JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. This writ petition has been filed questioning a judgment
and order dated 02.02.1990 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. No. 90 of 1987. The
petitioner herein filed the said application purported to be on the
ground that he was prevented from performing his duties and he
had not been paid his wages. He further prayed that he should not
be discharged from service without following the procedure laid
down under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Constitution’).
2. The petitioner was initially appointed as Safaiwala as a
casual labourer in the Carriage and Wagon Branch, New Delhi on
08.04.1985. He worked as a casual labourer only for 137 days up
to 31.07.1986. According to him, he had worked as casual labourer
for a total number of 280 days. In support of which plea, he has
annexed a purported chart containing the names of 12 persons
wherein the petitioner’s name is at serial No. 10. However,
admittedly on 01.01.1987, the respondents discharged all those
persons whose names appeared in the said chart and the said
action on the part of the respondents was the subject matter of the
original application before the learned Tribunal.
3. By reason of the impugned order, the learned Tribunal
held that as the petitioner can file a representation, the same may
be considered on its own merits. The said original application was
disposed of directing:-
“… The applicants will, however, be at liberty
to file a fresh application in accordance with law,
if so advised. We also direct that the
respondents shall consider any representations
that may be made by the applicants as regards
their claim for wages for the past period
expeditiously. The applicants may file fresh
application, if they are aggrieved by the decision
taken by the respondents on their
representations. The application is disposed of
on the above lines.”
4. It does not appear form the writ petition that pursuant
to and in furtherance thereof any representation was filed by the
petitioner herein, although the said original application was
disposes of by the learned Tribunal on 02.02.1990 and this writ
petition has been filed on 22.02.2002.
5. Mr. Malik B.D. Thareja and Mr. K.K. Puri, the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would contend that the
petitioner was not aware of the proceedings before the learned
Tribunal and had lost contact with his counsel and in that view of
the matter, this Court should entertain this writ petition despite
delay. In support the said contention, reliance has been placed on
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Katiji and Ors. ;
State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. ; and State of Bihar and Ors.
v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Anr. .
6. The petitioner herein has failed to show that the had a
right to be absorbed in the Railway service. Only because he has
allegedly completed a period of 240 days, the same by itself would
not entitle him of regularization of his service.
7. In Madhyamik Siksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar
Mishra and Ors. , it was held thus:-
“4. We are unable to uphold the order of the
High Court. There were no sanctioned posts in
existence to which they could be said to have
been appointed. The assignment was an ad hoc
one, which anticipatedly spent itself out. It is
difficult to envisage for them, the status of
workmen on the analogy of the provisions of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, importing the
incidents of completion of 240 days work. The
legal consequences that flow from work for that
duration under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 are entirely different form what, by way of
implication, is attributed to the present situation
by way of analogy. The completion of 240 days’
work does not, under that law import the right to
regularization. It merely imposes certain
obligations on the employer at the time of
termination of the service. It is not appropriate
to import and apply that analogy, in an extended
or enlarged form here.”
8. Apart form the said fact, a writ petition cannot be
entertained after a period of 12 years, the submissions, which have
been made in support of the application for condensation of delay, in
our opinion, cannot be believed.
9. If the petitioner was interested in getting his services
regularized, he should have been in constant touch with his counsel
who had appeared before the Tribunal. If he failed to do so, he
should thank himself for the same.
10. The decision cited by the learned counsel in support of
the contention that the writ petition should not be dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches alone may now be considered.
11. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag’s case (supra),
was a case where the appeal by the State was barred by 4 days,
wherein the Apex Court held:-
“4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are petted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay.”
12. In Chandra Mani’s case (Supra), the Apex Court held
that ceratin amount of latitude within reasonable limits is
permissible in condoning the delay, particularly when the State is
the appellant having regard to the impersonal bureaucratic set-up
involving red-tapism.
13. In Kameshwar Prasad Singh’s case (Supra), the Apex
Court condoned the delay of 679 days in filing Special Leave Petition
upon having satisfied itself that sufficient cause has been shown by
the petitioner, as he had been pursuing other remedies.
14. The aforesaid decisions cannot be said to have any
application in the instant case.
15. “Delay defeats equity” is a well-known concept. A
person, who approaches a Court of equity must approach that
Court within a reasonable period.
16. In any event, the post in which the petitioner sought for
regularization of his services, it is unlikely to be still vacant despite
expiry of the period of 12 years.
17. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta & Ors. v. Union of India and
Ors. it was held:-
“5. The representation does not give any
detail. It is not mentioned if the scheme was
given due publicity or not. No explanation is
given as to why the petitioner did not approach
till 1990. Nor it is stated if any of the casual
labourer of the project were reemployed or not.
It is vague and was lacking in material
particulars.
6. Two questions arise, one, if the petitioners
are entitled as a matter of law for re-employment
and other if they have lost their right, if nay, due
to delay. Right of casual labourer employed in
projects, to be re-employment in railways has been
recognized both by the Railways and this Court.
But unfortunately the petitioners did not take
any step to enforce their claim before the
Railways except sending a vague representation
nor did they even care to produce any material to
satisfy this Court that they were covered in the
scheme framed by the Railways. It was urged by
the learned Counsel for petitioners that they may
be permitted to produce their identity cards etc.,
before opposite parties who amy accept or reject
the same after verification. We are afraid it
would be too dangerous to permit this exercise.
A writ is issued by this Court in favor of a
person who has some right. And not for sake of
roving enquiry leaving scope for manoeuvring.
Delay itself deprives a person of is remedy
available in law. In absence of any fresh cause
of action or any legislation a person who has lost
his remedy by lapse of time loses his right as
well. From the date of retrenchment if it is
assumed to be correct a period of more than 15
years has expired and in case we accept the
prayer of petitioner we would be depriving a host
of others who in the meantime have become
eligible and are entitled to claim to be employed.
We would have been persuaded to take a
sympathetic view but in absence of any positive
material to establish that these petitioners were
in fact appointed and working as alleged by them
it would not be proper exercise of discretion to
direct opposite parties to verify the correctness of
the statement made by the petitioners that they
were employed between 1964 to 1969 and
retrenched between 1975 to 1979.”
18. Yet again in Narayan Singh Solanki v. Union of India and Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 321, the Apex Court held:-
“…We are not inclined to go into the merits of
the matter as we are of the view that the
appellant having resigned form the service and
accepted his provident fund in the year 1963
and thereafter remained silent for nearly 28
years, and therefore, demand for change in
option in the year 1992 did not deserve to be
entertained. In fact the appellant was guilty of
laches and, therefore, not entitled to change his
option for pension. On this short question, we
dismiss this appeal. There shall be no order as
to costs.”
19. Furthermore, in Patel Motibhai Naranbhai and Anr. v.
Dinubhai Motibhai Patel and Ors. , it was held:-
“10. Faced with the situation that an
application for filing the award in court under
Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act has become
barred by limitation, Jayantikumar Ishwarbhai
Patel induced the Arbitrator to make an
application for filing of the award and also for
making the award the rule of the court. In other
words, Jayantikumar Ishwarbhai Patel, a party
to the dispute, with the help of the Arbitrator,
did indirectly what he could not have done
directly. We are of the view that law cannot be
allowed to be circumvented in this fashion. The
court should have declined to entertain the
application moved by the Arbitrator nearly six
years after making of the award. Without six
application of the Arbitrator, the application
made by Jayantikumar Ishwarbhai Patel under
Section 14(2) could not survive. The court
should not come to the aid of a party where
there has been unwarrantable delay in seeking
the statutory remedy. Any remedy must be
sought with reasonable promptitude having
regard to the circumstances.”
20. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any
reason to interfere with the said order. This writ petition is
accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, there shall be no order as to costs.