ORDER
AR. Lakshmanan, J.
1. The petitioner is a tax payer. Challenging the assessment made by the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras, she filed an appeal to the Taxation Appeals Committee in S. No. 18/TAC-655/85. The appeal was filed under Rule 14 of Part (V) of Schedule (IV) of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act. According to the petitioner, the rental income as fixed by the department was on the higher side and that the same should be fixed on an amount which would be equivalent to fair rent that may be fixed by any competent court. The Taxation Appeals Committee, however, rejected the appeal on the ground that the same has been preferred beyond 15 days and that there is no provision under the Act to condone the delay. This decision was delivered on 12.3.1986 in the appeal of the petitioner. The petitioner filed an appeal under Rule 154 of Schedule IV of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 in the Court of Small Causes, Madras.
2. The Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes by his order dated 5-1-1988 passed a judgment in M.T.A. No. 14 of 1986 as follows:
“The point:- Admittedly the appeal filed before the Taxation Appeals Committee was out of time. The order of the Commissioner has been received by the appellant on 21-11-85 and she has filed the appeal on 13-12-85. The period fixed for appeal against the order of the Commissioner is 15 days. The learned counsel for the appellant was unable to point out any provision under which this court has powers to condone the delay. There is no provision in the Act to condone the delay, probably because the aggrieved landlords can prefer objections in respect of the subsequent assessments also. Since this court has no power to condone the delay in preferring the appeal before the Taxation Appeals Committee, this appeal has necessarily to be dismissed.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.
…… Sd. N. Palaniappan, Chief Judge, Appellate Authority.”
3. Thus, it is seen that the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, was also under the impression that he has no power to condone the delay in preferring the appeal before the Taxation Appeals Committee. Aggrieved against the said order, the petitioner has preferred the above Civil Revision Petition.
4. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. P.D. Adi Kesavalu that this Court has inherent powers to entertain the application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal within the meaning of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 and hence, the dismissal of the application by the Chief Judge, is erroneous and liable to be interfered with in the interest of justice.
5. This Civil Revision Petition was admitted by Nainar Sundaram, J.(as he then was) on 13-3-1991. During the pendency of the revision and at the time of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner raised few intrinsic questions of law for consideration of this Court for disposing of this revision. According to him, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the provisions contained in Section 5 of the said act shall apply in case of Special or Local law to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such Special or Local law and as the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 is a Special as well as a Local law and as there is nothing in that Act expressly excluding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the appeals preferred before the Taxation Appeals Committee under Rule 14 of the Schedule IV of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, the Taxation Appeals Committee ought to have exercised the power vested in it to excused to delay in proffering the appeal on sufficient cause being shown for that delay.
6. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner cited the decision in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi wherein the Apex Court has considered the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to all the appeals under any enactment unless expressly excluded.
7. The above was a case wherein Special Leave Petitions were filed before the Supreme Court against the condonation of delay in the application for grant of Special Leave under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the acquittal of the petitioners by the trial court, inspite of the mandatory period of limitation provided in sub-section (4) of Section 417 of the Code. The Supreme Court while construing the scope of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 has observed as follows:
“There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provision contained in Section 29, sub-section (2), is concerned, whereas, under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29, Sub-section (2), clause (b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded. Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any Special or Local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, which would include Section 5, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such Special or Local law. Section 29, sub- section (2), clause (b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 specifically excluded the applicability of Section 5, while Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in clear and unambiguous terms, provides for the applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Rani’s case (supra) can, therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitation Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason of Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian limitation Act, 1908. Since under the Limitation Act, Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29, sub-section (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a Special or Local law, if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the Special or Local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5, that it would stand displaced.”
8. Learned counsel also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in C.S.T. v. Madan Lal Das and Sons . That was a case in which an appeal filed by a dealer against the order of the Sales Tax Officer was disposed of by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax. Though, a copy of the appellate order was served on the respondent, he lost the copy and thereafter, he filed an application for obtaining another copy of the order which was delivered to him on 18th August, 1967. Thereupon, he filed a revision on 9-9-1967 beyond the statutory period of one year. The respondent claimed that he was entitled to exclude the time spent for obtaining the appellate order in computing the period of limitation for filing the revision. Learned Judge (revision) accepted this revision. However, the High Court to which the question was referred at the instance of the Sales Tax Officer answered in favour of the respondent relying upon Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Hence, the department preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court.
9. The Supreme no Court while construing the scope of Section 12(2) has observed as follows:
“There can be manner of doubt that the U.P. Sales Tax Act answers to the description of Special or Local law. According to sub- section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, reproduced above, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any Special or Local law, the provisions contained in Section 12(2), inter alia, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such Special or Local Law. There is nothing in U.P. Sales Tax Act expressly excluding the Application of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act for determining the period of limitation prescribed for revision application. The conclusion would, therefore, follow that the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act of 1963 can be relied upon in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision petition under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.”
10. A Division Bench of our High Court consisting of G. Ramanuj am and M. Fakkir Mohammed, JJ., rendered a decision in Rethinasamy v. Komalavalli (1982 (II) MLJ 406), which can also be usefully referred to and the principles stated therein beneficially followed. That was a case of a delay of 28 days in filing the appeal to the Appellate Authority against an order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller under Tamil Nadu Act 18 or 1960. The application for condoning the delay was filed along with the appeal. The Appellate Authority held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not have any application so far as the provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are concerned and in that view dismissed the application. A revision was filed against that order to this Court which was disposed of. The question before the Division Bench was whether the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 23(l)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act as amended by Act 23 of 1973 is a “Court” as described in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The word “Court” has not been defined in present Limitation Act, 1963 or in the old Limitation Act of 1908. The Bench observed that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had restricted its application to certain proceedings, whereas the new Act 26 of 1963 has wider application. It is useful to refer to the following paragraphs of that judgment:
“Here again, we are inclined to hold that the principle of liberal and benevolent construction of the statute is also attracted. The Indian Limitation Act is not applicable to specified courts or Tribunals alone. Moreover, the new Indian Limitation Act was alive to the changed circumstances and causes due to developed litigation and advancement in the litigious field of life. That is evident from the change in the preamble to the new Limitation Act, 1963, which refers to not only suits, but also other proceedings, whereas the old Act contained the word for other purpose. The term other proceedings will, in our opinion, include and embrace proceedings under the Special and the Local laws. If the intention of the Parliament was to restrict the Limitation Act only to the civil Courts, it would have certainly defined the court in the Limitation Act. The Parliament has brought out changes in the preamble and also to Sections 5,12,14,29, etc.
in the result, we hold that for the purpose of Sections 3,5 and 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, the appellate authority is a Court and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an appeal preferred by the petitioner herein before the Appellate Authority, constituted under Section 23(l)(b) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960).”
11. Now it appears that the provisions relating to Taxation Rules contained in Schedule IV has undergone a drastic change. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (3) of Section 347 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, the Governor of Tamil Nadu made certain amendments to Schedule IV to the said Act which was approved by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly as required by Sub-section (5) of the said Section 347 of the Act. G.O. Ms. No. 1178 Municipal Administration and Water supply dated 10-12-1987 was published in the Government Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 10-12-1987. Under the old rule revision of assessment was dealt with under Part V of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act. Under the old Rule 14, an objector, who is dissatisfied with the order passed by the commissioner under sub-rule (3) of Rule 13-A, may within 15 days from the date on which such order was received by him appeal against it to a Committee called the Taxation Appeals Committee consisting of three members, two of whom shall be members of the Council elected by it and the third shall be a person appointed by the State Government either without remuneration or on such remuneration as may be fixed by them and subject to such other conditions as may be prescribed by them. The person so appointed by the government shall be the chairman of the committee. The Taxation Appeals Committee shall have all the powers of the Central Committee under Sub-section (1) of Section 26 and the provisions of Sub-section (2) of that Section shall apply to requisition made by the Taxation Appeals Committee as if it were the Central Committee. No business shall be transacted at any meeting of the Taxation Appeals Committee unless the Chairman and at least one other member of the Committee are present. If the chairman and one other member present are divided in opinion as to the decision to be given on any appeal, the appeal shall be decided at a meeting of the Committee attended by all the three members. All appeals coming up before the Committee at a meeting when all the three members are present, shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members. In the event of disagreement among all the three members, the Chairman shall endeavor to bring about agreement among themselves or between any two of them over a specific proposal, failing which the opinion of the Chairman shall prevail.
12. Under Rule 15(a), an appeal shall lie to the Court of Small Causes against any decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee constituted under Rule 4. The said Rule is extracted below :
“An appeal shall lie to the Small Cause Court against any decision of the (Taxation Appeals Committee constituted under Rule 14) (….) but no such appeal shall be heard, unless
(i) a notice of intention to appeal has been given to the Commissioner within ten days (from the date on which such decision was communicated by registered post), and
(ii) the petition of appeal has been presented within four- teen days (from the date on which such decision was communicated by registered post) (and the tax has been paid within the said period.)
Explanation:- In the case of a tax leviable by half yearly instalments the requirements of clause (ii) as to payment of the tax shall be deemed to have been satisfied if the half-yearly instalement due under the order appealed against has been paid.
(b) The court may for sufficient cause excuse delay in the presentation of an appeal.
(c) The notice of intention to appeal shall state the name, occupation and residence of the appellant or of his attorney or vakil 9, if any, and the grounds of appeal.
(d) The appellant shall not, except with the leave of the court, urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection which has not been set forth in his notice of intention to appeal.
(e) The provisions of Part sII and III of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, relating to appeals shall apply to every appeal preferred under this rule.”
13. As already stated, these two Rules have now undergone a change as under the old rale 14 is now substituted by new Rule 12 in Part V (revision assessment). The said Rule reads as follows:
“12(1) There shall be one or more Taxation Appeal Tribunals (hereinafter referred to in this part as Tribunal) for hearing and disposing of an appeal prepared by any person who is not satisfied with the assessment order made by the commissioner under this Act, other than the orders relating to the transfer duty and the tax on timber.
