Allahabad High Court High Court

Shyama Charan Dubey vs State Of U.P. on 12 October, 1988

Allahabad High Court
Shyama Charan Dubey vs State Of U.P. on 12 October, 1988
Equivalent citations: 1990 CriLJ 456
Author: P Basu
Bench: P Basu


ORDER

Palok Basu, J.

1. The short question involved in the present application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is as to whether on the facts of the present case the accused possesses a right to get further investigations ordered through the Magistrate’s Court in supposed exercise of powers under Section 173(8) Cr. P.C.

2. The brief facts are that on 28th of March, 1988, a first information report had been lodged under Section 396 IPC at 8.20 a.m. by one Sudhir Kant Dwivedi, the gist of the allegations is that an armed dacoity was committed in which Babu Ram and Munni Devi were brutally assaulted as a result of which they died. The accused took away the ornaments and other documents etc. which were kept in the boxes. The informant and many other witnesses saw the accused out of whom the applicant Shyam Charan Dubey alias Aspatali r/o village Jeepure, P. S. Gohan, district Jalaun was named as an accused along with four others.

3. The admitted case between the parties is that during investigation, proceedings under Sections 82/83, Cr. P.C. were taken against the applicant. However, the father of the applicant raised objections about the attachment on the ground that the applicant was living separately out of Jalaun and the attached property did not belong to him. The applicant had come up in a petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. on an earlier occasion before this court when it was directed that the Magistrate may decide the objections of the father of the applicant if raised before him under Section 84, Cr. P.C. because the application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. was held to be not maintainable as charge-sheet had not been filed against the applicant till then.

4. Now that the charge-sheet has been filed the present application has been moved under Section 482, Cr. P.C. with the prayer that the aforesaid first information report may be quashed while in the argument it was stated that the charge-sheet may be quashed. It has further been prayed that directions be issued for further investigation by the police commanding it to record the statement of the applicant, examine one Sri Ganga Ram, a member of Parliament, and also seize some documents showing alleged presence of the applicant in Delhi and Agra on the date and time of dacoity committed at Jalaun and until the said investigation is done the arrest of the applicant may be stayed and the proceedings in the court may also be stayed.

5. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the Investigating Officer to which a rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the applicant. Since the affidavits had been exchanged, at the request of parties, the petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage.

6. I have heard Sri. V. C. Misra, learned counsel for the applicant at considerable length and Sri Jitendra Kumar, learned Government Advocate, also at sufficient length.

7. Luckily both the parties have relied upon the two cases on the point i.e. Ram Lal Narang v. State, AIR 1979 SC 1791 and Kashmiri Devi v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1988 SC 1323. Reference was made during the arguments to a few other decisions which I shall refer to in the discussions to follow. The mainstay of the arguments of the rival advocates had been the words used in Section 173, Cr. P.C. and the decisions mentioned above.

8. On behalf of the applicant it was argued that Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. should not be interpreted in a way (so) as to make a distinction between an accused on the one hand and the prosecution agency on the other. Sri Misra has argued that on behalf of the applicant two applications were moved before the Magistrate which are yet undecided. In the alternative it is argued that if this court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. does not pass that order, the Magistrate concerned may be directed to issue those directions to the Investigating Agency as has been done in Kashmiri Devi’s case (supra). It is argued that if the observations of the Supreme Court in Narang’s case and Kashmiri Devi’s case (supra) have to be applied to any other case, the instant one is the most appropriate.

9. Sri Jitendra Kumar argued the case with absolute sincerity that the purpose of enacting Section 173(8) will be frustrated inasmuch as no finality will ever be attached to an investigation and resultant charge-sheet by the Investigating Agency if applications on behalf of the accused are entertained and allowed directing further investigations so that alleged alibi evidence or the like is directed to be collected. Strong reliance has been placed on Sections 169, 172, 173 and 190 Cr. P.C. on the facts of the present case it has been argued that in the dacoity, two persons have lost their lives and independent and natural witnesses are available who are naming the accused-applicant as one of the dacoits. He is an absconder and has not surrendered before the competent court yet even though warrants had been issued for his arrest. The application should be rejected as neither maintainable on facts nor in law.

