IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 4849-4850 of 2000
Sita Ram Bhandar Society,
New Delhi ....Appellant
Vs.
Lt. Governor, Govt. of N.C.T.
Delhi & Ors. ......Respondents
JUDGMENT
HARJIT SINGH BEDI,J.
1. These appeals are directed against the judgment of the
Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated 2nd September
1998 dismissing the writ petitions. The facts are as under:
2. On 13th November 1959, a Notification was issued by the
Chief Commissioner of Delhi under 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act (hereinafter called the “Act”) notifying the Government’s
intention to acquire 34070 acres of land for the “Planned
…2/…
2
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
Development of Delhi”. This notification had, within its ambit,
agricultural land belonging to the appellant society, bearing
Khasra No. 157 in Village Lado Sarai, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi
measuring 8 Bighas and 11 Biswas or 8620 sq. yards
equivalent to 1.8 acres. The appellant filed objections under
Section 5A of the Act on the 10th December 1959 submitting
that the land be exempted from the proposed acquisition. It
pointed out that the appellant body was a registered trust and
a religious body managing three temples in Pilani, Rajasthan
and several gardens, water tanks etc. having religious
significance. The objections raised were apparently found
without merit whereafter the Chief Commissioner issued a
declaration under Section 6 of the Act which was published on
16th May 1966 pertaining to 2153 Bighas 2 Biswas
corresponding to about 448 acres. The Collector, Land
Acquisition also rendered his award on 19th June 1980
clarifying that it pertained only to 1996 Bighas 18 Biswas
leaving out an area of 156 Bighas 4 Biswas for the time being
3
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
as it was built up and that the award for this area would be
given later. The appellant’s property Khasra No.157 was,
however, included in the award of 19th June, 1980. It appears
that pursuant to the award possession of 1933 Bighas and 2
Biswas was taken by the Collector, Land Acquisition on the
20th June 1980 and further handed over to the beneficiary
department. It was, however, observed in the proceedings of
20th June 1980 that the possession of the balance area of
about 61 Bighas would be taken after the removal of the
structures with the help of the demolition squad. On the 29 th
July 1980 a Notification under Section 22 (1) of the Delhi
Development Act, 1957 was issued by the Central
Government, placing the acquired land at the disposal of the
Delhi Development Authority for the planned development of
Delhi. At this stage, the appellant filed CWP No.1068 of 1980
in the Delhi High Court challenging the validity of the
Notification under Section 4 and Declaration under Section 6
of the Act. This petition was dismissed in limine on the 18 th
August 1980. The appellant thereupon preferred Special
4
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
Leave Petition in this Court and after leave was granted the
appeal was registered as C.A. No. 1738 of 1981. While the
appeal was still pending, the appellant filed Writ Petition
No.2220/1981 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in
the Supreme Court. It appears that an interim order was
made by the Supreme Court in these proceedings on 15th of
July 1981 staying dispossession of the appellant from the
property in dispute and the said order was confirmed on 16th
September 1982. Both the Civil Appeal and the Writ Petition
aforementioned were, however, dismissed by this Court on the
20th July 1993. It also appears from the record that while the
aforementioned two matters were pending in this Court, the
appellant filed Suit No. 1226 of 1992 on the Original Side of
the Delhi High Court praying for an injunction against the
respondents, including the Delhi Development Authority, that
no structure be demolished and that no interference be made
with the plaintiff’s possession and management of the Suit
land. An interim injunction was also sought and obtained in
these proceedings. It is the appellant’s case that though the
5
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
aforesaid Suit was transferred to the District Court in Delhi on
account of the revision of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the
Delhi High Court, the said interim injunction still continued to
operate, but despite the interim orders the Delhi Development
Authority continued to impinge on the appellant’s property on
which a Contempt Petition was filed in the High Court, which
in its order dated 19th May 1992, directed the respondent
authorities to ensure compliance with the High Court’s order
dated 2nd April 1992 made in the civil suit. It is further the
case of the appellant that some time later the Delhi
Development Authority again tried to interfere with the
appellant’s property on which yet another Contempt Petition
No.36 of 1993 was filed and the same is said to be pending.
The appellant, however, continued to be persist in its efforts to
save the acquired land and at this stage filed C.W.P.No.700 of
1994 in the Delhi High Court on 28th January 1994
challenging, inter-alia, the constitutional validity of Section 22
of the Delhi Development Act, whereunder the acquired land
had been handed over to the DDA, and also praying for the
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CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
allotment of an alternative site in lieu of the acquired land.
This writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on September
8, 1995 the prayer of the counsel for the petitioner (the
present appellant) in the following terms:
“Mr. Anand says, in view of the
order dated 29.11.94, he would not press
this petition at this stage and would
apply for allotment of alternative land in
the institutional area.Dismissed as withdrawn. However,
we will make it clear that allotment of the
alternative land be made to the petitioner
as per policy.”3. Still dissatisfied, the appellant filed W.P. No. 623 of 1995
in the Delhi High Court challenging some facets of the alleged
violation of the Master Plan of 2001 which had statedly made
the entire proceedings for the planned development of Delhi
incohate and which had rendered the acquisition without any
authority of law . This matter came up before the Delhi High
Court after notice on 20th February 1995 on which the High
Court observed that the petitioner was seeking two distinct
prayers in the Writ Petition, (1) that the land which had been
7
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000acquired under the Land Acquisition Act should be released
from acquisition and (2) that the DDA should not be permitted
to use the aforesaid land for a purpose other than that
postulated in the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan
and as the two prayers were mutually distinct and pertained
to different causes of action, one writ petition was not
maintainable. On this, the learned senior counsel for the
appellant, Mr. R.K. Anand stated that he would file two
separate writ petitions for which liberty was granted and the
papers of CWP No. 623 of 1995 were accordingly returned to
the counsel. The appellant thereupon moved two writ
petitions i.e. W. P. Nos. 1628/1995 praying that the
respondent DDA be restrained from taking over possession of
the land and Writ Petition No. 1629/1995 seeking to challenge
the land acquisition proceedings which had been initiated by
the Notification under Section 4 and Declaration under
Section 6 of the Act in the year 1959 and 1966 respectively
and also pleading that as the possession had not been taken,
the land be released under Section 48 of the Act. The Division
8
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000Bench while dealing with the question of possession held that
the writ petitioner had only relied on two stray entries in two
Khasra Girdawaris for the period 13th October 1980 to 11th
March 1981 which had recorded the land to be “Gair Mumkin
Kotha Pukhta and Char Diwari” and that this entry was
meaningless in the light of the fact that the land had been
described as “Rosli” (agricultural) and not a built up property
in the award No.36/80-81 dated 19.6.1980 and that in any
case the plea appeared to be an after thought as it had not
been taken by the petitioner though it was available at the
time when Writ Petition No. 1068/1980 (in the Delhi High
Court) and Writ Petition No.2220/1981 had been directly filed
in this Court. The Court further held that it was clear from
the proceedings recorded by Shri Lal Singh Naib Tehsildar,
Land Acquisition, on 20th June 1980 in the presence of a large
number of Revenue Officials that possession had indeed been
taken over on that day after demarcation had been made with
respect to 1933 bighas 2 biswas, including the land belonging
to the appellant, and that boundary pillars had been affixed
9
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000round the demarcated land and that the possession had
further been handed over to Shri N.N. Seth, Tehsildar on 20th,
21st, 23rd and 24th of June 1980. The Court also noted that the
proceedings aforementioned were witnessed as to their
authenticity by Shri N.N.Seth, and the two DDA Officials, Shri
Raj Bahadur and Shri Gulab Singh. The Division Bench in
this background observed that possession had, in fact, been
taken over after appropriate proceedings. The two writ
petitions were accordingly dismissed by the Division Bench of
the Delhi High Court vide the impugned judgment leading to
the present appeals as a consequence.
4. At the very outset, Mr. Sunil Gupta, the learned senior
counsel for the appellant has candidly stated at the Bar that
the appellant was no longer challenging the acquisition and
the relief claimed in W.P. 1629/1995 was, therefore, not being
pursued in this appeal. He has, however, prayed with the
greatest emphasis, that in so far as the claim arising out of
W.P. No.1628/1995 was concerned it was clear from the
record that possession of the appellant’s land i.e. 1 acre 8
10
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000Biswas continued to remain with the appellant despite the
findings to the contrary recorded by the High Court, and as
such it was open to the Government to withdraw from the
acquisition if it so desired, under Section 48 of the Act.
