JUDGMENT
D.B. Bhosale, J.
1. This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is directed against the Judgment and order dated 28.6.1990 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short, “MRT”) by which the Revision filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3-tenants was allowed by setting aside the order dated 30.12.1985 passed by the Leave Reserve Deputy Collector, Kolhapur in Tenancy Appeal No. 37 of 1985 and 41 of 1985 and the order of Tenancy Awal Karkoon dated 19.5.1984 was maintained.
2. Briefly stated, the petitioners are the purchasers of 80 Areas of land out of 1 Hector and 91 Ares from Gat No. 1222, situated at Village Paragaon, Taluka Hatkanagale. They claim to have purchased 80 Ares of land by a registered conditional sale deed dated 26.4.1983 from respondent No. 4 – landlord and since then they are in possession of the said portion of land out of Gat No. 1222.
2.1 This petition arises out of the proceedings initiated by the respondents-tenants (for short, “tenants”) who filed an application under Section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (for short, “Tenancy Act”) seeking declaration that they are tenants of Gat No. 1222 admeasuring 1 Hector 91 Ares (for short, “land in question”). Though respondent No. 4 landlord (for short “landlord”) was party in the said proceedings he chose not to appear before any of the authorities below. The Tenancy Awal Karkoon (fort short “ALT”) after considering the material placed before him and the statements of the statements of the tenant and his witnesses, declared respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as tenants of the land in question. Being aggrieved by that order, the landlord and the petitioner-purchaser filed independent appeals bearing Tenancy Appeal Nos. 41/1985 and 37/1985 respectively before the Sub-Divisional Officer (for short “the SDO”). Both the appeals were allowed. The tenants carried the matter further in revision before the Maharashtra revenue Tribunal (for short “the MRT”). The MRT allowed the revision by its judgment and order dated 28.6.1990 which is being challenged by the petitioners in the instant writ petition.
2.2 The record reveals that the tenants had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 113/1984 against the landlord and the petitioners seeking permanent injunction against them. The suit was dismissed on 13.2.1990 i.e. during pendency of the revision application bearing MRT.KP 31 of 1984 and MRT.KP 32 of 1986. Another suit was filed by the petitioners bearing R.C.S.No. 32/1986 against the tenants for injunction simplicitor restraining them from obstructing possession in 80 Ares of land purchased by them. Interalia the subject matter of both the suits and the instant writ petition is one and same. That suit came to be dismissed for default on 10.11.1985.
3. It is against this backdrop I heard learned counsel appearing for the parties for quite sometime. With the assistance of Mr. Kamble, learned counsel for the petitioners I went through the record and the impugned orders as also, the judgment of the Civil Court passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 113/1984. Mr. Kambale contended that the tribunal was wrong in recording the findings that the tenants were in lawful possession of the entire land in question and that is not consistent with revenue record which clearly show that the name of the petitioners was entered in the kabjedar column after they purchased 80 Ares of land and they were put in possession of the said portion of the land. In view thereof, according to Mr. Kamble, the tenant cannot be treated as “deemed tenant” as contemplated under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act in respect of 80 Ares of land purchased by the petitioners. He placed heavy reliance on the findings recorded by the Civil Court in R.C.S.No. 113/1984 to contend that the petitioner was put in possession by the landlord on 26.4.1983. He further submitted that panchnama dated 15.6.1983 was misread by the authorities below for holding that the tenants were in possession of entire Gat No. 1222. The panchnama, according to Mr. Kamble, shows that the petitioner was in possession of only hut situated in the said Gat number. In so far as certificate issued by Warana Sahakari Pani Puravatha Seva Sanstha, Pargaon dated 21.5.1983 is concerned, he submitted that it was wrongly relied upon by the tribunal to reach a conclusion that the water was being drawn by the tenants for the lands in dispute. According to Mr. Kambale, even the other material relied upon by MRT is not sufficient to hold that the tenants were in lawful possession of entire Gat No. 1222 and in particular 80 Ares of land purchased by registered sale deed dated 26.4.1983.
3.1 On the other hand Mr. N.J. Patil, learned counsel for the respondent-tenants submitted that under Section 4 of the tenancy Act what is required is only lawful possession. It does not matter whether an entry in the tenancy column or a rent note or a rent receipt to support the claim of a tenant exists or not. He further submitted that in any case rightly or wrongly the authorities below after evaluating the material produced before them, have reached a conclusion that the tenants were in lawful possession of the land and, therefore, entitled to be declared “deemed tenant” as contemplated under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act and such finding of fact cannot be disturbed in the supervisory jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution. In other words, according to Mr. Patil, the High Court cannot in its jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot convert itself into a court of appeal, reassess and evaluate the evidence and reach a conclusion other than the one reached by the authorities below. Mr. Patil further submitted that the MRT rightly set aside the order passed by the Leave Reserve Deputy Collector, Kolhapur who had committed an error in law while allowing both the appeals filed by the petitioners and the landlord.
