JUDGMENT
R.G. Vaidyanatha, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of detention dated 6th May, 1995. We have heard Shri Nitin Sarpotdar for the petitioner, Shri S.R. Borulkar, A.P.P. for the State and Shri H.V. Mehta for Union of India.
2. The Commissioner of Police, Bombay passed the impugned order of detention detaining the petitioner by an order passed under section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980.
Grounds of detention are at Exhibit C to the petition. We will refer to the relevant grounds at the appropriate stage.
3. Being aggrieved by the detention order, the detenue has approached this Court for quashing the same.
4. At the time of arguments the learned Counsel for the petitioner raised the following three points in support of the petition.
i. delay in passing the order of detention;
ii. translation of all the grounds of detention and documents was not furnished in Urdu; and
iii. delay in the disposal of the representation by the State Government.
On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the State controverted all the three contentions and supported the order of detention.
We will consider these three points one by one.
Point No. (i)
5. The order of detention is dated 6-5-1995. The last of the incident referred to in the grounds of detention was dated 6-10-1994. It was, therefore, argued that there is a gap of 7 months in passing the impugned order of detention after the last incident mentioned in the grounds of detention and hence the ground is stale and the live link between the order of detention and the prejudicial activity is snapped. In order to appreciate this argument, we will have to refer to some dates which were made available by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State by producing the case papers. It may be mentioned here that in the petition specific ground for the delay in passing the order of detention was not taken and hence the respondent had no opportunity of filing an affidavit to explain the delay. We are conscious of the fact that strict rules of pleadings are not applicable to habeas corpus petitions. We therefore, permitted the learned Counsel for the petitioner to argue this point even though it has not been specifically raised in the petition and the respondent had no opportunity to file an affidavit. That is why we permitted the learned Additional Public Prosecutor to produce the case papers so that we can find out whether there has been delay and if there is delay, whether the same has been properly explained.
From a perusal of the case papers we find that the last incident was on 6-10-1994 and within three weeks the Sponsoring Authority has put up the proposal for detention. It shows that the Sponsoring Authority has acted with promptitude in submitting the proposal within three weeks from the last of the incident. The papers were received by the Assistant Commissioner of Police who sent a report on 20-2-1995. The same was processed and approved by the Deputy Commissioner of Police on 2-3-1995. Then the papers passed through the Additional Commissioner of Police, Joint Commissioner of Police, Special Public Prosecutor, Deputy Commissioner of Police (Crime), Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime) and Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime) till 6-4-1995. Then the papers were placed before the Commissioner of Police on 6-4-1995. But the Commissioner of Police wanted some more information and called for particulars. The particulars were furnished to the Commissioner of Police on 17-4-1995. Then the Commissioner of Police approved on the file about the necessity of detaining the detenue on 20th April, 1995. Thereafterwards three weeks time was taken for translation of the document, the preparation of the order, copies etc.
6. We must also bear in mind the propensity and potentiality of the petitioner in disturbing the maintenance of public order as could be seen from the serious allegations made in the grounds of detention. We will refer only to few of the allegations to show the propensity and potentiality of the petitioner. Apart from the general allegation that the detenue and his associates were indulting in criminal activities, some particulars are given. It is alleged that the petitioner and his associates forcibly took possession of a building which was in the occupation of Mohamed Anwar Haji Hasham Ratiwala Muslim. It is stated that at that time, the petitioner and his associates threatened the victim at a point of machinegun and asked him to come with the original documents and hand over possession of the building. Then it is stated that in mid-September 1994, the petitioner and his associates were carrying open revolvers and suddenly went to the medical stores of Mohamed Anwar Haji Hasham Ratiwala and forcibly took charge of the keys of the godown as well as the garment shop and hotel. It is stated that due to this fact a wave of terror and panic triggered off in the entire locality and none dared to come to the rescue of the victim Mohamed Anwar Haji Hasham Ratiwala. It is stated that the petitioner and his associates forcibly occupied that building. It is alleged that on 5-10-1994 at about 4.00 p.m. the petitioner gave a threatened phone call to Mohamed Anwar Ratiwala and warned him to vacate the entire house situated in the said building or otherwise he would be shot down. Accordingly, the petitioner and his associates translated their threat into action and forcibly took possession of the building. In that connection a case in Crime No. 353/94 under section 342, 384, 387, 506(II), 34 I.P.C. read with section 3 and 25 of the Arms Act was registered against them. It is also alleged that the petitioner and his associates unleashed a reign of terror in that area. Then it is alleged that on 1-10-1994 the petitioner and his associates approached one Mohamed Farookh Haroon Chunawala and threatened him and asked him to pay money. When this incident took place the passers-by got terror-stricken and left the road as a result of this activity of the petitioner and associates. Subsequently Mohamed Farookh lodged a complaint at the police at J.J. Marg, Police Station vide C.R. No. 369/94 under section 387, 506(II) I.P.C. against the petitioner and his associates.
7. In our view, the serious allegations made against the petitioner and his associates show that he was a dreadful criminal and has unleashed terror in that area. If there is delay of 3/4 months in passing the order of detention it cannot be said that there is undue or inordinate delay. It is well settled that there is no arithmetical formula as to in how many days or how many months a detention order is to be passed. It is always a question of fact to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor invited our attention to , Rajendra Kumar v. State of Gujarat, where there was delay of five months in passing the order of detention. The Apex Court observed that since the detenue was a member of a gang indulging systematically in cutting of aluminium electric wire, the delay of five months in passing the order of detention cannot be said to be undue delay or unexplained delay. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court reported in 1993 Cri.L.J. 1078, K.K. Hamja v. State of Maharashtra, where there was delay of 8 months in passing order of detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. In the facts and circumstances of that case it was held that the live link between the prejudicial activities and detention order does not snap in view of the delay. It is further pointed out that mere delay does not ipso facto vitiate the detention order.
It is, therefore, seen that it is always a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.
Having regard to the dates mentioned above and the fact that the Sponsoring Authority sent a proposal within 3 weeks from the last incident and the serious allegations made against the petitioner in the grounds of detention, we are satisfied that there is no delay and even if there is a delay, there is explanation of the same and the order of detention cannot be challenged on that ground.
Point No. (ii)
8. The ground made out is that the petitioner is from Uttar Pradesh and he knows only Urdu and the grounds of detention and the documents were not supplied to the petitioner in Urdu language and therefore, the order of detention is vitiated.
On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor invited our attention to paragraph 6 of the affidavit of the present Commissioner of Police Shri R.D. Tyagi filed in answer to the petition and has stated that in paragraph 7 that the petitioner knows English language very well and therefore, non-supply of documents in Urdu language does not vitiate the order of detention.
In addition to the affidavit of the Commissioner of Police, at the time of hearing, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor produced casepapers where we find a certificate of Saifi High School, Bombay, dated 26-10-1994 which shows that the petitioner studied in that school upto 6th standard.
The learned Additional Public Prosecutor also produced a copy of the statement of the petitioner made before the Assistant Police Inspector on 18-5-1995 that he received the grounds of detention and other papers where he has mentioned that he has studied in English Medium and he knows English. He has agreed to take the copies of papers in English. In view of the materials placed before us we are satisfied that the petitioner knows English and no prejudice is caused to the petitioner in not furnishing the documents in Urdu language. Point No. 2 is answered accordingly.
Point No. (iii)
9. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that there is inordinate delay in the disposal of the representation given by the petitioner to the State Government.
Few facts which are necessary for this purpose are as follows:—
The date of representation is dated 5-6-1995 which was received by the State Government on 23-6-1995. It was rejected by the State Government on 3-7-1995.
The affidavit of Shri M.D. Ambade, Desk Officer, Government of Maharashtra, Home Department (Special) shows that on 24th and 25th June, 1995 were public holidays. The representation was proposed and put up through the officers concerned of the Home Department to the Deputy Chief Minister on 30th June, 1995. We may take judicial notice that in June the number of days are 30. 2nd July, 1995 was also a holiday being Sunday. The Deputy Chief Minister considered the representation carefully and rejected it on 3rd July, 1995. If we exclude the holidays within 4/5 days the representation had been attended to by various officers and ultimately by the concerned Minister and it was rejected on 3rd July, 1995, in our view, there is absolutely no delay in the disposal of the representation sent by the petitioner.
10. In our view none of the three grounds which were pressed into service by the learned Counsel of the petitioner merit acceptance.
11. In the result, petition fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged.