ORDER
S.R. Nayak, J.
1. An important question of law of general importance whether the appellate Court acting Under Section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, for short ‘the Act’, has the power to remand the proceedings to the Rent Controller for fresh trial and disposal, arises for consideration and decision in this Civil Revision Petition.
2. The facts leading to the filing of the Civil Revision Petition be stated briefly as under:
The respondent herein filed R.C.C. No. 23 of 1993 against the petitioner herein for his eviction from the petition schedule premises on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent in the Court of the Rent Controller, Ongole. The petitioner filed his counter inter alia contending that there is no landlord and tenant relationship between him and the respondent. In the said R.C.C. the respondent herein filed I.A.No. 183/94 Under Section 11(4) of the Act with a prayer for eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule premises. The learned Rent Controller by his order dt. 8-7-1994 dismissed LA. No. 183/94. The respondent herein preferred an appeal R.C.A.No. 5/95 to the Prl. Subordinate Judge, Ongole Under Section 20 of the Act. The learned Subordinate Judge after hearing the learned counsel for the parties was of the opinion that it was not possible to give any finding on the question whether there is landlord and tenant relationship between the parties without conducting a regular enquiry and without recording evidence and the learned Rent Controller dismissed the application without giving any finding on that question. In that view of the matter, the learned Subordinate Judge by his order dt. 26-2-1996 set aside the order made by the learned Rent Controller and remanded the proceedings to the learned Rent Controller with a direction to conduct a regular enquiry and dispose of the application afresh as per law. Hence this Civil Revision Petition by the tenant-petitioner.
3. Heard Sri P. Sree Rama Murthy, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Singam Venkata Subba Rao learned counsel for the respondent. The only point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned Subordinate Judge, Ongole has no jurisdiction Under Section 20 of the Act to remand the proceedings to the Rent Controller, and, therefore the order impugned in the revision should be held to be one without jurisdiction. No other point is urged. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions of the learned single Judges of mis Court in Mahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmaiah, Ekrramuddin v. Smt Sheela Bai Ekbote, 1972 A.P.H.N. 3 Konduru Ammannachaty v. Rahima Khatoon, 1984 (2) ALT 364. In addition, the learned counsel for the petitioner also placed relicence on the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gian Chand v. Ram Rakha Mul and Ors., 1984 (2) R.C.J. 62 (P & H) and the decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court in Moti Ram Banarasi Pass v. Shri Shiv Dayal Trust, 1984 (2) R.C.J. 368 (H.P.) in support of his submission. On the other hand, Sri Singam Venkata Subba Rao, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Ongole.
4. Therefore, the only question which arises for consideration and decision of the Court is whether the Appellate Court acting Under Section 20 of the Act has the power to remand the proceedings to the Rent Controller or not.
5. Section 20 of the Act reads:
20. Appeal:
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within thirty days, from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and elsewhere to the Subordinate Judge or if there are more than one Subordinate Judge, to the Principal Subordinate Judge having original jurisdiction over the area aforesaid. In computing the said period of thirty days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded.
(2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal.
(3) The appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appeal.
(4) The decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in Section 22.”
6. In Mahboob Bi’s case (1 supra) Munikannaiah J. placing reliance on the judgment of Mohammed Ahmed Ansari J. in Brijmohan Lal v. Rajalingam, 1959 ALT 206 held that in an appeal Under Section 20 it is not competent for the appellate Court to remand the case to the Rent Controller for fresh trial on merits. In Ekrramuddin’s case (2 supra), A.V. Krishna Rao J. and in Konduru Ammannachary’s case (3 supra) Punnayya J. expressed similar views. All the decisions of this Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are by the learned single Judges of this Court. No decision of the Division Bench or the Full Bench taking such view is brought to my notice. The decisions of Punjab and Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh High Courts referred to above were cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner from All India Rent Control Digest (Vol. II) and the full judgments were not made available to me. The relevant statutes were also not made available to me.
7. In Thimmasamudram Tobacco Co. v. Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Nellore, a Division Bench of this Court construing Section 35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 held that the power of remand is inherent in the appellate jurisdiction conferred on the appellate authority Under Section 35 of that Act though the said section does not specifically empower the appellate authority to remand the proceedings to the original authority. In para 9 of the judgment, the Division Bench observed:
“It is true that the section speaks only of the appellate authority passing such order as he thinks fit, confirming, altering, or annulling the decision or order appealed against and there is no specific provision enabling the appellate authority to remit the matter to the original authority for making an inquiry afresh. We do not think that the absence of such provision disables the appellate authority from sending the matter back to the officer that passed the order.
The conferment of the appellate jurisdiction on a tribunal, in our opinion, necessarily implies that it has as much power to remand as it has to confirm, alter or annul and incidentally it has the power to hear the appeal. Without such power it is difficult for the appellate authority to dispose of an appeal satisfactorily. If the appellate authority finds that the procedure prescribed by a provision of law has been violated by an officer he has either to allow the appeal without directing any fresh inquiry or dismiss the appeal, if the argument of the appellant’s counsel were to prevail and this cannot be regarded as a satisfactory state of affairs. We, therefore, feel that the power of remand is inherent in the appellate jurisdiction conferred on an appellate authority.”
