Bombay High Court High Court

Shri Shahaji Kisan Asme vs Shri Sitaram Kondi Asme on 24 September, 2009

Bombay High Court
Shri Shahaji Kisan Asme vs Shri Sitaram Kondi Asme on 24 September, 2009
Bench: J. H. Bhatia
                                             1


              IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                                                             
                        SECOND APPEAL NO. 567 OF 2007




                                                     
                                       IN
                       REG. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 222 OF 1992
                                       IN
                         REG. CIVIL SUIT NO. 215 OF 1978




                                                    
    1.   Shri Shahaji Kisan Asme                 )
         Age 41 years                            )




                                            
    2.   Smt. Hirabai Kisan Asme,                )
         Age 36 years,       ig                  )

    3.   Shri Netaji Kisan Asme                  )
                           
         Age 34 years,                           )

    4.   Smt. Vimal Kisan Asme,                  )

         Age 50 years, Occupatin of 1 to 4       )
           


    5.   Shri Yashoda Hanmant Kadam          )
        



         Age 43 years, Occu: agricultgurist, )
         All R/o. Ganeshwadi, Taluka Kharav, )
         Dist. Satara.                       ).. Appellants





                                             (Nos.1 to 4 orig. Plffs &
                                             No.5 orig. deft.No.3).
                Versus

    1.   Shri Sitaram Kondi Asme                 )





         since deceased by his heirs             )
         Appellant Nos. 1 to 4 and               )
         Respondent No.3.                        )

    2.   Shri ramchandra Gangaram pawar,         )
         Age 40 years, Occu: Agriculure          )




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    3.    Smt. Kalavati @ Parubai Shankar         )
          Kshirsagar,                             )
          Age 65 years, Occu: Agriculture.        )




                                                                                 
    4.    Smt. Khashibai Parshuraom Bhosale )




                                                         
          Age 55 years, Occu: Agricultural, )
          (Deceased through her heirs)      )

    4a.   Ashok Parashuram Bhosale                )




                                                        
          Age 55 years, Occu: Driver.             )

    4b.   Subhash Parashuram Bhosale              )
          Age 45 years, Occu: Business.           )
          Permanent Address: Hingnul,             )




                                             
          Tal. Karad, Dist. Satara.               )
          Both at present R/o. Tadakeshwar
                              ig                  )
          Bhayyachi Chawl, Room Nos.2 & 3,        )
          Gufa Road, Gufa Takadi, Ramwadi,        )
                            
          Jogeshwari, Bombay - 60.                )

    5.    Smt. Kusum Nana Jagadale,               )
          Age 50 years, Occu: Agricultural.       )
            


    6.    Smt. Bhagirathi Kisan Asme,             )
          Age 60 years, Occu: Agriculture,        )
         



          Nos. 2, 3 6 residents of Ganeshwadi,    )
          Taluka Kharva, Dist. Satara.            )
          No. 4 at Chikhali,Taluka Karad,         )





          Dist. Satara. No. 5 at Hiingnule,       )
          Taluka Karad, Dist. Satara.             )
          No.7 at Revalkarwadi, Taluka            )
          Khatav, Dist. Satara.                   )..Respondents





    Mr. G.S.Godbole, Advocate, a/w Ms. Manjiri Parasnis, advocate, for the
    appellants..
    Mr.Dilip Bodake, Advocate, for respondent nos. 2, 3, 4b & 5.

                                                  CORAM:       J.H.BHATIA,J.
                                                   DATE :      24th September, 2009.




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                                        JUDGMENT

1. Second Appeal is filed by the original plaintiffs being aggrieved by

refusal of shares to them in the property of their grandparents.

2. Before dealing with the question of law raised in this Appeal, it will be

useful to state the facts in brief. Defendant No.1 – Sitaram had two sons,

namely, Kisan and defendant No.2 – Ramchandra. Defendant Nos. 4, 5

and 6 are the daughters of Sitaram. His son Kisan died in 1968, leaving

behind his first wife Bhagirathibai, who is defendant No.7, second wife

Vimal, who is plaintiff No.4 and three sons, who are plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3

and a daughter, who is defendant No.3. They are children from his second

wife Vimal. The plaintiffs i.e. the sons and the second wife of Kisan, filed

Regular Civil Suit No.215 of 1978 seeking partition and separate

possession of the joint family property. According to them, defendant no.2

Ramchandra was given in adoption to one Gangaram Pawar and,

therefore, he did not have any right, title or interest in the suit properties

which are ancestral and join family properties in the hands of Sitaram and

other members of the joint family. The defendant No.2, who is the main

contesting defendant, denied that he was given in adoption. According to

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him, said Gangaram Pawar is his maternal grandfather and therefore he

could not have been lawfully given in adoption to said Gangaram Pawar.

He also contended that some of the suit properties are his self-acquired

property and his father Sitaram had bequeathed his share in the remaining

property to him under a Will. He also contended that the plaintiff No.4 was

not lawfully wedded wife of Kisan and the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 and

defendant No.3 are not the legitimate children of Kisan. Therefore, they

cannot claim any share in the ancestral property of the joint family.

3. Several issues were framed by the trial Court. After hearing the

evidence led by the parties, the trial Court came to conclusion that plaintiff No.4

Vimal was not lawfully wedded wife of Kishan because his first marriage with

defendant no.7 Bhagirathibai was subsisting when he married plaintiff No.4. As

a result of this, plaintiff No.4 could not claim any share in the property and the

plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 and defendant No.3 being the illegitimate children of

deceased Sitaram and plaintiff No.4 Vimal, they can claim share only in the share

of deceased Kisan, but not in the joint family property. The trial Court also held

that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that defendant No.2 was given in adoption.

The trial Court held that the defendant no.1 had bequeathed his estate in favour

of defendant No.2 by Will. The claim of defendant No.2 that some properties

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were self-acquired was also accepted. The trial Court came to conclusion that in

the notional partition of the joint family property, on death of Kisan in 1968, his

1/4th share would be inherited by succession by the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 and

defendant Nos. 3 and 7, his mother Draupadabai. Accordingly, the trial Court

granted 1/24th share in the property to each of the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 and

defendant No.3.Draupadabai, wife of defendant No.1 and mother of deceased

Kisan and defendant No.2 Ramchandra, died in 1976. However, the trial Court

held that the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 and defendant No.3, being it legitimate children

of Kisan, cannot get any share in the estate of their grandmother Draupadabai on

her death.

4. Being not satisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the trial

Court, the plaintiffs preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.222 of 1992. Pending the

appeal, defendant No.1 also died. The first appellate Court upheld the findings of

the trial Court to the effect that defendant No.4 is not legally wedded wife of

deceased Kisan and that the defendant No.2 was not given in adoption .

However, the appellate Court held that none of the properties was self-acquired

property of defendant No.2 and that the defendant No.1 had not bequeathed his

share in the property to defendant No.2. Thus, whole of the property was treated

as the joint family property. However, it was held that the plaintiff No.4 is not

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even entitled to any share in the property and similarly the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3

and defendant no.3 are held entitled only to share in the share of their father

Kisan, but not in the entire ancestral property. Therefore, the plaintiffs have filed

the Second Appeal. It may be noted that defendant No.2 has not filed any appeal

or cross objection.

5. Even though several grounds were raised in the Appeal Memo and

some additional grounds were also added later on, the learned Counsel for the

plaintiffs/appellants pressed only the following two grounds in this Appeal :-

“1. Whether the Courts below have completely overlooked the
provisions of Section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and

have failed to note that the Appellants, being the children of

deceased Kisan Sitaram Asme, would also be entitled to succeed to
the estate of Drowpadabai, mother of Kisan, after her death in the
year 1976 and whether the Courts below have failed to allot the

share to the Appellants in the property of the said Drowpadabai ?

2. Whether the Courts below have failed to note that in view of

the settled position of law that the word “son” used in Section 15(1)

(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is wide enough to include even
the illegitimate son of a Hindu female dying intestate and would also
include the children of predeceased son, whether the Appellants

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could have been excluded from getting the share in case of intestate
succession in respect of property of deceased Drowpadabai ?

6. In view of death of defendant No. 1 pending the First Appeal and

the grounds raised in the Appeal Memo, following questions of law arise in the

present matter :-

(1) Whether the plaintiffs/appellants Nos. 1 to 3 & defendant No.

