JUDGMENT
B.P. Saraf, J.
1. These writ petitions arising out of the orders passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in proceedings initiated under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Tenancy Act”) are between the same parties and involve identical questions of law and fact. As such, all these petitions are taken up together for hearing and disposal.
2. Writ Petition No. 1429 of 1983 :–The petitioners are tenants of a plot of land bearing Survey No. 362/1 (Gat No. 983) admeasuring about 31 acres. The respondent is the landlady. The Additional Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal started inquiry under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act in respect of the above land and after hearing the parties, by order dated 7th June, 1975, fixed the purchase price of the said land. Aggrieved by the above order, the landlady applied to the Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as “the Appellate Authority”). Before the Appellate Authority, it was contended by the landlady that the land in question was leased out to the tenants for sugarcane cultivation and, as such, in view of the special provisions contained in section 43-A of the Tenancy Act, sections 32 to 32-R (including section 32-G) had no application. On the other hand, the contention of the tenants was that the land had not been leased for sugarcane cultivation and, as such section 43-A had no application. The Appellate Authority, on consideration of the facts of the case, arrived at a conclusion that the land in question had been leased out for sugarcane cultivation. While arriving at this conclusion, the Appellate Authority took note of the fact that there was no instrument of lease or Kabulayat between the landlady and the tenants. No rent notes were also produced by either of the parties. Under the circumstances, the Appellate Authority decided the factual controversy in regard to the nature of the lease on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Some of the factors taken into consideration for the purpose by the Appellate Authority are :
(a) The previous use of the land or its major portion;
(b) the use of the land during the currency of the lease;
(c) the knowledge which may be implied to the parties to the lease regarding the intention of the tenant to use the land;
(d) the suitability of the land for growing a particular crop, the area on which the land is situated and the nature of the use to which the surrounding lands are put;
(e) whether the land is under the command of irrigation canal.
The Appellate Authority observed that the tenant had himself stated in cross-examination that there was irrigation facility in the village and the land in question was under irrigation and he was paying education cess whenever he was raising sugarcane crop. It was also stated by the tenant that he was raising sugarcane crop in the alternate years. The Appellate Authority also found that the sugarcane crops were grown on the surrounding lands. The tenants were sending sugarcane crop to one Bhagwati factory. This fact was also not in dispute. The Appellate Authroity also observed that the quality of the soil was good and there was evidence to show that during the year 1954-55, sugarcane crop was raised on the said land. The Appellate Authority also took note of the prevailing practice in the area that when sugarcane crop is raised for a year or two continuously, paddy crop is to be taken in alternate years. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances and the statement of the tenant himself, the appellate authority arrived at a definite finding of fact that the suit land was leased out for sugarcane cultivation. The Appellate Authority, therefore, held that section 43-A of the Tenancy Act was applicable and the land was exempted from the operation of provisions of section 32 to 32-R. The order of the lower Court passed under section 32-G of the Act, was therefore, set aside.
3. The tenants went in revision under section 76 of the Tenancy Act to the Tribunal. The Tribunal, on perusal of the statements of the parties and the relevant records, came to the conclusion that the finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Authority in regard to the purpose of the lease was proper and legal and no interference was needed with the said finding. The Tribunal observed that the circumstances were indicative of the fact that the land must have been leased for the purpose of growing sugarcane. The revision petition of the tenants was, therefore, dismissed. Aggrieved by the above order, the tenants have approached this Court by filing the present writ petition.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners – tenants submits that the Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the revision application. According to the counsel, the Tribunal did not appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case in the proper perspective and thereby committed a manifest error of law in affirming the finding of the appeal Court. The learned Counsel for the landlady, on the other hand, submits that the Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion on careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and such a decision cannot be challenged before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
5. My attention was drawn to the provisions of section 76 of the Tenancy Act and the limited nature of the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal thereunder. Reference was also made to a decision of the Supreme Court to show that the scope and ambit of the power under section 76 of the Tenancy Act is more or less identical to section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it stood prior to 1976 amendment. It was also submitted that the power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is also limited and the same should be exercised only in cases of gross injustice, failure of justice or lack of jurisdiction. It was submitted that none of these conditions is fulfilled in the present case and, as such, this writ petition is not maintainable.
6. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. The facts of this case may be restated in brief. The petitioners are the tenants of an agricultural land in respect of which proceedings were initiated by the Competent Authority under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act and after hearing the parties, order was passed under the said section fixing purchase price of the said land. The contention of the landlady was that as the land was leased out for sugarcane crop, it was outside the purview of sections 32 to 32-R of the Act by virtue of the overriding provision contained in section 43-A of the Act. The landlady, therefore, appealed to the Deputy Collector. The Deputy Collector found merit in the submission of the landlady. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the evidence of the parties and the documents before it, the Appellate Authority recorded a finding of fact that the land in question was leased out for sugarcane cultivation and that being so, in view of the provisions of section 43-A of the Act, section 32-G had no application. The order of the lower Court fixing the purchase price was, therefore, set aside.
7. The tenants filed revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (“Tribunal”). The Tribunal observed that the finding regarding the nature of the lease had been arrived at by the Appellate Authority on proper appreciation of evidence and material on record. It, therefore, did not find any reason to interfere with the order of the Appellate Authority which was based on the above findings. It is the above order of the Tribunal which is subject-matter of challenge before this Court.
8. I have carefully considered the facts of this case and the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties. Before adverting to the nature of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under section 76 of the Act, it may be mentioned that section 32 of the Act provides for purchase of land by tenants in the circumstances mentioned therein. Section 43-A of the Act contains special provisions for industrial or commercial undertaking and in respect of leases of land granted to bodies or persons other than those mentioned in Clause (a) thereof for the cultivation of sugarcane or growing of fruits or flowers or for the breeding of livestock. In view of this overriding provision, lands covered by section 43-A of the Act are outside the purview of section 32 of the Act. Therefore, if a land is held on lease for the cultivation of sugarcane, the provisions of sections 32 to 32-R of the Act are not attracted. Whether a lease is granted for the purpose of cultivation of sugarcane or not is, of course, a question of fact, which has to be decided by the authorities concerned on a proper appreciation of the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority, on a careful and detailed discussion of all the relevant facts of the case recorded a finding that the land was leased out for sugarcane cultivation. The Tribunal refused to interfere with the said finding. The question is whether the Tribunal was wrong in doing so. For that purpose, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of section 76 of the Act which deals with the power of revision. It provides for revision only on the following grounds :
(a) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law; or
(b) that the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law; or
(c) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this Act, which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice.
9. The finding that the land was leased out for agricultural purpose is admittedly a finding of fact. The decision of the Collector and the Appellate Authority is based on evidence on record. The controversy is whether the Tribunal, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 76 of the Act, can interfere with such a finding. It is well-settled that if a decision is based on evidence, however, unsatisfactory the judgment may be, it does not cease to be question of fact and unless the Tribunal finds that there was no evidence for the finding of fact, the mere insufficiency of evidence or defect in the appreciation of evidence will not convert a question of fact into a question of law. Whether the proof of a particular fact is satisfactory or not is for the fact finding authority to determine. Adequacy of evidence or sufficiency of evidence cannot be a question of law and the Tribunal, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot reappreciate the evidence and give a fresh conclusion of its own unless it holds that the finding of the Appellate Authority is perverse. The scope and power of revision under section 76 of the Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Baldevji v. State of Gujarat, wherein it was held that the powers of revision entrusted to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, are practically identical with the second appellate powers of the High Court under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code before it was amended by Act 104 of 1976. The scope and ambit of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not mere res integra. As observed by the Supreme Court in Ramachandra v. Ramalingam, , the exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined to cases where the High Court is satisfied that the decision is contrary to law or some usage having the force of law, or that the decision has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law, or if there is a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code, or by any other law for the time being in force which may have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. Only in such cases, the High Court can interfere with the conclusions of the lower appellate Court. It was made clear that the error or defect in the procedure referred to in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly and unambiguously indicates an error or defect connected with, or relating to the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. From the above observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the power of the Tribunal under section 76 of the Act is a limited one and can be exercised on any of the grounds mentioned in the three clauses of sub-section (1) thereof. In the instant case, it is clear that none of the three grounds specified in section 76(1) is present. The Tribunal, on perusal of the order of the Appellate Authority and the records of the case, was correct in holding that the Appellate Authority which was the final fact finding Court having come to a conclusion that the land was leased out for the sugarcane cultivation, there was no ground to interfere with the said finding. I do not find any cogent reason to interfere with the above decision of the Tribunal. In my opinion, the Tribunal acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction in refusing to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority on appreciation of all the material and documents on record.
