ORDER
S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. What is the true effect and import of sub-section (3) of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894) fells for consideration in this appeal.
2. The fact of the matter is not in dispute.
3. Land to the extent of Ac.20-11 gts. belonging to the 2nd respondent herein was acquired by the 1st respondent for the use of the appellant-company. An award was passed on 3-8-1987 fixing the compensation at the rate of Rs.6,000/- per acre. No application was filed by the 2nd respondent for reference to the civil Court in terms of Section 18 of the Act. Other persons similarly situated, however, sought for reference to the civil Court. Pursuant to or in pursuance thereof, the civil Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.6,000/-to Rs.9,500/- per acre. The 2nd respondent herein thereafter filed an application under Section 28-A of the Act for re-determination of the amount of compensation which was entertained by the Collector and by
order dated 31-12-1990, the compensation was enhanced to Rs.9,500/- per acre. On the same day, the 2nd respondent filed an application under sub-section (3) of Section 28-A of the Act.
4. The question, which arises for consideration is as to whether the application filed by the 2nd respondent herein for reference under sub-section (3) of Section 28-A was maintainable?
5. The learned single Judge without going into contentions raised by the parties herein, dismissed the writ petition observing that as the matter is already pending consideration before the civil Court in OP No.31 of 2000, all the issues shall remain open.
6. Section 28-A of the Act reads as follows:
Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court :–(1) Wherein an award , under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other lands covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court :
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite
for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (i), conduct an enquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18.
7. The object underlying the enactment of the above provisions, as indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, was:
“(ix) Considering that the right of reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually take advantage of by inarticulate and poor, people and is usually exercised by the comparatively affluent landowners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference Court under Section 18 of the Act.”
8. From the order-dated 31-12-1993 of the Collector, it appears that the application filed by the 2nd respondent
under sub-section (1) of Section 28-A was allowed in terms of sub-section (2) thereof observing:
Accordingly, Sri V. Ramakrishna Rao has filed petition under Section 18 of the LA Act for redetermination of amount of compensation basing in the Court orders in the above judgment in OP No.76 of 1988. Notices were issued to all the persons interested while fixing the date for enquiry as provided under Section 28-A(2). No objections and claims were received from any person within the stipulated time.
The petitioner Sri V. Ramakrishna Rao has submitted an application claiming Rs. 1,00,000/- per acre and not produced any documentary evidence.
In the instant case the petitioner’s land in Sy No.76 measuring 20-11 acres by dry situated at Rachapalli (v) falls in Category-11.
Hence, the rate of Rs.6,000/- to Rs.9,500/-deserves to be enhanced.
Hence, award is passed under Section 28-A of LA Act after determination of land value in Sy No.76 measuring 20-11 acres dry situated at Rachapalli (v) for an amount of Rs. 1,49,337/- only and ordered to be paid to Sri V. Ramakrishna Rao, S/o Laxmikantha Rao, r/o Kamanpur. The apportionment stated is enclosed herewith.
9. Despite the same, the 2nd respondent by application dated 31-12-1990 sought for reference of the matter of the civil Court under Section 28-A(3) of the Act stating:
I humbly submit that 1 have been paid an amount of Rs. 1,49,337-69 towards the land compensation payable to me for the acquired S.No.76 measuring 20 acres 11 guntas dry situated at Rachapalli village
of Manthini Mandal. The amount of compensation awarded by the LAO is very meager, and not fair market value of my acquired land. Hence, I have received the amount under protest.
I therefore request you to kindly refer the above matter of the competent civil Court for fixing of their market value, under Section 28-A (3) of LA Act.
10. While allowing the said prayer, the Special Deputy Collector in his letter dated 2-6-2000 addressed to the Senior Civil Judge, Peddapalli, observed:
The Awardees Sri V. Ramakrishna Rao has filed petition for referring the case to civil Court under Section 28-A(3) of LA Act for fixing of fair market value before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapalli vide reference 4th cited on the same day of receiving the compensation, even though he has not recorded under protest in the acquaintance roll, as is being done.
The Collector Karimnagar has accorded permission to refer the case to civil Court under Section 28-A(3) of LA Act vide reference (supra).
11. It has been submitted before us that the civil Court’s order on reference has been set aside by this Court and the matter is pending for fresh consideration before the civil Court.
12. In these proceedings, we are not concerned with any subsequent event and/or question, which might have arisen. The only question that arises for consideration is as to whether an application filed under sub-section (1) of Section 28-A during the prescribed period would be maintainable from the date of the order of the Court of the first instance or appellate Court.
13. Section 28-A was inserted by Act 68 of 1984. Evidently, the Legislature
in its wisdom though that even if a person had not filed any application for reference under Section 18 of the Act, he should not be discriminated against in the matter of payment of compensation where the civil Court allows compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector in respect of the lands covered by the same notification issued’ under Section 4(1). Section 28-A therefore has a limited role to play.
14. From a perusal of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the Act, it would appear that after an award is made under Part III whereby the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, a right accrues to a person interested in the land covered by the same notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4, who is also aggrieved by the award of the Collector but who had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, to move an application before the Collector for re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court.
15. A bare perusal of the provisions, in our considered opinion, leave no manner of doubt that the reference to provision of sub-section (3) can be had by a person if he is aggrieved by an order passed under subsection (2) and not otherwise. The Scheme of Section 28-A, which was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 as indicated hereinbefore, is that the persons similarly situated should be granted compensation alike. But subsection (2) confers power upon the Collector to pass a separate award. It may, in the fact situation of a particular case provide for less amount of compensation than that was granted by the civil Court. In a situation of that nature alone and not in a case like the present one where the application
under sub-section (1) has been allowed the applicant can ask for a further reference.
16. A provision contained in a statute must be read in its entirely having regard to the purport and object thereof. In our view, in a case of this nature, the principles of contextual interpretation should be applied and on that basis, there is no escape from holding that the persons who have not applied for reference under Section 18 of the Act cannot be given an opportunity to get a higher compensation than those who had made such a reference. At the cost of repetition, it may be observed that the purpose of Section 28-A(1) is to see that the persons similarly situated receive the same amount of compensation.
17. In Union of India v. Pradeep Kumar, , the Apex Court held:
…..Section 28-A is, therefore, in
the nature of a beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of right of reference to the civil Court under Section 18, of the Act. In relation to beneficent legislation, the law is well settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation the Court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed keeping in view the object underlying the said provision.
…..There is nothing in subsection (1) of Section 28-A to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of
Section 28-A. By construing the expression ‘where in an award under this Part in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A’ to mean ‘where in the first award made by the Court under this Part,’ the word ‘first’, which is not found in subsection (1) of Section 28-A, is being read therein and thereby the amplitude of the said provision is being curtailed so as to restrict the benefit conferred by it. In the matter of construction of a beneficent provision is not permissible by judicial interpretation to read words which are not mere and thereby restrict the scope of the said provision, (See: Jnan Ranjan Sen Gupta v. Arat Kumar Base, ).
…..By holding that the award
referred to in Section 28-A (1) is the first award made after the coming into force of Section 28-A, such persons would be to deprived of the benefit extended by Section 28-A. Such a construction would thus result in perpetuating the inequality in the payment of compensation which the Legislature wanted to remove by enacting Section 28-A. The object underlying Section 28-A would be better achieved by giving the expression “an award” in Section 28-A is natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the Court in Part III of the Act after the coming into force of Section 28-A. If the said expression in Section 28-A(1) is thus construed, a person would be able to seek re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are satisfied :
1. An award has been made by the Court under part III after the coming into force of Section 28-A;
2. By the said award the amount of compensation is excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under
Section 11 has been allowed the applicant in that reference;
3. The person moving the application under Section 28-A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to which the said award relates.
4. The person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18;
5. The application is moved within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the re-determination of amount of compensation is sought;
and
6. Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A for re-determination of compensation by an applicant.
18. The Apex Court in Vijayalakshmamma v. B.T. Shankar while dealing with the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, observed thus:
We are also of the view that either having regard to the state of law prevailing on the eve of coming into force of the Act or the nature and extent of the changes and alterations effected in the then existing personal law envisaged by Parliament should there be any justification whatsoever for Courts to rewrite Section 8 of the Act by doing violence to the language by adding something which has been consciously and deliberately omitted by Parliament itself.
19. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge erred in holding that the application is maintainable. Accordingly, the writ appeal is allowed and the order under appeal is quashed. No costs.