JUDGMENT
M.M. Kumar, J.
1. The instant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution is directed against order dated 3.5.2005 passed by the Sikh Gurdwara Judicial Commission, Amritsar (for brevity, ‘the Judicial Commission’) allowing the defendant-respondents to lead evidence to meet the evidence led by the plaintiff-petitioner. It is appropriate to mention that the defendant-respondents were not allowed to file the written statement and probably for that reason alone the permission has been granted confining the prayer of the defendant-respondents to adduce evidence that they were able to meet the evidence of the plaintiff-petitioner. In support of the view taken by the Judicial Commission, a judgment of Orissa High Court in the case of Radhamoni Padhiari v. Tangudu Jaganatham and Anr., A.I.R. 1978 Orissa 209 has been relied upon.
2. Mr. P.S. Thiara, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the defendant-respondents, whose defence has been struck off, cannot be permitted to lead their evidence of their own. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Modulo India v. Kamakshya Singh Deo, and another judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Basalingappa Chinnappa Goudar and Ors. v. Shantavva and Ors., 2002(1) C.C.C. 120.
3. After hearing the learned counsel and perusing the aforementioned judgments, I am of the considered view that there is no merit in this petition. The Judicial Commission has consciously taken the view which is in consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Modulo India (supra) and the one taken by the Karnataka High Court in the case of Basalingappa Chinnappa Goudar’s case (supra). The Judicial Commission has not permitted the defendant-respondents to adduce such evidence so as to permit them to build their own case. The evidence to be adduced by the defendant-respondents has been confined only to the area by which they are able to meet the evidence led by the plaintiff-petitioner. Thus, there is no ground to interfere in the impugned order.
4. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Modula India (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel do not advance his case. In that case also, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court is that in case the defence of a defendant is struck off, then he is not debarred from adducing evidence to the extent that he is able to meet the case of the plaintiff. However, the bar is to adducing of evidence to build up the case by the defendant himself. In that case, the Supreme Court has followed the earlier view taken in the case of Babbar Sewing Machine Company v. Trilok Nath Mahajan, and laid down the following proposition:-
“We agree that full effect should be given to the words that defence against ejectment is struck off. But does this really deprive the defendant tenant of further participation in the case in any manner? While it is true that, in a broad sense, the right of defence takes in, within its canvass, all aspects including the demolition of the plaintiff’s case by the cross-examination of his witnesses, it would be equally correct to say that the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses really constitutes a finishing touch which completes the plaintiffs case. It is a well established proposition that no oral testimony can be considered satisfactory or valid unless it is tested by cross-examination. The mere statement of the plaintiff’s witnesses cannot constitute the plaintiffs evidence in the case unless and until it is tested by cross-examination. The right of the defence to cross examine the plaintiffs witnesses can, therefore, be looked upon not as a part of its own strategy of defence but rather as a requirement without which the plaintiff’s evidence cannot be acted upon. Looked at from this point of view it should be possible to take the view that, though the defence of the tenant has been struck out there is nothing in law to preclude him from demonstrating to the Court that the plaintiff’s witnesses are not speaking the truth or that the evidence put forward by the plaintiff is not sufficient to fulfill the terms of statute.
To us it appears that the basic principle that where a plaintiff comes to the Court he must prove his case should not be whittled down even in a case where no defendant appears. It will at once be clear that to say that the Court can only do this by looking the plaintiff’s evidence and pleadings supplemented by such questions as the Court may consider necessary and to completely eliminate any type of assistance from the defendant in this task will place the Court under a great handicap in discovering the truth or otherwise of the plaintiffs statements, for after all, the Court on its own motion, can do very little to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the plaintiff’s avernments and it is only the opposite party that will he more familiar with the detailed facts of a particular case and that can assist the Court in pointing out defects, weaknesses, errors and inconsistencies of the plaintiffs case.
We, therefore, think that the defendant should be allowed his right of cross-examination and arguments. But we are equally clear that this right should be subject to certain important safeguards. The first of these is that the defendant cannot be allowed to lead his own evidence. None of the observations or decisions cited have gone to the extent of suggesting that, in spite of the fact that the defence has been struck off, the defendant can adduce evidence of his own or try to substantiate his own case.”
(emphasis added)
5. From the perusal of the above para, it is evident that the Judicial Commission has deliberately granted the permission to the defendant-respondents to lead evidence which is aimed at meeting the evidence of the plaintiff-petitioner. It is further pertinent to mention that Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has now been held to be directory in nature and the time Schedule of 30 and 90 days is not mandatory. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kailash v. Nankhu and Ors., . In the present case, last date for filing the written statement as noticed in order dated 13.11.2004 Annexure P-2 was 2.7.2002 but the written statement was filed on 3.10.2002. The defence of defendant-respondent 1 was struck off as the written statement was found to be time barred. If the principles laid down in Kailash’s case (supra) are applied, then it cannot be held that written statement could be considered as time barred. Therefore, there is no illegally warranting interference of this Court.
For the reasons stated above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.