5. In this background, Mr. Gupta, has raised three
arguments before us during the course of hearing. He has
first pointed out that it was the positive case of the appellant
that the land in dispute was encircled by a boundary wall and
as such possession thereof could be taken only after entering
the land and not by any symbolic or paper possession. As a
corollary, it has been submitted, that there was no material on
record to show that the actual physical possession had been
taken as would preclude the withdrawal of the acquisition
under Section 48 of the Act. In this connection, the learned
counsel has placed reliance on Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs.
M.D. Bhagat & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 700 and Om Prakash &
Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (1998) 6 SCC 1 which had
been subsequently followed in P.K.Kalburqi vs. State of
Karnataka & Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 489. It has finally been
11
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000submitted that there was ample evidence on record to show
that the property in dispute was, in fact, surrounded by a wall
and had some other structures as well, and in view of the
positive stand taken by the Land Acquisition Collector in his
award dated 19th June 1980 that the possession of the area
covered by structures would be the subject matter of a
supplementary award, the very basis of the judgment of the
High Court that the possession had been taken on the
20th June 1980 was erroneous.
6. Mr. Saharya and Mr. Wasim Quadri, the learned counsel
appearing for the DDA and the Delhi Government respectively
have controverted the submissions and have pointed out that
the appellant had, for almost 30 years, been able to scuttle the
development of the area by taking piecemeal stands in the writ
petitions and civil suits from the year 1980 onwards and
though the aforesaid matters had been rejected with positive
findings that possession had been taken, and that there was no
wall or structure on the land in question. It has also been
submitted that the proper procedure had been adopted by the
12
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000Naib Tehsildar and that the possession had been taken over as
per law on the 20th June 1980 and there was ample evidence to
this effect which had been considered by the Division Bench.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties very
carefully. The Act provides a machinery for the acquisition of
the land. An acquisition is set in motion by a Notification
under Section 4 when it is proposed to acquire any land for
public purpose and Section 5A envisages the filing of
objections with regard to the proposed acquisition. After the
objections under Section 5A have been considered and been
found without merit, a declaration under Section 6 of the Act
is published that the land is indeed required for a public
purpose. Section 9 of the Act provides that after all the
proceedings and certain other formalities have been completed
the Collector shall give public notice that the Government
intends to take possession of the land and calling upon the
persons interested to file their claims for compensation. The
matter is then enquired into by the Collector who renders his
award under Section 11 of the Act and possession is taken by
13
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000the Collector under Section 16 on which the land vests
absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It
is the case of the respondent that all the procedures had been
followed and that possession had been taken under Section 16
on the 20th June 1980, and as such, the question of its release
under Section 48 of the Act did not arise, as this provision
gives “liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of
which possession has not been taken”. The question raised by
Mr. Gupta is that as the area in question was very extensive
i.e. about 1933 bigas and the land belonging to the appellant
was surrounded by a boundary wall, symbolic possession was
meaningless and some more positive action was called for. To
support this view he has relied on the three judgments cited
earlier. We find, however, that the aforesaid judgments, in
fact, help the case of the respondent rather than the other way
around. In Narayan Bhagde’s case, which was heard by
three Hon’ble Judges of this Court one of the Hon’ble Judges
(Untwalia,J.) held that the principles underlying Order 21,
Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of the CPC prescribing the modes of
14
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000delivery of possession including symbolic and actual could be
applied to proceedings under the Act but the other two Hon’ble
Judges (Bhagwati and Gupta,JJ.) held that the said provisions
could not be applied to proceedings under the Act and that
actual possession thereof was required to be taken. In this
background, the two Hon’ble Judges observed as under:-
“We think it is enough to state that
when the Government proceeds to take
possession of the land acquired by it under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take
actual possession of the land, since all
interests in the land are sought to acquired by
it. There can be no question of taking
`symbolical’ possession in the sense
understood by judicial decision under the
Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession
merely on paper be enough. What the Act
contemplates as a necessary condition of
vesting of the land in the Government is the
taking of actual possession of the land. How
such possession may be taken would depend
on the nature of the land. Such possession
would have to be taken as the nature of the
land admits of. There can be no hard and fast
rule laying down what act would be sufficient
to constitute taking of possession of land.
There cannot be an absolute and inviolable
rule that merely going on the spot and making
a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise
would be sufficient to constitute taking of
possession of land in every case. But here, in
15
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000our opinion, since the land was lying fallow
and there was no crop on it at the material
time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the
spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of
determining what part was waste and arable
and should, therefore, be taken possession of
and determining its extent, was sufficient to
constitute taking on possession. ”8. In Om Prakash’s case (supra) the basic issue was as to
whether the land which was the subject matter of acquisition
could be acquired in view of the State policy that Abadi land
was not to be acquired. It is in this connection, the Court
observed that there appeared to be no conclusive evidence that
possession had been taken from the land owner, and the
matter was left open for the land owner to approach the State
Government under Section 48 of the Act to have land released.
In P.K.Kalburqi’s case (supra), a reference was made to the
judgment in Narayan Bhagde’s case (supra) and it was once
again reiterated that the procedure for taking possession
would depend upon the nature of the land and the extent
thereof. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid judgments
would reveal that while taking symbolic and notional
16
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000possession is perhaps not envisaged under the Act but the
manner in which possession is taken must of necessity
depend upon the facts of each case. Keeping this broad
principal in mind, this Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board
vs. Viswam (D) by Lrs. AIR 1996 SC 3377 after considering
the judgment in Narayan Bhagde’s case, observed that while
taking possession of a large area of land (in this case 339
acres) a pragmatic and realistic approach had to be taken.
This Court then examined the context under which the
judgment in Narayan Bhagde’s case had been rendered and
held as under:
“It is settled law by series of
judgments of this Court that one of the
accepted modes of taking possession of
the acquired land is recording of a
memorandum or Panchanama by the
LAO in the presence of witnesses signed
by him/them and that would constitute
taking possession of the land as it would
be impossible to take physical possession
of the acquired land. It is common
knowledge that in some cases the
owner/interested person may not
cooperative in taking possession of the
land.”17
In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust,
Amritsar vs. State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1239 yet
again the question was as to the taking over of the possession
of agricultural land and it was observed thus:
“It is seen that the entire gamut of the
acquisition proceedings stood completed by
April 17, 1976 by which date possession of the
land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh
has contended that the appellant still retained
their possession. It is now well-settled legal
position that it is difficult to take physical
possession of the land under compulsory
acquisition. The normal mode of taking
possession is drafting the Panchnama in the
presence of Panchas and taking possession
and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the
accepted mode of taking possession of the
land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of
possession would tantamount only to illegal or
un lawful possession.”
9. It would, thus, be seen from a cumulative reading of the
aforesaid judgments, that while taking possession of a large
area of land with a large number of owners, it would be
impossible for the Collector or the Revenue Official to enter
each bigha or biswas and to take possession thereof and that
a pragmatic approach has to be adopted by the Court. It is
18
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000also clear that one of the methods of taking possession and
handing it over to the beneficiary department is the recording
of a Panchnama which can in itself constitute evidence of the
fact that possession had been taken and the land had vested
absolutely in the Government.
10. The question arises as to whether in the face of the
above observations, the procedure adopted by the Naib
Tehsildar, Land Acquisition Shri Lal Singh was the correct
one. The Award was rendered in the present matter on the
19th June 1980. As per the possession proceedings
(Panchnama) recorded by Shri Lal Singh dated the 20th June
1980, possession of 1933 bighas 2 biswas of land had been
taken over and handed over to the Revenue Department on the
21st June 1980, 23rd June 1980 and 24th June 1980. In the
Panchnama it was also observed that the land had been
demarcated and pillars had been affixed and that the physical
possession had further been handed over to Shri N.N. Seth,
Tehsildar, the representative of the beneficiary department.
Admittedly, Khasra No.157 was covered by this document. It is
19
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
recorded that the possession of the land under the built up
area of 160 bighas 6 biswas could not be handed over and the
details of this land have also been provided in the aforesaid
document. Khasra No.157 does not come in this category.
Mr.Gupta has, however, emphasized that some material
documents which show the possession had not been taken on
20th June, as alleged, had been ignored by the Division Bench
which he has referred us to the Khasra Girdwaris for the years
1980-81 and 1981-82 showing the existence of a Char Diwari.
He has, accordingly, submitted that the observations in the
award that the appellant’s land was “Rosli” was incorrect in
the light of this record. We find absolutely no merit in this
plea. A Khasra Girdwari which is a mere crop inspection
report entered twice a year (Kharif and Rabi crops) has no
presumption of truth attached to it. Even otherwise the state
of the land as on the date of the Notification under Section 4 of
the Act (which is 13th November 1959) would be the relevant
date as to the nature of the land and a crop inspection report
20 years later cannot be taken as proof of some facts said to
20
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
exist in the year 1959. Mr. Gupta has also stressed that from
the Award itself it was clear that the wall standing on Khasra
No.157 had been assessed to a compensation of Rs.420/- and
as such the observations in the award that land was
agricultural was erroneous. Mr. Saharya has, however,
pointed out that the part of the Award to which reference has
been made by Mr. Gupta is captioned as “Wells and
Structures’ and that a reference to a wall in the body is
typographical error. We reproduce the relevant portion of the
award herein under:
Wells and Structures
“The land under acquisition has number of
wells, water channel and structures. The Assistant
Engineer (Valuation) has made the rate assessment
of each of these items to which I agree and award
accordingly subject to the verification at the time of
possession as per details given as under: –
Value
Kh.No. Item Assessed
Well, Drain, Water
555/2/2 tank Rs.6920/-
254 Well Structure Rs.2490/-
577/430 -do- Rs.2130/-
217 Well Structure Rs.2730/-
100 Structure Rs.260/-
670/27 -do- Rs.3320/-
15 Well Rs.4030/-
21
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
Structure/Room
Well, Water tank,
29 Room & Structures Rs.3490/-
Well, Structures,
Water tank, rooms &
139 drains 4600/-
Well Structures,
160 room & drain Rs.2750/-
394 Well Structures Rs.4690/-
399 -do- Rs.2380/-
242 Structure Rs.540/-
149 -do- Rs.260/-
580/148 Wall Rs.1264/-
157 -do- Rs.420
Well, Water Tank,
172 drain Structure Rs.7960/-
298 -do- Rs.4890/-
333 wells, Structure Rs.5350/-
Structure &
20 Compound wall Rs.3300/-
Well, Water drains,
195/2 Water tank & room Rs.7530/-
321 -do- Rs.7250/-
Well, Water tank
478 drains & rooms Rs.6665/-
Room, water tank,
321 drain Rs.1125/-
478 Drain Rs.360/-
Well, water tank,
92 drain, Khurli, rooms Rs.7260/-
Well, water tank,
drain khurli, rooms,
155 verandah Rs.6720/-
Well, Water tank,
597/202/264 Room Rs.2700/-
Well, Water tank,
Water Channel
455 room Rs.2790/-
Well, Water tank,
86 drains, rooms Rs.3320/-
Value
No. Item assessed
514 Well Rs.1720/-
464 -do- Rs.2850/-
688/518/119/2 -do- Rs.2290/-
189 -do- Rs.1820/-
436 Well, structures Rs.1020/-
210 Well Rs.2060/-
453 -do- Rs.5650/-
22
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
Total: Rs.1,21,189-00
There are water channels running
through Kh. Nos. 228, 635/251, 254, 253,
255, 250, 263, 597/262, 261, 269, 434, 435,
440, 442, 443, 444, 445 & 446. The Naib-
Tehsildar has made a detailed valuation to
which I agree and award Rs.2870/- as
compensation as these channels.”
11. A reading of the above extract reveals that wells, and
structures connected with wells, and irrigation
facilities have been referred to therein and an
independent wall is not even remotely the subject
matter. Mr. Gupta has, however, seriously objected
to this explanation by submitting that no plea
doubting the accuracy of the document having been
raised in the counter affidavit, the respondents were
now precluded from making this submission. We,
however, feel that in the light of the context in which
the entire matter has been dealt with in the Award,
there can be no doubt that the entry `wall’ should be
read as `well’ vis-`-vis Khasra No.157. There is yet
23
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
another circumstance, perhaps even more relevant.
We find that no question had ever been raised by the
appellant with regard to the presence of a wall in the
objections filed under Section 5A or even in the
responses filed to the notices under Section 9 of the
Act and the only prayer was that the land be
exempted from acquisition (Item no.36). These
omissions become more significant as several other
landowners had claimed compensation for the
superstructures that were existing on the acquired
land. It is also equally significant, as pointed out by
Mr. Saharya, that no question had ever been raised
by the appellant with regard to the existence of a wall
or superstructure in any of the litigations prior to the
present set of Writ Petitions. Mr. Gupta has,
however, referred us to the objections dated 15th
November 1966 showing the existence of a wall.
These objections are, to our mind, meaningless as
they had not been filed in response to the notification
24
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
under Section 4 which had been published in the
year 1959 and were filed after the declaration under
Section 6 had been made and are, therefore, an
obvious after thought. It also bears notice that
despite the claim under this document, no plea with
regard to the existence of a wall had been raised at
any stage till the filing of the present petitions in the
year 1995.
12. Mr. Gupta has, with great emphasis, pointed out that
from the affidavit dated 30th July 1996 sworn by Mr.
G.S.Meena, Under Secretary, Land and Building Department,
it was clear that the appellant continued to remain in
possession on account of the stay of dispossession granted by
the High Court on 15th July 1981 in WP No. 2220/1981 and
the confirmation of the said order on 16th September 1982 and
as such the stand of the appellants that possession had been
taken was not correct. We have, however, already observed
that possession had been taken between 20th and 24th June
1980, and the acquired land thus stood vested in the State
25
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
free from all encumbrances under Section 16 of the Act. It is
also relevant that the afore-referred writ petition was
dismissed meaning thereby that the said order should
automatically be vacated as well. Even assuming for a
moment that the petitioner had re-possessed the acquired
land at some stage would be of no consequence in view of the
provisions of section 16 ibidem. In Narayan Bhagde’s case
(supra) one of the arguments raised by the land owner was
that as per the communication of the Commissioner the land
was still with the land owner and possession thereof had not
been taken. The Bench observed that the letter was based on
a misconception as the land owner had re-entered the
acquired land immediately after its possession had been taken
by the government ignoring the scenario that he stood divested
of the possession, under Section 16 of the Act. This Court
observed as under:
“This was plainly erroneous view, for
the legal position is clear that even if the
appellant entered upon the land and resumed
possession of it the very next moment after the
land was actually taken possession of and
26
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000became vested in the Government, such act on
the part of the appellant did not have the effect of
obliterating the consequences of vesting.”
To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the appellant had
re-entered the land on account of the various interim orders
granted by the courts, or even otherwise, it would have no
effect for two reasons, (1) that the suits/petitions were
ultimately dismissed and (2) that the land once having vested
in the Government by virtue of Section 16 of the Act, re-entry
by the land owner would not obliterate the consequences of
vesting.
12. We must also observe that the petitioner has been able
to frustrate the acquisition and development of the land
right from the 1980 onwards by taking recourse to one
litigation after the other. The record reveals that all the
suits/writ petitions etc. that had been filed had failed.
Undoubtedly, every citizen has a right to utilize all legal
means which are open to him in a bid to vindicate and
protect his rights, but if the court comes to the
27
CA Nos.4849-4850/2000
conclusion that the pleas raised are frivolous and meant
to frustrate and delay an acquisition which is in public
interest, deterrent action is called for. This is precisely
the situation in the present matter. The appeals are,
accordingly, dismissed with costs which are determined
at Rupees two lacs. The respondents, shall, without
further loss of time proceed against the appellant.
…………………………….J.
(Dalveer Bhandari)
……………………………J.
(Harjit Singh Bedi)
New Delhi,
Dated: September 15, 2009