JUDGMENT
Vishnu Sahai, J.
1. Through this writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the CunsUtution of India, the petitioner-detenu has impugned the detention order dated 12th April, 1999, passed by the 1st respondent Mr. R.H. Mendonca, Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai, detaining him under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (No. IV of 1981)(Amendment 1996)(hereinafter referred to as the M.D.P.A. Act).
The detention order along with the grounds of detention, which are also dated 12th April, 1999, was served on the petitioner-detenu on 14th April, 1999 and their true copies are annexed as Annexures’A’ arid’B’ respectively, to this writ petition.
2. The prejudicial activities of the petitioners-detenu warranting the issuance of the impugned detention order are contained in grounds of detention. A perusal of the grounds of detention would show that the impugned detention order is founded on one C.R. and two incamera statements. The C.R. which is mentioned in ground 4(a-ii) is C.R. No. 248/ 98 under Sections 324, 114 I.P.C. registered against the detenu and his associates at the Dadar Police Station, on a complaint lodged by Santosh Dashrath Gurav alias Sachin Patil on 14th July, 1998. The details in respect of the C.R. are furnished in grounds 4(a) and 4(a-i). In short, they are as under:
The informant Santosh Dashrath Gurav alias Sanchin Patil is a resident of Janata Colony, Room No. 118, Worli Village, Mumbai. On 14th July, 1998, at about 1-30 a.m. when the informant was returning home and had reached the area behind Building No. 41, Adarsha Nagar, Worli Village, Mumbai, the petitioner and his associates carrying empty beer bottles emerged. He started walking hurriedly. On this, the petitioner arid his associates told him “have you grown over smart” and the petitioner’s associates Prashant alias Parshya and Sanjay Ganpat Shinde picked up apiece of broken pavement from the road and hurled it towards him and the petitioner and his associate Vinayak Venpure pelted empty beer bottles on him. This resulted in his sustaining injuries on right hand and his hiding in a latrine behind the bus stop of Route No. 169. At this juncture, the police party attached to Dadar Police Station, which was patrolling the area, came there and rushed towards the petitioners and his associates. It succeeded in arresting the latter but the petitioner however ran away.
2A. The incamera statements are of witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ and are dated 18th December, 1998 and 21st December, 1998 respectively. Statement of Witness ‘A’:
Witness ‘A’ in his statement stated that he knew the petitioner and his associates as notorious goondas from Janata Colony, Nartman Bhat Nagar, Worli, Koliwada area, who moved about armed with deadly weapons and collected moneys from businessmen, shopkeepers, etc. on their point. The witness stated that on 4th November, 1998, at about 6.00 p.m. while he along with his friend was returning home and had reached near Saibaba Mandir, the petitioner and his associates armed with knife and chopper, emerged from a lane and the petitioner on the point of knife demanded Rs. 5.000/- from him and when he replied that he did not have that much money, the petitioner started inflicting blows with fists and kicks on him. When his friend asked the petitioner not to assault him, the associates of the petitioner assaulted him. Due to fright the witness paid Rs. 300/- to the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner threatened him not to inform the police. By this time people collected there but on seeing the weapons in the hands of you (petitioner) and your associates those people ran away and the hutment dwellers closed their doors.
Statement of Witness ‘B’:
Witness ‘B’ in his statement stated that he knew the petitioner as a notorious goonda, who along with his 3/4 associates moved about armed with deadly weapons and extorted money on their point. The witness stated that on 5th December, 1998, at about 11.30 a.m., the petitioner armed with a knife along with three unknown associates who were armed with choppers, came to his shop, and on the point of the said weapons demanded Rs. 5.000/- from him and when he told the petitioner that he did not have money, he slapped him. When his servant in the shop rushed forward, the associates of the petitioner inflicted blows with fists and kicks on him. On this the customers and the servants in the shop got frightened and ran way. On listening their loud voice (petitioner and his associates) the shopkeepers in the vicinity also closed their shops. On account of fright thewitness paid Rs. 2.200/- to the petitioner. While leaving, the petitioner threatened the witness not to inform the police and on account of fright of the petitioner he did not inform the police.
3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Although in this writ petition Mr. U.N. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has pleaded a large number of grounds but he is only pressing before us two grounds, namely, those pleaded as grounds 7C and 7B. We now propose to deal with the said grounds.
4. Ground 7C in substance is that even if the facts relating to C’.R. No. 248/98 are accepted as gospel-truth they only disclose breach of law and order and not public order, Mr. Tripathi urged that the petitioner did not act in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under Section 2(a) of the M.P.D.A Act, and therefore, the impugned detention order passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the M.P.D.A. Act is vitiated.
Ground 7C has been replied to in paragraph 8 of the return of the detaining authority. The thesis of the detaining authority therein is that the petitioner-detenu is detained as a dangerous person under Section 2[b-i) of the M.P.D.A. Act and the facts relating to C.R. No. 248/98 and those contained in incamera statements of witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ demonstrate breach of public order and not law and order simpliciter.
5. Mr. Rajiv Patil, learned Counsel for the respondents strenuously urged that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Amanullah Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat 1999 SCC 1024 incamera statements of the witnesses can also be taken into consideration for determining whether a person is a dangerous person under Section 2(b-i) of the M.P.D.A. Act. He urged and rightly in our judgment, that although the said judgment was rendered in a case under Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 but since the definition of dangerous person under Section 2(c) of the said Act has been bodily lifted and incorporated in Section 2(b-i) of the M.P.D.A. Act the said decision would squarely apply to this case. Mr. Patil pointed out that a perusal of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said decision would show that the Apex Court repelled the contention that only the C.R. and not the incamera statements of the witnesses can be taken into consideration for determining the question whether a person is a dangerous person under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985. We have gone through the said decision and find that a perusal of paragraphs 3 and 4 do show that the aforesaid contention of Mr. Patil is correct.
6. We have perused ground 7C and paragraph 8 of the return of the detaining authority wherein the said ground has been replied to and heard learned Counsel for the parties. In our view the facts relating to C.R. No. 248/98 and those contained in incamera statements of witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ show that the petitioner-detenu was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order to in the sense to which the said expression is used under Section 2(a)(iv) of the M.P.D.A. Act. Section 2(a)(iv) of the M.P.D.A. Act reads thus:
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
(a) “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” means-
(i)_____________________________________________________________
(ii)_______________________________________________________________
(iii)_______________________________________________________________
(iv) in the case of a dangerous person, when he is engaged, or is making preparation for engaging, in any of his activities as a dangerous person, which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this Clause (a), public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter aha, if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this clause directly or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling in insecurity, among the general public or any section thereof, or a grave or. widespread danger to life or public health.
7. A perusal of Section 2(a)(iv) of the M.P.D.A. Act would show that a person would be acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, as a dangerous person, if he is engaged or is making preparation for engaging in any activities, as a dangerous person which affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
A perusal of the explanation would show that if any of the activities of a dangerous person directly or indirectly are causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity, among the general public or in any section thereof, public order would be deemed to have affected adversely.
7A. In the instant case the underlined portions of the incamera statements of witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ squarely demonstrate that the activities of the petitioner as a dangerous person were directly causing alarm and a feeling of insecurity amongst the section of public present there. To recapitulate:- Witness ‘A’ stated that seeing the incident and seeing the weapons in the hands of the petitioner and his associates people ran away and the hutment dwellers closed their doors.
Witness ‘B’ stated that seeing the incident the customers and servants in the shop got frightened and ran away and the shopkeepers in the vicinity closed their shops.
8. For the said reasons ground 7C fails.
We now propose considering ground 7B. Ground 7B, in short, is that in between the incident which took place on 14th July, 1998 (which resulted in C.R. No. 248/98 of Dadar Police Station) and 12th April, 1999 the date on which the impugned detention order was issued, there was a gap of eight months and on account of the aforesaid gap the nexus between the prejudicial activities of the petitioner-detenu and the rationale of clamping the detention order on him was snapped.
