JUDGMENT
R.R.K. Trivedi, J.
1. In both the aforesaid writ petitions parties are the same and questions of facts and law are also identical. Thus, both the petitions can be decided by a common judgment against which the parties have no objection. Writ Petition No. 2687 of 1997 shall be the leading case.
2. Facts necessary to appreciate the controversy between the parties are that the petitioner Society was registered on 18.10.1958 and it started an educational institution known as Adarsh Higher Secondary School, Jurapur Beehar, Dahiyawan, Allahabad. Prabha Shankar Pandey and Ram Lakhan Shukla, petitioner No. 2, claiming themselves as Sachiv and Manager respectively of the Society, made an application seeking renewal of the registration of the Society. At their instance, vide order dated 8.10.1991, renewal was granted for a period of five years with effect from 10.10.1990. Respondent No. 4 also filed an application on 9.1.1992 claiming renewal of the registration. However, when it came to his notice that renewal has already been granted at the instance of Prabha Shankar Pandey and Ram Lakhan Shukla, he made an application on 24.3.1992 for cancellation of the renewal of the registration granted on 8.10.1991. On 18.7.1992 a show cause notice was issued as to why the renewal may not be cancelled under Section 12-D of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter referred as the Act). On 27.7.1992, reply was submitted by Prabha Shankar Pandey and Ram Lakhan Shukla. The Assisant Registrar, respondent No. 2, by his order dated 22.8.1992, cancelled the renewal of the registration granted in favour of the petitioners which was challenged in writ petition No. 32538 of 1992. In this writ petition an interim order was passed on 1.10.1992 staying the operation of the order dated 22.8.1992. On 11.7.1996 operation of the interim order dated 1.10.1992 passed in the above writ petition was limited till 22.7.1996. However, on 22.7.1996, the interim order could not be extended as the Court not sit. Then an application was filed on 25.7.1996 praying for extension of the stay order. On this application a limited interim order was passed on 9.8.1996 which was further made operative until further orders on 12.8.1996. After hearing the parties, however, the interim orders granted on 1.10.1992, 9.8.1996 and 12.8.1996 were vacated by order dated 21.8.1996. Challenging the aforesaid order, Special Appeal No. 121 of 1996 was filed. On 12.9.1996 both the Special Appeal and the writ petition were disposed of finally. At the instance of the petitioners, the order dated 12.9.1996 was modified. The order dated 12.9.1996 as it stood after modification is being reproduced below :
“Heard Sri R.L. Sharma for appellants; learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and Shri R.N. Singh for respondent No. 4.
Feeling aggrieved by the order passed on 21.8.1996 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32538 of 1992 vacating the stay order passed on 1.10.1992 the petitioners-appellants have filed this appeal assailing the said order. With consent of learned Counsel for parties, we have heard both, the Special Appeal and the writ petition for disposal.
In the writ petition the appellant’s prayed for quashing of the notice dated 18.5.1992 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) and the order dated 22.8.1992 (Annexure 9 to the writ petition) passed by the Assistant Registrar, Societies, Chits and Firms, Allahpur, Allahabad, respondent No. 2 cancelling the renewal of registration granted in their favour. By order dated 1.10.1992 this Court granted stay of operation of the impugned order (Annexure 9 to the writ petition) the said interim order was continued from time to time till it was vacated by the order dated 21.8.1996. On the basis of the interim orders passed by this Court from time to time the appellants, as stated by Sri R.L. Sharma, were in charge of the management of the society and in the meantime, the term of the renewal order (five years) having elapsed application for further renewal is to be filed by them. According to Sri R.L. Sharma the impugned stay vacation order dated 21.8.1996 has seriously prejudiced the appellants inasmuch as after the said order was passed the application for renewal of registration filed by respondent No. 4 has been granted. Shri R.N. Singh, learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 submits that the writ petition has been rendered infructuous since the period of renewal order, which was granted upto 9.10.1995, is already over.
On perusal of the impugned order it appears that the main reason which promoted the learned Single Judge to vacate the stay order was that the period of validity of the renewal (five years) had elapsed and despite the cancellation order the appellants had reaped benefit of the order of renewal of registration due to the stay order passed by this Court.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case noted above and the submission made, it is our considered view that the special appeal and the writ petition should be disposed of with the order that on the appellants’ submitting an application for renewal of their registration before the competent authority within three weeks, the said authority will consider the same keeping in view the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the rules framed thereunder without being influenced by the observations made/findings recorded in the impugned stay vacation order dated 21.8.1996 passed in Writ Petition No. 32538 of 1992 and order dated 22.8.1992 which was under challenge in the said writ petition, dispose of the matter in accordance with law by passing a reasoned order within two months of receipt of the application after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties. It is ordered accordingly.
The Special Appeal and the Writ Petition are. disposed of on the above terms. No costs.”
3. As there was no interim order during the period 22.7.1996 to 9.8.1996, respondent No. 2 on 1.8.1996 issued the renewal certificate in favour of respondent No. 4. Challenging the orders dated 1.8.1996, Writ Petition No. 40888 of 1996 was filed. The learned Single Judge on noticing the observations in the order of the Division Bench dated 12.9.1996, passed in Special Appeal No. 121 of 1996, vide order dated 18.12.1996, directed to place the record of the aforesaid writ petition before the same Bench.
4. In pursuance of the order dated 12.9.1996, passed in Special Appeal No. 121 of 1996, respondent No. 2 passed the order dated 16.12.1996 rejecting the claim of the petitioners challenging which they filed Writ Petition No. 2687 of 1997. By order dated 8.8.1997 passed in Writ Petition No. 40888 of 1996, both the petitions were directed to be listed together. It is, thus, that the aforesaid two writ petitions have come before us for hearing.
5. After hearing Counsel for the parties on 29.8.1997 we passed the following order :-
“With the consent of learned Counsel for the parties, the cases are heard for disposal. They will be listed for further hearing on 5.9.1997. On that date Sri S.K. Saxena, Assistant Registrar, Societies, Chits and Firms, Regional Office, Allahapur, district Allahabad, will be present in Court with the record in which the matter relation to renewal of registration of Shiksha Prasar Samiti, Allahabad was dealt with by him. Further, he will file an affidavit explaining the circumstances in which he passed the order of renewal dated 1.8.1996 on the application filed by Ram Kailash Mishra when the dispute was sub-judice before this Court. Learned Standing Counsel will ensure presence of the officer in the Court on the date fixed.”
6. On 5.9.1997, learned Standing Counsel, however, filed affidavit of Sati Ram, successor of Shri S.K. Saxena, and presently posted as Assistant Registrar. Learned Standing Counsel also produced the record of the case. Shri S.K. Sexena did not appear in Court as directed by us. However, considering the fact that the dispute of renewal of the registration has been pending between the parties for the last over six years, instead of issuing fresh direction for securing presence of Shri S.K. Saxena, the then Assistant Registrar, we heard both the writ petitions on merits and reserved judgment.
7. We have heard Shri R.L. Sharma for petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and Shri R.N. Singh and Shri Sandeep Saxena for respondent No. 4.
8. After hearing the rival submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties at length, in our opinion, the only question for determination before us is as to whether respondent No. 2 was justified in passing the order dated 1.8.1996 issuing the renewed registration certificate in favour of respondent No. 4 for five years with effect from 10.10.1995 when the matter was sub-judice before the Court and whether the order dated 16.12.1996 passed by respondent No. 2 has been passed in terms of our order dated 12.9.1996 in Special Appeal No. 121 of 1996?
9. Before discussing the merits of the case, it shall be relevant to take into consideration the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules with regard to the renewal of registration. Section 3-A of the Act has been inserted in the Act by U.P. Act No. 52 of 1975 and it provides provision for renewal of certificate of registration. Section 3-A of the Act is being reproduced below :-
“3-A. Renewal of certificate of registration.–(1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), a certificate of registration issued under Section 3 shall remain in force for a period of five years from the date of issue:
Provided that a certificate issued before the commencement of the Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter in this section referred to as the said Act), shall remain in force for a period of five years from the date of such commencement on payment of the difference of the fees specified under Sub-section (3) and the fees already paid.
