. Vide State of Madras v. Srinivasa Iyengar . Even in the case of non-service of notice under Section 9(3) of the Act upon a person interested on the passing of the award, a Division Bench of this Court held, as early as in Kasturi Pillai v. Municipal Council Erode (1920) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 280, that the party to whom a notice was not served in accordance with Section 9(3) when really served with a notice of award afterwards under Section 12, has his remedy under the stature to apply for a reference under Section 18 and, therefore, repelled the plea that the award has to be treated as void for the failure to issue a notice under Section 9(3). Unless there is a strong case of deliberate non-service which could be called perverse or wilful or fraudulent omission resulting in manifest injustice, the consequent award passed could not be held to have been rendered void merely because of non-service of notice.
14. The position in law being what has been stated above, a consideration of the object of notice under Section 9(3) with the stipulation regarding the number of days though not specifically engrafted but assumed for consideration to be so, in our view, is purely a directory one and that once a notice has indisputably been served upon a claimant merely on the ground that the notice was not of the required number of days but for a period less than that will not have by itself the effect of nullifying the award particularly when no fault is found with the publication of notice under Section 9(1). In our view, a notice served, though not of the required number of days constitutes sufficient and substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 9(3) of the Act and that the notice of “fifteen days” cannot be said to be a mandatory requirement and, therefore, the fact that a notice under Section 9(3) with less number of days has been served in a particular case, will not have the result of rendering either the proceedings or the ultimate award void and inoperative in law. We have come to such a conclusion, as referred to supra, having regard to the nature, character and legal effect of the award ultimately passed as well as the extent to which a person interested in the land, which is the subject-matter of the award, could reasonably be said to feel or claim to be really and legally aggrieved. The claimant in such a situation, in our view, is not at all prejudiced and by seeking for a reference under Section 18 of the Act, it is well open to the persons concerned to have the quantum of compensation and all other claims properly and effectively determined by a competent civil court to which the Collector is bound to make a reference of those claims when asked for by the person aggrieved on receipt of the notice of award under Section 12. That apart, after the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act by Central Act 68 of 1984, we find that a radical change has been introduced by substituting a new section in the place of old Section 25 which, after amendment, now reads that the amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 and there is no ceiling on the maximum, as the provision stands now. Thereby, the otherwise penal stipulation contained in the unamended Section 25 of the Act stands abrogated.
15. For all the reasons stated above, we consider it to be not necessary but that we are justified in taking the view that the requirement, if any, regarding the number of days of notice under Section 9(3) is not mandatory but merely directory and the failure, if any, to adhere strictly to the number of days of such notice does not render the proceedings subsequent to that stage, either null and void or inoperative. That apart, the petitioners have not shown to us as to how and in what manner any prejudice has been caused to them due to the fact that the notice was a day or two less than the fifteen days time and there was absolutely no material before us in this regard. Consequently, we have no hesitation in rejecting the plea on behalf of the petitioners and hence the writ petition shall stand dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
16. Before parting with the case, we may point out that at the time of admitting the writ petition, in W.M.P. No. 17359 of 1987 we find that by an order dated 27.11.1987, interim stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the impugned notice dated 24.10.1987 has been granted. But at the same time, even before this, the award appears to have been actually passed in the case on 12.11.1987. That being the position, as and when a notice of award under Section 12 is served on the petitioners, they shall be at liberty to seek for a reference under Section 18 of the Act and have their claims adjudicated before the competent civil Court, and the dismissal of this writ petition shall not stand in the way of their enforcing such rights in accordance with law.