3, the children of Kisan would be entitled to succeed to

the estate of Draupadabai, mother of Kisan in view of the

provisions of Section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act?.

(2) Whether the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 and defendant no.3 would be

entitled to succeed to the estate of defendant No.1 Sitaram as

his grandchildren.?

7. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. Mr. Godbole, the learned

Counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants vehemently contended that in view of

the difference in the language used in Section 8 read with Schedule and in

Section 15(1)(a) and 15(1)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, it must be held

that as far as the property of a female is concerned, it can be succeeded by

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her son and daughter or the children of son and daughter irrespective of

whether the children of such son or daughter one legitimate or illegitimate

and that they should be treated as related to the deceased. On the other

hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent/defendant No.2 vehemently

contended that the provisions of section 15 and the definition of word

“related” in Section 3(1)(j) will have to be read with Section 16 of the

Hindu Marriage Act whereby the legislature granted legitimacy to the

children of void and voidable marriages for a limited purpose of

succeeding to the property of parents only.

8. At this stage, there is no dispute that defendant No.7 Bhagirathibai

was the first wife of deceased Kisan and the plaintiffs had failed to prove that she

was divorced before the marriage of plaintiff No.4 Vimal with Kisan. She was

married to Kisan after the Hindu Marriage Act came into force and at the time of

her marriage, the marriage of Kisan and defendant No.7 was subsisting and it

continued to subsist till death of Kisan.

9. Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that a marriage

may solemnize between any two Hindus if neither party had a spouse living at

the time of the marriage. Section 11 provides that any marriage solemnized after

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commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition

presented by by either party thereto be so declared by a decree of nullity if it

contravenes the conditions specified in clauses (i) ,(iv) and (v) of Section 5.

Therefore, in view of this, the marriage of deceased Kisan and plaintiff No.4

Vimal was void because the first marriage of Kisan was subsisting and his first

wife was living at the time of the second marriage.

10. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act makes provision for

devolution of interest in the coparcenary property. Section 8 of the Hindu

Succession Act provides general rules of succession in the case of a male dying

intestate. Section 15 provides general rules of succession in case of a female

Hindu who dies intestate. Section 3(1)(j) of Hindu Succession Act defines the

word “related” and it reads as follows :-

“3(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, –

(j) “related” means related by legitimate kinship:
Provided that illegitimate children shall be deemed to be related to
their mothers and to one another, and their legitimate descendants

shall be deemed to be related to them and to one another; and any
word expressing relationship or denoting a relative shall be
construed accordingly.”

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From this, it will be clear that whenever a person is said to be related to another

for the purpose of succession, the relationship must be legitimate and therefore

the illegitimate children shall not be treated as related to any person and cannot

succeed such person. However, the proviso to clause (j) makes an exception and

thereby the illegitimate children shall be deemed to be related to their mother and

to one another and the legitimate descendants of such illegitimate children shall

be deemed to be related to them and to one another. Therefore, in view of this

definition, the plaintiff No.1 to 3 and defendant No.3, who are the illegitimate

children of deceased Kishan and plaintiff no.4 Vimal cannot claim any legitimate

kinship with anybody except their mother and among themselves. Therefore,

they shall be deemed to be related to their mother Vimal and they also shall be

deemed to be related to each other inter-se.

11. Section 15(1) reads as follows :-

“15. General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus – (1)
The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve

according to the rules set out in section 16, –

(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any
pre-deceased son or daughter) and the husband;

(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;

(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;

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(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and

(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.”

On careful perusal of Section 15(1)(a) with definition of word “related” in

Section 3(1)(j), it will become clear that the sons and daughters, whether

legitimate or illegitimate, of a female Hindu the children of such pre-deceased

son or daughter are entitled to succeed her. Thus, iIn view of the provisions of

Section 3(1)(j) read with Section 15(1)(a) illegitimate children may inherit the

property of their mother and because they are deemed to be related to each other

they may succeed to each other also. However, there is no other provision in the

Hindu Succession Act under which illegitimate children can succeed to the

property of any other person except their mother or themselves.

