JUDGMENT
J.G. Chitre, J.
1. The petitioner is taking exception to the judgment and order passed by M.R.T. in the matter of Revision Application No. MRT. KP. 176 of 1983, dated 8.4.1988 whereby the learned Member of M.R.T. dismissed the revision application filed by the petitioner by holding that the judgments and orders passed by Tahasildar and A.L.T. as well as by Assistant Collector were proper, correct and legal.
2. Some facts need to be stated for unfolding the matter in controversy. Survey No. 200 admeasuring 3 Acres 33 gunthas situated in village Padal, Tal. Panhala, District Kolhapur happens to be the suit land. The petitioner Balkrishna @ Vilas Ramaji Todakar happens to be landlord. He was born, as the record shows, on 4.4.1946 and became major some times in the year 1964. The record shows that the suit land was leased some time in the year 1950. The respondents were the tenants of the suit land.
3. The landlord contended that the suit land was leased for growing sugarcane. There was no agreement in writing to that effect but the present petitioner/landlord had examined one witness viz. Ganpati Shripati Patil on that point to point out that sugarcane crop was growing in the adjacent field. In addition to this, the landlord contended that the tenants did not exercise their right of purchasing the land within prescribed period and, therefore, their right of purchasing the said land stood forfeited. The tenants, the present respondents, countered this contention raised by the petitioner landlord by contending that the suit land was never leased for growing sugarcane. The tenants contended that they had exercised their right of purchasing the said land by expressing their desire to purchase the said land by making a statement in that context before the Tahasildar in the year 1971. So also it was contended on behalf of the tenants that they did not know as to when the landlord attained majority.
4. Shri Pandit, Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the learned Tribunal did not properly appreciate that the evidence of Ganpati Shripati Patil was proving that the said land was leased for growing sugarcane. He pointed out that his evidence has been corroborated by the fact that sugarcane crop was growing in the adjacent land. Shri Saste pointed out that the evidence of Ganpati Shripati Patil and the contentions raised by the petitioner on this point have been nugated by the 7/12 extract entries in respect of the description of the crop growing in the said field. He further submitted that the fact that sugarcane crop is growing in adjacent field would not be sufficient enough to hold that the suit land was leased out for growing sugarcane crop and thus entitling the landlord in getting possession of the said land. This Court dismisses the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner on this point because the evidence of Ganpati Shripati Patil has been appreciated by the Courts below as also the M.R.T. correctly and there is no error whatsoever in the conclusion drawn by those two Courts and the Tribunal against the petitioner. It is pertinent to note that the rent was to be paid in kind and that too by giving paddy to the landlord. The entries in respect of the cultivation column also speak against the petitioner. This Court does not find any ground for deviating from the conclusion drawn by two Courts below and the Tribunal so far as this aspect of findings of fact is concerned.
5. Shri Pandit placed reliance on the judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in the matter of Mohan Gajanan Deshpande v. Dhondiram Hari Chavan and Ors. wherein the Single Bench of this Court had held that:
Provisions of Section 32F(1)(a) and Section 32F(1A) came into force on 17th October. 1969. Thus before the advent of the amendments, it was not at all incumbent on a minor landlord to notify the date of his attaining majority to the tenants under Section 32F(1)(a). It was indeed necessary for the tenant to notify his desire of going in for statutory purchase to the landlord as well as the A.L.T. within one year from the expiry of the period during which a minor landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31. Under Section 31(3) of the Act, a minor landlord is permitted to take proceedings for termination of the tenancy within one year of his attaining majority. The combined effect of these twin provisions is that under Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 32F as obtaining prior to the amendment of 1969, the tenant was obliged under Section 32F(1A) to give an intimation of his desire to purchase the land within two years of the landlord attaining majority.
6. The Single Bench of this Court in the said matter further went on observing that :
It is obvious that because a number of tenants had not the means to know the precise date of their landlord having attained majority by the two amendments of 1969 mentioned above, an obligation was cast on a minor landlord to give intimation of his having attained majority to his tenant within a year of the event (section 32F(1)(a)). The proviso to Section 32F(1A) further enabled the defaulting tenant who had managed to stick to his possession to give intimation of his desire of purchase to his landlord till 17th October, 1971 (that is to say for two years from the commencement of 1969 Amendment Act).
7. It is further observed that:
There is nothing in the wording of these two provisions to show that they are retrospective in operation. There is also no indication in the Amending Act itself to draw such an inference. If retrospective effect is assigned to the amendment of Section 32F(1)(a), some absurd results will follow. To cite one example, the provisions of Section 31(3) have been existing on the statute book in the present from right since the commencement of the Act at any rate for a substantial number of years prior to 1969. If the amendment of Section 32F(1)(a) is presumed to be retrospective, it would apply even to a landlord who had attained majority, say in 1960. His right to terminate tenancy under Section 31 would have already stood exhausted by 1961. Obviously such old closed matters were not sought to be disturbed by the amendment of Section 32F(1)(a). Further the proviso to Sub-section (1A) of Section 32F would be rendered totally otiose, if retrospective effect is given to the amendment of Section 32F(1)(a). When these two amendments are harmoniously construed together, the plain result is that the obligation under the amended provision of Section 32F(1)(a) is cast on only those landlords who attain majority on or after 17th October, 1969. In order to protect tenants who had no means to know the date on which their landlords had already attained majority prior to 17th October, 1969, the proviso to Sub-section (1A) gave them a breather of two years to ascertain the correct position and to take effective steps for being declared statutory purchasers, provided of course they had managed to retain possession with them as on 17th October, 1969. Therefore, the landlord who had attained majority before 17th October was under no obligation to give intimation of his having attained majority to the tenant. The tenant in his turn could not press in aid the concession enuring to him under the proviso to Section 32F(1A).
8. For substantiating his submissions Shri Saste placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Shrikrishna Subhana Horambale and
Ors. v. Shripad Jiwaji Apte, (deceased by L.Rs.) and Ors. wherein the Single Bench of this Court held that:
Reverting then to the position here, there is no dispute that more than once, the tenants have unequivocally expressed their willingness to purchase the suit land. It is also not in dispute that the tenants have been in personal cultivation thereof at all relevant times. Indeed, they and their predecessors have been in possession and cultivation continuously for nearly half a century prior to the tiller’s day 1st April, 1957 as also continuously thereafter till now. The tenants willingness to purchase was more than once placed on record before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal in purchase proceedings under Section 32 read with Section 32G but each time the proceedings and the purchase stood postponed not because of any fault of the tenants but because the physically disabled landlord continued to remain physically disabled all throughout his life. There is no provisions in the Tenancy Act under which, despite the aforesaid circumstances and the tenants’ willingness to purchase more than once positively expressed and exercised the said right of purchase nevertheless becomes ineffective or stands extinguished by the demise of the disabled landlord. There is also no provision which legally requires or obliges to tenants to give to the successors-in-title of the deceased disabled landlord notice or intimation of willingness to purchase despite their such willingness already expressed to the late landlord himself, in his own life time in proceeding under Section 32 read with Section 32G of the Tenancy Act. Also relevant in this context is the pertinent circumstance that neither Section 31(3) nor Section 32F(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act includes successors-in-title of a disabled landlord. This, indeed, is yet another strong indication of the legislative intent in the aforesaid behalf.
9. Shri Saste also placed reliance in the matter of Amrutrao Ratnakar Rajadhye v. Krishna Sakharam Patil and Ors. 1997 (3) Mh. L.J. 783 wherein Single Bench of this Court held, in context with the similar situation, that:
That what the law requires is that the landlord must be informed in writing of the tenants desire of willingness to purchase the land. Once this has been done and the proceedings for purchase had been initiated and they have been deferred merely because of the disability of the landlord it does not mean that on such disability coming to an end the landlord tenant must again give fresh notice. The requirement, is that notice must be given. In the instant, case by starting proceedings to purchase the tenants expressed their desire to purchase the land after 1st April, 1957, The petitioner landlord was informed of the tenants desire to purchase the land. The Tribunal also was given a notice of the said facts. That would amount, to sufficient, compliance with the provisions of Sub-section (1)(A) of Section 32-F of the Act. The question of notice would arise if no proceedings had been initiated for purchase and which were deferred because of the disability and the tenants had not given notice of their intention to purchase within the stipulated time. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the tenant had not complied with the requirements of giving notice. It is now well settled that in case of welfare legislation the Court must give expression to the intent of the Legislature. The Legislature’s intent is to confer ownership rights on the tenant. The requirements of notice are to inform the landlord about tenant’s desire to purchase the land and the exercise of option within the time laid down. This requirement has to be construed liberally in as much as all that the tenant is bound to show is that there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Sub-section (1)(A) of Section 32-F. Once the tenant shows that he has substantially complied with all the requirements of Sub-section (1)(A) of Section 32-F to deny the right of purchase on the ground that no notice had been given after the landlord become a major would be to defeat the legislative intent. There is no requirement of giving fresh notice.