Mr. Tripathi urged that on account of the delay of eight months in issuing the detention order, the detention order lost its preventive character and became punitive.
9. Ground 7B has been replied to in paragraph 9 of the return of the detaining authority. The reply therein, in short, is that although C.R. No. 248/98 was registered on 14th July, 1998, the two incamera statements were recorded on 18th December, 1998 and 21st December, 1998 and the delay in issuing the detention order has been satisfactorily explained.
Mr. Rajiv Patil, learned Counsel for the respondents strenuously urged that since the petitioner-detenu has been detained as a dangerous person under Section 2(b-i) of the M.P.D.A. Act and the Supreme Court in 1999 SCC 1042 (supra), wherein it considered the definition of dangerous person under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, which is identically worded as Section 2(b-i) of the M.P.D.A. Act, has held that incamera statements of witnesses can be taken into consideration for determining whether a person can be detained as a dangerous person, the delay in issuing the detention order could be considered from the date of the last incamera statement, namely, 21st December, 1998 and not 14th July, 1998.
10. We have perused ground 7B, paragraph 9 of the return of the detaining authority wherein the said ground has been replied to and heard learned Counsel for the parties. We make no bones in observing that in view of the ratio laid down in 1999 SCC 1024 (supra), the delay in issuing the detention order in case of the petitioner, who is detained as a dangerous person under Section 2(b-i) of the M.P.D.A. Act would be computed from 21st December, 1998, the date when the last incamera statement was recorded.
11. We find from a perusal of paragraph 9 of the return of the detaining authority that the delay in issuing the detention order between 21st December, 1998 and 14thJanuary, 1999 has been satisfactorily explained.
A perusal of paragraph 9 shows as under:-
(a) On 14th January, 1999 the proposal was forwarded to Assistant Commissioner of Police;
(b) On 16th January, 1999 the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mahim Division, endorsed it and forwarded it to Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-IV;
(c) The Deputy Commissioner of Police gave his endorsement on 22nd January, 1999 and forwarded the papers to Additional Commissioner of Police (CR):
(d) The Additional Commissioner of Police went through the papers and gave his recommendation on 25th January, 1999;
(e) After the Additional Commissioner of Police had given his endorsement the papers were forwarded to Senior P.I., P.C.B., C.I.D., who on 7th February, 1999 forwarded the papers to the Assistant Director of Public Prosecution;
(f) The Assistant Director of Public Prosecution went through the papers and on 12th February, 1999 and gave an opinion that it was a fit case for preventive detention and forwarded the papers to Assistant Commissioner of Police (P);
(g) On 18th February, 1999 the Assistant Commissioner of Police (P) gave his endorsement and forwarded the papers to Deputy Commissioner of Police (p);
(h) On 23rd February, 1999 the Deputy Commissioner of Police forwarded the papers to Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime):
(i) The Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime) went through all the papers and gave his endorsement on 27th February, 1999 and forwarded the papers to Joint Commissioner of Police;
(j) The Joint Commissioner of Police gave his recommendation on 4th March, 1999 and the papers were forwarded to the Detaining Authority;
(k) On 20th March, 1999 the Detaining Authority carefully went through the proposal and all the papers and opined that it was a fit case for detaining the petitioner and formulated the draft grounds of detention and forwarded the papers to the sponsoring authority on the same day for fair typing and preparing translation of documents in the language known to the detenu;
(1) On 1st April, 1999 the fair typing and translation of documents was completed and the Additional Commissioner of Police went through all the papers and submitted the papers to the detaining authority; and
(m) On 12th April, 1999 the detaining authority issued the detention order.
12. In our view, a perusal of paragraph 9 of the return of the detaining authority shows that the delay in issuing the detention order between 21st December, 1998 (the date of the second incamera statement) and 12th April, 1999 (the date on which the detention order was issued) has been satisfactorily explained.
13. For the said reasons, we do not find any merit in ground 7B either.
14. As mentioned earlier, Mr. Tripathi has pressed no other ground before us.
15. In the result, this petition is dismissed and rule is discharged.