REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2008
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.509 of 2008)
Siddhapal Kamala Yadav ...Appellant
Versus
State of Maharashtra ...Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of
the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, dismissing the appeal filed by
the appellant who was found guilty for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `IPC’) by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon, in Sessions Case No.140 of 2002 and
was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine with
default stipulation.
3. The prosecution case unfolded through depositions of ASI Ukhadu
Tadvi (PW-2), hospital nurse Smt. Suman Bhave (PW-3) and guard Bhagwat
Sutar (PW-4), also complaint (Exhibit 18) that was filed by ASI Tadvi,
on behalf of the State. The incident in question took place on the
night between 18th and 19th July, 2002. To be precise, it took place at
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about 4.00 a.m. of 19.7.2002, at Ward No.14 of Civil Hospital, Jalgaon,
where the appellant and the victim Dilip Sitaram Chaudhary (hereinafter
referred to as `deceased’) were lodged.
The complainant ASI Tadvi was posted on guard duty at the said
prisoners’ cell in the Civil Hospital. There were other four policemen
also, along with him, namely, Police Constables Ibrahim, Bhagwat, Gokul
and Police Naik Sattar. Victim Dilip was admitted for treatment since
14.7.2002. On 18.7.2002, the appellant was admitted for treatment with
the complaint that he was murmuring to himself, like a lunatic. Both,
the victim and the appellant, were lodged in Ward No.14 in a common
room. ASI and 4 plicemen were the party on guard, posted at the said
ward.
On the fateful night, there was no electricity supply. At about
3.30 a.m. on 19.7.2002, constable Gokul was on duty. Since it was
raining, policemen occupied a location at the ground floor of the
hospital. Gokul alone was in the guardroom, by the side of the prisoners
ward.
At about 4.00 a.m. Police Constable Gokul, on duty, shouted, “Dada
run, there is a noise of violence in the prisoners’ room”.
Consequently, entire guard party rushed to the Wardroom and it was
opened. As ASI Tadvi entered the room, he was grabbed by the appellant.
However, all policemen managed to control the appellant and again put
him on the bed, where he was asked to sleep on the night with handcuff.
It was noticed at that time that, the appellant had freed himself from
the handcuff. It was noticed that the co-prisoner was not on the bed,
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but was hanging from the cot, his leg still was locked to the bed with
the fetter. Iron stand, used for hanging a saline bottle, was lying by
his side. It was also noticed that Dilip, the deceased who was hanging
by the side of the cot, had suffered head injury. The prisoner, who was
caught by the guard and who had escaped from the handcuff, was the
appellant. In the meanwhile, electricity supply was resumed by the
hospital generator. Nurse Suman (PW-3) had arrived there, who summoned
Resident Medical Officer (in short `RMO’). The RMO and other doctors
then carried the victim Dilip on a stretcher to the room of Casualty
Medical Officer (CMO) Dr. Survade, who, after sometime, informed that
the victim had expired. Intimation to that effect was sent to Zilla Peth
Police Station.
A detailed complaint, narrating these events, was lodged by ASI
Tadvi to the said Police Station, which was registered as First
Information Report at 08.30 hours and after investigation and committal
of the case, trial, which culminated into impugned judgment before the
High Court, was held.
As already described hereinabove, ASI Tadvi (PW-2), so also nurse
Suman (PW-3) and Police Constable Bhagwat (PW-4), are the persons, who
reached the location in response to call by guard on duty, Police
Constable Gokul. Other set of important witnesses is of four doctors.
Dr. Surwade (PW-5), was the CMO, who had reached the location upon call
by nurse Suman. Dr. Bhalchandra (PW-8) had performed autopsy. He has
recorded an opinion that, the death was result of head injury sustained
with multiple rib fracture, injuries suffered were sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to result into death and the saline stand
could be the possible weapon for inflicting the injuries. Dr. Satish
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Patil (PW-9) and Dr. Subhash Badgujar (PW-10) are the two psychiatrists,
then attached to civil hospital and the appellant was under their
observation, at the material time. The prosecution and the trial Court
have laid heavy emphasis on their evidence, in order to counter the
defence of mental illness, raised by the accused.
Rajendra (PW-1), is the panch witness to inquest panchnama
(Exh.16), spot panchnama (Exh. 26) was drawn in presence of panch
witness Prabhakar. Blood stained pant of the accused was also seized
under panchnama (Exh. 27), in his presence. Third panch witness Vilas
(PW-7) was present when arrest of the accused was effected, vide Exhibit
30 and also when clothes of the deceased were seized under Exhibit 29.
