PETITIONER: SHRI GANESH NARAYAN HEGDE Vs. RESPONDENT: SHRI S. BANGARAPPA AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT20/04/1995 BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) MAJMUDAR S.B. (J) CITATION: 1995 SCC (4) 41 JT 1995 (4) 124 1995 SCALE (2)748 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.:
1. Leave granted. Heard counsel for both the parties.
2. The appeal arises from the judgment and order of a
learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court quashing
the charge framed by the learned Magistrate.
3. A complaint was filed by the appellant against the
three respondents herein under Section 500 of the Indian
Penal Code. After receiving the evidence of the prosecution
as contemplated by Section 244, the learned Magistrate
framed the charge against the respondent-, under Section 500
of the Indian Penal Code. While framing the charge, the
learned Magistrate has recorded his reasons therefor. In
this order, he referred to the objections raised by the
accused and his reasons for rejecting the same. The learned
Magistrate observed: “(O)n going through the evidence
adduced before court by the complainant at this stage, I am
of the considered opinion that there exist grounds to frame
charge against A. 1 to 3 for the offence punishable U/S. 500
I.P.C.” The first respondent preferred a Revision (Criminal
Revision Petition No.104 of 1989) before the First
Additional Sessions Judge, Hubli against the order of the
learned Magistrate. The learned Sessions Judge dismissed
the Revision observing that inasmuch as the learned
Magistrate has framed the charge on a consideration of the
evidence adduced by the complainant, oral and documentary,
and on being satisfied that there was a prima facie case
made out against the accused, his order is not liable to be
interfered with in Revision. He observed that a Revisional
Court can interfere with the order of the trial magistrate
framing charges only where it finds that the order of the
trial magistrate is illegal, capricious or perverse. There-
upon the first respondent approached the High Court under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for the
quashing of the charge. The learned Single Judge allowed
the petition on the Following basis:
“From the discussion made above, it has to be
said that the approach of the Courts below in
ordering to frame charge against the
petitioner and the other two accused for an
offence punishable under Section 500 IPC is
the resultant of non- application of mind to
the material available on record and also
resultant of incorrect exercise of
jurisdiction conferred. The Courts below
should have borne in mind that a person can be
charged only when the allegations alleged
against him are established prima facie and
not otherwise, because in criminal cases the
Courts must be very cautious and careful
before proceeding to frame charge as
unnecessary framing of charge on the one hand
may result in affecting the persons liberty
and on the other hand cause continuous and
128
unnecessary harassment, as it has happened in
the instant case.
From the allegations made in the complaint and
the intention to prosecute the accused by
pursuing the complaint the material placed on
record and the information gathered at the
trial it is clear that it is a matter of mere
prestige for both the parties who according to
their own version belong to different
political faiths. It is not a genuine case of
one making any inputation against the other or
the other being defamed or his reputation low-
ered in the estimation of the public. This
prolonged and protracted litigation and
harassment to both the parties would have been
ended in the beginning itself if the courts
below had taken into consideration the effect
of Section 245 Cr.P.C. and its applicability
to the necessary material on record keeping in
mind the basis of the complaint, the
admissibility of the documents in evidence and
the circumstances and context in which the
alleged imputations were made by the
petitioner.”
4. The learned Judge quashed the charge not only with
respect to the first respondent-accused, who alone was the
petitioner before him, but also with respect to Respondents
2 and 3 (Accused 2 and 3 respectively), who had neither
filed a Revision before the Sessions Judge nor had applied
to the High Court for quashing the charge.
5. The complainant-appellant, Shri Ganesh Narayan Hegde,
says that he belongs to a highly reputed and well-known
family of North Kanara district whose main occupation is
agriculture and sericulture. Some members of the family are
running a rice mill and one of the sons of the complainant
is running a chemical factory. The complainant says that he
is the founder and President of various cooperative and
educational institutions and that he is also the founder-
President of Sahakari Shikshan Prasarak Samithi, Siddapur
and is connected with certain other educational societies
and banks. He says that by sincere and selfless work done
in these institutions he has acquired a high status and
position in the society and that though he is the cousin of
Shri Ramakrishna Hegde, the former Chief Minister of
Karnataka, he is not associated with his political party.
According to the complainant, the first respondent-accused
is an active politician. During the relevant period, he was
the President of a political party -called ‘Kranthiranga’.
The first respondent aspired to become the Chief Minister of
Karnataka but he was frustrated in his efforts by Shri
Ramakrishna Hegde who became the Chief Minister. The first
respondent was, therefore, waiting for an opportunity to
tarnish the image of Shri Ramakrishna Hegde. Shri
Ramakrishna Hegde contested to the Legislative Assembly from
Kanakapura Constituency. The first respondent set-up his
candidate against Shri Hegde. In the course of the election
campaign, the first respondent held a press conference on
April 28, 1983 at his residence at Bangalore. Respondents 2
and 3 who are the Editor and Chief Reporter respectively of
the newspaper “Samyukta Karnataka”, a daily, also attended
the press conference. The first respondent made scandalous
and false imputations against the complainant during the
said press conference and requested the correspondents to
publish the same in their newspapers. The news item as
published in “Samyukta Karnataka” daily (in its Hubli
edition) reads thus:
“Involvement of Hegde’s Brother in Rice
smuggling’?”
129
“Bangalore – 28, Sri S.Bangarappa the
President of Kanriataka Krantiranga, has
accused to day that Sri Ganesh Hegde the
brother of the Chief Minister Sri Ramakrishna
hegde is involving in smuggling of rice to
Goa. Talking at a press conference, he said
that the authorities are not dared to take
action against the mill owner Sri Ganesh
Hegde.”
(Translation from Kannada)
6. The complainant submitted that the said imputation is
false to the knowledge of the first respondent and was made
with intention to defame and harm the reputation of the
complainant. The allegation of smuggling of rice leveled
against the complainant is absolutely false and that the
said false news item has lowered the prestige and reputation
of the complainant and his family in the eyes of the public.
His case is that he is not the brother of Shri Ramakrishna
Hegde as made out in the news item but only a cousin.
7. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that
the framing of charge by the Magistrate is neither
misdirected in law nor can it be said that there was no
evidence before him upon which he could have formed an
opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused
has committed the offence within the meaning of Section
246(1). The learned Magistrate, it is submitted, considered
the oral and documentary evidence, the decisions cited by
both the sides and under a reasoned order rejected the
objections raised by the first respondent and framed the
charge. The learned Sessions Judge dismissed the Revision
filed by the first respondent holding that the learned
Magistrate has acted properly and in accordance with law in
framing the charge and that there are no grounds for
interfering with his orders. A second Revision does not lie
under the code, and though an application under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not barred, the High
Court cannot sit and act as the second Revisional Court
while exercising the powers under Section 482. This
provision can be invoked only where there is an abuse of
process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Learned counsel complained that the learned Single Judge has
examined the matter as if he were an appellate court and
quashed the charge on that approach and that he has exceeded
his jurisdiction in doing so and in interfering at an
interlocutory stage.
8. Shri Sheshagiri Rao, the learned counsel for the first
respondent justified the reasoning and conclusion of the
learned Single Judge. He submitted that the complaint is
the result of political vendetta, that it is not a genuine
grievance and that the first respondent was not acting out
of any extraneous motives in making the statement complained
of. Learned counsel submitted that the first respondent is
an active politician, that subsequently he has also become
the Chief Minister of Karnataka and that he made the said-
statement under the bonafide belief that it is true. He
made the said statement, submitted the learned counsel, in
good faith and in public interest. The first respondent was
not actuated by any motives of personal gain or personal
animosity. Learned counsel further submitted that the said
publication was in the year 1983, that twelve years have
passed by since then and that any interference at this
distance of time may not be called for in the interests of
justice.
