JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The appellant was promoted as Manager ‘A’ Grade by the Haryana State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited. This promotion was annulled by the State Government. Aggrieved by the order, he filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This petition having been dismissed by the learned single Judge, he has filed the present Letters Patent Appeal. A few facts as relevant for the decision of the case may be briefly noticed.
2. The appellant was initially appointed as a Field Inspector in the year 1972. He was promoted to the post of Field Officer on January 17, 1979. On October 6, 1981, the appellant was promoted as Senior Sales Officer on purely adhoc basis. He had joined as such on October 9, 1981. While he was working as such, his services were regularised as Senior Sales Officer with effect from the date of initial appointment viz. October 9, 1981. At about the same time, the appellant represented for his being appointed in the cadre of Manager ‘A’ Grade. The matter was placed before the Administrative Committee in the meeting held on January 20, 1983. A copy of the agenda item that was placed before the Committee is at Annexure P-5 on the record. The proposal was approved. On February 17, 1983, the appellant was appointed as Manager ‘A’ Grade with effect from January 20, 1983.
3. After about five years, various persons who claimed to be senior to the appellant submitted a representation alleging that their claim for promotion to the post of Manager ‘A’ Grade and been illegally ignored. It appears that the matter was considered. The Federation decided to issue a show cause notice to the appellant. On April 11, 1989, a show cause notice was actually issued. He submitted his reply. The Board of the respondent-Federation considered the matter in the meeting held on July 25, 1989. Keeping in view the fact that the representatives of the Government had recorded a note of dissent, the matter was referred to the Government. On June 14, 1991, the Government accepted the view point expressed by its representatives in the meeting of the Board of Directors. Resultantly, it was held that the appellant’s promotion to the post of Manager ‘A’ Grade without considering the claims of persons senior to him was illegal. As a result, he was ordered to be reverted to his original post.
4. The appellant approached this Court His petition under Article 226 was considered by the learned single Judge. It was held that there were 12 persons senior to the appellant who were eligible for promotion to the post of District Manager ‘A’ Grade. By the impugned order of promotion, he had become senior to those 12 persons. The respondents had not afforded any opportunity to those senior persons. On realizing the mistake, the wrong has been undone. The Federation had merely rectified the mistake. It was further held that the appellant being Senior Officer, he was not entitled to be appointed as Manager ‘A’ Grade. In fact, according to the learned single Judge, he did not belong to any of the six categories mentioned in the Rule from which appointment could be made to the post of Manager ‘A’ Grade. The objection regarding delay raised on behalf of the appellant was also rejected on the ground that the respondents were not aware of the fact that he had been actually promoted in the year 1983. Thus, the Writ Petition was dismissed. Hence this appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard.
6. It has been contended by Mr. Patwalia that the appellant was a distinguished sportsman, a Wrestler. According to the Rules, a person working on the post of Field Officer was eligible for promotion to the post of Manager ‘A’ grade. Since the appellant had been promoted to the post of Field Officer on January 17, 1979 and was continuing to works on this post before his promotion as Senior Sales Officer, the learned single Judge has erred in taking the view that he was not eligible for promotion as Manager ‘A’ Grade. It has been further pointed out that the appellant having been promoted as far back as January 20, 1983, the respondents had erred in reversing the order after a lapse of more than five years.
7. The claim made on behalf of the appellant was controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents. Mr. Malik who appeared for some of the private respondents submitted that the Administrative Committee, was appointed to act in conformity with the Rules. Under the Rules, every eligible person had a right to be considered in order of seniority. There were 12 person who were senior to the appellant. Their claim was arbitrarily ignored. That being so, the respondents have acted rightly in rectifying the mistake. It was further contended that the respondents were never made aware of appellant’s promotion. It was, in the year 1988 or thereafter, that they had come to know of his appointment as Manager ‘A’ Grade. They had represented immediately thereafter. In this situation, they cannot be accused of any culpable delay. Still further, it was pointed out that the appellant had reaped undeserved benefits for a long time. The authorities had rightly annulled the appellant’s promotion and given the respondents their due. The action of the Government having been affirmed by the learned single Judge, no ground for interference was made out at the stage of Letters Patent Appeal. The contentions raised on behalf of private respondents have been reiterated by Mr. C.B. Goel who appeared on behalf of respondent- Federation as well as by Mr. Bishnoi, learned counsel for the State of Haryana.
