ORDER
Khan, (J)
1. Anil Kumar, about 13 years old, a student of Vth class and the only son of his parent, died in a road accident on 5.12.1978 while he was trying to enter his school bus. His parents filed claim Suit No.316/79 and MACT by award dt.21.2.1983 awarded them a compensation of Rs.25,000/-. Two Appeals were filed against this award-one by claimants claiming enhancement in the compensation and the other by insurance company pleading its limited liability of Rs.5,000/-. The first Appeal of claimants was disposed of by order dt.15.3.1994 affirming award of Rs.25,000/- and the other Appeal filed by the insurance company was dismissed holding that the deceased was not a passenger, but a third party, to render the liability of insurer unlimited.
2. Appellants (claimants) feel still dissatisfied and have filed this LPA for further enhancement of compensation. The insurance company on the other hand has filed cross-objections placing reliance on proviso (ii) to sub-section (1) of Section 95 of Old M.V.Act to urge that its liability was limited to Rs.5,000/.
3. Appellants’ case is that Anil Kumar was the only son of his parents and that if he had survived, he would have completed his education and taken employment and supported his parents. In other words, it is projected that his future prospects were not taken in regard either by the tribunal or by First Appellate Court while determining compensation. Reliance in this regard is placed on judgments of various High Courts including this Court in 2000 ACJ page 1006 and that of Himachal Pradesh High Court in 1997 ACJ page 831 to insist that higher compensation ranging between Rs.2/- lacs to Rs.5/- lacs was awardable in the present case. It is also pointed out that this Court had awarded Rs.2/- lacs for the death of a 7 years old boy in its judgment supra and that H.P. High Court had also awarded Rs.5/- lacs for the death of children between 10 to 12 years. It is further submitted that Railways had also raised its compensation limit to Rs.4/- lacs by amending its Rules and so had an amendment to Section 163-A of the new MVA prescribed for a national income to be taken in regard in those cases where income was not known at the time of the death for purposes of determining compensation.
4. The insurance company on its part is heavily relying on a Supreme Court judgment in Noorjahan v. Sultan Rajia, 1997 ACJ page 1 to support its stand that its liability was limited to Rs.5,000/-.
5. Record shows that accident had taken place way back in 1978 and it is presumed that compensation of Rs.25,000/- with 12% P.A. interest awarded must have been received by appellants. Therefore, it remained to be seen whether after two decades and more, awarded compensation could be faulted or tested in the light of present day approach and trends adopted by the Courts for this purpose. In other words whether these could be applied retrospectively to invalidate or modify the awards passed years back. It is a matter of common knowledge that Courts had adopted new principles and a liberal approach in awarding compensation in accident claims but that, in our view, does not furnish any basis for upsetting awards made long back in the context of trends and principles in vogue then. Doing so would be to open a pandora’s box exposing old awards to new winds of change. By that logic all old judgments and awards would look irrelevant and redundant today. After all courts pass judgments in a given scenario and their outlook, approach and application of legal principles is shaped and guided by the prevailing circumstance. These are, therefore, not liable to be tested or invalidated on the basis of present day barometers. Viewed, thus it is not difficult to appreciate that judgments relied upon by L/C for appellants award higher compensation and that too in exercise of writ jurisdiction where the writ court is not obliged to strictly follow or adopt any method for determination of compensation. But it is a different story in accident claims altogether where Courts are required to adopt a method to work out the dependency and to award the compensation for death or injury on that basis. Therefore, it becomes unsafe to draw from such judgments or to follow these routinely. It is also true that Supreme Court in Shanti Bai case awarded Rs.1.5 lacs for the death of a labourer by assuming his daily-wage at Rs.10 per day. But that also could not possibly apply to child death cases which were surrounded by too many imponderables. This is not to suggest that future prospect of a school going child was not liable to be taken in regard for purposes of determination of compensation. We would have gladly done so but only in a permissible appropriate situation. The present case presents a difficulty in this regard because First Appellate Court had affirmed Tribunal Award by relying on various judgments of this Court and other High Courts which held the field at relevant time. Therefore, it would be too much to pick holes on it or to upset it merely by applying new parameters.
6. The same holds true about the contention raised in the cross-objection by respondent insurance company. While dealing with this aspect, First Appellate Court had referred to the judgments of various High Courts on either side to conclude that person entering or mounting the bus was not a passenger but a third party, because he or she could not be said to be traveling at that time. The Court had even relied upon the judgments of this Court holding that a person could be called passenger only when he bought a ticket while traveling in the bus. As such, it would too much to say at this stage that First Appellate Court had fallen in error in siding with the predominant view at the relevant time, more so when divergence of opinion prevailed on the interpretation of proviso (ii) to Section 95(1) of the Act at that time which was finally set at rest by Supreme Court judgment in Noorjahan case (1997) ACJ page 1 holding that persons entering into or alighting from a passenger vehicle were also passengers.
7. In the circumstances, we deem it appropriate to allow the matter to rest at that to dismiss this Appeal and the cross-objections.