PETITIONER: SHRIMANT SARDAR CHANDROJIRAO ANGRE Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/1967 BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. SHAH, J.C. CITATION: 1968 AIR 494 1968 SCR (1) 761 ACT: Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act (Madhya Bharat 28 of 1951), s. 5(b)(iv)--Grove, meaning of. HEADNOTE: After the resumption of the appellant's Jagir lands in the State by the enactment of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, he claimed the mango trees, planted by him on both sides of a long road, as constituting a "grove" within the meaning of s. 5(b)(iv) of the Act, and therefore continued to belong to him. HELD: A grove irrespective of where it was situate, but belonging to or held by the jagirdar was to continue to belong to or to be held by him. To secure the full and proper use and enjoyment of such a grove, if it was on land other than that which was allowed to be retained by him, sub-clause (iv) of s. 5(b) further provides that the land on which such a grove stood with the areas appurtenant thereto also shall be settled upon him in accordance with the M. B. Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act Samvat 2007. The intention of the legislature appeared to be that properties which the jagirdar was in personal use and possession of or in respect of which he had paid valuable consideration were to be retained by him. [764 H; 765 A]. The language of sec. 5(b) (iv) does not require that the trees need be fruit-bearing trees nor does it require that they should have been planted by human labour or agency. But they must be sufficient in number and so standing in a group as to give them the character of a grove and to retain that character the trees would or when fully grown preclude the land on which they stand from being primarily used for a purpose other than that of a grove-land. Cultivation of a patch here and a patch there would have no significance to deprive it of its character as a grove. Therefore, trees standing in a file on the road side intended to furnish shade to the road would not fulfil the requirements of a grove even as understood in ordinary parlance. [766 C-E]. Daropadi v. Mannu Lal, A.I.R. 1929 All. 557. Kashi v. Jagoo Bai. A.I.R, 1934 All. 290, Shiv Sahai v. Hari Nandan, A.I.R 1963 All. 413, Hasan v. State of Bombay, 62 Bom. L.R. 617, referred to. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1965.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the December 7, 1961 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
(Gwalior Bench) in Civil Misc. Petition No. 77 of 1959.
A. K. Sen, B. D. Gupta, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder
Narain, for the appellant.
I. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shelat, J. The appellant is the ex-jagirdar of certain
villages called Jagir Nevri Bhorasa. It appears that while
the jagir was in his possession he had constructed roads one
of which is the road connecting Bhorasa with Dewas Astha
Road. The road about 1 1/2 miles in length was lined on
both sides with mango trees. In 1951 the Madhya Bharat
Abolition of Jagirs Act, 28 of 1951 (hereinafter referred to
as the Act) was passed for resumption of jagir lands in the
State. Under that Act, the right, title and interest of the
appellant in his said jagir were extinguished and the jagir
lands vested in the State. In 1955, the Tehsildar put up
the mangoes grown on the said trees for public auction. By
his application dated February 8, 1955 the appellant
objected to the said auction claiming that the said trees
were planted and reared by him, that they constituted a
“grove” within the meaning of s. 5(b)(iv) of the Act and
therefore continued to belong to him. The Tehsildar
rejected the application. The appellant’s appeal and
thereafter a revision before the Board of Revenue were also
likewise rejected. The appellant then filed a writ petition
in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh but that also was
dismissed on the ground that the said trees could not be
said to constitute a “grove”. The appellant has filed this
appeal after obtaining special leave.
The only question arising in this appeal is whether the said
trees standing on the two sides of the said road can be said
to be a “grove” within the meaning of sec. 5(b)(iv).
The Act was passed for resumption of jagir-lands in the
State and to carry out certain land reforms in the jagir
areas. Section 3 provides for the date of resumption and
sec. 4(1) lays down the consequences of resumption. Under
sub-section (1) of that section, the right, title and
interest of a jagirdar in his jagir lands including forests,
trees, fisheries, tanks, wells, ponds, etc., stand resumed
to the State as from the date of resumption. The section
also provides for resumption of the right, title and
interest of the jagirdar in all buildings on jagir lands
used for schools, hospitals and other public purposes.