9. the complaint has been tried, it is
130
stated, according to the warrant procedure, at the request
of the first respondent. Section 244(1) provides that
“(W)hen, in any warrant-case instituted otherwise than on a
police report, the accused appears or is brought before a
Magistrate, the MagistratE shall proceed to hear the
prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in
support of the prosecution.” SeCtion 245(1) says that “(1)f,
upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 244, the
Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no
case against the accused has been made out which, if
unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate
shall discharge him.” Section 246(1) then says “(1)f, when
such evidence has been taken, or at any previous stage of
the case, the magistrate is of opinion that there is ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence tri-
able under this Chapter, which such magistrate is competent
to try, and which, in his opinion, could be adequately
punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against
the accused. ”
10. Section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers
upon the Sessions Judge the power to revise any order made
by the Magistrate but sub-section (3) thereof declares at
the same time that “(W)here any application for revision is
made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions
Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in
relation to such person shall be final and no further
proceedings by way of revision at the instance of such
person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other
Court.”
11. Section 482 of the Code saves the inherent powers of
the High Court. It reads:
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court
– Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to
limit or affect the inherent powers of the
High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under
this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process
of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
ofjustice.”
12.While it is true that availing of the remedy of the
revision to the Sessions Judge under Section 399 does not
bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court under
Section 482, it is equally true that the High Court should
not act as a second Revisional Court under the garb of
exercising inherent powers. While exercising its inherent
powers in such a matter it must be conscious of the fact
that the learned Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his
revisory power in the matter. The High Court should
interfere only where it is satisfied that if the complaint
is allowed to be proceeded with, it would amount to abuse of
process of Court or that the interests of justice otherwise
call for quashing of the charges. A few decisions of this
Court may usefully be referred at this stage. In
Mrs.Dhanalakshmi v. R.Prasanna Kumar & Ors. (AIR 1990
S.C.494) this Court stated in a case of similar nature:
“Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
empowers the High Court to exercise its
inherent powers to prevent abuse of the
process of Court. In proceedings instituted
on complaint exercise of the inherent power to
quash the proceedings is called for only in
cases where the complaint does not disclose
any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or
oppressive. If the allegations set out in the
complaint do not constitute the offence of
which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it
is open to the High Court to quash
131
the same in exercise of the inherent powers
under Section 482. It is not, however,
necessary that there should be a meticulous
analysis of the case, before the trial to find
out whether the case would end in conviction
or not. The complaint has to be read as a
whole. If it appears on a consideration of
the allegations, in the light of the statement
on oath of the complainant that ingredients of
the offence/ offences are disclosed, and there
is no material to show that the complaint is
mala fide frivolous or vexatious, in that
event there would be no justification for
interference by the High Court.
The High Court without proper application of
the principles that have been laid down by
this Court in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of
Bihar, (1977) 2 SCR 357 : (AIR 1977 SC 1754),
Trilok Singh v. Satya Deo Tripathi, 1980 Cri
LJ 822: AIR 1979 SC 850 and Municipal Corpn.
