Delhi High Court High Court

Shri Pankaj Narang vs State And Anr. on 20 January, 2006

Delhi High Court
Shri Pankaj Narang vs State And Anr. on 20 January, 2006
Equivalent citations: 127 (2006) DLT 670
Author: J Singh
Bench: J Singh


ORDER

J.P. Singh, J.

1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order dated 25.6.2005 passed by Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi summoning the petitioner under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act.

2. I have heard Mr. Hari Narayan Takkar, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the point of admission, and have gone through the documents placed on the file.

3. A perusal of the complaint shows that in para 2 and para 6 of the complaint it is averred that respondent No. 2 is a company under the Companies Act and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are Directors of the respondent No. 1 company and are looking after and managing the affairs of respondent No. 1 company and as such are responsible for the day to day affairs of the company and are also squarely liable in the present dispute. The respondents are jointly and severally liable and they refused to clear their liabilities. The complainant company has been supplying wood to the respondents from time to time as per the orders placed by the respondents.

4. In partial discharge of legally recoverable dues, the respondent issued cheque dated 25.11.2003 in favor of the complainant in the sum of Rs. 18.00 lakh drawn on Bank of India, Delhi. The said cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. The respondents were requested to make the payments but in vain. Then legal notice was sent but to no effect.

5. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, after examining the complaint, affidavit evidence, documents and after hearing arguments, found sufficient grounds for summoning the respondents (including petitioner) and ordered accordingly.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner, Shri Pankaj Narang, was not in charge or responsible to the company for conduct of the business and, therefore, the mere allegation whatsoever in the complaint carries no weight and that he was only a member of the board of directors but never dealt with the complainant in any manner qua the transaction. Therefore, the summoning order should be quashed.

7. I may mention here that the Negotiable Instruments Act was amended from time to time to curb the delays in disposal of the cases based on dishonour of cheques. The latest amendment was made in the year 2002 and a duty has been cast upon the Magistrates to decide such matters as expeditiously as possible and preferably within six months. These matters have to be dealt with as summary cases (Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act) and Sections 254, 260 to 264 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The amendments have been incorporated to bring these cases on fast track primarily to create confidence and credibility in the people qua the transactions based on cheques.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon single Bench judgments viz., [Rachna Kapoor v. State and Ors. , Cdr. Shekhar Singh v. N.K. Wahi reported in 102 (2003) DLT 297, K.K. Chug v. State and Ors. and Mahendra Pratap Singh Ratra and Anr. v. N.K. Metals and Anr. ] to canvass his point that the role of each and every respondent should be specifically detailed in the complaint.

9. Such a question had arisen before the Supreme Court in the judgment titled Raj Lakshmi Mills v. Shakti Bhakoo (3 Judges Bench). This was a case under Section 138 & 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (and the summoning order was challenged) under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that case also the contention about the petitioner accused not being in charge or responsible for the conduct of the business was raised. The Supreme Court of India held as under:-

4. We are of the opinion that at the stage of summoning when evidence was yet to be led by the parties, the High Court could not on an assumption of facts come to a finding of fact that the respondent was not responsible for the conduct of the business. On this ground alone, these appeals are allowed and the impugned decision of the High Court is set aside.

10. In my view, whatever points are being raised before this Court are the matters of defense and should be raised in the trial court instead of challenging every interlocutory order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate. If interference is made by the High Court against every such order, then it will open flood gates to the High Court to decide such cases without there being any evidence on record. I have in detail dealt with such matters in the judgment titled Daljeet Singh Chandok v. State and Anr. reported in 2006 I AD (DELHI) 457.

11. Considering all the facts and circumstances, I do not find it a fit case for interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petition is malafide and vexatious. It is, therefore, dismissed with Rs. 2500/- as costs which be deposited with Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee.

12. The trial court is, however, directed to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible.

13. Nothing said herein will tantamount to expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

14. A copy of the order be sent to Secretary, Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee.