JUDGMENT
1. The writ petition is filed assailing the orders of the Government in Memo No.56887/UCII(1)/97-11, dated 1-5-1999 and for consequential directions to the respondents to release the lay out and building permission.
2. The petitioner is a co-operative house building society registered under the
provisions of A.P. Co-operative Societies Act on 25-6-1981 and represented by its President. It is the case of the petitioner that it entered into an agreement of sale dated 28-8-1981 with Mrs. N. Paul and another who were declared as surplus holders of urban land in respect of an extent of 9,291 sq.mts. In pursuance of the guidelines issued in G.O. Ms. No.136, dated 28-1-1981 it made an application to the Government for exemption under Section 20(1)(a) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act (for brief ‘the ULC Act’). The excess landholders also filed an application for exemption. When the matter was under consideration, the Government issued another G.O. Ms. No.964, dated 27-6-1983 superseding the G.O. Ms. No. 136. Therefore, the case of the petitioner was considered. The Government passed orders exempting the land from the provisions of the Chapter-Ill of the ULC Act through its Memo dated 25-7-1984 and directed allotment of house sites through HUDA to the genuine members of the society to enable them to construct the houses and that the amount if any paid to the landlord will be set of against the compensation payable by the Government to the landlord.
3. While the matter stood thus, the G.O. Ms. No.964 was challenged in the High Court, which was set aside by the High Court thereby restoring G.O. Ms. No.136. The Government carried the matter in appeal. But, however, it has withdrawn the appeal. Thus, G.O. Ms. No.136, dated 28-1-1981 was again restored. It is the case of the petitioner that they also paid lay out fee charges to the municipality and also developmental charges to the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority. The Collector also granted permission for them to have necessary fencing for the purpose of protection from the illegal encroachments. However, the Government have not issued any order exempting the land from the provisions of the ULC Act and passed orders under G.O. Ms. No.136. Under those
circumstances, the petitioner filed WP No. 18796 of 1997. The said writ petition was disposed of with a direction that the matters covered by proceedings No.E2/ 5218/76, dated 13-6-1997 of the Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling Act insofar as it relates to the petitioner society concerned was directed to be considered within a period of two months. Thereupon the Government passed order dated 18-8-1997 rejecting the case of the petitioner. However, this Court passed order in CC No.1682 of 1997, dated 4-2-1998 setting aside the order dated 18-8-1997 and directed the Government to pass fresh orders. Finally, the Government have now passed an order in Memo No.56887/UCII(1)/97-l 1, dated 1-5-1999 rejecting the case of the petitioner for grant of exemption. Aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition has been filed.
4. The Government filed a detailed counter narrating the facts of the case and stated that the decision was taken by the Government is quite legal and valid and the same is in accordance with law and hence the writ petition was liable to be dismissed.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the order rejecting the application of the petitioner is illegal and contrary to the provisions of the ULC Act. The reasons assigned by the Government are wholly illegal and untenable. The action of the Government is wholly mala fide. He submits that the application was made as early as in 1981 and it is only in 1999, it was finally rejected. Even the said rejection is wholly illegal and contrary to law. The learned Counsel submits that the Government issued guidelines in G.O. Ms. No.136, dated 20-1-1981 for exemption the surplus landholders in case they proposed to transfer the excess vacant land to the registered co-operative societies or group of housing societies. The learned Counsel submits that the petitioner society fulfils all the conditions laid down in the said G.O.
and in fact the Government itself recognised the society as genuine society in its proceedings dated 25-7-1984 when the matter was considered with reference to G.O. Ms. No.964, dated 27-3-1983. Therefore, rejecting the case of the petitioner for exemption is highly arbitrary and it is a case of non-application of mind. Secondly also he submits that the Urban Land Ceiling Act has been repealed by the Central Government and therefore the provisions of the ULC Act are not applicable and hence the Government has no power to reject the case under the purported exercise of powers under ULC Act. The learned Counsel further submits that the orders or notification issued under Section 20 of the Act have the force of law and therefore, the Government is bound to implement the orders issued in G.O. Ms. No.136 and if the society is found to fulfil the conditions laid down in the said G.O., the Government is bound to grant permission and it has no power to reject the case. Learned Counsel further submits that in view of the repeal of ULC Act, the Government have no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order.
6. The learned Government Pleader on the other hand submits that it is always open for the Government to reject the case in view of the public requirement of the said surplus land. Therefore, having exercised the power it would not be open for the petitioner to challenge the same. He also stated that the repeal of ULC Act has no application to A.P. State.
7. The issue that arises for consideration is whether the impugned orders issued by the Government dated 1-9-1995 are valid?
8. However, before delving into the merits of the matter, it is to be made clear that the Parliament repealed the ULC Act by the repealing enactment called Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repealed Act, 1999. This Act came into
force in the State of Haryana, Punjab and Union Territories and it shall apply to other States which adopts the repealing Act by resolution passed in that behalf as required under clause (2) of Article 252 of the Constitution of India. Admittedly, the State of Andhra Pradesh has not yet adopted the repealing Act. Therefore, it has to be necessarily held that the repealing Act has no application to the State of Andhra Pradesh. Hence this contention stands rejected.
9. Coming to the merits, it is no doubt true that the society was formed in 1981 when the applications were made by the society as well as the owner for granting exemption under Section 20(lXa) of the Act keeping in view the guidelines issued by the Government in G.O. Ms. No.136. In this regard, it is to be noted that when the Government issued G.O. Ms. No.964, dated 27-3-1983 in supersession of G.O. Ms. No.136, the application of the petitioner was pending consideration under G.O. Ms. No.136. But, however, the Government considered the matter with reference to G.O. Ms. No.964 and passed two orders on 25-7-1984.
The first order reads thus:
“Government have examined the request of Mrs. N. Paul and other landholders for grant of exemption in consultation with Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad and Commissioner, Land Reforms and Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad in the light of the guidelines issued in G.O. Ms. No.964, Revenue, dated 27-6-1983. They see no reason to consider the request for grant of exemption contained in the application first cited.”
The second order is extracted below:
“Orders have been issued in Government Memo 1st cited rejecting the application
of Mrs. N. Paul and other landholders for exempting the land in Sy. No.127/1 situated at Shaikpet Village, Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration measuring 9,291 sq.mts. from the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 under Section 20. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad is requested to take necessary further action as per G.O. 2nd cited under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and handover the possession of the land to HUDA for seeking layouts and plots and for allotment of the plots to the genuine members of the Silen Valley Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Hyderabad in accordance with the guidelines issued in the G.O. 2nd cited.
The list of (10) members of the Silen Valley Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Hyderabad is appended to this Memo. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad, Member and Convenor of the Allotment Committee constituted in the G.O. 2nd cited is requested to take action as per para 5(cXl) of the G.O. 2nd cited to finalise the allotment of house plots to the genuine members of the said society for construction of residential houses by causing such enquiry as may be necessary to determine the eligibility of members of the society for allotment of house sites. Any amount already paid by the society or member of the society to the landholder will be set off against the compensation payable by the Government to the landholder under Section 11 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act.”
10. However, it is stated that aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner society filed WP No.14731 of 1984. It is also to be noted that the validity of G.O. Ms. No.964 was challenged before this Court and it was
set aside. Basing on the order of Division Bench, this Court disposed of the WP in the following terms:
The Bench of this Court has struck down G.O. Ms. No.964, Revenue (UC.II) Department, dated 27-6-1983. The impugned order was passed by taking the guidelines in G.O. Ms. No.964, Revenue (UC.II) Department, dated 27-6-1983. In view of the Bench decision of this Court, the impugned order has to be quashed. The Government is directed to consider the application under G.O. Ms. No. 136, Revenue (UC.II) Department, dated 28-1-1981. The Supreme Court passed the order in CMP Nos.3100, 3129 and 4545 to 4558 of 1985 dated 11-2-1985 as follows:
“Till the disposal of the matters there will be stay of the consideration of the application by the authority. The State Government should not distribute the lands also till the disposal of the matters and the respondents shall also not make any constructions on the land.”
11. The same direction will follows. Therefore, the impugned order is set aside. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs.
12. The Supreme Court direction will stand till the disposal of the case by the Supreme Court. The matter was carried by the Government before the Supreme Court, but they were withdrawn by the Government. Accordingly the Supreme Court passed orders and dismissed the appeals on 9-2-1990. Since the Government did not pass any orders after withdrawal of appeals, the petitioner society filed another WP No. 18796 of 1997 and the said writ petition was disposed of on 11-8-1997 with the following directions:
Under these circumstances, the Government is now required to consider the matter and pass appropriate orders. Therefore, the writ petition is disposed of
with a direction that the matter covered by the proceedings No.E2/5218/76, dated 13-6-1997 of the Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling insofar as it relates to the petitioner society is concerned shall be considered and decided within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
13. It is needless to mention that since the members of the society have not been able to construct their house, the matter needs to be expedited on priority basis. The Government shall consider the matter taking into consideration the earlier decision in respect of the same society that it was genuine and its members are also genuine.
14. The Government passed order dated 18-8-1997 rejecting the case of the petitioner without reference to the orders passed by this Court on 11-8-1997. Therefore, said orders of Government were set aside in CC No.1682 of 1997, dated 4-2-1998 and directed the Government to pass fresh orders. Accordingly, they passed orders dated 1-5-1999 which are now assailed in this writ petition. This is how the present writ petition came to be filed.
15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is quite arbitrary and illegal. It was passed mala fide with extraneous consideration. As the Government found the society genuine and its members are genuine, it has no power to reject on the alleged ground of public requirement. Even the Government issued G.O. Ms. No.136 in the interest of public. Hence he submits that the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. On the other hand, learned Government Pleader submits that the surplus land vested with the Government and it is the prerogative of the Government to deal with the land. The decision taken by the Government cannot be said to be illegal as the Government keeping in view the public requirement,
rejected the case of the petitioner. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
16. In the impugned order, while rejecting the application of the petitioner, the Government gave the following reasons in Para 9 which reads:
“Government after careful examination of the matter de novo found that there are no merits in their request in accordance with G.O. Ms. No.136, Revenue, dated 28-1-1981 and also in view of public requirement of the said surplus land they do not see any reason to comply with the request. Hence, the request of Smt. N. Paul and others for grant of exemption of land admeasuring 9,291 sq.mts., in Sy. No.122/1 of Shaikpet so as to alienate the land in favour of Silen Valley Co-operative Housing Society is hereby rejected.”
17. The undisputed facts are that the owners of the land were declared surplus under the ULC Act. They made application as also the petitioner for exemption under Section 20 and for consequential allotment to the society in terms of G.O. Ms. No.136. For proper appreciation of the case, it is necessary to consider Section 20 of the Act. The relevant portion is extracted:
“20. Power to Exempt:–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter–
(a) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as
may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter;
(b) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government either on its own motion or otherwise, is satisfied that the application of the provisions of this Chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, that Government may, by order, exempt subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter:
Provided that no order under this clause shall be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing.
(2) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that any of the conditions subject to which any exemption under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) is granted is not complied with by any person, it shall be competent for the State Government to withdraw, by order, such exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person for making a representation against the proposed withdrawal and thereupon the provisions of this Chapter shall apply accordingly.”
18. As can be seen from the above provision, the Government is empowered to grant exemption under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act and guidelines were issued in case of exemptions in respect of the co-operative house building societies. The Government themselves have issued guidelines to exempt the surplus urban land in case the land is being purchased by the genuine co-operative housing building societies. It is not the case of the Government that it is not a genuine society. It is also not the case of the Government that the petitioner society did not fulfil any of the conditions laid down in
G.O. Ms. No. 136. But, on the other hand, it is stated that in view of the public requirement of the said surplus land the exemption was rejected. But, however, the learned Government Pleader submits that the land is required for public purpose as the other Government Departments and other organisations are making requests for allotment of land. He submitted that Atomic Energy Department, Power Grid Corporation of India, Khadi Industries Commission, Timmala Tirupathi Devasthanams etc., have made requisitions for allotment of land for the purpose of establishing offices etc. The very purpose of exempting the land under Section 20 is in the public interest namely for allotment through the co-operative societies to its members, who do not have any residential plots.
19. Para 2 of the G.O. Ms. No.136 recites as follows:
“The Government have carefully examined the matter. In view of the powers of exemption conferred upon the State Government under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and in order to curb the speculative transactions and to easily make available a plot of land at a reasonable price to the bona fide houseless members of a co-operative housing society. The Government considers it expedient in the public interest to lay down the following guidelines, in superannuation of the earlier guidelines issued in G.O. Ms. No.4270, Revenue, dated 10th September, 1980, for processing the exemption applications under Section 20(1)(a) of the ULC Act, 1976.”
20. In this case we are concerned with Section 20(1)(a) of the Act. As can be seen from the above provision, the Government is empowered to grant exemption under the aforesaid section keeping in view the guidelines if any issued. The Government
already issued guidelines for exemption in respect of genuine Co-operative House Building Societies in G.O. Ms. No. 136. The power of exemption is not only a right conferred on the State Government, but at the same time it is coupled with duty to exercise such power in a reasonable and fair manner, failing which, it gets attracted to judicial review. When the discretionary powers are vested with the Public Authority, the discretion has to be exercised fairly and objectively. Admittedly, the power under sub-clause (a) is to be exercised in the interest of expediency of public interest. G.O. Ms. No.136 was issued keeping in view the public interest and exempting the surplus landholders permitting them to transfer the land to the genuine co-operative Societies for allotment to its members who did not own any housing plots. Thus the object is to promote economic development and social improvement to sub-serve the common good. Also the object of the Act being to prevent concentration of urban land in the hands of a few people and to prevent speculation and profiteering therein and to bring about equitable distribution of land. This object would be fully served by promoting the cooperative effort by making allotment to the genuine co-operative Societies. What is required to be considered is that the discretion which vests with the Government by virtue of G.O. Ms. No.136 to exempt the surplus urban lands, must be exercised in fair and transparent manner. It is fairly settled that absence of arbitrary power is the essential of the rule of law, upon which the entire constitutional system is based. In a system governed by Rule of Law, discretion conferred upon the authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits. The decision taken should be in accordance with known Rules of Law.
21. The principles on which the administrative decision of a public authority in the exercise of its discretion, have been settled one and half centuries back in a leading English case, Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 680, which are as under:
“What then, are those principles? They are perfectly well understood. The exercise of such discretion must be real exercise of the discretion. If, in the statutes conferring the discretion, there is to be found expressly or by implication, the matters to which the authority exercising the discretion ought to have regard, then, in exercising the discretion, they must have regard to those matters. Conversely, if the nature of the subject-matter and the general interpretation of the Act make it clear that certain matters will not be germane to the matter in question they must disregard those matters.”
And further it was observed:
“It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. What does that mean? Lawyers, familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to the exercise of statutory discretion often use the word, ‘unreasonable’ in a rather comprehensive sense. It is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he is to consider. If he does obey these rules, he may truly be said and often is said, to be acting reasonably. Similarly, you may have something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it will lie within the powers of the authority. In another sense it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as having been done in bad faith. In fact, all these things largely fall under one head.”
22. The case has been followed in India. The same principles have been laid down by the Supreme Court and the Indian High Courts in a number of cases.
23. Following the above case, the House of Lords laid down the same principles in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, (1968) 1 All ER 694. it was observed:
“Parliament must have conferred the discretion with intention that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act; the policy and objects of the Act must be determined by construing the Act as a whole, and construction is always a matter of law for the Court. In a matter of this kind it is not possible to draw a hard and fast line, but if the Minister, by reason of his having mis-construed the Act or for any other reason, so uses his discretion as to thwart or run counter to the policy and objects of the Act, then our law would be very defective if persons aggrieved were not entitled to the protection of the Court.” (per Lord Reid at Page 699).
24. This case has been referred to and followed by the Supreme Court and High Courts in a number of cases.
25. Therefore, it is necessary that the discretion vested under Section 20 of the Act should be exercised by the State in a manner which would advance the public interest and nothing should be brought to bear on the power of the Government to narrow down the public cause. When the Government issued G.O. Ms. No.964 superseding the G.O. Ms. No. 136, the Division Bench in Katya Co-operative Building Society Ltd., v. State of A.P., (DB), while setting aside the G.O. observed that the State Government was bound to exercise the power under Section 20 in each individual case honestly
and by genuinely addressing itself to the matter before it and blanket order to the effect that all applications for grant of exemption under Section 20 of the Act by the Co-operative Societies was quashed.
26. In the instant case, the Government rejected the case of the petitioner stating that there are no merits in the request. Obviously, no reasons are forthcoming in the order passed by the Government. The Government after hearing the parties who are represented by advocates and after considering the matter was expected to pass a reasoned order. But in the instant case, it has passed a cryptic order stating that there are no merits in the request. Such an order is ex facie arbitrary, the Court could have again remanded the matter. When the reasons are not disclosed in the order and in view of the fact that the matter was under consideration from 1981 and to render substantial justice to the parties, this Court is entitled to peruse the files to know as to whether any such reasons were recorded before taking such decision. The learned Government Pleader submitted the concerned files for perusal of this Court.
27. It is not the case of the Government that the petitioner society is a bogus society and the members are not genuine and that it did not fulfil the conditions laid down in G.O. Ms. No.136. In fact, G.O. Ms. No.136 gives power to the Government to except the surplus landholders to sell the surplus land to genuine co-operative societies. When that was superseded by G.O. Ms. No.946, the case of the petitioner was considered by the Government under G.O. Ms. No.964 and it passed orders on 25-7-1994 referred to above. In the first order, it rejected the case for grant of exemption on the basis of; G.O. Ms. No.964, which was ruling the field. In the second order passed on the very same day, the Government has directed to handover the possession of the land to
HUDA for making lay out of plots and for allotment of plots to the genuine members of the petitioner society. Thus, it was not rejection of the case of the petitioner for exemption. But, as per the G.O. Ms. No.964, the order was passed rejecting the case for exemption as a policy matter and directing HUDA to sanction lay out and to allot the land to genuine members of the same society. Therefore, it has to be necessarily inferred that the Government did not find fault with the society. On the other hand, instead of making transfer in favour of the petitioner for making consequential allotment to its genuine members, the Government entrusted that work to HUDA. Therefore, what the HUDA could have done was none other than what could have been done by the Society under G.O. Ms. No. 136. Therefore, it is not a case of rejection even on earlier occasion in public interest. The Government considered that the public interest would be well served by making allotment through HUDA instead of society because of G.O. Ms. No.964. Since the G.O. Ms. No.964 is no more existing, the matter has to be considered under G.O. Ms. No.136. The policy of the Government while issuing G.O. Ms. No. 136 was to permit the co-operative Societies to purchase the surplus land and to allot to its members. Para 2 of the said Government Order affirms the said policy, which is extracted supra.
28. However, the learned Government Pleader submits that the land is also required for public purpose as other departments, such as Atomic Energy Department, Power Grid Corporation of India, Khadi Industries Commission, Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams etc., have made requisitions for allotment of land for the purpose of establishing offices. Therefore, it has to be seen what reasons prompted the Government to reject the case of the petitioner.
29. Admittedly, in the instant case, the application was made by the society as early
as in 1981 and for one reason or other reason, the matter was not given finality. Now the ground of rejection is that in view of the public requirement of the said land, the request for exemption was rejected. The files did not in any manner reveal that the requests have been made by other departments for allotment of land and on that basis the request of the petitioner has to be negatived. However, from the separate files produced by the Government Pleader, it is seen that some departments made requests for allotment of land in November, 1998 and thereafter. At that relevant time, when the application was made in 1981, there was no such request at all from any Governmental agencies. While rejecting the application also the authorities did not consider that since there was a request from the other department the requests of the society for exemption from the provisions of the ULC Act was rejected. Note file simply reveals that the Government has taken a decision to reject the application. But, what prompted the Government to reject the application of the petitioner, the reasons are not forthcoming either in the order or in the files which are placed before this Court. Though it is stated by the Government that the decision was taken, since the land vested in the Government. Yet, as can be seen from the letters issued by the Municipality that the charges were collected for approving the tentative lay out and the Collector also granted permission to construct a compound wall to safeguard the property. But, however, subject to exemption by the Government under Section 20. The dispute is not with regard to exemption before or after vesting or after taking possession. But, the real issue is whether the Government has acted fairly by exhibiting transparency. As can be seen from the note file of the Government that, as a policy, the Government was not agreeing for request of exemption under Section 20 of the ULC Act and that the case of the petitioner was rejected twice on earlier occasions and therefore on these two grounds the matter was rejected. It may be noted
that the Government itself carved out a policy for granting exemption in respect ofthe co-operative Housing Societies proposing to be purchased surplus land and their policy contained in G.O. Ms. No.136 has neither been rescinded nor modified. There is no other policy which has been spelt out in any notifications issued by the Government. In such a case, it would be most inappropriate to reject the case of the petitioner on the ground that as a policy, the Government is not agreeing for the request for exemption. Having issued notification in pursuance of the Government policy, it would not be reasonable on the part of the Government to reject the request for exemption as a matter of policy without there being any such policy. The guidelines were issued in G.O. Ms. No.136 to exercise the power for proper implementation of the provision. They are binding on the Government. They cannot violate the same on an undisclosed policy. Therefore, the ground that as a policy such application as rejected is not sustainable in law and it is held accordingly.
30. Another ground which weighed the Government that earlier the request was rejected twice. This ground also is untenable for the reasons that when the matter was not properly considered on two earlier occasions, the Court directed them to consider in a proper perspective. Simply because, the case of the petitioner was rejected twice earlier, and the Government cannot reject third time on the ground. This shows the way in which the matter was dealt with and its manifestation of casual approach of the Government to the genuine cause of the petitioner society. Admittedly, the avowed object of granting exemption in respect of the lands purchased by the co-operative societies was in public interest and that public interest cannot be unsettled by merely stating that the Government has rejected the case earlier on two occasions. While dealing with the application for exemption, the Government is expected to consider the
matter in a transparent manner without any pre-conceived notions. Therefore, in view of these circumstances, 1 am of the view that the impugned order of the Government are illegal and arbitrary. When once the Government finds that the petitioner complied with the requirement under G.O. Ms. No.136, there is no other alternative except to grant exemption. It cannot be now said that the requests from the other Government departments were pending, that would override the requirement of the petitioner. In any event, the case of the petitioner has to be considered with reference to the application as on 1981. It may be that number of requests must have received by the Government much later to the application of the petitioner, but the public interest of the petitioner society cannot be ignored on the ground that some other organisations made an application for allotment of the land. It is no doubt true that the surplus land vests with the Government. But, under Section 20 of the ULC Act, the surplus land is required to be utilised for public purpose, the allotment of land to the co-operative House Building Societies is also one of the public purpose. Under these circumstances, the impugned order is not sustainable in law and the same is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, it is set aside.
31. Since it is not the case of the Government, that the society did not fulfil the conditions for allotment under G.O. Ms. No.136, the Government is directed to issue appropriate orders granting exemption under Section 20 of the Act. This exercise shall be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No costs.