12. Hindu Marriage Act was enacted in 1955. Section 16 of the Hindu

Marriage Act, before its amendment in 1976 provided that only those children,

who were born before marriage of their parents was declared to be void, would

be deemed to be legitimate for a limited purpose of inheriting the property of

their parents only. By making an amendment in section 16 by Marriage Laws

(Amendment) Act, 1976, the difference was tried to be done away with between

the children born before the marriage was declared null and void and the children

who were born after. Section 16 reads as follows :-

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“16. Legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages -(1)

Notwithstanding that marriage is null and void under section 11, any

child of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the
marriage had been valid, shall be legitimate whether such child is
born before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws

(Amendment) Act,1976 (68 of 1976), ad whether or not a decree of
nullity is granted in respect of that marriage under this Act and
whether or not the marriage is held to be void otherwise than on a

petition under this Act.

(2)

Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of a voidable
marriage under section 12, any child begotten or conceived before

the decree is made, who would have been the legitimate child of the
parties to the marriage if at the date of the decree it had been
dissolved instead of being annulled, shall be deemed to be their

legitimate child notwithstanding the decree of nullity.

(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be
construed as conferring upon any child of a marriage which is null
and void or which is annulled by a decree of nullity under section 12,

any rights n or to the property of any person, other than the parents,
in any case where, but for the passing of this Act,such child would
have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any such rights by

reason o his not being the legitimate child of his parents.”

In view of sub-section (1) of section 16, a child of a marriage which is null and

void, who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be

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deemed to be a legitimate child. However, sub-section (3) provides that such

children of null and void marriage or the marriage which is annulled by a decree

of nullity under Section 12 shall not be entitled to rights in or to the property of

any person other than the parents. Section 16(3) makes an important provision

in respect of succession to the property of parents and, therefore, it will have to

be read along with the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. In view of the

provisions of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, a child of a null and void

marriage is also entitled to succession to the estate of its father under Section 8

and of mother under Section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. However, the

word “parent” connotes father or mother and the meaning of word `parent’

cannot be extended beyond that. `Parent’ cannot mean parents of parent or the

grand-parents.

13. Mr. Godbole tried to contend that in the schedule read with Section 8

of the Hindu Succession Act words used are son, daughter, son of a pre-deceased

son, daughter of a pre-deceased son, son of a pre-deceased daughter,daughter of

a pre-deceased daughter, Son of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son and

daughter of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son and like that, which means

only the particular relatives will be entitled to inherit the property of a male

Hindu under section 8. However, as per the language of Section 15(1)(a), the

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property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve upon the sons and

daughter (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the

husband. The learned Counsel contends that on death of Draupadabai, her estate

would devolve upon her sons, including the children of the pre-deceased son. He

contends that the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 and the defendant No.3 are the children of

the deceased Kisan and therefore they are is entitled to succeed to the property of

Draupadabai under clause (a). In my considered opinion, the words used in the

Schedule read with Section 8 and the words used in clause (a) of Section 15(1)

do not support the claim of the plaintiffs. Under Section 8 property of a male

devolves upon, firstly the heirs being the relatives specified in Class I of the

Schedule and then secondly, if there is no Class I heir, then upon the heirs being

relatives specified in Class II of the Schedule. In Class I, certain specified

relatives are provided who could succeed to the property of a male Hindu prior to

the Amendment of 2005, It will be interesting to note that prior to the

Amendment of 2005. Class I included the following relatives:

“Class I

Son; daughter, widow; mother; son of a pre-deceased son; daughter
of a pre-deceased son; son of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a
pre-deceased daughter; widow of a pre-deceaed son; son of a pre-
deceased son of a pre-deceased son; daughter of a pre-deceased son

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of a pre-deceased son; widow of a pre-deceased son of a pre-
deceased son;

[Note: son of a pre-deceased daughter of a pre-deceased daughter;
daughter of a pre-deceased daughter of a pre-deceased daughter;

daughter of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter
of a pre-deceased daughter of a pre-deceased son added to Class I by

Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005].

It is interesting to note that in this, son , daughter, son of a pre-deceased son ,

daughter of a pre-deceased son, son of a pre-deceased daughter, daughter of a

pre-deceased daughter, son of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son, daughter

of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son would be entitled to be the legal

heirs. It shows that the son and daughter of a pre-deceased son and daughter

would be entitled. While son and daughter of a predeceased son of a pre-

deceased son would also be entitled to succeed, son or daughter of a pre-

deceased daughter of a pre-deceased daughter or a daughter of a pre-deceased son

of a pre-deceased daughter or a daughter of a pre-deceased daughter of a pre-

deceased son would not be entitled as heirs of Class I. They were in Class II.