4. It is well settled that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of a tribunal if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion or unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention. This principle is settled in D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee . In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram the Apex Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and has further stated as to what is perverse finding in law. The perverse finding in law is one which no reasonable person properly instructed in law could have come to such a finding or there is misdirection in law or view of fact has been taken in teeth of preponderance of evidence or the finding is not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the Apex Court in this judgment has held that the High Court has no jurisdiction. It would be advantageous to reproduced paragraph 20 of the said judgment which reads thus:
“20. It is true in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it, if there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where the findings were perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case on the question that the High Court has sought to interfere, it is manifest that the High Court has gone into questions which depended upon appreciation of evidence and indeed the very fact that the learned trial Judge came to one conclusion and the Appellate Bench came to another conclusion is indication of the position that two view were possible in this case. In preferring one view to another of factual appreciation of evidence, the High Court transgressed its limits of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. On the first point, therefore, the High Court was in error”.
4.1 In Bathumal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. (SIC) and Anr. the Apex Court had gone a step further and held that the error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, is not subject to correction by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. An error of fact can be corrected only by a superior court in exercise of its statutory power as a court of appeal. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final on facts. It is thus clear that this court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot interfere with the findings within the jurisdiction of inferior tribunal or court except where the finding is perverse as held in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao case (supra). Even an error on facts is not subject to correction by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution by converting itself into a court of appeal. It can be corrected only by a superior court or tribunal in exercise of its statutory power. Keeping in view the parameter of the jurisdiction of this court under Article 227, as defined, by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments I would now like to consider whether there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence or the finding recorded by the ALT and MRT were perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice and the order of remand passed by SDO was correct or not.
5. In the appeals filed by the petitioner and landlord bearing Appeal Nos. 37/1985 and 41/1985 after considering the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Tenancy Act, the SDO misdirected himself in law and held that the petitioner was not liable to be declared as tenant since he did not produced on record the documentary evidence such as agreement, rent receipts, assessment receipts etc. From the contents of the order of SDO, it is further clear that he got influenced of the fact that the names of the petitioners did not find place in the kabjedar column in 7 X 12 extracts of the land in question for the relevant years. Keeping this in view the MRT ventured to reassess and evaluate the material produced by the parties on record in the light of the provisions of Section 4 and its interpretation made by this court in the judgment referred to by him in the impugned judgment. The MRT while interfering with the judgment and order dated 30.12.1985 passed by the Leave Reserve Deputy Collector, Kolhapur and affirming the order of ALT placed reliance on the following material: (a) The panchnama drawn by the Circle inspector, Vadgaon of Gat No. 1222; (b) The certificate dated 21.5.1983 issued by the Chairman and Manager of Warana Sahakari Pani Puravatha Seva Sanstha; and (c) The oral evidence of one of the tenants as well as other witness referred to in the judgment of MRT.
5.1 The panchnama drawn on 15.6.1983 shows that there was a hut in possession of the tenants and they were residing there over 7-8 years. It further shows that the entire Gat No. 1222 was found well ploughed and was made ready for sowing operations. The tenants claim that they were in possession of entire Gat and they had made it ready for sowing operations. As against this the petitioners claim that they purchased 80 Ares of land out of Gat No. 1222 by registered sale deed dated 26.4.1983 and were put in possession on 26.4.1983 but were not found in possession. In so far as certificate dated 21.5.1983 is concerned, it clearly shows that the water was being supplied for agricultural purposes to Gat No. 1222. The certificate was issued in favour of the tenants and it shows that they were taking water from the scheme of the society for land bearing Gat No. 1222 since 7-8 years prior to issuance of the certificate. On the basis of this document the tribunal has drawn inference that the tenants were in possession of the land in question and were performing agricultural operations. Even the oral evidence of the tenant and his witnesses show that the land was leased to the tenants by the landlord at the rate of Rs. 500/- as rent per year.
5.2 At this stage it may be noticed that before the tenants came into possession of the land in question in 1975 the land was being cultivated by other tenants namely Chougule and Mahar. It appears that they abandon their right in the land in question and thereafter the petitioners got into possession of the said land and were cultivating it lawfully for 7-8 years prior to the sale deed dated 26.4.1983. There is no dispute that the landlord never cultivated the land in question personally. The MRT has also relied upon the other circumstances such as agreement for sale dated 20.5.1990 executed between the landlord and tenant in respect of 41 Ares out of Gat No. 1222. The MRT also noticed that the landlord never initiated any proceedings against the tenants for their eviction. It is thus clear from the judgment of the MRT which, in view of the error in law committed by the SDO, was required to reassess and evaluate the evidence on record to reach a conclusion that the tenant was lawfully cultivating the lands in question. Keeping in view the evidence that was produced on record and relied upon by the MRT, holding respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as “deemed tenants” under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act, cannot be called perverse and cannot be said to have resulted in manifest injustice. As a matter of fact the SDO overlooked the evidence and unnecessarily gave importance to the record of rights and the fact that no rent receipt was produced on record, which, in my opinion, was against the provisions of Section 4 of the Tenancy Act. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by ALT and the MRT need no interference by this court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
6. That takes me to consider the provisions of Section 4 of the Tenancy Act. It provides that a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another persons shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not a member of the owner’s family or a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner of any member of the owner’s family, or a mortgagee in possession. In the instant writ petition we are not concerned with the explanation I and II appended to Sub-section 1, Sub-section 2 and Sub-section 3 of Section 4 of the Tenancy Act. This court in Dhondu Bapu Survey v. Aniruddh Yeshwant Vaidya 1997 TLR Volume XXV Page 6 in Special C.A. No. 479 of 1972 had an occasion to deal with the provisions of Section 4 of the Tenancy Act. In this case the reasoning of the Tribunal were held to be against the provisions of Section 4 of the Tenancy Act. It was held that an entry in the tenancy column or a rent note or a rent receipt to support the claim of a tenant to be a “deemed tenant” under that Section is not a precondition. The relevant observations in the judgment reads thus:
“All that is required under that section is ‘lawful’ cultivation by a person other than the member of the family of the landlord subject to other conditions laid down in Section 4. It is not open to the Revenue Tribunal to read into that section of fashioned notion of the law of landlord and tenant, which required the entries in the tenancy column, rent note or rent receipt to support the case of tenancy. The Legislature knowing all these old requirements has adopted a definition of ‘statutory tenancy’ irrespective of such things”.
I am in respectful agreement with the observations made in the said judgment.
6.1 The Apex Court also had an occasion to deal with provisions contained in Section 4 of the Tenancy Act and to interpret the expression “deemed tenant” in Dahya Lala and Ors. v. Rasul Mohamed Abdul Rahim and Ors. . In that case the Apex Court was considering as to whether the person claiming status of “deemed tenant” must have been cultivating land with the consent or under authority of the owner. The Apex Court was dealing with argument of the learned counsel for the landlord that there can be no tenancy without the consent or authority of the owner to the occupation of the land in dispute. The Apex Court while dealing with the arguments in paragraph 6 of the report held thus:
“But the Act has by Section 2(18) devised a special definition of tenant and included therein persons who are not contractual tenants. It would therefore be difficult to assume in construing Section 4 that the person who claims the status of a deemed tenant must be cultivating land with the consent or authority of the owner. The relevant condition imposed by the statute is only that the person claiming the status of a deemed tenant must be cultivating land “lawfully”. It is not the condition that he must cultivate land with the consent of or under authority derived directly from the owner. To import such condition is to rewrite the section, and destroy its practical utility. A person who derives his rights to cultivate land from the owners would normally be a contractual tenant and he will obviously not be a “deemed tenant”. Persons such as licenses from the owner may certainly be regarded as falling within the class of persons lawfully cultivating land belonging to others, but it cannot be assumed therefrom that they are the only persons who are covered by the section. The Act affords protection to all persons who hold agricultural lands as contractual tenants and subject to the exceptions specified all persons lawfully cultivating lands belonging to others, and it would be unduly restricting the intention of the Legislature to limit the benefit of its provisions to persons who derive their authority from the owner, either under a contract or otherwise. In our view, all persons other than those mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) and (c) of Section 4 who lawfully cultivate land belonging to other persons whether or not heir authority is derived directly from the owner of the land must be deemed tenants of the lands”.
6.2 In yet another judgment in Kishan Ramchandra Kumbhar and Ors. v. Kashinath Bandu Teli and Ors. 2004 (1) Mh.L.J. 285 this court has reiterated the principle of law laid down in Dahya Lala’s case (supra).
7. The law is thus clear that even without their being an entry in the tenancy column or a rent note or a rent receipt in favour of a person, who is lawful possession, must be declared as “deemed tenant” under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act irrespective of the fact whether or not the authority of such person is derived directly from the owner of the land. All that is required under that section is “lawful” cultivation by a person other than the member of the family of the landlord subject to other conditions specified in that section for claiming a status of the “deemed tenant”. In the circumstances I have no hesitation inholding that respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were cultivating the land lawfully and are, therefore, entitled to claim status of “deemed tenant” as contemplated under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act. In the result writ petition is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. No order as to costs.