Section 5, however, provides that notwithstanding anything
contained in sec. 4 the jagirdar shall continue to remain in
possession of land cultivated personally by him; of open
enclosures used for agricultural or domestic purposes and in
continuous possession for twelve years immediately before
the date of resumption, all open house-sites purchased for
valuable consideration, all private buildings, places of
worship, and wells situated in, and trees standing on lands
included in the aforesaid enclosures and house sites and /or
land appertaining of such buildings or places of worship
within the limits of village sites. Sub-cl. (iv) of sec. 5
(b) reads as under:
“all groves wherever situate belonging to or
held by the Jagirdar or any other person,
shall continue to belong to or be held by such
Jagirdar or other person, as the case
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may be, and the land thereof with the areas
appurtenant thereto shall be settled on him by
the Government according to the provisions of
the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and
Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat
2007.”
Under cl. (c) also the jagirdar is allowed to continue to
remain in possession of all tanks, trees, wells and
buildings in or on occupied land belonging to or held by the
jagirdar or any other person.
These provisions show clearly that the legislature has used
the word “trees” at three places in three different
contexts, in secs. 4(a), 5(b) and 5(c) apart from the
expression “all groves wherever situate” in sub-cl. (iv) of
sec. 5(b). Whereas under sec. 4(a) the trees are to vest in
the State Government along with the forests, fisheries etc.,
the trees mentioned in sec. 5(b)(iii) and (c) are allowed to
continue to belong to and be held by the jagirdar.
Obviously, the word “trees” in these provisions has not been
used in any uniform sense and therefore has to be construed
in the context in which it is used. For instance, the word
‘trees’ in sec. 5(b)(iii) and (c) is placed in juxtaposition
with other properties such as private buildings, places of
worship, wells situated in lands included in the said
enclosures and house sites referred to in sub-cls. (i) and
(ii). It appears that the policy of the legislature was
that jagir lands including forests, trees in such forests,
fisheries, wells, tanks, ponds, ferries, pathways, village
sites etc., which were used by, the public and in which the
members of the public were interested were resumed while the
land in personal cultivation of the jagirdar, enclosures
used for agricultural and domestic purposes, house sites
purchased for valuable consideration, private buildings,
places of worship, wells, trees standing on lands in such
enclosures and house sites and tanks, trees, private wells
and buildings in or on occupied land belonging to or held by
the jagirdar were allowed to continue to belong to and be
held by him. It will be seen that groves in sub-cl. (iv) of
sec. (b) are included amongst properties allowed to continue
to belong to and be held by the jagirdar. Subclause (iv)
also shows that such groves need not be of fruit trees nor
need the trees thereof have been planted by the jagirdar.
The words “wherever situate” indicate that it is not
necessary that they should be on lands or properties allowed
to be retained by the jagirdar under s. 5. If a grove
belonged to or was held by him, whether planted by him or of
natural growth and wherever situate it is allowed to
continue to belong to him and be held by him. The intention
of the legislature appears therefore to be that properties
which the jagirdar was in personal use and possession of or
in respect of which he had paid valuable consideration are
to be retained by him. It is in this context that we should
construe subcl. (iv) of sec. 5(b). A grove irrespective of
where it is situate, but belonging to or held by the
jagirdar is to continue to belong to or to be held by him.
To secure the full and proper use and, enjoyment of such a
grove, if it is on land other than that which is
764
allowed to be retained by him, sub-clause (iv) further
provides that the land on which such a grove stands with the
areas appurtenant thereto also shall be settled upon him in
accordance with the M.B. Revenue Administration and Ryotwari
Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007.
What then is the meaning of the word “grove” within the
meaning of sec. 5(b)(iv)9 Though the Act contains a
definition section the legislature has not chosen to include
therein any definition of a “grove”. It intended therefore
that it should be understood in its ordinary dictionary
sense. In Webster’s New World Dictionary, p. 641, a grove
has been defined as a small wood; groups of trees standing
together without undergrowth. The Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, Vol. 1, 838 also defines it as a small wood, a
group of trees affording shade or forming avenues or walks.
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 98, p. 688 a grove is defined
to mean a cluster of trees not sufficiently extensive to be
called a wood; a group of trees of indefinite extent but not
large enough to constitute a forest; especially such a group
considered as furnishing shade for avenues and walks.