(2) The Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial Officer not below the rank of a Sub-Judge
(3) The terms and conditions of the Tribunal shall be such as may be determined by the Government.
(4) The salary and other allowances payable to the Tribunal shall be borne from the funds of the Corporation.”
Rule 15 of the new Rule provides for an appeal against a decision of the Tribunal being filed within 30 days from the date of the order of the Principle Judge, City Civil Court, instead of Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes as per the old Rule. Under the new Rule, it is to be noticed that the revisional power of the High Court is taken away.
14. As per Rule 12(2) in Schedule V of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, as substituted by G.O. Ms.1178 dated 10-12- 1987, the Taxation Appellate Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial Officer not below the rank of a Sub-Judge and hence, the Taxation Appellate Tribunal, in my opinion, has to be treated as a Court, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Taxation appeals Committee, apart from having the trappings of Judicial Tribunal, has power to give a decision and a definite judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement and as such, in my view, it falls within the meaning of the term “Court” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. I have therefore, no hesitation in holding that the impugned order of the Appellate Authority, viz., Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes is vitiated since it was held that the Taxation Appeals Committee has no power to excuse the delay in filing the appeal and the Taxation Appeals Committee could have seen that sufficient is shown by the petitioner for the delay caused cause in filing the appeal before the Taxation Appeals Committee. Since the impugned order suffers from patent illegality and material irregularity and for the reasons explained above in this order, I set aside both the orders of the Taxation Appeals Committee and the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, impugned in this revision.
15. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5 of the Act is specifically made applicable to Section 29(2) of the Act, it can be availed for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by Special or Local law, viz., the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, which is not only Special but also a Local law. Therefore, I am of the view that the dismissal of the appeal by the Taxation Appeals Committee on the ground that it is out of time is liable to be set aside in the interests of justice. The Taxation Appeal filed by the petitioner before the former Taxation Appeals Committee, Corporation of Madras in S. No. l8/TAC. 655/85 is now restored and will go before the Taxation Appeal Tribunal now constituted under G.O. Ms. No. 1178 Municipal Administration and Water Supply, dated 10-12-1987, and which is constituted for the following reasons:
The “Taxation Appeals Committee” constituted under Rule 14 Schedule IV to the Madras City Municipal corporation Act, 1919 is a “court” for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for the following reasons :-
“Neither the Limitation Act, 1963 nor the General clauses Act, 1897 defines the term Court. If the intention of the Parliament was to restrict the Limitation Act only to the Civil Courts, it would have certainly defined the term ‘Court’ in the Limitation Act, 1963. The preamble to the Limitation Act, 1963, refers not only ‘Suits’ but also ‘other proceedings.’ The term ‘other proceedings’, will, therefore, include and embrace proceedings under ‘Special’ and ‘Local’ laws as contemplated under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The supreme Court of India in Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narairt has held that in order to constitute a ‘Court’ in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a Judicial Tribunal, power to give a decision or a definite judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. The Taxation Appeals Committee exercises powers under the Madras City Municipal corporation Act, 1919, which is an enactment of the State Legislature. It is invested with the power to decide the controversy between the Corporation and the Assessee and there is in existence a ‘lis’ between them. There is assertion and denial. The dispute involved the rights and obligations of the parties which are decided by the Taxation Appeals Committee in a judicial manner. The parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their contentions and to adduce evidence in proof of it and it also imports a judicial function to decide on the evidence adduced and in accordance with law thereafter declare the rights of the parties in a definite judgment with all the paraphernalia of a court and the power of an ordinary civil court of the land. The procedure and final decisions are akin to that of a court. The decisions of the Taxation Appeals Committee are final and binding upon the parties to the dispute and bear authoritativeness, unless they are set aside or modified by appropriate proceedings in the manner established by law. The indisputable conclusion that will have to be arrived in theses circumstances is that the Taxation Appeals Committee deserves to be regarded as a ‘court’.”
16. The Jurisdiction of the Civil court under Section 9, C.P.C. to entertain suits challenging revision of property tax has been impliedly ousted in view of the provisions in the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 to file appeals before the Taxation Appeals Committee for such relief as reiterated by the Supreme Court of India in Srikant Kashinath Jituri v. Corporation of the City of Belgaum . This necessarily leads to the inference that the Taxation Appeals committee is a substitute for the regular Civil Court, in respect of these matters and must, therefore, be deemed to have been vested with all powers of a Civil court, conferred by several enactments including the Limitation Act. 1963.
17. The applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act 1963, in respect of proceedings under “Special” or “Local” laws should not be construed in strict terms of the relevant Section whose benefits are sought to be derived; but it should be only seen whether the principle of that Section had application.
18. The Taxation Appellate Tribunal shall give opportunity to the petitioner, hear her grievance and pass appropriate and suitable orders in accordance with law. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No Costs.