JUDGMENT
K.S. Bhat, J.
(1) The landlady is the petitioner before me. She sought eviction of the respondent under Section 14(l)(e) and 14(l)(a) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It is not necessary to refer to the grounds urged under Section 14(l)(a) because the learned Counsel for the petitioner has confined the case to the claim under Sub-clause (e) on the ground that the respondent had paid the rents subsequently.
(2) The parties are residing in the same building. There is no dispute that the landlady has 3 sons, 3 daughters-in-law and 12 grand children. This figure is with reference to the date of the trial. Material on record also discloses that the grand children were aged between 2 to 15 years at that time. The landlady has three married daughters.
(3) It is also necessary to note that the property originally belonged to the husband of the petitioner and he left a Will under which a life estate was given to the landlady and the remainder was given to the sons and therefore, all the sons have substantial interest in the premises.
(4) According to the landlady she is residing in the first floor having two rooms and another two rooms on the top floor of the building. The Trial Court has held that the top floor rooms have been bifurcated further into 4 rooms measuring 12′ x 8′ each. However, the fact remains that but for the bifurcation the total rooms available to the landlady are only four. The claim of the landlady was rejected by the Trial Court on the ground that the landlady obtained possession of tenanted premises on the ground floor in the year 1968-69 and instead of occupying the same she had converted the same into a god own and was leased again. The Court further held that the sons are having separate kitchens and they are independent assesseds under the provisions of Income Tax Act and further held that they are having separate ration cards. Therefore, according to the Trial Court the children are not living with the landlady for the purposes of Section 14(l)(e).
(5) Before considering the contentions, it is also necessary for me to note that the respondent was represented by Mr. Prem Shankar Khandelwal, Advocate in the Trial Court and he took notice of the Civil Revision Petition and his name also is shown in the cause list. But I did not have the advantage of hearing Mr. Khandelwal.
(6) The primary question is whether the sons of the landlady could be considered as living with her for the purposes of Section 14(l)(e). For this purpose I assume that the sons are having separate kitchen. It is also necessary to note that only one of the sons is having a separate kitchen in the sense that he was having a separate mess and evidence is not clear as to the alleged separate kitchen used by other two sons. I am also assuming that the sons are having separate ration cards and also that they are independent assesseds for the purposes of Income Tax Act.
(7) The fact that the children are independent assesseds is entirely irrelevant for the purpose of deciding as to whether they are living with their mother. It is common knowledge that in a family consisting of several members each member may be a separate and independent assessed especially when the concept of taxable entity is recognised separately as ‘HUF’ and ‘individual’. The fact that they are having separate ration cards also cannot be held to be a ground to hold that they are living separately from the mother, as held by this Court in 0m Prakash v. Void Sham Sunder, reported in 1992 Rlr (DB) page 31. The provisions governing the issuance of ration card might have been taken advantage of by the members for various reasons. The concept of living does not mean that there should be a common mess always. In a family consisting of large number of members it is likely that some members may have distinct and separate taste or likings or it is quite possible that the ladies in the household cannot comfortably carry on their activities together in the kitchen and in order to maintain harmony a sort of federal structure is accepted as a mode of living in the family. Admittedly all of them are residing in the same building. It is not proved that each unit is residing in a separate identifiable independent unit. Therefore, only because one of the sons is having a separate kitchen is not a ground to hold that the said son and his wife and children are not living with the petitioner (mother). Under Section 14(l)(e) a landlord/ landlady can seek possession of the premises which is residential when he or she requires the same bona fide for occupation as a residence for himself or herself. The first part of Section 14(l)(e) does not confine the requirement only to the landlord and his dependent children. Those normally reside with the landlord is considered as part of his family and the requirement of all the persons for residence shall have to be considered when a claim is made under Section 14(l)(e).
(8) The next question pertains to the sufficiency of the present accommodation to the landlady. The Trial Court held that the landlady has converted the top floor into four rooms by bifurcating the existing rooms. However, the Trial Court omitted to note that the said rooms by bifurcation (by wooden partition) resulted in the cabins measuring 12′ x 8′. There were 12 grand children. Probably the number must have increased in the course of years. But the fact remains that these 12 grand children are grown up and they require proper acumen dation not only for their studies but also for their living. The Trial Court has overlooked this simple fact while rejecting the landlady’s claim.
(9) The fact that in the year 1968-69, a commercial tenant vacated the premises in ground floor and it was converted into a god own for re-letting, cannot vitiate the present requirement of the landlady in the year 1976, especially when the tenant as R.W.I admitted that the entire locality is a lugged commercialised areas.
(10) In view of the above, it is not possible for me to uphold the findings of the Trial Court. Accordingly, it is set aside. There shall be an order of eviction under Section 14(l)(e) as prayed for by the petitioner. The respondent is granted six months time to vacate the premises. However, this would be subject to payment of rents regularly.