8. It is needless to state that a single Judge of this Court is bound by the decisions of the Division Benches arid the Larger Benches. Therefore, I am bound by the decision of the Division Bench in M/s. Thimmasamudram Tobacco Company’s case (7 supra). This decision of the Division Bench is not noticed by any of the learned single Judges who held the view that in an appeal Under Section 20, it is not competent for the Appellate Court to remand the case to the Rent Controller. But, inherent trappings or attributes of appellate jurisdiction can be limited or restricted or ousted altogether by statutes or Constitution. In other words, limits of appellate jurisdiction are governed by the statutes or Constitution. As held by the Division Bench in M/s. Thimmasamudram Tobacco Company’s case (7 supra) the power of remand is inherent in the appellate jurisdiction. This statement of the Division Bench is undoubtedly a clear statement of law, a judgment in rem and therefore ratio decidendi. If that is so, the only question to be considered is whether Section 20 of the Act has, either explicitly or impliedly, limited or ousted the inherent power of the Appellate Court to remand the proceedings to the Rent Controller. The right of appeal in Civil actions being unknown to the common law and of statutory origin, it is necessary that the requirement of the statute which provides for appeal be strictly complied with to confer jurisdiction on the Appellate Courts. An appeal is a judicial process, a continuation of the original proceeding and it removes a cause, entirely subjecting the facts as well as the law to a review and a retrial. In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (Third Revision) it is stated that the appellate jurisdiction is exercised by revising the action of the inferior Court, and remanding the cause for rendition and execution of the proper judgment, after citing the decision in Dodds v. Duncan 12, Lea (Term.) 731.
9. Sub-Section (3) of Section 20 of the Act is relevant for the purpose. The language of Sub-section (3) is quite clear, precise, unambiguous and it does not admit more than one meaning. The Appellate Authority is armed with the power to inquire as he thinks fit either personally or through the Rent Controller. This provision only enables the Appellate Authority to resort to an inquiry either personally or through the Rent Controller if the facts and circumstances of a case warrant him to do so in his discretion. From the provisions of Sub-Section (3) it cannot be deduced that the power of the Appellate Authority to remand the proceedings to the Rent Controller is ousted. In a given case, if the Appellate Authority thinks that an inquiry is necessary on a point or on an issue, he himself can hold the inquiry or alternatively he may transmit such point or issue to the Rent Controller with a direction to hold an inquiry on that point or issue and submit his finding, and after receipt of the finding from the Rent Controller the Appellate Authority may decide the appeal on merit. But, it is not an invariable rule that the Appellate Authority should always adopt this particular procedure. The Appellate Authority, if he finds that on an issue or a point framed by the Rent Controller, there is no evidence or further evidence or inquiry is necessary for satisfactory disposal of the case, he may set aside the order of the Rent Controller and remand the proceedings to the Rent Controller for fresh disposal of the case in accordance with law giving appropriate directions. When Section 20 confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedly grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are necessary for proper exercise of appellate jurisdiction. An express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. The powers which have been conferred by Section 20 on the Appellate authority are of widest possible amplitude, and, therefore those powers must carry with them by necessary implication of powers and duties incidental to make the exercise of those powers fully effective. In Income Tax Officer v. Mohd. Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 the Supreme Court held that the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal has power to grant stay even in the absence of specific empowerment of that power in the Act by declaring that the power to grant stay is incidental or ancilliary to its appellate jurisdiction. Similarly in Smt. Savitri v. Govind Singh, the Supreme Court held that a Magistrate acting Under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code has power to grant interim maintenance. The Supreme Court further held that Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, by necessary implication, confers power on the Magistrate to pass an order directing a person against whom an application is made under it to pay a reasonable sum by way of interim maintenance. Rama Rao, J. of this Court also in Vangara Satyanarayana v. Vangara Venkataratnam and Anr., 1987 (2) ALT 266 held that though the power to grant interim maintenance is not specifically conferred on the Court Under Sections. 18 and 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, the Court has necessary incidental and ancilliary power to grant interim maintenance pending main application for maintenance. I need not dilate this aspect further because the inherent power of the Appellate Authority to remand the proceedings to the Rent Controller is not taken away by Section 20 or by any other provisions of the Act; therefore, the law lad down by the Division Bench in M/s. Thimmasamudratn Tobacco Company’s case (7 supra) should be applied, and if it is so applied, then, it should be held that the Appellate Authority Under Section 20 of the Act has power to remand the proceedings to the Rent Controller. Alternatively it should be held that the provisions of Sub-Section (3) of Section 20 do not warrant a construction or an interpretation to hold that the power of the Appellate Authority to remand is impliedly ousted.
10. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned Subordinate Judge, Ongole himself should have decided the appeal by placing reliance on the language: “the Appellate Authority ——————- shall decide the appeal” occurring in Sub-section (3) of Section 20 as if the order of the Appellate Authority is not a decision. Ofcourse, the learned counsel for the petitioner does not go to the extent of asserting that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge impugned in this Civil Revision Petition is not a decision. But the fact remains that unless he contends so, his argument has no legs to stand. Even a remand order is a ‘decision’ in legal parlance. The learned Subordinate Judge has decided that the dismissal of I.A. No. 183/94 without holding any enquiry on the question of jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is totally erroneous. That finding/opinion is a decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edition) the term ‘decision’ is broad enough to cover both final judgments and interlocutory orders; the term may also include various rulings, as well as orders. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Subordinate Judge has refused to decide the appeal. The impugned act of the learned Subordinate Judge is his ‘decision’, and therefore the mandate of Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act is obeyed by the learned Subordinate Judge.
11. In the result and for the foregoing reasons the Civil Revision Petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs in this Civil Revision Petition.