However, they were included in Class I after the amendment of 2005. For the

moment, we are not concerned with the amended provisions. Thus, prior to 2005

Amendment, the legislature had made a difference between son and daughter of

a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son on one hand and son and daughter of a

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pre-deceased daughter of a pre-deceased daughter on the other. Thus, while son

and daughter of a predeceased son of a pre-deceased son were heir in the Class I,

the son and daughter of predeceased daughter of pre-deceased daughter would

fall in entry III of Class II. In view of this, in the Schedule, the legislature did not

use the word “children” which is neutral in respect of gender. In section 15(1)(a),

the legislature provided that property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall

devolve upon the sons and daughters including the children of any pre-deceased

son or daughter. The word `children’ includes the sons as well as daughters of a

pre-deceased son or pre-deceased daughter, but it does not go beyond the

grandchildren. If a female Hindu is not succeeded by sons and daughters or

grandchildren and the husband her property would devolve upon the heirs of

her husband or upon her parents or upon heirs of her father and then upon heirs

of her mother.

14. Mr. Godbole tried to find support from Lachman Singh vs. Kirpa

Singh and Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 547, wherein the Supreme Court made the

following observations in para 5 :-

“…The word `sons’ in clause (a) of Section 15(1) of the act includes

(i) sons born out of the womb of a female by the same husband or by
different husbands including illegitimate sons too in view of Section
3(j) of the Act and (ii) adopted sons who are deemed to be sons for

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purposes of inheritance. Children of any predeceased son or adopted
son also fall within the meaning of the expression `sons’.

On reading the above observations, it only appears that children of a female

Hindu, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as well as children of any pre-deceased

son or adopted son fall within the meaning of expression `son’. It is impossible

to hold from these observations that the illegitimate children of a son of a woman

would be included in the word `son’ within section 15(1)(a). In the present case,

Kisan was the legitimate son of deceased Draupadabai and Sitaram and he could

certainly inherit the property of his parents and he would also be entitled to share

in the coparcenary property as a coparcener. However, he had died during the

lifetime of his father as well as mother. The plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3, who sought

partition and share in the property, are the illegitimate children of deceased Kisan

and the plaintiff no.4 Vimal. In view of the definition of word `related’ in

section 3(1)(j) read with Section 15(1), they can succeed and inherit the property

of their mother Vimal and in view of Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act,

they can also succeed to their mother as well as father. Section 16(3) makes it

abundantly clear that they would be entitled to inherit the property of their

parents only and no other relations. They being illegitimate children cannot be

deemed to be related to the grandparents which necessarily requires that the

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children must be legitimate. Therefore, they cannot claim any right over the

property of their grandparents. While taking this view, I am supported by several

authorities.

15. In Jinia Keotin and Ors. vs. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi and Ors.

(2003) 1 SCC 730, the Supreme Court observed as follows :-

“4. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned

counsel on either side. The Hindu Marriage Act underwent important
changes by virtue of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act,1976, which

came into force with effect from 27-5-1976. Under the ordinary law, a
child for being treated as legitimate must be born in lawful wedlock. If
the marriage itself is void on account of contravention of the statutory

prescriptions, any child born of such marriage would have the effect, per

se, or on being so declared or annulled, as the case may be, of
bastardizing the children born of the parties to such marriage.

Polygamy,which was permissible and widely prevalent among the

Hindus in the past and considered to have evil effects on society, came to
be put to an end by the mandate of Parliament in enacting the Hindu
Marriage Act,1955. The legitimate status of the children which

depended very much upon the marriage between their parents being
valid or void, thus turned on the act of the parents over which the
innocent child had no hold or control. But, for no fault of it, the
innocent baby had to suffer a permanent setback in life and in the eyes of

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society by being treated as illegitimate. A laudable and noble act of the
legislature indeed in enacting Section 16 to put an end to a great social

evil. At the same time, Section 16 of the act,while engrafting a rule of
fiction in ordaining the children, though illegitimate, to be treated as

legitimate, notwithstanding that the marriage was void or voidable
chose also to confine its application, so far as succession or inheritance

by such children is concerned to the properties of the parents only.”

“5. So far as Section 16 of the Act is concerned, though it was

enacted to legitimate children, who would otherwise suffer by becoming
illegitimate, at the same time it expressly provides in sub-section (3) by

engrafting a provision with a non obstante clause stipulating

specifically that nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
shall be construed as conferring upon any child of a marriage, which is
null and void or which is annulled by a decree of nullity under Section

12 “any rights in or to the property of any person, other than the
parents in any case where but for the passing of this Act,such child

would have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any such rights
by reason of his not being the legitimate child of his parents”. In the

light of such an express mandate of the legislature itself, there is no
room for according upon such children who, but for Section 16 would
have been branded as illegitimate, any further rights than envisaged

therein by resorting to any presumptive or inferentia process of
reasoning, having recourse to the mere object or purpose of enacting
Section 16 of the Act. Any attempt to do so would amount to doing not
only violence to the provision specifically engrafted in sub-section (3) of
Section 16 of the Act but also would attempt to court relegislating on the

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subject under the guise of interpretation,against even the will expressed
in the enactment itself. Consequently, we are unable to countenance the

submissions on behalf of the appellants. The view taken by the courts
below cannot be considered to suffer from any serious infirmity to call

for our interference in this appeal.”

16. In Shantaram Tukaram Patil and another vs. Smt. Dagubai
Tukaram Patiland others [1987 Mah.L.R. 777] , the Divisin Bench of this

Court observed as follows :-

“20 We have mentioned earlier that legitimacy had been bestowed

upon the children born of a marriage which was declared to be void
by a decree of nullity before the amendment in 1976. The amendment
of 1976 extended this legitimacy to the children born of a marriage

which is void, whether it is so declared or not by a decree of nullity.

Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act by law confers a right upon

such illegitimate children in the property of their parents. Even if it is
regarded that this is a legal fiction, the consequences of that legal

fiction must be extended to their logical end. After examining the
provisions of both the Hindu Marriage Act and the Hindu Succession
Act it would be noticed that if the right attaching to the legitimacy

created by Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act is not extended to
include the right to the property under the Hindu Succession Act,
section 16(3) will make no sense. In construing the scope of a legal
fiction it is not only proper but even necessary to assume all those
facts on which alone the fiction can operate. Referring to the

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following observations of Lord Asquith in (East End Dwellings Co.
Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council 1952 AC 109 at p. 132 the Supreme

Court in I.T. Commissioner v. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 Supreme Court
352, explained the scope of a legal fiction :-

“If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you

must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the
consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had
in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.

One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents.
The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it

does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your

imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of
that state of affairs.”

In (B.P. Aneie v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar), AIR 1975
Supreme Court 164, the Supreme Court further pointed out :-

“It is now well settled law that where a legal fiction is created, full

effect must be given to it and it should be carried to its logical
conclusion.”

“22. That apart both the Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Succession
Act belong to a family of laws relating to the same subject. We take it
as settled rule of interpretation that if two legislations which are pari
mateia, taken as form cognate legislations, they form one Code. They,
therefore, should be taken as forming one system and interpreting and

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22

enforcing each other. This rule of interpretation has received the
approval of the Supreme Court in several decisions (See for example,

(State of Assam v. D.P. Barura) AIR 1969 Supreme Court, 831)…..”.

17. Relying on the Supreme Court authority in Jinia Keotin & Ors. vs.
Kumar Sitaram Manjhi &
Ors., the learned Single Judge of this Court in

Marutirau Mane vs. Shrikant Maruti Mane & Ors. 2007 (3) Mh.L.J.813 held
that children of null and void marriage could claim succession or inheritance to
the property of the parents only.

18. `Parent’ does not mean grandparents. In view of this legal position,

the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 and defendant No.3 being illegitimate children of

deceased Kisan can inherit the property of their parents i.e. their father alone in
the present circumstances and not the estate of the parents of Kisan. In view of
the legal position, I find no fault in the allotment of shares by the Courts below in

the suit property.

19. for the aforesaid reasons, the Appeal stands dismissed.

(J.H.BHATIA,J.)

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