(2) A Society registered under Section 3, whether before or after the commencement of the said Act, shall on application made to the Registrar within one month of the expiration of the period referred to in Sub-section (1) and on payment of the fee specified in Sub-section (3), be entitled to have its certificate of registration renewed for five years, at a time :
Provided that in the case of a society registered before the commencement of the said Act, the Registrar shall refuse to renew the certificate of registration if after giving it an opportunity of showing cause against such refusal, he is satisfied that any of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 exist in respect thereof.
(3) There shall be paid to the Registrar with every application for renewal of the certificate of registration-
(a) a fee equal to the registration fee payable under Section 3 or rupees one hundred, whichever is less, if such application is filed within the period specified in Sub-section (2) ;
(b) an additional fee of twenty rupees, if such application is filed within one month of the date of expiration of the period specified in Sub-section (2); and
(c) an additional fee at the rate of ten rupees per month or part thereof, if such application is filed beyond one month of the expiration of the period specified in Sub-section (2);
(4) Every application for renewal of the certificate shall be accompanied by a list of members of the managing body elected after the registration of the society or after the renewal of certificate of registration and also the certificate sought to be renewed unless dispensed with by the Registrar on the ground of its loss or destruction or any other sufficient cause.
(5) A Society which fails to get its certificate of registration renewed in accordance with this section within one year from the expiration of the period for which the certificates was operative shall become an unregistered society:
Provided that the Registrar may, for sufficient cause, allow an application for renewal more than one year after the expiration of the period for which the certificate was operative on payment of a fee of two hundred rupees.
(6) Where a certificate of registration is renewed in accordance with Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (5) such renewal shall operate from the date of expiration of the period for which the certificate was operative.”
10. From a perusal of the aforesaid Section 3-A of the Act, it is clear that a society registered under Section 3 of the Act is entitled to have its certificate of registration renewed on payment of fee specified in Sub-section (3). Sub-section (4) provides that every application for renewal of the certificate shall be accompanied by a list of members of the managing body elected after the registration of the society or after the renewal of the certificate of registration and also the certificate sought to be renewed unless dispensed with by the Registrar on the ground of its loss or destruction or any other sufficient cause.
11. It is not disputed that the order dated 12.9.1996 has become final between the parties. The order dated 12.9.1996, as modified on 27.9.1996, was passed on the statement of the learned Counsel for the parties to the effect that the term of five years of the order of renewal having elapsed, application for further renewal is to be filed. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners on such application for renewal being made the interest of the petitioners may be prejudiced by order dated 21.8.1996. Learned Counsel for the respondents also submitted that the writ petition has been rendered infructuous since the period of renewal order which was granted upto 9.10.1995 is already over. The order dated 12.9.1996 should have been read and construed in the light of the aforesaid submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties. In fact, under the order dated 12.9.1996 the application of the petitioners seeking renewal of the registration was required to be considered keeping in view the provisions of the Act and the Rules without being prejudiced by the stay vacation order dated 21.8.1996 passed in Writ Petition No. 32538 of 1992 and the order dated 22.8.1992 passed by respondent No. 2. However, in our opinion, respondent No. 2 utterly failed to comply with the direction. The order dated 16.12.1996 impugned in Writ Petition No. 2687 of 1997 is almost reproduction of the order dated 22.8.1992. Only in the last paragraph, he has concluded that respondent No. 4 is the real Manager of the institution and the objections raised by Prabha Shankar Pandey and Ram Lakhan Shukla are baseless and are not effective, hence Ram Kailash Mishra is accepted as Manager of the institution and the order is being passed in compliance of the order of the Court. It would be appropriate to reproduce the last paragraph of the impugned order dated 16.12.1996 :
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,oa lk{;ksa ls eSa bl fu”d”kZ ij igq¡prk gw¡ fd Jh jke dSyk’k feJ
laLFkk ds okLrfod izcU/kd gSa ,oa Jh izHkk’kadj ik.Ms; o Jh jkey[ku ‘kqDy }kjk
mBkbZ x;h bl lEcU/k esa vkifÙk fujk/kkj gS tks fd izekf.kr ugha gS A vLrq Jh
jke dSyk’k feJ dks laLFkk dk izcU/kd Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gS rFkk ek- mPp U;k;ky; ds
vkns’k vuqikyu esa mä vkns’k vkt fnukad 12-12-96 dks ikfjr fd;k tkrk gS A**
12. From a perusal of the aforesaid order, it is clear that respondent No. 2 has in fact decided the dispute of management which was not direction of this Court. The direction was for deciding the application seeking renewal of the registration with effect from 10.10.1995 and onwards for five years. Respondent No. 2 has not said a word whether the papers submitted by the petitioners seeking renewal are complete as required under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 3-A of the Act and whether the registration certificate seeking renewal has been filed or not. In our opinion, the order passed by respondent No. 2 did not comply with our order dated 12.9.1996. It was specifically said that he shall not be influenced by the order dated 22.8.1992. However, the impugned order appears to be substantially a reproduction of the same order. On perusal of the order it is also not clear as to whether any finding was recorded in terms of Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 3-A of the Act while passing the order and granting renewal in favour of respondent No. 4 on 1.8.1996. In fact, respondent No. 2 acted with undue haste in granting renewal at the instance of respondent No. 4 while the matter was under active consideration of this Court. Limited interim orders are passed by the Court to prevent misuse of the same. Quite often it does happen that limited interim orders are not extended on the date of expiry by this Court for want of time or for various other reasons. But normally whenever the case is next taken up, the interim orders are extended unless the matter is decided the same day or the interim order is vacated by a specific order after hearing the parties. During such gap the authorities must wait for reasonable time and should refrain from passing order advantageous to one party. We have no hesitation in saying that these two petitions have come before us on account of the undue haste and unreasonable attitude adopted by respondent No. 2. He ought to have watched at least for a reasonable time and must have waited to see as to whether this Court extended the stay order further or vacated the same or decided the writ petition finally. The period of 17 days from 22.7.1996 to 9.8.1996 during which the stay order was not there could not be said to be a proper time for respondent No. 2 to pass the order at the instance of respondent No. 4. Such a course should be invariably avoided. Thus, the order dated 1.8.1996 granting renewal at the instance of respondent No. 4 with effect from 10.10.1995 and the order dated 16.12.1996 passed allegedly in pursuance of our order dated 12.9.1996 cannot be sustained.
13. The question now left is as to what relief may be given to the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the case. In our opinion, in cases where both the sides were seeking renewal of registration of the same society, they cannot be said to be aggrieved party, if the renewal of the registration is granted by the authority concerned. The renewal is of the registration of the society and it is for benefit of all the members and office bearers of the society. There may be a situation that two rival factions of the same society may apply for renewal separately and the renewal may be granted at the instance of one of them but the ultimate beneficiary shall be the society as a whole and not the individuals alone seeking renewal. In such a situation after renewal of the registration of the society, the dispute about renewal must be taken to have come to an end. The issue left between the parties shall be in substance a dispute with regard to the membership of the society or offices claimed by them which cannot be decided by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 under the provisions of the Act. For that the parties should approach, either the prescribed authority under Section 25 of the Act or may file suit in Civil Court. While granting or refusing renewal of registration if any finding is recorded by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 , that while be only a tentative or prima facie view taken on the basis of the material on record for purposes of renewal only. Obviously such a finding of an administrative authority cannot have any binding effect on the parties, while contesting the issue before the prescribed authority under Section 25 of the Act or in a suit before Civil Court, which shall be quasi-judicial and judicial proceedings respectively.
14. Now coming to the facts of the present case, we are not aware whether the parties were also in dispute with regard to each other’s membership of the society. A stranger cannot and should not be allowed to claim renewal of registration of the society. There is also no finding recorded by respondent No. 2 on this question. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the impugned orders should be set aside and the respondent No. 2 may be directed to consider afresh the renewal applications filed by the petitioners and respondent No. 1 seeking renewal of registration of the society with effect from 10.10.1995 in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the order dated 12.9.1996 passed in Special Appeal No. 121 of 1996 and this order.
15. For the reasons stated above, both these petitions are allowed. Orders dated 1.8.1996, Annexures 16, 16-A and 16-B to writ petition No. 40888 of 1996 and order dated 16.12.1996, Annexure 35 to writ petition No. 2687 of 1997 are quashed. Respondent No. 2 is directed to pass a fresh order with regard to renewal of the registration of the society with effect from 10.10.1995 in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. The order passed by respondent No. 2 shall be a reasoned order and shall be passed after hearing the parties within three months from the date of production of a copy of this order before him. No order as to costs.