4. The trial Court, as noted above, discarded the defence of mental
illness as raised by the accused and found him guilty. The accused
reiterated its stand of general exception under Section 84 of the IPC
before the High Court. It was submitted that at the time of occurrence
by reason of unsoundness of mind the appellant was incapable to knowing
the nature of the act and was, therefore, entitled to protection under
Section 84 IPC. The High Court did not find any substance in the plea
and dismissed the appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the nature of the
acts clearly shows that the appellant was of unsoundness mind and did
not know the consequence of the act and, therefore, ought to have been
given protection under Section 84 IPC.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported
the judgment of the High Court.
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7. Section 84 lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of
alleged unsoundness of mind. There, is no definition of “unsoundness of
mind” in the IPC. Courts have, however, mainly treated this expression
as equivalent to insanity. But the term “insanity” itself has no precise
definition. It is a term used to describe varying degrees of mental
disorder. So, every person, who is mentally diseased, is not ipso facto
exempted from criminal responsibility. A distinction is to be made
between legal insanity and medical insanity. A Court is concerned with
legal insanity, and not with medical insanity. The burden of proof rests
on an accused to prove his insanity, which arises by virtue of Section
105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 (in short the `Evidence Act’) and
is not so onerous as that upon the prosecution to prove that the accused
committed the act with which he is charged. The burden on the accused is
no higher than that resting upon a plaintiff or a defendant in a civil
proceeding. (See Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat AIR 1964 SC 1563). In
dealing with cases involving a defence of insanity, distinction must be
made between cases, in which insanity is more or less proved and the
question is only as to the degree of irresponsibility, and cases, in
which insanity is sought to be proved in respect of a person, who for
all intents and purposes, appears sane. In all cases, where previous
insanity is proved or admitted, certain considerations have to be borne
in mind. Mayne summarises them as follows:
“Whether there was deliberation and preparation for the
act; whether it was done in a manner which showed a
desire to concealment ; whether after the crime, the
offender showed consciousness of guilt and made efforts
to avoid detections whether, after his arrest, he offered
false excuses and made false statements. All facts of
this sort are material as bearing on the test, which
Bramwall, submitted to a jury in such a case : `Would the
prisoner have committed the act if there had been a
policeman at his elbow ? It is to be remembered that
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these tests are good for cases in which previous insanity
is more or less established. These tests are not always
reliable where there is, what Mayne calls, “inferential
insanity”.
8. Under Section 84 IPC, a person is exonerated from liability for
doing an act on the ground of unsoundness of mind if he, at the time of
doing the act, is either incapable of knowing (a) the nature of the act,
or (b) that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The
accused is protected not only when, on account of insanity, he was
incapable of knowing the nature of the act, but also when he did not
know either that the act was wrong or that it was contrary to law,
although he might know the nature of the act itself. He is, however, not
protected if he knew that what he was doing was wrong, even if he did
not know that it was contrary to law, and also if he knew that what he
was doing was contrary to law even though he did not know that it was
wrong. The onus of proving unsoundness of mind is on the accused. But
where during the investigation previous history of insanity is revealed,
it is the duty of an honest investigator to subject the accused to a
medical examination and place that evidence before the Court and if this
is not done, it creates a serious infirmity in the prosecution case and
the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused. The onus, however,
has to be discharged by producing evidence as to the conduct of the
accused shortly prior to the offence and his conduct at the time or
immediately afterwards, also by evidence of his mental condition and
other relevant factors. Every person is presumed to know the natural
consequences of his act. Similarly, every person is also presumed to
know the law. The prosecution has not to establish these facts.
9. There are four kinds of persons who may be said to be non compos
mentis (not of sound mind), i.e., (1) an idiot; (2) one made non compos
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by illness (3) a lunatic or a mad man and (4.) one who is drunk. An
idiot is one who is of non-sane memory from his birth, by a perpetual
infirmity, without lucid intervals; and those are said to be idiots who
cannot count twenty, or tell the days of the week, or who do not know
their fathers or mothers, or the like, (See Archbold’s Criminal
Pleadings, Evidence and Practice, 35th Edn. pp.31-32; Russell on Crimes
and Misdemeanors, 12th Edn. Vol., p.105; 1 Hala’s Pleas of the Grown
34). A person made non compos mentis by illness is excused in criminal
cases from such acts as are-committed while under the influence of his
disorder, (See 1 Hale PC 30). A lunatic is one who is afflicted by
mental disorder only at certain periods and vicissitudes, having
intervals of reason, (See Russell, 12 Edn. Vol. 1, p. 103; Hale PC 31).
Madness is permanent. Lunacy and madness are spoken of as acquired
insanity, and idiocy as natural insanity.
10. Section 84 embodies the fundamental maxim of criminal law, i.e.,
actus non reum facit nisi mens sit rea” (an act does not constitute
guilt unless done with a guilty intention). In order to constitute an
offence, the intent and act must concur; but in the case of insane
persons, no culpability is fastened on them as they have no free will
(furios is nulla voluntas est).