Though a grove in this sense may consist of a group of trees
of indefinite extent it cannot be divorced from the idea of
a homogeneous or at any rate. a substantially homogeneous
unit consisting of a cluster of trees close to each, other
so as to serve as a shade to walks or avenues. Apart from
the meaning that the dictionaries offer the word “grove” has
also been the subject-matter of a number of decisions. The
case of Daropadi v. Mannu Lal(1) was, of course an extreme
case of only 4 fruit trees in an area of 3 bighas and that
too on the boundaries. Ashworth J. could therefore easily
discard the contention that the said trees formed a grove or
that the land on which they stood was a grove land within
the meaning of sec. 3 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 which
provided that so long as any considerable portion of a plot
had a sufficient number of trees to prevent that plot from
being cultivated, assuming the trees to have reached their
full size, the entire plot would retain the character of
grove but not otherwise. It is true that when the learned
Judge made, this observation he had in mind the definition
of grove in s. 3 of that Act, but he also observed that that
was the sense in which a “grove” and “grove land”‘were
ordinarily understood and that the definition did no more
than to bring out the sense in which these terms were
generally understood. In Kashi v. Jagoo Bai(2) also, Bennet
J. held that isolated trees cannot be said to constitute a
grove. But unlike these two cases, the land in Shiv Sahai
v. Hari Nandan(3) had 13 mango trees fully grown, big in
size and covering a major part of it. It was held that the
land was a grove-land within the meaning of sec. 3(5) of the
U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, in spite of the fact that there was
some cultivation on the land. The Court there observed that
the definition merely
(1) A.I.R. 1929 All 557 (2) A.I.R. 1934 All 290.
(3) A.I.R. 1963 All 413.
765
required that the trees must be in sufficiently large number
to preclude the land from being used primarily for a purpose
other than as grove-land. In Hasan v. State of Bombay(1)
the High Court was concerned with s. 5(h) of the Madhya
Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Rights (Estates, Mahals,
Alienated Lands) Act, 1 of 1951 which is in almost identical
terms as S. 5(b)(iv) of the present Act. The Court
interpreted the word “grove” to mean an area covered by a
cluster of trees specially planted by human agency but not
large enough to constitute a forest.
It would seem therefore that the word “grove” conveys com-
pactness or at any rate substantial compactness to be
recognized as a unit by itself which must consist of a group
of trees in sufficient number to preclude the land on which
they stand from being primarily used for a purpose, such as
cultivation, other than as a grove-land. The language of
sec. 5(b)(iv) does not require however that the trees needs
be fruit bearing trees nor does it require that they should
have been planted by human labour or agency. But they must
be sufficient in number and so standing in a group as to
give them the character of a grove and to retain that
character the trees would or when fully grown preclude the
land on which they stand from being primarily used for a
purpose other than that of a grove-land. Cultivation of a
patch here and a patch there would have no significance to
deprive it of its character as a grove. Therefore, trees
standing in a file on the road sidle intended to furnish
shade to the road would not fulfil the requirements of a
grove even as understood in ordinary parlance.
Counsel, however, contended that although the trees in ques-
tion are situate on the road sides along the said road there
may at some places be a group or groups of trees
sufficiently large in number and closely standing together
to preclude that particular area from being used for
cultivation or for any other purpose. In that case, be
argued, there was nothing in subcl. (iv) to prevent such a
cluster of trees from being regarded as a grove. We think
there is some force in this argument which requires
consideration. Neither the revenue authorities nor the High
Court approached the question from this point of view and no
inquiry at any stage seems to have been made whether there
are at any place or places such group or groups of trees to
constitute a grove or groves. All of them appear to have
dismissed the appellant’s claim only because of the fact
that the trees stand along the two sides of the road. It is
possible that the road might have been constructed in this
particular area because of a number of trees standing on
both sides of it which would provide shade over it and form
an avenue. In fairness to the appellant, we think it
necessary that he should have an opportunity to establish
that at some place or places along the said road there are
trees sufficient in number and proximity to constitute a
grove or groves.
(1) 62 Bom. L.R. 617
766
The appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High
Court are set aside and the case is remanded to the High
Court to decide the writ petition in the light of the
observations hereinabove made after calling a finding from
the Board of Revenue on the question whether there are trees
at any place or places along the said road sufficient in
number and proximity to constitute a grove or groves. The
Board will give an opportunity to the parties to adduce on
the aforesaid question such further evidence, as they may
think necessary. In the circumstances, there will be no
order as to costs.
Y.P. Appeal allowed.
767