JUDGMENT
Abhijit Sinha, J.
1. Heard Sri Rajan Ghosharve, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned Counsel for apposite party No. 2 and the learned Additional Public prosecutor for the State.
2. Through this application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. the two petitioners herein have questioned the propriety of the order dated 12.4.2004 passed in Complaint Case No. 645 (C)/2004 /Tr. No. 642/ 2005by Sri Sanjay Kumar Singh, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Patna, whereby he has taken cognizance of offences under Sections 323, 409 and 420/34 of the I.P.C. and 63 and 68A Copyright Act against the petitioners. Another prayer has been made for quashing of the entire proceeding presently pending in the court of Sri Bharat Tiwari, Judicial Magistrate, 1st, Class, Patna.
3. Petitioner No. 2, Hyder Kazmi, is the Proprietor of petitioner No. 1, M/s. Shanu Films, Mumbai, the producer of a Motion Picture in Hindi titled ” Path ” .
4. The prosecution ca se as called out from the petition of complaint can be noticed with relative brevity. The complainant claimed that he was a film distributor and by virtue thereof had been appointed a distributor of a Hindi motion picture titled “Patth” on 5.11.2003 by accused No. 4 (petitioner No .2 herein) .The complainant claimed that being the authorised distributor of the said film had booked the said film for exhibition at Munger on 8.11.2003 through M/s Konark Cinema, Munger out he suddenly received information that the said film was being screened illegally by means of V.C.D. through M/s Vijay Picture Palace (accused No. 1 ) and accordingly complained about the illegal screening to his Association/namely, B.J.M.P.A. and as a result thereof the said Association lodged a complaint before the Officer-in-Charge of the local police station. In course of investigation it transpired that accused No. 1 had purchased the said film from M/s Cinestor (accused No. 5). The complainant then approached the producer, M/s Shanu Films and enquired about the screening of the film “Patth” in Bihar by other distributors. The producer of the film in reply faxed a letter on 19.12.03 to the complainant informing him that he had not appointed any one except the complainant as distributor of the said film for the territories of Bihar and Jharkhand and that he had sold his video cable rights only to M/s Bombino Video Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai (accused No. 7).
5. It further transpires that the complainant sent legal notices to the accused Nos .2,4 and 5 on 27.12.03 but the replies sent by these accused persons were neither convincing nor satisfactory. It is also alleged that at about 4 P.M. on 12.03.2004, accused No. 2 in the company of four unknow person came to his office and gave him 2-3 slaps and threatened him with dire consequences. Hence the complaint.
6. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that whereas petitioner No. l is a firm engaged in film production, Petitioner No. 2 is the partner of the said firm and as such no offence is made out against them even if the allegations are taken to be true and no specific allegations had been made against the petitioners. In this connection it was sought to be pointed out that whereas the complainant was appointed distributor of the said film for Bihar and Jharkhand for screening in the theaters, they had sold their Video-Cable rights to wide Angle Media which in turn assigned its rights to M/s Bombino Video Pvt. Ltd. It was also submitted that the petitioners were in no way connected with the illegal screening of the film through Video and in course of investigation by the police none had named the petitioners and nothing incriminating was recovered from their possession. Finally, it was submitted that at the intervention of well-wishers and friends, good sense had prevailed and the parties had entered into a compromise und a joint compromise petition was file in court on 13.07.2005. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the impugned order amounts to non-application of mind since no offence can be said to have been made out against any of the petitioners.
7. Opposite party No. 2 the complainant, has appeared in response to the notice issued to him and has filed an affidavit inter alia stating that at the intervention of well-wishers and friends of both the parties the entire dispute had been settled amicably and he had compromised the case outside the court of his free will and volition and he had no objection if the impugned order of cognizance dated 12.04.2004 in Complaint Case No. 645-C/2004, and the entire criminal proceeding of the Complaint Case against the petitioners was quashed.
8. Admittedly, Sections 333 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and the provision of the Copyrights Act were compoundable under the provision of Section 320 Cr.P.C. but the offence under Section 409 of the I.P.C. is not. But as it would appear that no offence under Section 409 of the I.P.C. appears to have been made out against the petitioners as there is no offence of criminal breach of trust by public servant or by a banker, merchant or agent etc.
9. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure saves the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The expression “abusing the process of the court” is generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fides and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive and the High Court is under an imperative obligation to interfere in order to prevent the harassment of a citizen by an illegal prosecution. Broadly speaking, | the High Court will interfere where the facts float on the surface and there is not even a scintilla of suspicion of criminal liability against the accused. To allow the proceedings to continue in such a case would be allowing a force to be enacted to the harassment of the accused.
10. In the instant case whereas an offence under Section 409 of the I.P.C. does not appear to have been made out from the allegations made in the complaint; the other offences where under cognizance have been taken are compoundable under the provision of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. That apart the complainant who is the opposite party herein has filed an affidavit supporting the claim of his having entered into a compromise with the petitioners herein.
11. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrejirao Angre it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where in the opinion of the court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings.
12. The special features in the instant case are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of disputes.
13. In the case of Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1990 (Supp.) SCC 681. Their Lordships held as under:
We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission to compound the of fence. After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the trial court shall permit them to compound the offence.
14. Due regard being had to the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the above discussions I hereby (sic) quash the criminal proceeding in Complaint Case No. 645CC)2004/Tr.No.642/2005 pending in the court of Sri Bharat Tiwari, J.M., 1st Class, Patna, in exercise of the inherent powers since allowing the proceeding to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
15. In the result, this cr. misc. application is allowed and the criminal proceeding of the aforesaid Complaint Case No. 6451(C)/C4 are hereby quashed.