JUDGMENT
G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. The petitioner, who now stands retired from Govt. Service, has filed this writ petition challenging the order dated 28.1.75 (Ann. 28), order dated 29.11.77 (Ann. 29), order dated 18.10.79 (Ann. 31), and order dated 13.2.81 (Ann. 33).
2. The first order is an order passed by the Director, Department of Ayurved. Govt. of Rajasthan Ajmer removing the petitioner from service on the basis of a Departmental Enquiry held against him in respect of the charge-sheet dt. 30.12.69. The second order is an order dismissing appeal of the petitioner. Third one is a communication regarding dismissal of review petition filed by the petitioner and the fourth order is also a communication regarding dismissal of his review petition.
3. The charge sheet was served on the petitioner in the year 1962 vide notice dt. 1.11.62. It was superserded by another charge-sheet dt, 31.12.69 issued by the Director, Ayurved department. Enquiry proceedings were held in pursuance of charge-sheet dated 31.12.69. The petitioner claims that the enquiry was not held in accordance with the provisions contained under Rule 16 of the C.C.A. Rules 1958. On the basis of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority issued a show-cause-notice dated 8.8.72 to the petitioner and proposed a penalty of removal from service. The petitioner gave reply to show cause notice and thereafter the Disciplinary Authority passed an order dated 28.1.75 and removed the petitioner from service. An appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by order dated 29.1.77 and review petition filed by the petitioner has also been dismissed by the Hon’ble the Governor.
4. Many grounds have been raised in the writ petition challenging the order of punishment and subsequent orders passed on appeal as well as on review petition. One of them is that the order has not been passed in conformity with Rule 16(10) and Rule 16(12) of the CCA. Rules 1958. The other one is that Enquiry officer has not appreciated the evidence properly. The Disciplinary Authority did not apply its mind. Allegation of malafide have also been levelled against respondent No. 4 who held the office of Director Ayurved Department at the relevant time.
5. The Reply to the writ petition has been filed in which the averments made in the writ petition have been controverted.
6. I do not consider it necessary to deal with all the grounds which have been set out in the writ petition because the order dt. 28.1.75 is liable to be quashed only on the ground that the same is wholly laconic in as much as it does not contain any reason for imposition of penalty of removal from service. It is an order which is totally bereft of reasons. The order simply says that after the charges have been found proved against the petitioner a show cause notice for imposing punishment of removal from service was given to the petitioner and his explanation has not been found to be satisfactory. Therefore order of his removal from service has been passed.
7. This order does not meet with the requirements of principles of natural justice. One of the requirements of principles of natural justice is that every quasijudicial order must contain reasons. The courts have gone to the extent of holding that mere recording of reasons is not sufficient. Recording of reasons and communication thereof constitute essential requirements of the principles of natural justice. Rule 14 of the CCA. Rules 1958 itself contains provision that any of the penalties specified therein may be imposed for good and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. It is implicit in the Rule 14 read with Rule 16 and particularly Sub-rules 9 & 10 and 12 of Rule 16 of the CCA. Rules 1958, that the Disciplinary Authority must riot only record reasons, but must communicate the same to the delinquent. Provisions have also been made under Rules 2 of CCA. Rules 1958 for appeal against the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. When the delinghent is aggrieved by an order of punishment he can file an appeal. He can file appeal effectively only when he knows the reasons on the basis of which he has been punished.
8. The requirement of recording of reasons and communication thereof has been considered as a part of the principles of natural justice in several decisions of Supreme Court and of this court. Reference in this connection can appropriately be:
Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala
M.P. Industires Ltd. v. U.O.I.
Bhagat Raja v. U.O.I. ; Travancore Rayon Ltd. V. U.O.I.
Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. ;
State of Gujrat v. P. Raghav ;
Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. U.O.I. ;
Mahendra & Mahendra Ltd. v. U.O.I. and Anr. ;
S.N. Mukerjee v. U.O.I. ;
Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai ;
U.O.I. v. Ram Gopal ;
Ram Khilari v. U.O.I. 1976 R.L.W. 310;
State of Raj. v. Amolak Chand Sanghi 1983 R.L.R. 246;
9. In S.N. Mukenee’s case (supra) after an indepth examination of the subject it has been observed as under:
The object underlying the rules of natural justice” is to “prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action.” As pointed out earlier the requisement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon in the process of decision making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regard as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The exten of their application depends upon the particular statutory frame work where under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of a Judicial or quasi-Judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the adminsitrative authority by recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such as exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.
For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an adminstrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.
10. In Ram Khilari’s Vase (supra) a division bench has emphasized the need of communication of the reasons to the delinquent.
11. In view of the principles laid down in several decisions if the order of punishment passed against petitioner is examined it becomes clear that the Disciplinary Authority has not at all applied its mind and recorded reasons what to say of communication of the same to the petitioner. There is a total non consideration of the defence of the petitioner & his reply to the show cause notice. Thus there is a clear violation of Rule 16(9) & Rule 16(10) read with Rule 16(12) of 1958 Rules. On that ground alone the order of punishment passed against him liable to be quashed.
12. So far as the order of the Appellate Authority is concern it is equally illegal because it has not been passed in accordance with Rule 30(2) of CCA. Rules 1958 as held by this Court in Poonam Chand v. State of Raj. 1980 W.L.N. (U.C.) 311 and Ramchandra v. Union of India . The order passed on review is still more cryptic. In fact it is no order in eye of law because the communications annexures 31 & 33 reveals that the petitioner has only been informed that his review petition has been dismissed by the Governor. The actual order has not even been communicated to the petitioner.
13. As already has been observed by me it is not necessary to deal with the other submissions raised in the writ petition on the merit of findings regarding by the Enquiry Officer in respect of charges levelled against him, because the order of punishment as all other subsequent orders are liable to be quashed for violation of principles of natural justice.
14. Therefore the writ petition is allowed. The order dt. 28.1.75, 29.11.77 and 12.10.79 are quashed. However the respondents will be free to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law. Although the petitioner has retired in 1981. In view of the fact that the case has been decided now, the respondents shall give him benefits to which he became entitled as a result of quashing of impugned orders. It is however made clear that for the purpose of passing fresh order inquiry proceedings must be deemed to be pending on the date of retirement and provisions of Rule 170 of Rajasthan Service Rules 1951 are available to the respondents. Parties are left to bear their own costs.