9. In that view of the matter, Writ Petition No. 1429 of 1983 is without any merit and the same is therefore, dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
Writ Petition No. 863 of 1989
10. This writ petition has been filed by the landlords. In this case applications were filed by the landlady (predecessor of the petitioners) before the Tenancy Court for fixation of rent under section 43-B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (“Tenancy Act”) in respect of three pieces of land (including the land which is subject-matter of Writ Petition No. 1429 of 1983) on the ground that those lands were held by the tenants on lease for the cultivation of sugarcane. The Tenancy Court did not fix the rent in respect of the land which was subject-matter of dispute in Writ Petition No. 1429 of 1983. In respect of the other two lands, the Tenancy Court allowed the application of the landlady. It was held that the lands in question were covered by the provisions of section 43-A of the Tenancy Act and hence reasonable rent for the same was fixed under section 43-B of the Act at Rs. 1033/- per year. On appeal by the tenants under section 74 of the Tenancy Act, the order was confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. The tenants filed revision petitions before the Tribunal. The Tribunal reversed the concurrent finding of fact of both the Courts below in regard to the nature of lease of the land in question and held that the said lands were not leased out for sugarcane cultivation and, therefore, section 43-B of the Act was not applicable. In that view of the matter, the revision petitions of the tenants in respect of the two plots of land were allowed and the orders of both the authorities below were set aside. No order was, however, passed in respect of land which was subject matter of Writ Petition No. 1429 of 1983.
11. The landlords have challenged the above revisional orders of the Tribunal in this petition. The contention of the Counsel for the petitioner-landlords is that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction under section 76 of the Tenancy Act and acted like an Appellate Authority and reappreciated the entire evidence and on the basis of the same material and evidence, came to a conclusion different from the one arrived at by both the fact-finding authorities. According to the learned Counsel, such an action of the Tribunal cannot be sustained in law.
12. The learned Counsel for the respondent-tenants, on the other hand, supports the order of the Tribunal and submits that the Tribunal did not reappreciate the evidence but merely considered that part of the evidence which the authorities below failed to consider.
13. I have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the impugned order of the Tribunal. On a careful reading of the order of the Tribunal, I am satisfied that in the instant case the Tribunal has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred on it by section 76 of the Act. The Tribunal, in fact, proceeded to decide the matter afresh by reappreciating the evidence and arrived at an independent conclusion of its own which is not permissible in law. Whether the land in question was leased out for the purpose of cultivation of sugarcane or not is basically a question of fact. The landlords had adduced sufficient evidence, both oral and documentary, in support of their contention that the land had been leased out for sugarcane cultivation and it was being used for sugarcane cultivation when section 32 of the Act came into force. Whether such evidence was adequate or sufficient to arrive at the finding that the land in question was leased out for the sugarcane cultivation or not was for the authorities below to decide. It was not open to the Tribunal to decide the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence. The order of the Appellate Authority is very exhaustive and deals with all facts, circumstances and materials on the basis of which the conclusion in regard to the nature of the lease has been arrived at. Such a conclusion or finding of the Appellate Authority cannot be reversed by the Tribunal in exercise of its revisional powers under section 76 of the Act. In my opinion, in the present case, the Tribunal far exceeded its jurisdiction in venturing to reappreciate the entire evidence and arriving at a fresh conclusion in regard to the nature of the lease instead of confining itself to the three grounds specified in section 76(1) of the Act viz. (i) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law; (ii) that the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law; and (iii) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by the Act which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. The order of the Tribunal is therefore wholly without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside.
Order set aside.
Writ Petition No. 865 of 1989 and
Writ Petition No. 867 of 1989 :
14. In view of the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1429 of 1983 holding that the land in question was leased out for agricultural purposes, the impugned orders of the Tribunal are to be set aside.
15. Accordingly the orders of the Tribunal in both these writ petitions are set aside.
16. In the result, Writ Petition No. 865 of 1989 and Writ Petition No. 867 of 1989 are allowed.
Writ petition allowed.
Writ Petition No. 866 of 1989 :
17. This writ petition arises out of the proceedings initiated by the landlords for recovery of possession of the land leased out to the respondents under section 14 read with section 25 and 27 of the Act. The petition had been dismissed by the trial Court. But the order of the trial Court was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh decision by the Appellate Authority. The order of the Appellate Authority remanding the matter back to the trial Court was set aside by the Tribunal. It may be observed that the suit was dismissed by the trial Court only on the ground there being a mistake in the Gat numbers of the suit land. The appellate authority felt that this could not have been a ground for dismissal of the case of the landlady and the trial Court should have allowed the landlady to correrct the mistake and should have proceeded on merits. The matter was therefore, remanded to the trial Court to allow the landlords to correct the Gat numbers and to proceed with the same. This order of the authorities below was set aside by the Tribunal. I am of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in doing so. The order of the Tribunal is therefore set aside and quashed and the order of the Appellate Authority remanding back the matter to the trial Court restored.
18. In the result, Writ Petition No. 866 of 1989 is allowed.
19. All the five writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
20. In view of the fact that the matter is very old one, I direct the courts below to dispose of these matters expeditiously.
21. Certified copy expedited.
Writ petitions disposed of accordingly.