11. The section itself provides that the benefit is available only
after it is proved that at the time of committing the act, the accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or that
even if he did not know it, it was either wrong or contrary to law then
this section must be applied. The crucial point of time for deciding
whether the benefit of this section should be given or not, is the
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material time when the offence takes place. In coming to that
conclusion, the relevant circumstances are to be taken into
consideration, it would be dangerous to admit the defence of insanity
upon arguments derived merely from the character of the crime. It is
only unsoundness of mind which naturally impairs the cognitive faculties
of the mind that can form a ground of: exemption from criminal
responsibility. Stephen in `History of the Criminal Law of England, Vo.
II, page 166 has observed that if a person cuts off the head of a
sleeping man because it would be great fun to see him looking for it
when he woke up, would obviously be a case where the perpetrator of the
act would be incapable of knowing the physical effects of his act. The
law recognizes nothing but incapacity to realise the nature of the act
and presumes that where a man’s mind or his faculties of ratiocination
are sufficiently dim to apprehend what he is doing, he must always be
presumed to intend the consequence of the action he takes. Mere absence
of motive for a crime, howsoever atrocious it may be, cannot in the
absence of plea and proof of legal insanity, bring the case within this
section This Court in Sherall Walli Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra:
(1972 Cr.LJ 1523 (SC)), held that the mere fact that no motive has been
proved why the accused murdered his wife and child or the fact that he
made no attempt to run away when the door was broken open would not
indicate that he was insane or that he did not have necessary mens rea
for the offence. Mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion,
irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psychopath affords no
protection under Section 84 as the law contained in that section is
still squarely based on the outdated Naughton rules of 19th Century
England. The provisions of Section 84 are in substance the same as that
laid down in the answers of the Judges to the questions put to them by
the House of Lords, in M Naughton’s case (1843) 4 St. Tr. (NS) 847.
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Behaviour, antecedent, attendant and subsequent to the event, may be
relevant in finding the mental condition of the accused at the time of
the event, but not that remote in time. It is difficult to prove the
precise state of the offender’s mind at the time of the commission of
the offence, but some indication thereof is often furnished by the
conduct of the offender while committing it or immediately after the
commission of the offence. A lucid interval of an insane person is not
merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, but a
restoration of the faculties of the mind sufficiently to enable the
person soundly to judge the act; but the expression does not necessarily
mean complete or prefect restoration of the mental faculties to their
original condition. So, if there is such a restoration, the person
concerned can do the act with such reason, memory and judgment as to
make it a legal act ; but merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of
the disorder is not sufficient.
12. The standard to be applied is whether according to the ordinary
standard, adopted by reasonable men, the act was right or wrong. The
mere fact that an accused is conceited, odd irascible and his brain is
not quite all right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which
he suffered had rendered his intellect weak and had affected his
emotions and will, or that he had committed certain unusual acts, in the
past or that he was liable to recurring fits of insanity at short
intervals, or that he was subject to getting epileptic fits but there
was nothing abnormal in his behaviour, or that his behaviour was queer,
cannot be sufficient to attract the application of this section.
13. Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, reads as follows:
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“84. Act of a person of unsound mind – Nothing is an
offence which is done by a person who, at the time of
doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable
of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing
what is either wrong or contrary to law.”
14. The evidence of doctors who attended the accused-appellant and the
opinion expressed by them clearly goes to show that the appellant’s plea
relating to unsoundness of mind have no substance. Dr. Satish (PW.9)
was present when the appellant was admitted to the Civil Hospital on
18.7.2000 at about 11.45 a.m. He has stated as follows:
“I examined the patient, I did not find any obvious
psychiatric illness. He was still kept under
observation. Subsequently, Dr. Badgujar (PW.10) medically
treated patient Sidhapal.”
15. Similarly, Dr. Subhash Badgujar (PW.10) who also treated the
appellant form 18.7.2002 i.e. the date of admission till 25.7.2002 the
date of discharge has stated as follows:
“The said patient Sidhpal Yadav was not mentally ill
person from 18.7.2002 to 25.7.2002.”
16. According to PW.10 when he examined the appellant on 18.7.2002 in
the evening he was calm and quiet. He was neither angry nor was he
shouting. This according to the doctor indicated that the appellant was
normal. In the medical records it has been clearly stated that he was
not cooperative and it was difficult to establish any rapport with him.
17. Accordingly, the trial Court and the High Court have rightly held
that Section 84 IPC has no application to the facts of the present case.
18. The appeal is sans merit and is dismissed.
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………………………………………………………J.
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
………………………………………………………J.
(DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi:
October 13, 2008
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