10. Here it would be relevant to quote the observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shri Ram Narain v. State of Bombay wherein the Supreme Court had observed that:
The title of the landlord to the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tiller’s day and there is a completed purchase or sale thereof as between the landlord and tenant. The tenant is no doubt give a locus poenitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall, by an order in writing, declare that such tenant if is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal, the purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tiller’s day and will continue to be operative, the only obligation on the tenant then being the payment of price In the mode determined by the Tribunal. The title to the land, which was vested originally in the landlord, passes to the tenant on the tiller’s day or the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defensible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or make statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined by the Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested interest in the land defeasible only in either of those cases and it cannot, therefore, be said that the title of the landlord to the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite. Such then are the vital, valuable and vested rights conferred upon tenants by the Legislature. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary and then also save expressly in accordance therewith, Courts and Tribunals may not seek to undo what the Legislature seeks and intends to achieve.
11. In this context it would be necessary to quote Section 32F(1)(a) and (b):
32F. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections. –
(a) where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or physical disability the tenant shall have the right to purchase such land under Section 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31 (and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31):
(Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31st of March. 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated, having regard to the area, assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property and not in a large proportion).
(b) where the tenant is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or physical disability or a serving member of the armed forces, then subject to the provisions of Clause (a), the right to purchase land under Section 32 may be exercised,-
(i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains majority;
(ii) by the successor-in-title of the widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist;
(iii) within one year from the date on which the mental or physical disability of the tenant ceases to exist;
(iv) within one year from the date on which the tenant, ceases to be a serving member of the armed forces:
(Provided that where a person of such category is a member of joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31st day of March, 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated, having regard to the area, assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and not in a larger proportion).
It is pertinent to note that it has been pointed out in Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 32F that where the landlord is minor, or widow, or person subject to any mental or physical disability the tenant shall have right to purchase the land under Section 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31 and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31.
12. It is true that the Advocates appearing for the parties have placed reliance on the judgments of Single Bench of this Court for the purpose of substantiating their arguments. But the views expressed by the Single Bench of this Court in those judgments will have to be considered in context with the facts and circumstances of those cases and the present case. So also the views expressed will have to be considered by interpreting and understanding the intention of the Legislature in enacting the Act i.e. Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The observations made by the Supreme Court in Ram Narain’s case (supra) have to be kept in mind always in applying the ratio of the judgments and pointer indicated by the relevant provisions. There cannot be any debate that the Act has been enacted for the purpose of ensuring agricultural development of India for protecting the rural economy and the Indian economy which is mainly dependant on rural economy and agriculture. For that purpose a provision has been made by which the person cultivating the land on tiller’s day was given some rights in respect of the land which he was cultivating. Therefore, the possession of the relevant date of the litigating party or one of them would be always important. In this case on the relevant date the respondents were in possession of the land and there was a proceeding in between litigating parties in context with Section 32G wherein the respondents tenants unequivocally stated their willingness to purchase the land. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Ram Narain’s case the tenants had Vested right to purchase the land on tiller’s day i.e. on 1.4.1957. It continued till it foreclosed by operation of law followed by a legal process. In the present case the landlord was a minor and therefore, that right which was vested in the tenants stood postponed. As record shows in present case the landlord attained majority in the year 1964 or so. Therefore, in such case when the tenant had expressed his willingness to purchase the land in any proceeding which was initiated between the parties but by operation of law and disability of the litigants, the event of purchase of land was postponed to future date, it became incumbent and obligatory on the part, of the landlord to inform the tenant his intention to terminate the tenancy on the date on which he attains majority. In this context the Courts have to be circumspect and properly informed about the difficulties which members of rural public experience in their day-to-day life. It is presumed that every person who is a major understands his rights or gets well advised in respect of his legal rights when his property happens to be engaged in litigation. Therefore, such party/owner has to perform his obligation in informing his adversary of his attaining majority, otherwise indirectly he would be touching adversely in surprise and in awkward corner. If he fails in doing so and commits, defaults, he would be estopped from encashing the benefits arising out of that situation.
13. Therefore, assessing the view expressed by the Single Bench of this Court in the judgments quoted supra and reading the provisions of the Act as a whole in the context of for the spirit in which it has been enacted as a benevolent piece of legislation, this Court comes to the conclusion that it was obligatory on the part of the petitioner to give intimation of his intention to terminate the tenancy of the respondents/tenants after he attained majority during the period which has been indicated by the provisions of Section 32F(1)(a) and in the event of his failure to do so, he would not be entitled to encash the default as alleged by him on the part of the tenants, the respondents, more particularly when they had expressed their intention to purchase the land. Though the Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal did not express any appropriate words in his judgment, the meaning which has been conveyed by his judgment is the same. When this Court is exercising the jurisdiction of superintendence in view of Article 227 of the Constitution of India this Court will have to think whether the judgment which has been assailed is suffering from defect or perverseness, incorrectness and assumes the nature of illegality by itself. The answer from all corner is “no” and therefore, this Court dismisses the writ petition with costs and discharges the rule.