ORDER
Amar Bir Singh Gill, J.
1. In this revision petition, order dated
14-06-1980 passed by the Rent Controller, Jagadhari, and
order dated 08-10-1982 passed by the Appellate Authority,
Ambala, under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short “the Act”) have been
assailed under which the ejectment of the petitioner has
been ordered from the premises let out to him. There is
concurrent finding of both the authorities under the Act
that the petitioner could not prove if he had paid to the
landlord, now respondent, the rent of the premises let out
to him. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred
to the evidence on the file. However, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the revisional jurisdiction of
this Court has limited scope in view of the law laid down
by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Rajbir Kaur and
Anr. v. Chokosiri and Company, AIR 1988 S.C.
1845 wherein it has been observed as under:-
The scope of the revisional jurisdiction
depends on the language of the statute
conferring the revisional jurisdiction.
Revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the
appellate jurisdiction and cannot be equated
with that of a full-fledged appeal. Though the
revisional power – depending upon the language
of the provision – might be wider than
revisional power under Section 151 (or 115?)
of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet a revisional
Court is not a second or first appeal. When
the findings of fact recorded by the Courts
below are supportable on the evidence on record
the revisional Court must indeed be reluctant
to embark upon an independent reassessment of
the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of
its own, so long as the evidence on record
admitted and supported the one reached by the
Courts below. With respect to the High Court,
we are afraid, the exercise made by it in its
revisional jurisdiction incurs the criticism
that the concurrent finding of fact of the
Courts below could not be dealt and supplanted
by a different finding arrived at on an
independent reassessment of evidence as was
done in this case. We think in the
circumstances, we should agree with Sri Sanghi
that the concurrent finding as to exclusive
possession of M/s. Kwality Ice-Cream was not
amendable to reversal in revision. Contentions
(a) and (b) in our opinion are well taken and
would require to be held in appellants’ favour.”
2. I have perused the record of the case as well
and find that the consistent findings of the authorities
below are in accordance with the evidence on the record.
The solitary plea of the petitioner was that he had been
paying the rent to one Parshottam Lal Chopra, Property
Dealer, through whom he had obtained the premises on rent.
But said Parshottam Lal Chopra when appeared as
petitioner-tenant’s witness could not show any authority
on behalf of the landlord to collect rent from the
petitioner. It is also on the record that the shop in
question is a part of the residential premises of the
landlord. If the petitioner had any intention to pay the
rent to the landlord, there was no necessity of going to a
third person staying at a distance of the shop to pay the
rent by means of serving tea to Parshottam Lal Chopra
towards payment of rent as per evidence adduced by the
petitioner-tenant. Since the petitioner has miserably
failed to prove any payment of rent to the landlord, there
is no scope for interference in the order of ejectment
passed against him. There is no merit in the revision
petition and the same is dismissed.