JUDGMENT
K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.
1. In all these cases the petitioners are dealers in jari. The jari was being taxed under entry 49 of the Second Schedule. These writ petitions pertain to the years 1982-83 and 1983-84. Earlier in the year 1986 the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, initiated the proceedings under section 21(4) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (“the Act” for short) proposing to revise the assessment orders, which had taxed the gold-thread under entry 49 of the Second Schedule; The Deputy Commissioner proposed to tax the turnover under section 5(1) of the Act treating it as a sale of “imitation jari”. The petitioners challenged the notices in Writ Petitions Nos. 19754 to 19761 of 1986. The said writ petitions were disposed of on February 2, 1988 [Reported as Sha M. Hastimal and Co. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1989] 72 STC 308 (Kar)]. The notices were quashed by this Court. There is also no dispute that the said order was affirmed by a Bench of this Court by dismissing the writ appeals filed by the Revenue. In the earlier proceedings, the revisional authority proposed to hold that the cases in question were covered by section 5(1) and not by entry 49 of the Second Schedule. The difference of the tax would be 1 per cent. The petitioners contended that they are all dealers in gold-thread and that they are not dealers in imitation jari, therefore their turnover was taxable under entry 49.
2. During the relevant period, entry 49 referred to “gold-thread”. Sub-sequently, it was altered by Act 27 of 1985 substituting the earlier entry by the following entry :
“All kinds of jari including metallic yarn, metallic jari yarn, metallic plastic yarn, polyester film yarn and radiant yarn.”
This was further amended in the year 1988, and in the present Second Schedule, the entry is found as :
“Part ‘G’ :
4. Gold thread, that is, all kinds of jari including metallic yam, metallic jari yarn, metallic plastic yam, polyester film yarn and radiant yarn.”
3. While allowing the earlier batch of writ petitions this Court compared the earlier entry with the entry that was substituted by virtue of the amendment made in the year 1985 for the purpose of deciding the question before the court. The question posed by the court was as follows :
“The question, therefore, that arises for decision on the arguments advanced by both sides is : whether the turnover of the petitioners in gold-thread for the years 1982-83 and 1983-84, is to be taxed under entry 49 or under section 5(1) ?”
Again this Court has observed that :
“Since both the petitioners’ counsel and the Government Pleader have addressed arguments on merits also, whether the turnover in gold-thread is exigible to levy under section 5(1), or under entry 49 of the Second Schedule, I propose to deal with this point also in these writ petitions.”
After discussing the question the learned Judge concluded as follows :
“Entry 49 as amended by Act 27 of 1985, therefore, gives a clear indication as to the intention of the Legislature for the purpose of understanding and interpreting the entry before amendment. It is seen that the amended entry is made comprehensive to include all types of imitation jari. Therefore, there can be no doubt as to the interpretation of the entry before amendment that it was meant to tax only the ‘gold-thread’ or ‘jari’ and not any other kind of imitation jari.
For the reasons stated above, the writ petitions are allowed, and the notices issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, in each case, under section 21(4) of the Act, are quashed.”
The above decision thus clearly held that the gold-thread dealt by the petitioners was to be taxed only under entry 49 of the Second Schedule and not under section 5(1) of the Act.
4. Learned Government Pleader contends that while the earlier writ petitions arose out of the proceedings initiated under section 21(4), present ones are challenging the notices issued under section 12A of the Act which provides for the assessment of the escaped turnover. According to the learned Government Pleader, now the assessing authority has asked the petitioners to produce the records to find out as to whether the goods referred as gold-thread by the petitioners is actually gold-thread or artificial jari, because the artificial jari cannot be equated to gold-thread. According to the learned Government Pleader in the previous batch of writ petitions there is a clear statement that under entry 49 only the gold-thread or jari could be taxed and not any other kind of imitation jari. It was contended that the authorities are now entitled to examine whether the goods dealt by the petitioners were imitation jari or pure jari (which only can be called “gold-thread”).
5. When the earlier writ petitions were allowed and notices issued proposing to tax the turnover under section 5(1) were quashed, the Revenue did not seek any liberty to proceed afresh to rope in the turnover, again under section 5(1), by investigating the facts. Therefore the question arises, whether the assessing authority can now initiate action in respect of the same subject-matter, raising the taxability question in a different manner.
6. The earlier decision resulted in upholding the levy of tax under entry 49 of the Second Schedule; the earlier decision holds that goods were not taxable under section 5(1). The earlier decision was reached on the assumption that goods were “gold-threads” This assumption was fundamental to the earlier decision.
It is a principle of law that plea of estoppel will cover not only the decisions but in substance the ratio of what is fundamental to that decision. The ground work for a decision is as much conclusive as the decision itself. The fact that goods in question fall within the category of “gold-thread” was not collateral to the earlier decision rendered by this Court.
Therefore, the parties to the earlier litigation are now estopped from contending in this Court that those goods are not gold-threads.
While allowing the writ petitions and quashing the notices, the court clearly came to the conclusion that the goods involved were the goods which came within the purview of entry 49, and section 5(1) was inapplicable. This foundation for the decision is sought to be destroyed by the notices issued under section 12A by the respondent/s in the present proceedings. Only because the Revenue is represented by a different authority, it cannot contend that the basis of the earlier decision can be ignored and it does not bind the present respondent. The Revenue spoke through a higher authority than the present respondent, acting under a different provision of the same Act. The distinction between the source of the power of the present respondent acting under section 12A and the source of the power of the respondent in the earlier writ petitions acting under section 21(4) has no relevancy to the principle governing the binding nature of the decision of this Court on the officers of the Revenue. In fact, the Deputy Commissioner had, earlier, proceeded to initiate proceedings under section 21(4) at the behest of the assessing authority by referring the records to the Deputy Commissioner pointing out that the assessment should be under section 5(1). Having failed in that attempt the present respondent has now proceeded to achieve the same purpose once again under section 12A. The respondent is estopped from contending in this Court that the turnover of the petitioners are taxable under section 5(1).
7. For the reasons stated, it is not possible for me to sustain the notices issued by the respondents. The notices issued under section 12A are accordingly quashed. The rule is made absolute. The writ petitions are allowed. The petitioners are entitled to their costs from the respondents.
8. Writ petitions allowed.