JUDGMENT
Khan, J.
1. Petitioner had let out its premises at U-38-A,
Shakarpur, Delhi to one company called M/s. Shrestha
Priya Finance & Investment Limited. The company wound
up and a case of cheating (FIR No. 101/2000) was
registered against it under Sections 406/420/34 IPC at
P.S. Shakarpur on the complaint of some investors. Its
office at the premises was said to have been sealed and
then again re-opened and its office record was
transferred to Malkhana of Police Station. It also
transpires that when investigation of FIR No. 101/2000
was transferred to Crime Branch, petitioner was found in
possession of the premises.
2. Be that as it may, it was in this background
that petitioner was booked in two FIRs – FIR No. 428/2000
under Sections 454/380 IPC and FIR No. 433/2000 under
Section 188 IPC. He challenged both FIRs in this
petition. The first one was quashed by court order
dated 4.9.2001 but the second one survived and now it is
to be seen whether this would also go. 0
3. This FIR under Section 188 IPC charges
petitioner of disobeying Police Commissioner’s orders
contained in notification dated 22.6.2000 requiring
house owners to inform the concerned police stations
about the particulars of the tenants to whom the
premises was let out or sublet by them.
4. Petitioner’s case is that Police Commissioner’s
order was not to his knowledge and, therefore, no
offence could be said to have been made out against him
under Section 188 IPC. The stand of respondents,
however, is that the Commissioner’s notification dated
22.6.2000 was duly publicised before the relevant date
and its knowledge must be attributed to petitioner to
attract Section 188 IPC.
5. By court order dated 13.2.2002, respondent was
asked to indicate and specify all modes of publication
resorted to in this regard. DCP/HQ Sh. T.N. Mohan has
filed an affidavit in compliance along with some news
clippings and photocopies of some handbills, etc. in a
bid to show that Police Commissioner’s notification in
question was widely publicised and brought to the
knowledge of public and impliedly to petitioners also.
It remains to be seen whether such knowledge could be
attributed to petitioners in the facts and circumstances
of the case.
6. Section 188 IPC, which has a crucial bearing in
the matter, reads thus:-
“188. Disobedience to order duly
promulgated by public servant – Whoever,
knowing that, by an order promulgated by a
public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate
such order, he is directed to abstain from a
certain act, or to take certain order with
certain property in his possession or under his
management, disobeys such direction.
shall, if such disobedience causes to
tender to cause obstruction, annoyance or
injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or
injury, to any person lawfully employed, be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one month or with fine
which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with
both;
and if such disobedience causes or tends
to cause danger to human life, health or
safety, or cases or tends to cause a riot or
affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extent
to six months, or with fine which may extend to
one thousand rupees, or with both.”
7. The provision provides for two types of
punishments for knowingly disobeying a validly
promulgated order by a public servant. Its ingredients
are:-
(1) there must be an order promulgated by a public
servant.
(2) such public servant must be lawfully empowered
to promulgate such order.
(3) A person must have a knowledge of such order
directing him to abstain from an act or (b) to
take certain order with certain property in his
possession or under his management.
(4) He must disobey the order having its knowledge.
(5) Such obedience must cause or tend to cause (a)
obstruction, annoyance or injury or risk of it
to any person lawfully employ or (b) danger to
human life, health and safety.
8. We are not at this stage concerned with police
commissioner’s competence to pass an order requiring
house owners to give particulars of their tenants under
Section 144 under challenge before us. But it would
have to be examined whether his order was to the
knowledge of the petitioner and he had knowingly
disobeyed it.
9. As already seen, a person booked under Section
188 IPC must have actual knowledge of public servant’s
order requiring him to do or abstain from doing some
act. Acquiring or gaining of such knowledge is a
pre-requisite. Any proof of general notification
promulgated by a public servant would not satisfy the
requirement.
10. It is true that the knowledge of accused could
be presumed in certain circumstances but all the same a
complaint/FIR must indicate, even though not in very
express terms, that he had the knowledge of the order
and had knowingly disobeyed it. Where the terms of
complaint/FIR did not provides even as inkling in this
regard, it cannot be said to make out or constitute an
offence under Section 188 and in such a situation, it
would warrant to be quashed.
11. A perusal of the FIR does not indicate that
petitioner had actual knowledge of police commissioner’s
order. It is not the case of respondents also that this
order was served on him by whatever means/modes or was
either affixed on his premises or was gazetted on the
relevant date. Their stand, on the contrary, is that
the requisite knowledge must be attributed to him
because police commissioner’s order was punished in
some newspapers and handbills, etc. This, in our view,
would not meet the requirement, because a number of
events may be reported in newspapers. But that would
not attribute or convey knowledge of such events to all
readers. Moreover, a person may not be a reader of a
particular newspaper. He can’t, therefore, be
attributed knowledge of the contents of the newspaper.
It may have been understandable if a general public
notice of police commissioner’s order was shown to have
published in media in general to raise a presumption of
knowledge to the house owners living in a particular
area. But even that is not the case here.
12. The affidavit filed by DCP/HQ leaves much to be
desired in this regard. It does not specify the mode
adopted whereby commissioner’s order was brought home to
petitioner. It only resorts to generalities in the
belief that petitioner should be presumed to have gained
knowledge of the order whether or not it was brought to
his knowledge. Even the concerned SHO’s version has not
been pressed in service nor any material placed on
record to show the manner and method in which the order
was circulated or communicated to the residents of the
area in which petitioner lived.
13. We accordingly hold that petitioner could not
be attributed knowledge of police commissioner’s order
contained in notification dated 22.6.2000 and,
therefore, the impugned FIR could not be said to make
out any offence against him under Section 188 IPC.
14. This petition accordingly succeeds and FIR
No. 433/2000 registered in PS Shakarpur under Section 188
IPC is quashed.