of Delhi v. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala, (1983)
1 SCR 895: (AIR 1983 SC 158) proceeded to
analyse the case of the complainant in the
light of all the probabilities in order to
determine whether a conviction would be
sustainable and on such premises arrived at a
conclusion that the proceedings are to be
quashed against all the respondents. The High
Court was clearly in error in assessing the
material before it and concluding that the
complaint cannot be proceeded with. We find
there are specific allegations in the com-
plaint disclosing the ingredients of the of-
fence taken cognizance of. It is for the
complainant to substantiate the allegations by
evidence at a later stage. In the absence of
circumstances to hold prima facie that the
complaint is frivolous when the complaint does
disclose the commission of an offence there is
no justification for the High Court to
interfere. ”
13. To the same effect is the holding in another
decision in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Ors. (1988
(4) S.C.C.655). This Court said:
“It is trite that jurisdiction under Section
482, Cr.P.C., which saves the inherent power
of the High Court, to make such orders as may
be necessary to prevent abuse of the process
of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and
with circumspection. In exercising that
jurisdiction the High Court should not embark
upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the
complaint are likely to be established by
evidence or not. That is the function of the
trial Magistrate when the evidence comes
before him, Though it is neither possible nor
advisable to lay down any inflexible rules to
regulate that jurisdiction, one thing,
however, appears clear and it is that when the
High Court is called upon to exercise this
jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the
stage of the Magistrate taking cognizance of
an offence the High Court is guided by the
allegations, whether those allegations, set
out in the complaint or the charge-sheet, do
not in law constitute or spell out any offence
and that resort to criminal proceedings would,
in the circumstances amount to an abuse of the
process of the court or not. ”
14. Examined from the above stand point,it would be evident
that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has really
gone beyond the purview of Section 482 in quashing the
charge. He has not held that the evidence adduced by the
complainant, oral and documentary, if unrebutted, would not
have warranted the conviction of the accused within the
meaning of Section 245(1) nor has he held that on the
evidence adduced, the learned Magistrate could not have
reasonably formed an opinion that there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an offence, as
132
contemplated by Section 246(1). The learned counsel for the
respondent has laid great stress upon the observations of
the learned Magistrate in para 26 of his order, which reads:
“A. 1 has challenged the evidence of all these witnesses
generally and more particularly of the evidence of P.W. 1
the complainant. In my opinion, at this stage, the
evidentiary value of the documents and creditability of
witnesses cannot be considered in view of the settled
principles by Supreme Court of India in the decisions cited
supra. All the contentions advanced on behalf of accused
persons, could be weighed at the time of final disposal of
the matter. Therefore I am rather constrained to refrain
from examining any of the contentions canvassed for the
accused or considering the repercussions made of cross
examination of witnesses, lest any observations made by me
may prejudice either of the parties at the time of trial.
Further the evidence referred to in Section 245, relates to
evidence before charge. Therefore I do not propose to
examine any of the contentions urged for accused No. 1
during the course of arguments and about the decisions cited
at the Bar on behalf of accused persons.”
15. The learned counsel contended that the above
observations indicate that the learned Magistrate has not
applied his mind to the evidence before him at all and that
he has mechanically framed the charge. We do not think that
the learned counsel is right. The said observations were
made by the learned Magistrate with reference to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Akbar Dar v. State of Jammu
and Kashmir (1982 SCC (Criminal) 148) referred to in
preceding para 21 and should not be read in isolation. A
reading of the order does show that the learned Magistrate
has considered the oral and documentary evidence at length
and finally expressed his opinion in paragraph 30 thus:
“On going through the evidence adduced before
court by the complainant at this stage. I am
of the considered opinion that there exist
grounds to frame charge against A.1 to 3 for
the offence punishable U/S. 500 I.P.C. In
coming to conclusion that charge should be
framed against A- 1 to 3, I should not be
understood that I have expressed any opinion
if made by me during the course of discussions
will not come in the way of either parties at
the final disposal of the case on merits.
Therefore, for these reasons, I answer the
point in the ‘AFFIRMATIVE’.”
16. The learned Sessions Judge who examined the order of the
learned Magistrate has also expressed the opinion that since
the magistrate has framed the charge on a proper
consideration of oral and documentary evidence and on
forming the requisite opinion, no interference is called
for. As against this, the judgment of the High Court shows
that it has entered into the merits of the case and
pronounced upon the truth and correctness of the complaint
and the defence, as would be evident from the following
observations:
In Para 23 the learned Judge states that the oral evidence
should have been considered alongwith the documentary evi-
dence and that if that had been done, the learned magistrate
would have came to the conclusion that the imputation made
by the accused is “neither intentional nor it amounted in
lowering the reputation of the complainant in the estimation
of general public and the context in which such a statement
was made.” In Para 24 the learned Judge states that the
courts below