8. The two question that arise for consideration are;
1. Was the promotion of the appellant as Manager ‘A’ Grade in conformity with the Rules?
2. Should the claim of the respondents have been rejected on the ground of delay?
Regarding ‘1’
9. Admittedly, appointment to various posts in the Federation is governed by the provisions of the Haryana State Supply and Marketing Co-operative Service (Common Cadre) Rules, 1969. Under Rule 1.6, the Administrative Committee constituted by the Board is competent to enforce the various provisions. Under Rule 2.1 (b), it has been authorised to make appointments to “the various posts of the service other than that of the Secretary subject to the overall control of the Board…..”, Rule 2.2A, inter alia, provides that “the appointment to the graded posts of various categories i.e. Managers and Accountants of Societies shall be made from amongst the persons declared suitable for appointment in the specific grades as a result of screening and selection by the Administrative Committee …. ‘Rule 2.3 deals with the appointment to the various posts. So far as posts of Manager ‘A’ Grade are concerned, the provision is contained in Rule 2.3(a)(5). It provides as under:-
“ASSISTANT SECRETARY/ACCOUNTS OFFICERS/ESTABLISHMENT OFFICER/MANAGERS OF ‘A’ GRADE SOCIETIES.
i) By direct recruitment.
ii) By transfer of a person on deputation from any department of Government or any institution.
iii) By promotion from category 6 of Annexure I”.
10. A perusal of the above provision shows that the posts of Managers ‘A’ Grade can be filled up by promotion from amongst the persons mentioned in category 6 of Annexure I. The categories of posts mentioned at Serial No. 6 in Annexure I are:-
i) Managers of ‘B’ Grade Societies.
ii) Field Officer.
iii) Senior Accountant.
iv) Assistants (Selection grade).
v) Accountants of ‘A’ Grade Societies.
vi) P.A. to Secretary.
11. A perusal of the above provision shows that Field Officers alongwith Managers of ‘B’ Grade Societies are (alongwith other categories) eligible for promotion to the posts of Managers ‘A’ Grade.
12. Mr. Patwalia contended that the appellant had been promoted as a Field Officer on January 17, 1979. He was, thus, eligible to be considered for promotion to the post of Manager ‘A’ Grade.
13. Learned counsel appears to be right in his submission. It is the admitted position that the appellant was promoted as a Field Officer in January, 1979. The mere fact that he had been granted adhoc promotion as Senior Sales Officer, a post in a higher pay scale, could not mean that he would not be eligible to be considered for promotion from the post of Field Officer to that of Manager ‘A’ Grade. This would be all the more so in view of the fact that even the post of Manager ‘A’ Grade was in the same scale of pay as that of Senior Sales Officer viz. 700-1400/-. Thus, to this extent, the learned counsel for the appellant is right. Yet, his problem is not solved. Despite the fact that the appellant was eligible, the authority was bound to consider the claims of other eligible persons also. Admittedly, the post of Manager ‘A’ Grade had to be filled up by promotion. The note to Rule 2.3 specifically provides that “promotion means, promotion by selection keeping in view seniority-cum me it. “It is no doubt correct that in Rule 2.3(c), it has been provided that appointment to the service by promotion “shall be purely by selection on the basis of merit and no employee shall have a right to promotion as a matter of right by virtue of seniority”. Yet, the fact remains that the claims of various eligible persons have to be considered. It is also not disputed that there were 12 persons senior to the appellant whose claims had not been considered when he was promoted as Manager ‘A’ Grade. Some nut of those 12 persons are respondents in this appeal. In particular, it may be mentioned that respondents 6 to 8 are far senior to the appellant. They had entered service before him. They had been promoted as Field Officer in the year 1976. They were, thus, senior to the appellant by a period of about three years. Still their claim was not considered. This action of the respondent-Federation in ignoring the claim of the senior persons was totally violative of the Rules and even Article 16 of the Constitution. It was, thus, wholly illegal.
