JUDGMENT
J.M. Malik, J.
1. The short controversy pivots arounds the question, whether it is permissible to condone the delay in absence of sufficient cause under Section 5 of Limitation Act. Vide order dated 8.8.2005, the first appellate Court accepted the appeal and its operative order runs as follows:
16. In view of the above discussions finding of learned trial court on issue Nos. 7 and 8 is reversed. The appeal is allowed and preliminary decree is passed determining the share of appellant/plaintiff in the suit premises bearing No. 94/2, Gali No. 14, measuring 775 sq. yds., Village Libaspur, Delhi as shown in the red colour of the site plan as 1/3rd share and respondents No. 1 to 4/defendants No. 1 to 4 are jointly entitled to the 1/3rd share in the suit property and respondent Nos. 5 and 6/defendants Nos. 5 & 6 are also jointly entitled to the 1/3rd share in the suit property.
17. Decree Sheet be drawn accordingly; trial court record be returned along with this copy of the order. Parties are directed to appear before learned trial court on 05.10.05. Ld. Trial court shall proceed and take steps in accordance with law for passing of final decree of partition. File be consigned to Record Room.
2. In their above said application, pending before this Court, the appellants state that objections were pending before the Trial Court and the same were fixed for 18th July, 2006, but the Trial Court has declined to hear the objections. Consequently, the appellants have filed the present appeal and application Under Section 5 of Limitation Act. It is requested that the delay in filing the appeal of 224 days be condoned. The application is supported by an affidavit.
3. It is interesting to note that no sufficient cause for the condensation of above said delay has been mentioned. When the learned Counsel for the appellant was confronted with this fact, he conceded that this application and appeal were filed through some other counsel. He admitted that no sufficient cause is mentioned therein. He has, however, drawn my attention towards the fact that he had filed an application being CM No. 3441/2007 dated 3rd March, 2007, wherein he has prayed that one more substantial question of law be framed. He has enclosed one Khatoni which goes to show that the land in question vests with Gram Sabha. He pointed out that the courts below could not have passed the above said decree due to lack of jurisdiction.
4. It is well known that without sound reasoning no argument will cohere. Appellant’s prayer that the decree is a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction, will be considered only if delay in filing the appeal is condoned. Section 5 itself, adopts a pragmatic approach, inasmuch as it allows the condensation of delay if sufficient cause for delay is shown by party who fails to perform the act within the period prescribed by the Statute. The condition for condensation of delay is the presence of a sufficient cause which prevented the party from doing the act in question within prescribed time. In other words, Section 5 of Limitation Act insists on the presence of “sufficient cause” for the delay and therefore, the party seeking condensation of delay must show that in fact there was a sufficient cause for the delay. If the party which moves an application under Section 5 does not give facts to constitute “sufficient cause”, the application would be liable to be rejected. As a matter of fact, the appellants have made an attempt to reckon without its host. I have come across few authorities to be mentioned hereinwith which go to embolden these views.
5. In P. Mani Moopnar v. K. Rajammal and Ors. (2005) 11 Supreme Court Cases 800, it was held:
In our view, the High Court has erred in reversing the order of the trial court refusing to condone the delay. It was open to the High Court to accept the explanation given by the respondents for condoning the delay but, without setting aside the findings of the trial court on the sufficiency of cause shown, it was not permissible to the High Court to enter into the merits of the dispute and condone the delay.
6. In Collector of C. Ex., Madras v. A. MD. Bilal and Co. , it was held:
There is a delay of 502 days in filing this appeal. In the application seeking condensation of delay, no explanation, worth the name, let alone a satisfactory or reasonable explanation, has been offered. When faced with this situation, the learned Attorney General fairly conceded that the manner in which the delay had been caused in filing the appeal warrants an Enquiry and that the Union of India would take appropriate steps in this behalf, more particularly when many such cases, according to the learned Attorney General, have been brought to his notice in recent time. Be that as it may, in the absence of any satisfactory or cogent explanation for delay, the application for condensation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed as barred by time.
7. In P.K. Ramchandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. , it was held:
Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condensation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time.
8. In State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction Co. , it was held:
We have perused the impugned order whereby application seeking condensation of delay was rejected and the Revision Petition was dismissed as barred. The cause for the delay stated was long strike of Government employees. In the application seeking condensation of delay there was no mention as to when the strike commenced and terminated. The application was completely vague and the High Court committed no error in rejecting it. We find no ground to interfere in the said order. Civil Appeal No. 8053 of 2001 is, therefore, dismissed.
9. In Aushotosh Gaur (Sh.) v. New Delhi Municipal Council and Anr. 2006 VIII AD (Delhi) 241, it was held:
Needless to say that applicant-plaintiff was to show sufficient cause for non appearance, but no cause, whatsoever, was shown in this matter. Therefore, in my view, the appeal has been rightly dismissed.
10. In view of this position, the appellants have failed to prove sufficient cause for condensation of delay. Consequently, all the applications as well as appeal are dismissed as barred by time.
CM No. 10285/2006
Dismissed.