10. Before I come to the case law and scrutiny of the relevant sections in the Cr.P.C. appears necessary in order to appreciate the respective arguments noted above.

11. When an FIR is lodged regarding a cognizable offence under Section 154, Cr. P.C. and an Investigating Officer begins his investigation under Section 157, Cr. P.C. after holding a preliminary enquiry and examination of witnesses under Section 161, Cr. P.C. and recording confession or further statements under Section 164, Cr. P.C. making such search and seizure necessary in view of the provisions contained in Section 165 and 166, Cr. P.C. following the procedure as laid down in Section 167, Cr. P.C. If the investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours as to form an opinion about the truthfulness of the allegations and also complicity of the accused, if he finds that evidence is deficient regarding the alleged crime against an accused he will forward a report under Section 169, Cr. P.C. if he is of the view that evidence is sufficient, he will forward the accused to the magistrate, and then action shall be taken as per the provisions of Section 170, Cr. P.C. all this will be noted in the diary of proceedings to be maintained by the Investigating Officer as provided in Section 172, Cr. P.C. and then comes Section 173, Cr. P.C.

12. Section 173, Cr. P.C. is the only section which permits forwarding of a police report for purposes of taking cognizance of an offence as provided in Section 190(1)(b) of Cr. P.C. The definition of the words police report as mentioned in Clause (r) of Section 2, Cr. P.C. also indicates that the Code does not contemplate any other type of police report except the one submitted by the Investigating Officer under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C. for purposes of taking cognizance.

13. The argument on behalf of the accused-applicant, if summarised from practical point of view, will mean that since there has been irregularity in the investigation by the Investigating Officer the charge-sheet may be quashed, or, the Investigating Officer is not discharging his duties fully in accordance with the responsibilities conferred upon him by the statute and, therefore, cognizance should not be taken and hence the charge-sheet should be quashed. No other effect of the argument is conceivable. Then the Investigating Officer has filed a charge-sheet in court I will proceed on the assumption that he has done his duty in accordance with the law and if the Magistrate has taken cognizance on the said Police Report there will be absolutely no infirmity in the proceedings thereafter, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that some laxity or inertia has been permitted by the Investigating Officer which may be criticised as failing in discharging his official duties fully.

14. Coming to Sub-section (8) of Section 173, Cr. P.C., it may be noted that it only lays down a deeming provision. The necessity for providing such a deeming provision as is contained in the said Sub-section is to be found in the 41st Report of the Law Commissioner of India which is quoted as under:–

“A report under Section 173 is normally the end of the investigation. Sometimes, however, the Police Officer after submitting the report, under Section 173, comes upon evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. We should have thought that the Police Officer can collect that evidence and sent it to the Magistrate concerned. It appears, however, that Courts have sometimes taken the narrow view that once a final report under Section 173 has been sent, the Police cannot touch the case again and reopen the investigation. This places a hindrance in the way of the Investigating agency which can be more unfair to the prosecution, and, for that matter, even to the accused. It should be made clear in Section 173 that the competent Police Officer can examine such evidence and send a report to the Magistrate…. “(underlining by me).

15. The underlined portions in the aforesaid Report are indicative of a situation where a final report having been forwarded by the Investigating Officer and accepted by the Court further investigations were held to be barred. This view was sought to be undone. All that was initially recommended was that the Investigating Officer should have that right of further investigation in a given case if he thinks that further material should be collected by him and placed before the Magistrate.

16. Reverting back to the said sub-section as enacted by the legislature, it has to be noted that it is only permissive in character. The Investigating Officer (or Officer-in-Charge of Police Station) may undertake a further investigation even after filing of a charge-sheet. If he does so, the further evidence collected by him shall be forwarded to the Magistrate along with a further report. Therefore, I am clearly of the view that neither the prosecution, i.e. the informant nor the accused can claim as a matter of right a direction from a Court commanding further investigation by the Investigating Officer under Sub-section (8) of Section 173 after a charge-sheet was filed after investigation.

17. An additional reason for coming to the aforesaid conclusion is that even for investigation there must be a point of finality. The law expects the discharge of duties by the Investigating Officer properly resulting in a report under Section 173(2). It may only be in some exceptional case where the Investigating Officer may have to collect some further evidence/materials and submit it to the Magistrate along with his further report. Such an exceptional case will only prove the general rule that normally investigation terminate with filing of the charge-sheet in Court. In other words, the Investigating Officer believes and places reliance on the evidence and material collected by him by then.

18. About the decisions cited at the Bar, it may be stated at the outset that no decision was placed before me in which a direction may have been issued by a Court commanding the Investigation Officer to make a further investigation in order to collect such evidence as may have been suggested by the accused. Coming to the decision in Narang’s case (AIR 1979 SC 1791) (supra), the facts of the said case were entirely different from the present one. A close reading of the facts in Narang’s case will indicate concerning the smaller conspiracy investigations were complete where after the Investigating Agency commenced further investigation concerning the larger conspiracy. It was challenged by the accused that the Police had no right to make further investigation in exercise of their rights under Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. This is how the Supreme Court itself has summarised the facts in paragraph 12 of the said judgment. Strong reliance was however placed by Sri V. C. Misra on paragraphs 20 and 21 of the said case and, to be more precise, on the following line in paragraph 21 :–

“…It is easy to visualise a case where fresh material may come to light which would implicate persons not previously accused or absolve persons already accused. When it comes to the notice of the Investigating Agency that a person already accused of an offence has a good alibi, is it not the duty of the Agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report to the Magistrate? After all, the Investigating Agency has greater resources at its command than a private individual. Similarly where the involvement of persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of the Investigating Agency the Investigating Agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information.”

True it is that if the Investigating Officer proposes to rely upon such further evidence or material as he may have information about concerning the alibi of an accused, he must be expected to collect that further material. In posing the question in the paragraph quoted above, the Hon. the Supreme Court itself used the words ‘If…accused…has a good alibi’, the genuineness of it should be investigated. Suffice it to say, that the so-called alibi of the accused is good or bad will obviously have to be left to the choice of the Investigating Officer so long as his opinion is going to be the material force behind filing of a charge-sheet or filing of a final report. Narang’s case, therefore, does not further the case of the accused in the present application. On the question of alibi something more could have been said but I am refraining from making any observation whatsoever because it is likely to prejudice one party or the other.

19. In Kashmiri Devi’s case (AIR 1988 SC 1323) (supra) the Supreme Court entertained the grievance of the wife of the deceased to the effect that the Investigating Agency has minimised the offence of Section 302, I.P.C. so much so as to file a charge-sheet under Section 323, I.P.C. The clash of interest in the said case was between the family members of the deceased on the one hand and the Agency trying to secure justice for the deceased’s family members on the other. The matter was initially taken to High Court through a writ petition when the charge-sheet had not come and the matter was pending investigation. But, by the time the said writ petition could reach the Supreme Court by way of Appeal the charge-sheet indicating tragically minimised offences had been filed in the Magistrate’s Court. On the given facts, therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court issued directions to the Magistrate to direct further investigation by Central Bureau of Investigation. This case also, therefore, is of no help to the accused for the type of relief he is claiming in the present case.

20. Though two more decisions i.e. Saldhana’s case reported in AIR 1980 SC 326 and Sampat Lal’s case reported in AIR 1985 SC 195, were referred to during the course of argument by the learned counsel for the applicant but they were not cited. I may only say that the facts of those two cases were not touching the matters in controversy in the present application. Sri Jitendra Kumar drew the attention of the Court to three other decisions i.e. Tara Singh’s case reported in AIR 1951 SC 441, Mohd. Niwaz’s case reported in (1947) 48 Cri LJ 774 (Lahore) and Achchan’s case reported in 1982 All Cri C 305 : (1982 All LJ NOC 31). All the three cases are on the point that in the given facts the Police could make further investigation. Therefore, I am not making a detailed reference to those cases because the scope of Section 173(8), Cr.P.C. has not been discussed in detail therein.

21. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it must be seen that the Investigating Officer has preferred to believe the evidence collected by him during the course of investigation which indicated the complicity of the applicant in the said crime as a result of which he has forwarded the charge-sheet. The course now left open for the Magistrate is to proceed in accordance with law after having taken cognizance under Section 190, Cr. P.C. to secure the presence of the accused for commitment of the case to the Court of Session.

22. In view of the discussion above there is no merit in this application which accordingly dismissed at the admission stage.