14. The action being in violation of the Rules and Article 16 of the Constitution, suffered from an apparent illegality. The respondents were aggrieved. They had represented and the mistake having been clearly established, the authority was entitled to rectify it.
Regarding ‘2’
15. Mr. Patwalia vehemently contended that the promotion granted to the appellant in January, 1983 was challenged through a representation in August, 1988. At this stags, even a suit would have been barred by limitation. Thus, the Federation and the Government should have rejected the claim of the representationists on the ground of delay alone. Is it so?.
16. It is undoubtedly correct that whenever a matter is brought to the Court, delay is one of the factors which is taken Into consideration. Even though no limitation has been specifically provided for approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, yet, the rule of refusal to interfere on the ground of delay is invariably followed by the Court. Despite the fact that no period of limitation has been specifically laid down, the Court rejects a complaint whenever there is unexplained delay or even when a triable issue of limitation arises. However, this rule of delay does not govern administrative action. Whenever an authority finds that an error has been committed, it has the undoubted jurisdiction and discretion to rectify the mistake.
17. In the present case, the claims of senior and eligible persons were arbitrarily ignored. On coming to know of the wrong, the aggrieved persons had represented. The authority, after consideration of the matter, had found that the claim made by the representationists was valid. It had chosen to interfere. It cannot be said to have acted illegally or in violation of the Rules. Of course, the matter would have been different if the competent authority had refused to interfere. But, since the authority had chosen to annul the order and rectify the error, it cannot be said to have acted illegally or in violation of the Rules. Of Course, the matter would have been different if the competent authority had refused to interfere. But, since the authority had chosen to annul the order and rectify the error, it cannot be accused of having violated any law.
18. Mr. Patwalia, contended that the Board of Directors of the Federation had intact taken the view that no ground to interfere was made out. This was primarily on the ground of delay. Learned counsel is right to the extent that the elected members of the Board of Directors had taken a view in favour of the appellant. Yet, it is the admitted position that the representatives of the Government had recorded a note of dissent. In such a situation, the provisions of Section 29(3) of the Haryana Co-operative Societies Act, 1984, were attracted. A perusal of this provision shows that “where a difference of opinion in respect of any matter arises between the member nominated by the Government or the Managing Director appointed under Section 31 and other members thereof”, the matter has to be referred by the Society to the Government “whose decision thereon shall be final and deemed to be a decision taken by the Committee.” The matter was referred to the Government in conformity with this provision. The Government had considered it and agreed with the view expressed by its nominees. This was in strict compliance of law. That being so, it cannot be said that the respondent- Federation or the State Government had acted illegally.
19. In view of the above the answer to both the questions is against the appellant.
20. Mr. Patwalia also contended that the appellant has continued to work as Manager ‘A’ Grade since the year 1983. Now, a period of more than 15 years has already elapsed. Despite the decision of the Government as also the learned single Judge, the appellant had functioned as Manager ‘A’ Grade on account of interim stay orders granted by the Court He, thus, prays that he should now be allowed to continue on the higher post,
21. It is undoubtedly correct that the appellant appears to have continued on the higher post by virtue of the interim orders passed by the Bench. Yet, the fact remains that he earned this advantage at the cost of persons senior to him. Grant of any relief to the appellant would result in a corresponding loss to persons senior to him. The mere fact that the appellant has enjoyed undeserved benefit for a long period would not be a ground to perpetuate the wrong against the respondents. Thus, we are unable to uphold the claim made on behalf of the appellant. It may, however, be noticed that the post of Senior Sales Officer being in the same scale of pay as that of Manager ‘A’ Grade, the petitioner is unlikely to suffer any monetary loss by the implementation of the impugned order.
22. No other point has been raised.
23. In view of above, we find no merit in this appeal which is consequently dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs.